People v. Graham CA2/1

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Filed 5/24/24 P. v. Graham CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B331633

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA046159)
v.

BORIS GEORGE GRAHAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Martin Larry Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Penal Code section 1172.62 authorizes a trial court to
resentence a defendant who was convicted under a theory of
felony murder if the prosecution fails to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that under current law, the defendant was a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Basler (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 46, 50–51, 54–56 & fn. 2 (Basler).) Here, the trial
court found the prosecution discharged that burden. Because
defendant Boris George Graham fails to show that substantial
evidence does not support the order denying his petition, we
affirm.

A. Procedural Background3
We summarize only those portions of the procedural history
relevant to this appeal. In our Discussion, post, we describe
additional facts relevant to resolving the issues before us.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . . ” (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Prior to June 30, 2022, section 1172.6 was codified in
section 1170.95. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §§ 10, 47 [Assem. Bill
No. 200, which renumbered § 1170.95 as § 1172.6, and provided
that the statute took effect immediately on June 30, 2022]; People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3 [noting that Assem.
Bill No. 200 renumbered former § 1170.95 to § 1172.6 without
any substantive change].) For the sake of clarity and consistency,
we refer to the statute as section 1172.6.
3 In describing the procedural history and the evidence
considered by the trial court in ruling on Graham’s petition for

2
The People filed an information charging Graham with
murder, in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1);
kidnapping to commit robbery, in violation of section 209,
subdivision (b)(1) (count 2); kidnapping to commit carjacking, in
violation of section 209.5, subdivision (a) (count 3); first degree
robbery, in violation of section 211 (count 4); first degree
burglary, in violation of section 459 (count 5); carjacking in
violation of section 215, subdivision (a) (count 6); and evading an
officer causing death, in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3
(count 7). Pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), the
People averred as special circumstances that Graham committed
the murder while he was engaged in the commission of robbery,
carjacking, kidnapping, and burglary. Additionally, pursuant to
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), the People alleged that in the

resentencing, we rely in part on admissions made by the parties
in their appellate briefing, and on assertions made by the
Attorney General that Graham does not contest in his reply brief.
(See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674
[“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently
treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling
in the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”]; Reygoza v. Superior Court
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [criminal case in which
the Court of Appeal assumed that an assertion made by
respondent was correct because “defendant did not dispute
respondent’s claim in his reply”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of
Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [concluding that the
appellants made an implicit concession by “failing to respond in
their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”].)

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commission of the charged offenses, a principal was armed with a
firearm.
At Graham’s jury trial, there was evidence that in
February 1999, Graham and Kirell Taylor brought Christopher
Rawlings into his home in handcuffs and took several valuable
belongings; after Rawlings’s wife saw the two robbers push
Rawlings down in the garage, she quietly retreated into the
home, telephoned the police, gathered her two small children,
and hid on the rooftop of the home with the children; Graham
and Taylor put Rawlings into the trunk of his automobile; Taylor
sat in the driver’s seat and Graham sat in the front passenger
seat; Taylor thereafter drove at high speeds to evade the police
while Rawlings was still in the trunk of the automobile; the
vehicle crashed at the conclusion of the police chase, causing
Rawlings to be ejected from the trunk; Rawlings later died from
blunt force trauma to his head; and Taylor and Graham fled the
scene of the crash.4
The jury found Graham guilty on all seven counts,
concluded the murder was in the first degree, and found true the
principal armed with a firearm and special circumstance
allegations. The trial court sentenced Graham to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, doubled pursuant
to the “Three Strikes” law, on count 1, plus a consecutive term of
one year in prison for the firearm enhancement. The court
imposed but stayed sentences on the remaining counts pursuant

4 Taylor was separately tried by a jury and convicted of
Rawlings’s murder, kidnapping for robbery, kidnapping for
carjacking, two counts of second degree robbery, first degree
burglary, two counts of carjacking, and evading an officer causing
death.

4
to section 654. In August 2009, we issued an unpublished
opinion affirming the judgment.
In January 2022, counsel filed a section 1172.6
resentencing petition on Graham’s behalf. The trial court later
concluded Graham had made a prima facie showing under the
statute. At the evidentiary hearing held on June 8, 2023, the
court admitted the trial record filed in Graham’s prior appeal,
and Graham testified in support of his petition. The court found
Graham was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life and denied the petition. Graham
timely appealed the order denying his resentencing petition.

B. Discussion

1. Standard of Review
In his opening brief, Graham acknowledges that “[f]actual
determinations made below are entitled to great weight when
supported by the record,” but cites an appellate decision
regarding a habeas corpus petition for the proposition that “if the
difference of opinion with the lower court is not based on the
credibility of live testimony, such deference is inappropriate.”
(Citing In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1223.)
The Attorney General counters that the deferential
substantial evidence standard governs our review of the trial
court’s finding that Graham was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life, regardless of the extent
to which the court relied upon live witness testimony. Graham
does not respond to this argument in his reply brief. Instead,
Graham maintains that “there is no substantial evidence that
[he] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.)

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The Attorney General has identified the correct appellate
standard. “[A] trial court’s decision denying a petition under
section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing is predominantly
a question of fact” that is reviewed for “substantial evidence.”
(See People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 314
(Underwood).) “Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) “ ‘If such substantial evidence be found, it
is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence,
or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a
contrary conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ortiz (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1363, italics omitted.) Under the
substantial evidence standard, “we must begin with the
presumption that the evidence . . . was sufficient” to support the
trial court’s findings, “and the defendant bears the burden of
convincing us otherwise.” (See People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573–1574 (Sanghera).)
Our sister Courts of Appeal “have uniformly rejected” the
argument that in reviewing the denial of a section 1172.6 petition
following an evidentiary hearing, “we need not defer to the trial
court’s factual findings” that “are based on a cold record, [instead
of] live testimony and associated credibility determinations.”
(See Underwood, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 313–314 [collecting
cases].) We follow our colleagues’ approach. (See The MEGA Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522,
1529 [“We, of course, are not bound by the decision of a sister

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Court of Appeal. [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]e respect stare decisis,
however, which serves the important goals of stability in the law
and predictability of decision. Thus, we ordinarily follow the
decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree.’ ”].)

2. Graham Forfeited His Challenge to the Trial Court’s
Finding That He Was a Major Participant
In Graham’s opening brief, he argues, “[T]he prosecution
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Graham] acted
with reckless indifference to human life . . . .” Apart from a
heading in which Graham asserts “the prosecution failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Graham] was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life”
(boldface & capitalization omitted, italics added), Graham
does not argue in his opening brief that the People failed to show
he was a major participant.
In his reply brief, Graham states, “[Graham] has never
argued that he was not a major participant in a robbery but only
that he did not act with reckless indifference to life. [Graham]
was not a major participant in the kidnap[p]ing or car jacking,
which appeared to be unplanned, or at least unknown to
[Graham] until it happened and [Graham], certainly, could not
have foreseen the car chase and ultimate crash.” Graham
does not support this new argument with any citation to the
record or legal authority.
Given Graham’s briefing, we conclude Graham has
forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s finding that he was a
major participant, which is an element of first degree felony
murder. (See Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 54, fn. 2
[discussing the findings required for first degree felony murder];
People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 (Stanley) [“ ‘[E]very

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brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities
on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point,
the court may . . . pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’
[Citations.] This principle is especially true when an appellant
makes a general assertion, unsupported by specific argument,
regarding insufficiency of evidence.”]; People v. Flint (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 983, 1006, fn. 17 (Flint) [noting that an appellate
court may “ ‘decline to consider any factual assertion
unsupported by record citation at the point where it is
asserted[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a]n appellate court “will not develop the
appellants’ arguments for them” ’ ”]; People v. Taylor (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 628, 642–643 (Taylor) [concluding that a defendant
had forfeited a contention by raising it for the first time in a reply
brief].)

3. Graham Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Court Erred
In Finding He Acted With Reckless Indifference to
Human Life
In concluding Graham acted with reckless indifference to
human life, the trial court found that Graham “knew that guns
were involved and the car was driving in excess of 100 miles an
hour”; Graham “possessed and used a firearm” during the
incident; and one could infer “there were two guns involved” from
Rawlings’s wife’s trial testimony that she saw two perpetrators
standing over her husband. The court further indicated that
Graham was near the victim when the killing occurred, and
remarked that Graham “did have the opportunity to stop the
killing, to slow down . . . Taylor, and . . . to assist [Rawlings] or at
least check in on the status or condition of . . . the victim . . . .”
The court also found the crime lasted “a relatively long period of
time . . . consider[ing] the arrival at the house, waiting for . . .

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Rawlings to arrive home, . . . going through the house, [a] certain
degree of ransacking, placing . . . Rawlings in the trunk, and the
time of the pursuit.” The court acknowledged the record did not
establish that Graham was aware that Taylor was “likely to kill.”
Lastly, the court indicated it did not find credible Graham’s
testimony that “he told . . . Taylor to slow down,” and the court
opined that Graham could have prevented Rawlings’s death by
“wrestling the steering wheel from . . . Taylor” or applying the
brake of the vehicle by “forcing [Graham’s] foot across the floor
boards . . . .” The court thus followed the proper legal framework
for its analysis.5
On appeal, Graham argues the trial court erred in rejecting
his testimony that only one gun was involved in the robbery.
Graham also asserts, “The court inexplicably credited not what
the witnesses said at [Graham’s] trial but prior statements . . .
attributed to the witnesses [that were] introduce[d] for
impeachment.” Next, Graham maintains that “Taylor was the
planner of the event” and Graham “had no way of knowing . . .
that the incident would turn into a carjacking/[]kidnapping in
which the robbery victim was accidentally killed.” Additionally,

5 (See People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618–623
(Clark) [holding that in determining whether a defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life, a court may consider
(1) the defendant’s “knowledge of weapons, and [the] use and
number of weapons” involved in the offenses; (2) the defendant’s
“physical presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the
crime and/or aid the victim”; (3) “whether a murder came at the
end of a prolonged period of restraint of the victim[ ] by [the]
defendant”; (4) the “defendant’s knowledge of [his or her] cohort’s
likelihood of killing”; and (5) the “defendant’s efforts to minimize
the risks of . . . violence,” italics & capitalization omitted].)

9
Graham contends the trial court’s suggestion that he “could have
prevented the death by making Taylor slow down or simply
grabbed the wheel of a car traveling 100 mph is not reasonable,
as it would have been likely to ensure not prevent death.” “[A]s
for helping Rawlings,” Graham contends (a) “the police were
chasing them and would surely provide more competent
assistance than [Graham] could have provided,” and (b) “the
police were at the scene within seconds” of the crash. As
explained below, Graham fails to establish error under the
deferential substantial evidence standard of review.6
Graham acknowledges the People introduced evidence at
trial that Taylor had told police: (a) Taylor brought two guns to
the robbery; (b) after Taylor took certain items of Rawlings’s
property, Graham put Rawlings into the trunk of the vehicle; and
(c) following the crash, Taylor and Graham fled the scene.
Graham also acknowledges there was evidence he had admitted
to two witnesses that after he and Taylor committed a robbery,
Graham and Taylor put the robbery victim into the trunk of a
vehicle that later crashed during a police chase. Graham further
acknowledges his testimony at the evidentiary hearing
indicating: (a) Graham participated in the robbery with Taylor;
(b) Graham held a pistol during a brief period while Taylor
handcuffed Rawlings; (c) after Taylor heard a call on his police
scanner, Taylor and Graham got into Rawlings’s car, and Taylor
drove the vehicle at a high speed in an attempt to evade the
police; (d) Graham knew Rawlings had been forced into the trunk

6 We decline to address Graham’s argument that his
actions were not the proximate cause of Rawlings’s death because
Graham raises that contention for the first time in his reply brief.
(Taylor, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 642–643.)

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of the vehicle prior to the police chase; and (e) Graham fled the
scene of the crash without checking on Rawlings’s condition.
Notwithstanding Graham’s arguments to the contrary, the
trial court could have inferred from this evidence that Graham
disregarded a grave risk that the high-speed police chase would
result in Rawlings’s death.7 (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 621 [indicating that a defendant acts with reckless indifference
to human life if he or she “disregard[s] a ‘grave risk of death’ ”].)
Furthermore, Graham’s argument that the court erred in relying
on “prior statements . . . attributed to the witnesses introduce[d]
for impeachment” fails because he offers no analysis or citation to
authority to support it. (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793; see
also People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 583 [observing that
under certain circumstances, “[a]n out-of-court statement by a
witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is
admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted”].)
Regardless of whether Graham ought to have applied the
brake of the automobile or grabbed the steering wheel from

7 In observing that the robbery was “still in progress” when
Graham and Taylor fled from the police, the trial court remarked
“both kidnapping and carjacking based on the natural and
probable consequences theory is totally reasonable if the only
plan was to rob . . . Rawlings and not kidnap him or carjack him.”
Graham asserts this remark demonstrates that the court
improperly relied on the natural and probable consequences
theory. We do not address this contention because we have
already concluded that substantial evidence established Graham
assisted Taylor in forcing Rawlings into the trunk just before the
two robbers used the vehicle to flee from the police. (See People
v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123 [“ ‘[I]f the [trial court’s]
ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ”].)

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Taylor during the police chase, the trial court reasonably
concluded that Graham failed to undertake any measures to
prevent Rawlings’s death. This is because the court was entitled
to disregard Graham’s testimony that he told Taylor to slow
down. (See Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572
[“ ‘ “ ‘[We do] not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s
credibility for that of the fact finder.’ ” ’ ”].)
Lastly, we reject Graham’s claim that it was unnecessary
for him to assist Rawlings because “the police were at the scene
within seconds” of the crash. Graham fails to support this
contention with any citation to the record. (Flint, supra,
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006, fn. 17.) In fact, Graham represents in
his briefing he had testified that in fleeing from the vehicle crash,
“[h]is focus was on getting away” and he “did not think about
Rawlings . . . .” Graham’s own statements demonstrating that he
had no interest in offering aid to Rawlings thus also support the
trial court’s finding Graham acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [noting that
“appellate courts have considered relevant a defendant’s failure
to provide aid while present at the scene”].) Indeed, Graham’s
indifference to Rawlings’s life is underscored by evidence adduced
at trial that the engine of the vehicle caught fire after crashing,
and that Rawlings was still alive, albeit nonresponsive, for a
short time after the collision.
In sum, Graham fails to establish that substantial evidence
does not support the trial court’s finding he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant Boris
George Graham’s petition for resentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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