CourtListener 9507144•People v. Leyva CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/24/24 P. v. Leyva CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086071
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F18906048)
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY LEYVA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Arlan L.
Harrell, Judge.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Kari Mueller, Amanda
Cary and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Michael Anthony Leyva killed Miguel Arnufo Garcia by a knife stab to
the heart during a fight. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with a true
finding on a deadly weapon enhancement. Defendant contends: (1) the trial court
prejudicially erred by omitting the lack of lawful justification element and the definition
of lawful homicide when it preinstructed the jury on murder; (2) the court abused its
discretion in declining defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strike pursuant to
Romero;1 and (3) the court violated defendant’s right to due process by imposing fees and
a fine without a determination of defendant’s present ability to pay pursuant to Dueñas.2
The People respond that the trial court did not commit instructional error because
the instructions, when viewed in totality, completely and correctly instructed the jury on
the elements of murder, justifiable homicide, and self-defense. The People further
contend prior strikes may not be dismissed under Penal Code section 1385,
subdivision (c),3 because the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)) is an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement and, thus, the
court correctly denied defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strike even if its reasoning
for doing so was incorrect. Lastly, the People argue defendant forfeited his Dueñas claim
by failing to request a hearing on his ability to pay and the imposition of fees and the fine
was appropriate.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2019, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a deadly weapon
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information also alleged defendant had
1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
2 People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2.
suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, which
also qualified as serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).4
On November 17, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and
found true the weapon enhancement allegation.
On February 23, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life,
consisting of 25 years to life for the sole count doubled for one prior strike. The court
dismissed defendant’s other prior strike and struck the sentence for the deadly weapon
enhancement. The court ordered defendant to pay $1,070 in fees and a restitution fine.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
At about 2:35 p.m. on August 19, 2018, defendant drove a white truck to drop off
his girlfriend, Irene,5 at a cell phone store in a strip mall at Belmont and Sixth Street in
Fresno. Defendant and Irene had been smoking methamphetamine the whole week prior
and defendant had continued to smoke through the previous night. Defendant dropped
off Irene in front of the cell phone store and let her know he was going to use the
bathroom. Defendant drove away in the truck.
Irene went into the cell phone store and tried to find the employee she had been
told could fix her broken phone, but the employee was not at the store. Irene stood
around the store waiting because she did not see the truck outside. She felt
uncomfortable because two men in the store were staring at her. One of the men was
African-American and the other man was of an indeterminate ethnicity.6
4 The trial was bifurcated on defendant’s two prior strike convictions at defendant’s
request. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior convictions and conditionally
admitted his prior strikes before jury deliberations.
5 Defendant and Irene subsequently married in November 2018.
6 The other man was described as Hispanic, Indian or Pakistani.
3.
Irene asked a customer service employee if she could leave her number for the
employee who could fix her phone. Irene still did not see the truck, so she went out of
the store. Irene walked to Sixth Street and saw the back of the truck. Irene ran to the
truck and grabbed defendant’s phone from the middle console to get his number. Irene
wrote down defendant’s number and went back into the cell phone store. Irene gave the
paper with her number to the customer service employee and told her to have the “guy”
call her.
When Irene was back in the store, the two men who had been staring at her were
outside the store talking to each other. As Irene walked out of the store, the African-
American man tried to talk to her. He was telling Irene about a fire across the street.
Irene ignored him. The two men then walked away from the cell phone store across the
parking lot.
At that point, Miguel Arnufo Garcia walked up to Irene while she was on the
sidewalk in front of the cell phone store. Garcia was staggering and slurring. Irene did
not want defendant to see her talking to Garcia because defendant was “very jealous” and
gets upset when she talks to other men. Garcia was looking at Irene in a lewd manner
and said something like, “‘Hey, mama, what you working with?’” Irene believed he was
trying to pick her up. Garcia wanted Irene to go with him to the alley in the back of the
store. Irene said to Garcia something like “‘F*** off’” or “‘F*** you’” and then jumped
through the bushes. She saw defendant’s truck coming slow so she jumped into the
truck’s passenger side.
Irene told defendant, “‘Let’s go,’” when she got in the truck. Defendant asked
Irene, “‘Who was that?’” She responded, “‘I don’t know.’” Defendant said, “‘Are you
sure it wasn’t one of your little boyfriends?’” Irene said, “‘No. Let’s go.’”
Defendant rolled down the passenger side window and yelled to Garcia, “‘Why
are you being disrespectful to my girl?’” Defendant and Garcia exchanged words. Irene
could not hear what Garcia was saying while the two argued. Irene tried to roll up the
4.
passenger side window, but defendant kept the window down with the driver’s side
button. Garcia threw his hands up in a boxing motion “like he wanted to fight,” but did
not approach the truck.
Defendant turned off the truck, got out and walked towards Garcia. Defendant
was angry and walked with his shoulders and chest out “like he was going to start
fighting.” Defendant had a pocketknife with a three-inch blade in his dominant left hand.
Garcia dropped something from his hand and came towards defendant. Defendant and
Garcia met at a dirt area. The two talked and looked “like they were about to start
fighting.”
Irene remained in the truck and looked around for her phone. She put her head
back and closed her eyes for a split second. While Irene was not looking, defendant did a
“prison stab” 7 on Garcia straight to his heart. Defendant plunged the knife to just before
the hilt or at the hilt. When Irene looked back at defendant and Garcia, defendant was on
his stomach on the ground. She thought defendant got hit and landed on the ground when
she saw him down and missing a shoe. Garcia was standing over defendant about two
feet away. Garcia touched his chest and rubbed his two fingers together. He lifted his
shirt up and tried to pull a knife from his waist, but the knife got stuck on Garcia’s pants.
Irene yelled at defendant to get up and fight back when she saw Garcia trying to pull the
knife. Defendant got up and walked back to the truck.
Garcia ran towards the truck. Defendant got into the driver’s seat and tried to start
the truck. His hand was shaking, and he dropped the keys. Garcia used his knife to pop
the truck’s front and back tires on the passenger side.
The truck’s tires started to deflate as defendant drove off. Irene yelled at
defendant to take her to a friend’s tire shop across the street. As they drove, defendant
7 A “prison stab” reportedly refers to a quick in and out stab to the kidneys or a main
artery.
5.
pulled the knife out of his left pocket, handed it to Irene and told her to check it for blood.
Defendant looked shocked because Garcia did not fall right away after defendant stabbed
him. Defendant started to scream and said he was going to go back to prison for life.
Defendant said he needed to know how deep the knife went in. Irene opened the knife
and saw a little blood on it.
When Irene and defendant arrived at the tire shop, Irene got out of the truck and
told an employee she needed her tires changed. Irene took the knife and threw it over a
fence behind the tire shop.8 The shop changed the truck’s two passenger side tires.
At some point after defendant and Irene drove away, people in the cell phone store
and a neighboring business saw Garcia lying face down on the sidewalk outside the cell
phone store. There was blood on the ground and coming from Garcia. Garcia was
gurgling and asking for help. Employees from the nearby businesses called 911.
Fresno Police Department (FPD) officers and emergency medical services (EMS)
were dispatched to the scene. Garcia was unresponsive and had no pulse when the police
arrived. The police and EMS attempted lifesaving measures to no avail. An autopsy
determined Garcia’s cause of death was penetration of the heart due to a single stab
wound in the chest.9
Defendant and Irene returned to their house in the truck later that day. Defendant
dumped the clothes he was wearing on the way back to the house.
A few days after the stabbing, Irene dropped defendant off at her former stepdad’s
house in Oxnard, where defendant stayed a few days. Irene learned defendant wanted to
turn himself in and picked him up in Valencia. Irene and defendant drove to Reno and
stayed in a hotel for one night. While they were in Reno, defendant asked Irene who she
8 The neighboring resident later found the knife in their backyard and threw it away.
FPD’s search of Irene’s and defendant’s house unearthed the knife’s original packaging.
9 The toxicology report of Garcia showed he had a blood alcohol level of 0.12 percent.
6.
had been text-messaging. When Irene confirmed she had been text-messaging someone,
defendant jumped up and started choking Irene until she could not breathe. Defendant
threatened to kill them both.
Defendant and Irene returned to Fresno the next day. On September 1, 2018, Irene
told FPD that defendant wanted to turn himself in and directed them to a motel where
defendant was staying. FPD officers went to the identified motel, where defendant exited
his room with his hands up and was arrested without incident.
Irene gave various false versions of events to protect defendant. Irene decided she
wanted to “do what’s right” and “tell the truth.” She asserted the story she told during her
trial testimony was true. Defendant repeatedly attempted to persuade Irene not to testify
during pendency of the case.
II. Defense Evidence
Defendant’s long-time friend, Robert, worked with defendant in 2018 for an
employer who hauls mail for the United States Postal Service. Defendant worked as a
driver. The employer conducted random drug testing of employees. Robert never saw
defendant act in a way that made Robert think he was under the influence of
methamphetamine while working. Robert was aware defendant used methamphetamine
in the past.
In November 2020, Garcia’s older sister received a message through social media
purportedly from Irene. The message said defendant was “‘getting out’” and to let the
family know. The message also said, “‘[c]all me’” and provided a number. Irene and
defendant continued to communicate with each other by phone and letters while the case
was pending.
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Instructions
Defendant contends the trial court erred by omitting the lack of lawful justification
element when it preinstructed the jury on the elements of murder. Defendant further
7.
argues the court should have instructed the jury on lawful and unlawful homicide when
the court elected to preinstruct the jury on the definition of homicide. While defendant
acknowledges the court correctly and completely instructed the jury after the close of
evidence, defendant alleges the court’s preinstructions improperly and unfairly biased the
jury by allowing jurors to sit through the entire trial with a misunderstanding of the
elements of murder. Defendant avers the court’s error in omitting the lack of justification
element in its preinstructions violated his rights to due process and a fair trial and is
prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 because this was a “close”
self-defense case.
A. Additional Background
At the beginning of trial and prior to opening statements, the trial court discussed
its intended pre-evidence instructions with the prosecutor and defense counsel. Defense
counsel requested the court include CALCRIM No. 505.10 The court was not inclined to
give CALCRIM No. 505 “at this point” and stated it would give this instruction as well
as other instructions at the close of evidence. Defense counsel then requested the court
give CALCRIM No. 500 regarding lawful or unlawful homicide.11 The court also
declined this request and stated these are instructions the court gives “post evidence.”
Defense counsel “wanted to make a record that the Defense is requesting specifically
because this case and the defenses in this case are geared entirely towards self-defense
and justified—that the killing here was not unlawful, you know, the jury should be
instructed about that as well as the other principles of homicide.” To which the court
10 CALCRIM No. 505 provides form instructions on justifiable homicide and self-defense.
11 CALCRIM No. 500 provides the following instruction in brackets: “A homicide can be
lawful or unlawful. If a person kills with a legally valid excuse or justification, the killing is
lawful and he or she has not committed a crime. If there is no legally valid excuse or
justification, the killing is unlawful and, depending on the circumstances, the person is guilty of
either murder or manslaughter. You must decide whether the killing in this case was unlawful
and, if so, what specific crime was committed. I will now instruct you in more detail on what is
a legally permissible excuse or justification for homicide.”
8.
responded, “to be abundantly clear, the jurors will be fully instructed on the law of
homicide as [it] applies based upon the evidence presented during the course of the trial.”
In response, defense counsel argued: “[I]f the Court is declining the Defense’s request
for theadditional instructions, the Defense would ask that the Courtnot give any of the
[CALCRIM No.] 500 series instructions regarding any of the elements of the crime to be
charged, or the [CALCRIM No.] 3145 instruction regarding the elements of personal use
of a weapon. If we’re going to instruct on the elements, then let’s instruct on them all at
once.And if we’re going to instruct on part of the elements, then I’d ask that we instruct
on the self-defense element.” The court responded: “What the Court would be
instructing on are the allegations in the Information that the People are required to prove
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. So the Court would be giving the instructions as
they have been presented to counsel and asthe Court just stated a moment ago.”12
During the pre-trial instructions and before opening statements, the trial court said
to the jury in relevant part:
“Now [the Court is] going to give you what [the Court] refer[s] to
aspre-evidence instructions. These are the very basic instructions and
advise you of the elements that the People must meet to prove the
allegations. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, [the court] will give
you another set of instructions which will be much more comprehensive,
which will reflect the evidence that was presented during the course of the
trial, because only then will [the court] know and counsel will know what
evidence was actually presented and the Court will then be in a position to
give you the instructions that apply to the evidence that you have actually
received. [¶] … [¶]
“After you have heard all the evidence and before the attorneys give
their final arguments, [the court] will instruct you on the law that applies to
the case. [¶] … [¶]
12 On the sole count, the information alleged: “On or about August 19, 2018, in the above
named judicial district, the crime of MURDER, in violation of … Section 187[, subdivision ](a),
a Felony, was committed by [defendant], who did unlawfully, and with malice aforethought
murder Miguel Arnurfo Garcia, a human being.”
9.
“Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Do not make up your
mind about the verdict or any issue until after you have discussed the case
with other jurors during deliberations.…”
The court preinstructed the jury on the murder charge using parts of CALCRIM Nos. 500
and 520:
“Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. Murder is a
type of homicide. The defendant is charged with murder. [¶] The
defendant is charged in Count One with murder, in violation of …
Section 187. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] One, the defendant committed an act that caused the
death of another person; [¶] And two, when the defendant acted, he had a
state of mind called malice aforethought.”
After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury using CALCRIM
No. 500 in pertinent part: “A homicide can be lawful or unlawful. If a person kills with a
legally valid excuse or justification, the killing islawful and he or she has not committed a
crime. If there isno legally valid excuse or justification, the killing is unlawful and,
depending on the circumstances, the person is guilty of either murder or manslaughter.
You must decide whether the killing in this case was unlawful, and if so, what specific
crime was committed.” The court proceeded to instruct the jury on “what is a legally
permissible excuse or justification for a homicide,” including on self-defense (CALCRIM
No. 505). The court also instructed the jury on murder (CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521 and
522), imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571), and heat of passion (CALCRIM
No. 570). The jury was instructed if the court “repeat[s] any instruction or idea, do not
conclude that it is more important than any other instruction or idea just because [the
court] repeated it.” The court provided the jury with a written copy of the instructions.
B. Applicable Legal Principles
“In criminal cases, even absent a request, a trial court is obligated to instruct the
jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.”
(People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 179.) “[N]o particular form is required as long
as the instructions are complete and correctly state the law. [Citation.] In considering a
10.
claim of instructional error we must first ascertain what the relevant law provides .…
The test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the
instruction in a manner that violated the defendant’s rights.” (People v. Andrade (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) We make this determination by considering “the entire charge
of the court, not from considering only parts of an instruction or one particular
instruction.” (People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 13 (Smith); accord, People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202.)
“All criminal defendants have the right to ‘a jury determination that the defendant
is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824.) “The trial court has a sua sponte
duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense.” (Ibid.)
“California defines the crime of murder as the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought.” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243; see § 187,
subd. (a).) “Under California law, the elements of murder—that the prosecution, by
definition, is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt—are as follows: (1) the
defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person; (2) when the
defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought; and (3) he killed
without lawful excuse or justification.” (People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 829,
843.)
C. Standard of Review
Defendant argues the trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury were
incorrect and inadequate because the court omitted the lack of justification element of
murder. Defendant further argues this purported instructional error is subject to de novo
review. The People acknowledge whether an instruction correctly states the applicable
law is subject to de novo review, but argue defendant is effectively challenging the timing
of the court’s instruction. Because defendant concedes the court correctly instructed the
jury on the lack of justification element at the close of evidence, the People argue the
11.
alleged error must be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The People have the better
argument.
A challenge to whether an instruction correctly states the law is reviewed de novo.
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) Here, as defendant concedes, “the trial
court correctly instructed the jury on lack of justification at the conclusion of the
evidence.” This is also not a case where an element of the offense was omitted entirely
from the jury’s instructions because the jury was fully instructed on all the elements of
murder and lawful justification of a homicide before deliberations. (Cf. People v. Merritt,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 824 [the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of
robbery was constitutional error].) “The absence of an essential element from one
instruction may be cured by another instruction or the instructions taken as a whole.”
(Smith, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 13; accord, People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th
1216, 1248.) Because the court correctly and completely instructed the jury considering
the instructions as a whole and defendant simply challenges the timing of certain
instructions, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. (Smith, supra, at p. 16; People v.
Chung (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 755, 758–760 (Chung).) “Under this standard, a trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11
Cal.5th 259, 304.)
D. Analysis
Trial courts have wide discretion on when to instruct the jury. (Smith, supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at p. 14; People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 400 [“when to instruct
a jury is a matter within the trial court’s discretion”]; §§ 1093, 1094.) Only certain
preinstructions must statutorily be provided to the jury. (Smith, supra, at p. 15; § 1122.)
Specifically, “the court shall instruct the jury generally concerning its basic functions,
duties, and conduct.” (§ 1122, subd. (a).) These preinstructions “shall” also include
12.
“various matters, including admonitions that the jurors shall not discuss the case, read
media accounts, conduct their own investigations, or receive any payment for supplying
information regarding the trial. [Citation.] Such admonishments are directed at
precluding the jurors from being exposed to and influenced by outside sources or
extrinsic evidence during the trial as well as from deciding the case before it is submitted
to them. To have any real effect, these instructions must be given before the evidence is
presented at trial.” (Smith, supra, at p. 15; see § 1122, subd. (a).)
Section 1093 outlines the general order in which a criminal trial “shall proceed …
unless otherwise directed by the court .…” The order of proceedings “may be departed
from” when required by “the state of the pleadings” or “for good reasons, and in the
sound discretion of the court .…” (§ 1094.) “At the beginning of the trial or from time to
time during the trial, and without any request from either party, the trial judge may give
the jury such instructions on the law applicable to the case as the judge may deem
necessary for their guidance on hearing the case.…” (§ 1093, subd. (f).) After the
conclusion of evidence and any closing arguments, “The judge may then charge the jury,
and shall do so on any points of law pertinent to the issue .…” (Ibid.) The court may
provide the jury with a written copy of the instructions and must do so upon the jury’s
request. (Ibid.)
This court long ago gleaned from sections 1093 and 1094 that “when to instruct a
jury is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge; he [or she] may instruct at
any time during the trial.” (People v. Valenzuela (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 218, 221.)
“Although discretionary, the practice of preinstructing a jury on general principles of law
before opening statements has long been recognized by California appellate courts.”
(Smith, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) The “purpose of preinstructing jurors is not to
avoid the necessity of instructing at the close of argument; rather, it is to give them some
advance understanding of the applicable principles of law so that they will not receive the
evidence and arguments in a vacuum.” (Valenzuela, supra, at p. 222.) “Moreover,
13.
‘[c]alling the attention of the jury at the commencement of the trial, to legal problems to
be met, if fairly done, may be of great value in enabling the jury to understand the
purpose and thus properly evaluate various bits of the evidence.’” (Smith, supra, at
p. 15.) “[L]ike other instructional error claims, those challenging the timing of
instructions as an abuse of discretion or a violation of due process are determined based
on a review of the instructions as a whole in light of the entire record.” (Id. at p. 16.)
Defendant argues the trial court’s preinstructions were not “‘fairly done.’”
Defendant first faults the court for providing solely two elements of murder and argues
the court should have included the third element from the form instructions in CALCRIM
No. 520.13 CALCRIM No. 520 generally lays out the elements of first degree or second
degree murder with malice aforethought.14 The third element of the form CALCRIM
No. 520 instructions for murder is: “(He/She) killed without lawful (excuse/[or]
justification).]” The notes for the form instruction state “˂Give element 3 when
instructing on justifiable or excusable homicide.˃” (Judicial Council of Cal., Criminal
Jury Instns. (2022) p. 245.) Jury instructions in “[i]talicized notes between angle brackets
in the language of the instruction itself signal important issues or choices.” (Id. at
p. xxv.) The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 520 offer in relevant part: “The court has a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the first two elements of the crime. If there is sufficient
13 While defendant cites CALCRIM No. 505, the instructions for self-defense, defendant’s
argument focuses on the elements of murder as provided in CALCRIM No. 520. We presume
the cite to CALCRIM No. 505 was in error.
14 “The California jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council are the official
instructions for use in the state of California.…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).) This
includes the CALCRIM instructions. (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 294, disapproved
on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53–54, fn. 19.) California
Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(f) provides: “Use of the Judicial Council instructions is strongly
encouraged. If the latest edition of the jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council
contains an instruction applicable to a case and the trial judge determines that the jury should be
instructed on the subject, it is recommended that the judge use the Judicial Council instruction
unless the judge finds that a different instruction would more accurately state the law and be
understood by jurors.…”
14.
evidence of excuse or justification, the court has a sua sponte duty to include the third,
bracketed element in the instruction.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Criminal Jury Instns.
(2022) at p. 247.) The Bench Notes then cite People v. Frye (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148,
1155–1156 (Frye).
The Frye court held that “in a homicide case, the word ‘unlawful’ is a term of art
[because i]t connotes a homicide with the absence of factors of excuse or justification.”
(Frye, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) Excuse is “best exemplified by accident or
misfortune” (citing § 195) while “justification is exemplified by the concept of self-
defense” (citing §§ 197–198), “although these are not the exclusive bases for excuse or
justification.” (Frye, supra, at p. 1155, fn. omitted.) The Frye court further held the “use
of force or violence against another person is not presumed to be unlawful in the absence
of excuse or justification; it is unlawful by definition. [Citation.] Thus, as used in
various homicide instructions, the word unlawful does not signify an affirmative element
of the offenses. It is instead a negative element which simply means there is an absence
of excuse or justification.” (Ibid.) Excuse and justification are affirmative defenses that
must be raised by the defendant. (Id. at p. 1154.) Unlike the other two elements of
murder, these affirmative “defenses are not elements of the offenses which the
prosecution is required to prove unless they are properly raised .…” (Id. at p. 1160.)
This does not mean the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, but instead means “in the
absence of evidence supporting excuse or justification or of defense reliance upon such
matters, theories of excuse or justification are not regarded as pertinent to the charged
offense.” (Id. at p. 1156.) The Frye court thus concluded that “excuse and justification
are affirmative defenses which need not and should not be put before the jury in the
absence of some evidence supporting them or defense reliance upon them.” (Id. at
p. 1159.) “Under this scheme we treat the absence of excuse or justification, and hence
the question of unlawfulness, as an element of an offense only if such a defense is raised
in some manner.” (Ibid., italics added.)
15.
It is against this backdrop we consider the recommendation in the Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 520 to instruct on the third element of murder when providing
instructions on justifiable or excusable homicide. If the question of lawfulness is treated
as an element of the offense only where excuse or justification is raised as a defense, it
logically follows this element be given together with instructions on those theories to
provide the jury with the relevant legal principles to decide whether the homicide was
lawful. Given the prosecution’s primary witness, Irene, had told various versions of
events about the killing and was an admittedly problematic witness,15 the trial court
prudently chose to limit preinstructions to general principles of law regarding the offense
and wait until the close of evidence before instructing on justifiable or excusable
homicide, and correspondingly on the third element of murder. While defense counsel
argued prior to trial the “defenses in this case are geared entirely towards self-defense and
… that the killing here was not unlawful,” it was unclear at that point if defendant would
be testifying and, accordingly, whether there would be sufficient evidence to warrant
instruction on a theory of complete or imperfect self-defense. “[I]mperfect self-defense
occurs when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in
imminent danger of great bodily injury or death. [Citation.] Imperfect self-defense
differs from complete self-defense, which requires not only an honest but also a
reasonable belief of the need to defend oneself.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98,
132.) A trial court is not obligated to instruct on complete or imperfect self-defense
where the record is “devoid of evidence” of the defendant’s “subjective fear.” (Id. at
p. 134; see People v. Mejia-Lenares (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1446 [the trial court
15 During her opening statement, the prosecutor expressly referred to Irene as a
“problematic witness” due to Irene’s battery conviction, history of drug use and false statements
to the police about what occurred. Defense counsel admitted prior to jury selection he had “no
idea what [Irene was] going to say when she” testifies. Defense counsel acknowledged Irene’s
primacy as “the only person whowill testify to a number of the factors that [the prosecutor] is
going to later rely upon to say that [defendant is] guilty of an intentional killing as opposed to
self-defense.”
16.
need not instruct on imperfect self-defense on request absent substantial evidence to
support the theory].) Under the circumstances here, the court rationally concluded it
must hear all the evidence before determining if there was sufficient evidence to warrant
instructions on self-defense. Because Frye teaches instructions on justifiable or
excusable homicide need not and should not be put before the jury in the absence of
supporting evidence or reliance upon them, the court properly refrained from instructing
the jury on the lawfulness element until the evidence revealed which defense theories, if
any, were raised by the facts and must also be instructed upon.
Additionally, “[b]reaking instructions into phases of the trial does not tax the
attention span of jurors, provides timely and useful information to jurors as the trial
progresses, and arguably benefits the parties.” (Chung, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 760.)
This is precisely what the trial court did by providing the jury with a preliminary
framework on the murder charge and deferring more comprehensive instructions,
including on defenses, until the close of evidence. Defendant cites no authority the court
was required to include the lawful justification element of murder in its preinstructions
and the court’s decision not to do so was not arbitrary or capricious.16
Defendant next argues when the trial court elected to define homicide in its
preinstructions using CALCRIM No. 500, the court should have also provided the
following bracketed instruction from CALCRIM No. 500: “A homicide can be lawful or
unlawful. If a person kills with a legally valid excuse or justification, the killing is lawful
and he or she has not committed a crime.”
The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 500 regarding the bracketed instruction states:
“If no homicide defense instructions are given, do not give the bracketed language in the
second paragraph beginning ‘A homicide can be lawful .…’” (Judicial Council of Cal.,
16 Defendant surmises the trial court erroneously believed the prosecution was not required
to prove a lack of justification. The record does not support this unfounded assertion.
17.
Criminal Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 500, p. 217, italics added.)
Jury instructions in brackets “provide optional choices that may be necessary or
appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances of the case[.]” (Id. at p. xxvi.)
Because the trial court was not providing homicide defense instructions during its
preinstructions, the court properly chose not to include the bracketed instruction
regarding lawfulness. As previously discussed, the trial court is only required to instruct
the jury on excuse or justification where there is evidence supporting those theories.
(Frye, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156; see People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 179
[a trial court has a duty to instruct “on a particular defense only if it appears the defendant
is relying on such a defense, or substantial evidence supports the defense”]; People v.
Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1386 [“a trial judge has the authority to refuse
requested instructions on a defense theory for which there is no supporting evidence”].)
As above, the court logically concluded this bracketed instruction is more appropriately
given after the evidence showed which defenses, if any, had evidentiary support and must
be instructed upon.
We also “assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and
correlating all the instructions.” (People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327,
1332.) The trial court expressly billed its preinstructions as “very basic” and promised to
give another set of “much more comprehensive” instructions at the close of evidence.
The court noted only then will it know what evidence was presented and be able to give
the instructions applicable to the evidence the jury received. The court promised to
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. The court therefore explicitly
conveyed to the jury its preinstructions were partial instructions, and that additional and
more complete instructions would be given after all the evidence was received, including
on the applicable law. The court emphasized to the jury to keep an open mind throughout
the trial. The court further instructed the jury not to decide the verdict or any issue before
deliberations (CALCRIM No. 101), an instruction the court repeated multiple times
18.
throughout the trial. After the trial, the court provided comprehensive instructions to the
jury on murder, defenses, and the bracketed instruction from CALCRIM No. 500. The
court provided the jury with a full copy of the instructions for the jurors to consult during
their deliberations.
The jury was further informed the question of lawfulness was a consideration
before and after the evidence was presented because both the prosecutor and defense
counsel discussed the unlawful element of murder during opening statements and again in
closing arguments. (See People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [“The reviewing
court also must consider the arguments of counsel in assessing the probable impact of the
instruction on the jury.”].) In the prosecutor’s opening statement, she asserted the jury
“will be able to see this was an unlawful killing” at the end of the evidence. Defense
counsel, during his opening statement, asked the jury “to focus on … was the killing of
… Garcia done unlawfully[?]” During her closing argument, the prosecutor read
verbatim part of the bracketed instruction about lawful justification of a homicide from
CALCRIM No. 500. The prosecutor stated a homicide can be lawful or unlawful, and
acknowledged if defendant killed Garcia in complete self-defense, defendant is not guilty
of any crime. The prosecutor further noted if a person kills with a legal justification or
excuse, the person is not guilty of murder and expressly said the prosecution bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the killing was not justified. For his part,
defense counsel argued in closing, the jury must decide if the prosecution proved beyond
a reasonable doubt the killing was unlawful, and if it was in self-defense, the prosecution
did not prove it was unlawful. Defense counsel also stated the government has the
burden to disprove self-defense.17
17 Because counsels’ arguments and the jury instructions expressly stated the prosecution
bears the burden of proving every element of murder, including that the murder was not justified,
beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s implied contention the instructions circumvented the
requirement the prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt is without
merit.
19.
Defendant speculatively asserts the lack of the third element of murder in the
preinstructions “unfairly biased” the jury. Nothing in the record indicates the jury did not
correctly apply the law as instructed in deciding defendant’s guilt. (People v. Daveggio
and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821 [jurors are presumed to follow instructions
absent evidence to the contrary].) Defendant identified no evidence the jury was
confused about the elements of murder or lawful justification of a homicide. “In the
absence of such evidence, the presumption that the jurors regularly performed their duties
prevails [citation] .…” (Chung, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 760; accord, Smith, supra,
168 Cal.App.4th at p. 20; § 664.)
Even if we found the trial court erred in its preinstructions, any error would be
harmless under either standard of prejudice. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) We simply cannot agree with
defendant this was a close self-defense case. The “ordinary self-defense doctrine … may
not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation
of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under
which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1.) Defendant initiated a verbal argument with Garcia for being
disrespectful to his “‘girl.’” In response to Garcia’s raised fists, defendant got out of the
truck and walked toward Garcia with a knife in his dominant hand. Garcia had not
revealed his own knife at that point, so defendant escalated the fight by approaching
Garcia and introducing a deadly weapon into the exchange. Defendant intentionally
stabbed Garcia directly in the heart, an indisputably vital organ. Defendant plunged the
knife all the way to just before or at the hilt. Defendant was shocked Garcia did not fall
immediately, indicating defendant understood the wound’s severity. The evidence of
defendant’s guilt for murder was thus overwhelming. (Harrington v. California (1969)
395 U.S. 250, 254 [harmless error if guilt is established by overwhelming evidence].)
20.
Based on this record and the instructions as a whole, the trial court did not violate
defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial by preinstructing the jury on the elements
of murder without including the lack of justification element or lawful justification of a
homicide where the instructions were fully given at the close of evidence.
II. Dismissal of Prior Strike Conviction
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in declining his request to
dismiss his prior strike because the court arbitrarily and capriciously concluded defendant
would pose a danger to public safety if he were eligible for parole at the age of 75.
Defendant contends if the court had not erroneously found dismissal of the prior strike
would endanger public safety, there is a reasonable probability the court would have
dismissed the prior strike based on mitigating factors in section 1385, subdivision (c).
A. Additional Background
Defendant admitted he suffered two prior strike convictions. The first prior strike
conviction was for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) on November 4, 1991, when
an intoxicated defendant stabbed another man to death in an argument.18 Defendant and
the victim were “hanging out” on the same street with two different groups. There was a
friendly interaction between the groups when defendant and his group pulled up in their
car. The victim went into his sister’s apartment and came out with a plate of tacos. A
group outside, including defendant, started asking the victim for a piece of the food. The
victim told defendant something like “get off of me” and “get the hell out of here.” The
victim turned towards another person and defendant stabbed the victim in the chest.
Defendant ran away with the victim’s friends initially pursuing him before the friends
returned to the victim and drove him to the hospital. The victim lost consciousness en
route and died at the hospital.
18 Defendant included facts about this conviction in his Romero motion and a witness
testified to the circumstances of this stabbing before the trial court during an Evidence Code
section 402 hearing prior to trial on this matter.
21.
Defendant’s other prior strike conviction was for first degree residential burglary
(§§ 459, 460, subd (a)) on June 26, 1991. The probation officer’s report reflects
defendant’s additional criminal record included the following convictions: disorderly
conduct in 1991; escape from jail in 1991; threatening phone calls in 2005; corporal
injury on a spouse and resisting a peace officer in 2002; furnishing a minor with
marijuana in 2004; obstructing a peace officer without violence in 2003; and possession
of a controlled substance in 2011. Defendant also had multiple parole violations between
1999 and 2008.
The probation officer recommended a one-year determinate term for the weapon
enhancement followed by a consecutive indeterminate term of 75 years to life, consisting
of 25 years to life tripled for the two prior strikes. The probation officer explained the
rationale for this recommendation: “Although the defendant remained free from law
violations for nine years, the commission of the current matter clearly demonstrates a
lack of rehabilitation and a propensity for violence, at even the slightest trigger.”
Prior to the sentencing hearing on February 23, 2023, defendant filed a Romero
motion, inviting the trial court to strike his two prior strike convictions. In his motion
and during the sentencing hearing, defendant argued four of the nine factors from
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), weighed greatly in favor of dismissing the
“enhancements.” Specifically, defendant argued: (1) multiple enhancements were
alleged (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)); (2) the enhancement would result in a sentence of over 20
years (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)); (3) the prior convictions are more than five years old (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(H)); and (4) defendant was “technically” an adult at the time of the
convictions, but he was “just” 19 (id., subd. (c)(2)(G)). Defendant further argued his first
degree murder conviction would result in an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and he
would be 76 years old when he qualifies for parole if the strikes were stricken.
Defendant posited there was no reason to believe he would present a danger to the public
if released at 76 years old on parole.
22.
The prosecution opposed defendant’s request. The prosecution argued age was not
an appropriate consideration for dismissal. The prosecution also argued defendant is a
risk to public safety because he appears willing to engage in this behavior at any point in
his life.
The trial court noted section 1385 “talks about enhancements” and queried if the
Three Strikes law is an enhancement. Defendant “believe[d] so,” but the prosecution
argued the Three Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme. The prosecution
clarified the enhancement was for the weapon, but the two strike convictions placed
defendant in a different sentencing structure.
In explaining its ruling on the Romero motion, the trial court stated in pertinent
part:
“The Court has read and considered the invitation to exercise its
Romero discretion under … section 1385. Given the amendments to
[section] 1385, this Court feels bound to exercise its discretion in a
particular way. Given that the defendant here is facing three enhancements,
two under the Three Strikes law and one under … section 12022[,
subdivision ](b)(1) for the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife,
and given that the defendant is looking at a sentence for the crime itself of
first degree murder of 25 years to life, the Court believes that it would be in
the interest of justice under [section] 1385 to exercise its discretion and
dismiss for the purpose of sentencing only the serious felony prior for …
section[s] 459/460, first degree residential burglary, out of Stanislaus
County, as well as the enhancement .…
“It is difficult—the Court is finding difficulty in exercising its
discretion as to the voluntary manslaughter conviction from 1991 out of
Fresno County, because, again, [defendant] has killed twice. Based upon
the representation, 30 years apart. So what is to prevent him from doing it
again in the future, if he were released at the time of parole at around 75.
That’s what bothers me. And I think that would weigh on the minds of
most judicial officers who are forced to make this decision.
“[Section] 1385 provides that if the enhancement would result in a
sentence of in excess of 20 years, then the Court shall dismiss it unless to
do so would pose a danger to public safety.
23.
“Considering the circumstances of the prior conviction and the
circumstances of this current case and conviction, this Court is not satisfied
that it would be in the interest of—I believe to strike that serious felony
prior would not be appropriate. So the Court is declining the request to
dismiss the serious felony prior arising from the 1991 conviction for
voluntary manslaughter. That’s based upon the similar nature of the
offenses, the time between the prior offense and this offense. While the
Court is mindful that it is more than five years prior, the Court is mindful
that the serious felony prior added to the sentencing in this case would add
more than a sentence of 20 years.
“This case was brought about by the anger of [defendant]. The
Court is not satisfied that at whatever age [defendant] cannot again give in
to his anger, which could result in serious bodily injury or death to another
individual. Again, that is based upon the history that has been presented in
the prior case and this case.” (Italics added.)
After the court declined to strike the voluntary manslaughter conviction, the court
sentenced defendant to 50 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life doubled for that
prior strike.
B. Authority to Dismiss Prior Strike Convictions
In 1994, the Three Strikes law was enacted “to ensure longer prison sentences and
greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of
one or more serious or violent felony offenses.” (§ 667, subd. (b); accord, Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 504–505.) The law “consists of two, nearly identical statutory
schemes .… The earlier provision, which the Legislature enacted, was codified as
section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The later provision, which the voters adopted
through the initiative process, was codified as section 1170.12.” (Romero, supra, at
p. 504.) “[B]oth statutes have this effect: When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and
it is pleaded and proved that he has committed one or more prior felonies defined as
‘violent’ or ‘serious,’ sentencing proceeds under the Three Strikes law ‘[n]otwithstanding
any other law’ (§ 667, subd. (c); § 1170.12, subd. (a).)” (Id. at p. 505.) “Under that law,
if a defendant reoffends after having suffered a first qualifying felony conviction, a
doubled sentence is mandatory. If, after having suffered two qualifying felony
24.
convictions, an offender commits a third qualifying felony, the Three Strikes law
presumes he or she is incorrigible and requires a life sentence.” (People v. Vargas (2014)
59 Cal.4th 635, 638; see §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), (2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(A).)
Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a trial court “may, either on motion of the
court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed.…” In Romero, our Supreme Court held that
section 1385, subdivision (a), gives trial courts the power to dismiss a prior strike
conviction under the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) While
this statutory subdivision only permits dismissal on the court’s or the prosecution’s
motion, a defendant may “‘invite the court to exercise its power by an application to
strike a count or allegation of an accusatory pleading, and the court must consider
evidence offered by the defendant in support of his assertion that the dismissal would be
in furtherance of justice.’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony).)
Section 1385 has also long permitted a trial court to dismiss or strike an
enhancement. (People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209.) Effective January 1, 2022,
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81) amended section 1385 to
specify mitigating circumstances the trial court must consider in determining whether to
dismiss an enhancement. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; People v. Anderson (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 233, 238–239, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786.) As amended,
section 1385, subdivision (c), now provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising
its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
25.
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.”19
Defendant contends there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have
dismissed his prior strike based on two mitigating factors in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2): the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(C)) and the prior conviction is over five years old (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)). The
People assert section 1385, subdivision (c), does not affect the court’s discretion to
dismiss defendant’s prior strike conviction because the Three Strikes law is an alternative
sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. In a footnote in defendant’s reply brief,
defendant argues, without substantive discussion, the People are incorrect that section
1385, subdivision (c), does not apply to the Three Strikes law and the court was correct to
consider whether to dismiss his prior strike conviction under this statutory subdivision.
Whether section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill 81 applies to
prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law is a question of statutory
interpretation. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Tirado
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694; People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke)
[whether the amendments to § 1385 made by Sen. Bill 81 apply to prior strike
convictions is a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review].)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), outlines mitigating factors the trial court must
19 Our Supreme Court is poised to address a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal
regarding how to construe and apply the requirement to “‘afford great weight’” to evidence of
the mitigating circumstances. (People v. Walker, S278309, Sup. Ct. Mins., Mar. 22, 2023
<https://supreme.courts.ca.gov/case-information/minutes> [as of May 24, 2024]; People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 398, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309 [“[T]rial courts
are to rebuttably presume that dismissal of an enhancement is in the furtherance of justice (and
that its dismissal is required) unless the court makes a finding that the resultingly shorter
sentence due to dismissal ‘would endanger public safety.’”]; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1087, 1097–1098, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894 [disagreeing with the
analysis in Walker that affording “‘great weight’” to the mitigating circumstances creates a
rebuttable presumption].) Because section 1385, subdivision (c), is not applicable to prior strike
convictions, the disputed statutory language does not affect our analysis here.
26.
consider in deciding whether to “dismiss an enhancement.” (Italics added.) “The term
‘enhancement’ has a well-established technical meaning in California law. [Citation.] ‘A
sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.”’
[Citations.] It is equally well established that the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense.” (Burke,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(5).) “The plain
language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an ‘enhancement,’ and the
Three Strikes law is not an enhancement.” (Burke, supra, at p. 244.) The Courts of
Appeal have consequently thus far rejected the argument that section 1385,
subdivision (c), applies to the trial court’s authority to dismiss a prior strike conviction
under the Three Strikes law. (Burke, supra, at pp. 242−244; People v. Olay (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 60, 64−69 (Olay); People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 410 (Dain).)
We find the reasoning of our sister courts persuasive. “The Three Strikes law is a
separate sentencing scheme.” (People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 43.) The law
does not impose an additional term of imprisonment on top of the base term like an
enhancement, but instead, “when applicable, takes the place of whatever law would
otherwise determine defendant’s sentence for the current offense.” (Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 524.) Based on the statute’s plain language, section 1385, subdivision (c),
applies only to enhancements and, therefore, does not apply to the Three Strikes law as an
alternative sentencing scheme.
This interpretation is buttressed by the legislative history of Senate Bill 81. (See
People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1221–1222 [courts may look to extrinsic aids,
including legislative history, to interpret a statute where the statutory language is unclear
or ambiguous].) In a June 2021 bill analysis of Senate Bill 81, the Assembly Committee
on Public Safety generally defined an “‘enhancement’” consistent with the California
Rules of Court. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 27, 2021, at p. 5.) The bill analysis went on to state:
27.
“An enhancement differs from an alternative penalty scheme. An alternative penalty
scheme does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the base term; instead, it
provides for an alternate sentence for the underlying felony itself when it is proven that
certain conditions specified in the statute are true. [Citations.] Th[is] include[s] the
Three Strikes Law [citations] among others. The presumption created by this bill applies
to enhancements, but does not encompass alternative penalty schemes.” (Id. at pp. 5−6,
italics added.) “A more unambiguous statement of the Legislature’s intent to adopt the
legal meaning of enhancement for section 1385, subdivision (c) can hardly be imagined.”
(Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 67.)20
Furthermore, a factor defendant asserts applies here, section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(H), “requiring a court to treat the fact that a prior strike conviction is
over five years old as a mitigating circumstance would conflict with the Three Strikes law
itself.” (Dain, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.) Specifically, section 667,
subdivision (c)(3), expressly states “[t]he length of time between the prior serious or
violent felony conviction and the current felony conviction shall not affect the imposition
of sentence.” As aptly stated by the Dain court, “[w]e do not presume the Legislature
intended to repeal this provision when it enacted section 1385[, subdivision ](c)(2)(H).
[Citation.] Thus, under section 667[, subdivision ](c)(3), the bare fact that a prior strike
conviction is over five years old cannot be the basis for dismissing the strike.” (Dain,
20 In a footnote, the Burke court indicated the legislative history of Senate Bill 81 is
“inconsistent with [section 1385, subdivision (c)’s] plain language and suggests that the term
enhancement includes the Three Strikes law.” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, fn. 3.)
This was based on “repeated expressions that Senate Bill No. 81 was intended to codify the
recommendations of the Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code [(CRPC)], … [whose
report] repeatedly refers to ‘Strikes’ as enhancements rather than using the technical legal
meaning and does not separate ‘Strikes’ from inclusion in its recommendation.” (Ibid.) For its
part, the Olay court concluded “the broader understanding of the term enhancement used by the
CRPC is irrelevant here. And to the extent the legislative history may have been unclear about
the meaning of the term enhancement before June 2021, the June 2021 bill analysis cleared up
that confusion.” (Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 69.) We find the Olay court’s reasoning
more persuasive on this point.
28.
supra, at p. 411; see State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th
940, 955 [in “harmonizing potentially inconsistent statutes[,]” “‘“‘“[a]ll presumptions are
against a repeal by implication”’”’”].)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), the other factor defendant relies on, states:
“The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this
instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.” Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A), sets
the minimum term of an indeterminate life sentence for a third striker to include
“[i]mprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii).) Although the
Courts of Appeal have unanimously agreed section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), does not
require dismissal of an enhancement,21 application of this mitigating factor could
effectively preclude imposition of any third strike offense. Again, we do not presume
repeal by implication in interpreting potentially inconsistent statutes.
Finally, section 1385, subdivision (c), cannot be construed in a manner that
amends the Three Strikes law because the Legislature may only amend the law “by
statute passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the
membership concurring .…” (§ 667, subd. (j).) Senate Bill 81 did not pass by two-thirds
of the membership. (Dain, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 412.)
Because section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill 81 does not
apply to the Three Strikes law, the trial court was not required to consider the mitigating
factors in that statutory subdivision in ruling on defendant’s Romero motion.22
21 See People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 17–21 (rejecting argument that an
enhancement that results in a sentence of over 20 years must be dismissed where it would
endanger public safety); accord, People v. Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pages 238–241;
People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295–297.
22 We therefore need not and do not consider defendant’s argument there is a reasonable
probability the court would have dismissed his prior strike based on two mitigating factors in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
29.
C. Applicable Law to Dismissal of Prior Strike Convictions
Having concluded section 1385, subdivision (c), is not applicable to prior strike
convictions under the Three Strikes law, we now address the applicable law in deciding
whether to dismiss a prior strike.
The Three Strikes law was intended “to punish repeat criminal offenders severely”
and “drastically curtail a sentencing court’s ability to reduce the severity of a sentence by
eliminating alternatives to prison incarceration .…” (People v. Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at p. 641; accord, People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1104 (Mayfield).) By
doing so, the “law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these
sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) A
trial court’s denial of a request to dismiss a prior strike conviction is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. (Id. at p. 376.)
“Consistent with the language of and the legislative intent behind the three strikes
law,” our Supreme Court has “established stringent standards that sentencing courts must
follow in order to” dismiss a prior strike conviction. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377.) The “trial court must balance society’s legitimate interest in imposing longer
sentences for repeat offenders and the defendant’s constitutional right against
disproportionate punishment.” (Mayfield, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105, citing
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 530−531.) The court must also consider “the nature and
circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects.” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) “And, of course, the court must
remember the Three Strikes law is not discretionary in nature. Rather, the law must be
applied when the defendant has two or more prior strikes, unless the court concludes an
exception to the law should be made because, for articulable reasons that can withstand
scrutiny for abuse, the defendant lies outside the spirit of the law such that he should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more strikes.”
30.
(Mayfield, supra, at p. 1105, citing Williams, supra, at p. 161 & Carmony, supra, at
p. 376.)
“In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts.
First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely
because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized
nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’
[Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376−377.) A court abuses it discretion
in failing to dismiss a prior strike in “limited circumstances,” including where the court is
unaware of its discretion to dismiss, considers impermissible factors or application of the
Three Strikes law may as a matter of law produce an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd
result under the particular facts of the case. (Id. at p. 378.)
D. Analysis
“Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the
trial court’s ruling” on whether to dismiss a prior strike. (People v. Myers (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) Furthermore, while the trial court here appears to have
erroneously considered whether to dismiss defendant’s prior strike conviction under the
provisions of section 1385, subdivision (c), remand for resentencing is unnecessary if the
evidence shows there is no reasonable possibility the court would have dismissed
defendant’s prior strike. (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 502−504
[remand unnecessary even if the trial court improperly relied on two factual findings in
31.
declining to dismiss prior strike where there was no reasonable possibility the court
would have dismissed the prior strike].)23
“Extraordinary must the circumstance be by which a career criminal can be
deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very statutory scheme within which he squarely
falls and whose continued criminal career the law was meant to attack.” (People v.
Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 332 (Strong).) Therefore, the “circumstances where
no reasonable people could disagree that [a career] criminal falls outside the spirit of the
three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 378.)
In Williams, the defendant had two prior convictions for attempted robbery and
rape when he was convicted of felony driving under the influence. (Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at pp. 155−157 & fn. 3.) The trial court vacated the prior strike for attempted
robbery and sentenced the defendant based on only one strike. (Id. at pp. 156−157.) The
People appealed and our Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion.
(Id. at pp. 157, 162.) The court found nothing about the defendant’s present felony, or his
prior convictions was favorable to him, particularly considering his latest conviction for
driving under the influence was his fourth such offense. (Id. at p. 163.) This showed the
defendant “‘had been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that [such]
criminal conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson’
[citation].” (Ibid.) The court noted the defendant managed to pass 13 years between his
prior serious and/or violent convictions and his present offense, but further recognized the
defendant “did not refrain from criminal activity during that span of time, and he did not
add maturity to age.” (Ibid.) On the contrary, during those years the defendant was often
23 We may also affirm the court’s ruling where it is correct on any legal ground. (People v.
Fox (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 394, 399 [affirming the trial court’s ruling an Oregon conviction
qualified as a prior strike, although the court’s reasoning was erroneous]; see People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39 [an appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning]).
32.
in prison or jail, and when he was not, violated parole and probation, and committed
multiple additional felony and misdemeanor offenses. (Ibid.) The court found the trial
court’s order to vacate the defendant’s prior strike “fell outside the bounds of reason
under the applicable law and relevant facts.” (Id. at p. 164.)
In Mayfield, the defendant threatened to make a pregnant African-American
woman “‘drop’” her baby, while making racial epithets at the woman as she was waiting
at the bus stop. (Mayfield, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1099−1100.) The defendant had
a lengthy criminal record, including a previous hate crime conviction a year before that
was reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor, and two prior strike convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon in 2005 and mayhem in 2008. (Id. at pp. 1100−1101 & fn. 2.)
Nonetheless, the trial court struck the defendant’s 2005 prior strike as well as multiple
enhancements and sentenced the defendant to five years in prison. (Id. at
pp. 1102−1103.) The district attorney argued the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing the 2005 strike and the Court of Appeal agreed. (Id. at p. 1103.) The court
found the defendant “failed to reform his behavior during the decade plus that elapsed
between his first strike conviction and his third strike conviction.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
While the trial court relied on the fact the prior conviction was more than 14 years old,
the Court of Appeal stated pursuant to Williams, “older strike convictions do not deserve
judicial forgiveness unless the defendant has used them as a pivot point for reforming his
ways.” (Id. at p. 1107.) The court noted the defendant was “given a tremendous break in
2017 when the court reduced his felony hate crime to a misdemeanor.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
Despite this break, the defendant turned around and committed another hate crime against
a pregnant victim. The court concluded the defendant’s “unrelenting criminal behavior
since suffering his first strike conviction in 2005 demonstrates him to be an unchanged
man, with a stubborn character and no discernible prospects for reform.” (Ibid.)
Here, as in Williams and Mayfield, defendant failed to show he has reformed
despite the passage of nearly 27 years between his 1991 prior strike for voluntary
33.
manslaughter and the current offense. The circumstances surrounding the 1991 offense
were remarkably like the 2018 murder in important respects. Both deaths resulted from
defendant violently unleashing his anger against the victim for a seemingly trivial
offense. Defendant stabbed the victim in 1991 because he was angry the victim refused
to give him tacos. As he later did with Garcia, defendant stabbed his first victim in the
heart. This victim immediately went down when defendant stabbed him and died later at
the hospital. Far from using his prior conviction as a pivot point for reforming his ways,
defendant stabbed Garcia for the apparently unforgiveable sin of talking to his girlfriend
and did so in a location defendant knew could be fatal based on his first victim’s fate.
The trial court rightfully found defendant could at whatever age again give in to his short
temper in a violent way.
Nor does defendant’s character, background, or prospects reveal much, if anything,
that is favorable. While defendant was employed as a truck driver at the time of the
murder, he provided Irene with little money. Irene paid most of the bills and supported
defendant financially, including paying for the truck that was in his name. Defendant
regularly used methamphetamine during the week prior to the current offense. Within
days of killing Garcia, defendant choked Irene to the point where she could not breathe
because he was angry she was text-messaging someone. Defendant relentlessly tried to
persuade Irene against testifying while the instant case was pending, including by making
thinly veiled threats. Moreover, defendant did not refrain from criminal activity during
the period between his 1991 strike and his murder conviction. Instead, he managed to
rack up multiple parole violations and convictions for: threatening phone calls, domestic
violence, resisting a peace officer, obstructing a peace officer, and two drug offenses.
Defendant cannot be deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law for purposes of
his voluntary manslaughter conviction when he is precisely the type of “‘revolving-
door’” criminal the law was designed to encompass. (Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
p. 338.)
34.
Defendant argues the trial court’s “speculation” he would endanger public safety if
released at the age of 75 was arbitrary and baseless. Preliminarily, defense counsel
specifically argued in his Romero motion and at sentencing defendant would not pose a
danger to the public if released on parole at the age of 76.24 Defendant cannot complain
on appeal the court improperly considered a factor defendant expressly asked it to
consider. (See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 [under the doctrine of invited
error, the defendant could not complain of the court’s failure to instruct on a lesser
offense where defense counsel objected to the instruction]; but see In re Andrews (1976)
18 Cal.3d 208, 212 [the doctrine of invited error does not apply to an unauthorized
sentence].)
To the extent defendant is arguing consideration of whether his release around the
age of 75 would endanger public safety was an impermissible factor for the trial court to
consider, the argument is meritless. Defendant cannot and does not plausibly argue
whether he would pose a danger to society when he is released was not a permissible and
relevant factor for the court to consider. Society unquestionably has an interest in
protecting citizens by keeping dangerous criminals off the streets. (Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 530 [whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice under § 1385 requires
consideration of the interests of society as represented by the People].) The Three Strikes
law “undeniably reflects” a “public safety animus.” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 979 (Alvarez).) Considering the nature and circumstances of
defendant’s present and prior felonies, as well as his background and character
reasonably involves assessing whether defendant poses a danger to society. (See People
v. McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 475 [“history of violent conduct demonstrates
24 At sentencing, defense counsel stated in pertinent part: “Given his age and his
background, there’s no reason to believe that a 76-year-old [defendant] on parole, were he to be
paroled, would present any kind of danger to the public. [¶] … [¶] So the issue isn’t what the
age is, it’s simply the actuarial reality of the fact that an opportunity for [defendant] to be paroled
at age 76 does not yield a substantial public safety danger.…”
35.
[the defendant] is a danger to society” in assessing the defendant’s character].) California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1) specifically provides that whether “[t]he defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society” is an aggravating
circumstance to consider in determining the defendant’s sentence. (People v. Thomas,
supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 211−212 [the trial court may consider the Cal. Rules of Court in
determining whether to dismiss an action under § 1385]; People v. Cluff (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 991, 1004 [the trial court should consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances from the Cal. Rules of Court in exercising its discretion on a Romero
motion].) The court rationally concluded defendant’s history of resorting to violence to
resolve minor disputes posed an unacceptable danger to the public.
Defendant claims the trial court’s determination was “fundamentally flawed”
because the court purportedly failed to consider defendant would only be eligible for
parole around age 75, but would not be released if the parole board determined he still
posed a danger to public safety. Defendant essentially argues the court was precluded
from considering whether he would pose a danger to public safety when he would be
eligible for parole because the parole board will not release him on parole if he remains a
danger.
We are not persuaded. The “paramount consideration” of the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) in making release determinations is “whether the inmate currently
poses a threat to public safety and thus may not be released on parole.” (In re Lawrence
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1210; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (a).) Simply
because the Board must assess whether defendant remains a danger when he is eligible
for parole does not bar the trial court from considering this factor when deciding whether
to dismiss a prior strike or impose a longer sentence. The court is empowered to
determine defendant’s sentence in a manner consistent with the Legislature’s and the
People’s goals in enacting the Three Strikes law. (People v. McGlothin, supra, 7
Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [both “the Legislature and the People, by initiative, have adopted a
36.
particular sentencing scheme for repeat offenders” within which the trial court must “find
that exquisite balance in which a just sentence reposes”].) The “public safety
considerations underlying the three strikes law” is reflected by its imposition of longer
sentences for career criminals. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 979; accord, Strong,
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 338 [“longer sentences for career criminals who commit at
least one serious or violent felony certainly goes to the heart of the statute’s purpose—or
spirit”].) “Recidivism is a serious risk to public safety, and so incapacitation is an
important goal” of imprisonment. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 72.) Implicit
in imposition of a longer sentence is a finding defendant poses an unacceptable risk to
public safety if released in less time. The court need not delegate the responsibility to
safeguard the public to the Board to assess in the future.
Furthermore, taking defendant’s argument to its logical extreme, every court
determining an appropriate prison term would be unable to consider whether a defendant
will pose a danger to public safety when eligible for parole because the Board must also
make this assessment in deciding whether to grant release. Our criminal justice system is
replete with consideration of whether a defendant poses a danger to public safety in
making sentencing decisions. (See, e.g., § 1385, subd. (c)(2) [evidence of mitigating
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing an enhancement “unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety”]; § 1170.18,
subd. (b) [if an inmate is eligible for resentencing under the Safe Neighborhoods and
Schools Act (Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014)), the court shall
resentence the inmate unless resentencing “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety”]; § 1170.126, subd. (f) [if an inmate is eligible for resentencing under the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,
2012)), the inmate shall be resentenced unless the court determines resentencing “would
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”]; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)
[resentencing for an enhancement imposed under § 667.5, subd. (b) shall result in a lesser
37.
sentence unless the court finds “imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety”].)25 It was not arbitrary or irrational for the trial court to consider a factor the
Legislature has repeatedly identified as relevant to sentencing.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss
defendant’s prior strike for voluntary manslaughter. The record shows no reasonable
possibility the court would have dismissed the prior strike and its ruling did not “‘fall[]
outside the bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant facts [citations].”
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.)
III. Challenge to Assessment Fees and Restitution Fine
Defendant argues the trial court’s imposition of assessments and restitution fine
violated his right to due process because the court did not first determine whether he has
the ability to pay. The People argue defendant’s Dueñas claim is forfeited because he did
not seek a hearing on his ability to pay or present any evidence on that topic. We agree
with the People.
A. Imposition of Assessment Fees and Restitution Fine
At the sentencing hearing on February 23, 2023, defendant asked the trial court to
suspend any fines based on his inability to pay. The court imposed a $1,000 restitution
fine (§ 1202.4), a $40 court security assessment fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30
criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)). Defendant did not
object to the imposition of fees or the fine or request a hearing on his ability to pay, but
he did request a hearing on the amount of victim restitution. At a subsequent hearing on
March 30, 2023, defendant stipulated to the amount of $77,500 for victim restitution.
The court restated defendant’s sentence as well as the fees and fine imposed. Defendant
again did not object or request a hearing on his ability to pay.
25 Our analysis is not affected by the differing definitions of “unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” among the statutes. (See e.g., People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347.)
38.
B. Applicable Law and Analysis
In Dueñas, the Court of Appeal held “that due process of law requires the trial
court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s present ability to
pay before it imposes” any fines or fees. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164.)
Subsequent to Dueñas, the same court held that “a defendant must in the first instance
contest in the trial court his or her ability to pay the fines, fees and assessments to be
imposed .…” (People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490.)
Dueñas was decided in January 2019, more than four years before defendant was
sentenced in February 2023. While defendant asked the trial court to suspend any fines
based on his inability to pay, he did not request a hearing on his ability to pay or object to
the fees and fine imposed. Defendant only requested a hearing regarding the amount of
victim restitution, an amount he later stipulated to at the subsequent hearing. Failure to
object before the court generally forfeits the issue on appeal and this principle applies
equally to constitutional claims like those raised by defendant. (People v. McCullough
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [a constitutional right may be forfeited by failure to assert the
right before the tribunal with jurisdiction to determine it]; accord, United States v. Olano
(1993) 507 U.S. 725, 731–732.) Furthermore, “[i]n general, a defendant who fails to
object to the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to
challenge those fines, fees, and assessments on appeal.” (People v. Greeley (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 609, 624.) This is particularly true in cases like this where sentencing
occurred after the Dueñas court declared a constitutional right to have courts determine
ability to pay prior to imposing mandatory fines and fees. (Greeley, supra, at p. 624.)
Further, we cannot say with confidence that an objection to the restitution fine on
constitutional grounds would have been futile in light of Dueñas having been decided
more than four years prior to sentencing in this case. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5
Cal.4th 228, 237 [“Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise
an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by
39.
substantive law then in existence.”].) Defendant’s claim is forfeited, and under the
circumstances, we decline to depart from the rule of forfeiture.
Defendant argues whether the trial court could impose the fees and fine on an
indigent defendant without making a determination on his ability to pay is a pure question
of law subject to de novo review. He then argues his assessments and fine should be
vacated because they were imposed on an indigent defendant without determining his
ability to pay, or, in the alternative, the matter be remanded for an ability to pay hearing if
the evidence is insufficient to show he is indigent. An exception to the rule of forfeiture
is when a defendant raises constitutional claims on appeal that “involve pure questions of
law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed
in the trial court.” (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235.) While our court has
previously been divided on the issues of forfeiture where there was no opportunity to
object because Dueñas (or 8th Amend. cases) had not yet issued at the time an objection
would have been timely made (e.g., People v. Montes (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1119–
1121 [forfeiture excused where futile or unsupported by existing law]; People v. Son
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 565, 596–598; People v. Lowery (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1046,
1053–1054; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073–1074), we are in
agreement that the question of ability to pay is a fact-intensive inquiry and not a pure
question of law (Montes, supra, at p. 1121; Son, supra, at p. 591; Lowery, supra, at
pp. 1060–1061; Aviles, supra, at pp. 1074–1076). Defendant does not raise a pure
question of law “based on undisputed facts, but his contention instead seeks ‘a factual
determination of his alleged inability to pay based on a record that contains nothing more
than his reliance on appointed counsel at trial.’” (Aviles, supra, at p. 1074.)
40.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
41.
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