CourtListener 9506374•In re A.Y. CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/22/24 In re A.Y. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.Y., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES A168831
DEPARTMENT,
(Marin County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. JV27190A)
v.
E.Y.,
Defendant and Appellant.
EY. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to
her child AY. (minor) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1
Her sole contention on appeal is the Marin County Health and Human
Services Department (Department) and juvenile court failed to comply with
the initial inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.; ICWA).2
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
1
Code unless otherwise indicated.
In her notice of appeal, mother states she is also appealing two other
2
orders: an order granting a restraining order against her for the benefit of
R.H. (maternal aunt), and an order denying a petition filed under section 388
1
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2022, the Department filed a section 300 petition alleging
one-month-old minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk minor will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness “as a result of willful or negligent
failure of [mother] to adequately supervise and protect [minor] due to her
substance abuse” and “mental health issues which are exacerbated by her
substance use.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) Specifically, the petition alleged mother
had used amphetamines for two days in December 2021 while minor was in
her care, mother had a “past history of polysubstance drug [use] and used
substances during her pregnancy,” mother had “used methamphetamine and
other substances off and on for over a decade,” and mother had a “history of
multiple hospitalizations due to suicidality while [she was] under the
influence while [minor’s] sibling was previously in her care, thus putting
[minor] at substantial risk of harm.” The petition averred the Department
had completed an initial ICWA inquiry asking mother about minor’s Indian
status (Judicial Council form ICWA-010) and that inquiry “gave . . . no reason
to believe the child is or may be an Indian child.”
At the detention hearing, mother denied the allegations of the petition.
The juvenile court, after finding there had been an ICWA inquiry with
respect to mother and there is no reason to believe minor is an Indian child or
seeking reinstatement of reunification services. However, in her appellate
briefing, mother presents no argument as to those orders and any challenge
to them has therefore been waived. (In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
342, 344, fn. 1 (Adrian L.).)
2
that ICWA applied, placed minor with mother and ordered family
maintenance services.3
In its February 2022 jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department
observed the juvenile court had found ICWA did not apply. In an interview,
mother stated she had two older sisters, R.H. and J.J.4 She had a close
relationship with her parents (maternal grandparents) despite maternal
grandfather’s “tendency to abuse alcohol.” Even though he “disciplined her
physically, she has great memories with her father . . . and they did many
activities together, like building things, teaching [mother] how to cook, and
participating in the ‘Indian Princess’ program.” Both maternal grandparents
had passed away.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court sustained the section 300
petition, found the allegations were true by a preponderance of the evidence,
and adjudged minor a dependent of the court.
At the disposition hearing, the court continued minor’s placement with
mother and ordered family maintenance services.
In its family maintenance status review report, the Department once
again stated the juvenile court had found ICWA did not apply and
recommended continuation of maintenance services. At the review hearing,
3 Mother identified four men as possible biological fathers to minor.
Two were ruled out due to minor’s ethnicity. Of the remaining two possible
fathers, alleged father M.P. made his first appearance at the section 366.26
hearing. However, DNA testing revealed M.P was not minor’s biological
father. Mother did “not know any identifying information” for the second
man who mother identified as “Sean.” Neither M.P., nor any other alleged
father is a party to this appeal.
4 To avoid confusion, we refer to R.H. as maternal aunt or by her
initials, and J.J. only by her initials.
3
the court agreed with the recommendation and continued supervision and
family maintenance services.
In August 2022, the Department filed a supplemental dependency
petition, alleging mother had relapsed during the interim period and been
involved in “two domestic violence incidents” with her boyfriend, one of which
occurred while minor was in the home. Mother had also “stopped adhering to
her medication regime” and missed several therapy sessions. The petition
noted minor had been “detained” on August 23, and on that same day, the
assigned social worker served a warrant to remove minor from mother’s
custody.
In its detention report, the Department recommended minor be
detained and a jurisdiction/disposition hearing be set. Mother reported she
had been involved in a domestic violence incident with her then-boyfriend.
After they argued, mother went into the bedroom where her boyfriend
followed her, “ ‘pounced on her,’ ” and “proceeded to choke her.” Mother also
admitted she had relapsed, using cocaine, alcohol, marijuana, and
methamphetamines in the days following the incident. After the incident,
mother had called maternal aunt who came and took minor. Minor, who was
now nine months old, was currently placed with maternal aunt.
The Department updated its ICWA efforts, noting in a December 2021
interview, mother had “denied that she is a registered member of a Native
American tribe or Alaskan Native village.” In August 2022, mother “again
denied” and maternal aunt also denied being registered members of any tribe
or village.
At the subsequent hearing, the court detained minor and found there
was no reason to believe or know minor was an Indian child and that ICWA
did not apply and continuance in mother’s home to be contrary to minor’s
4
welfare. The court placed minor with maternal aunt and ordered
reunification services and visitation.
In its October 2022 jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department
recommended the court sustain the supplemental petition and order
reunification services. The Department again noted the juvenile court had
previously found ICWA did not apply and reported minor was “comfortable
and adjusting to his placement” with maternal aunt, who had started the
resource family approval process.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, the court sustained the
supplemental petition, adjudged minor a dependent, found there was no
reason to know or to believe minor is an Indian child, and unless new
information was received indicating such, ICWA did not apply. The court
also ordered visitation and reunification services, and set the matter for a
review hearing.
In its six-month review report, the Department recommended
termination of services and that the court set a section 366.26 hearing. The
Department reiterated the court had previously found ICWA did not apply.
Since the last report, mother had been released from her inpatient drug
treatment program. In November, she reported her sister, J.J., “who uses
substances, randomly show[ed] up to [mother’s] home.” Mother’s “safety
plan” for “when [J.J.] shows up to her home” included leaving or calling
maternal aunt, R.H. J.J. was also on a list of “slippery people” to avoid. In
the following month, mother was proactive in participating in services and
visitation had just been increased and changed to be unsupervised. But in
January and February 2023, mother’s “support team” expressed concern over
her recent behavior. Mother reported having relapsed and having contacted
her ex-partner and engaging in “violent behavior with him.” Minor’s half-
5
sibling5 called maternal aunt worried about minor “because he knew [mother]
had relapsed.” Minor, now 16 months old, remained with maternal aunt and
was “thriving” and “developmentally on track.”
At the six-month review hearing, the court found the Department had
provided reasonable services in an effort to return minor home and mother
had made minimal progress in alleviating the causes that led to placement,
terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing for selection of a permanent plan. Although mother filed an intent to
file a writ petition challenging the setting of the section 366.26 hearing, she
did not move forward with doing so.6
On August 22, 2023, the Department submitted a Parental Notification
of Indian Status Form (Judicial Council form ICWA-020) signed by mother’s
attorney, indicating she did not have any “Indian Status.”
On the same day, the court held the section 366.26 hearing. As we
have noted, alleged father M.P. made his first appearance in the case at this
hearing. After the court questioned him regarding any Indian heritage, the
court turned to mother, at which point the case worker stated, “my
understanding is that [mother] has declined to fill out the ICWA-020 form.”
Mother’s counsel then told the court, “Mother states she has not declined to
fill it out, but that she is still looking into the issue herself of whether she
has.” The court then questioned mother directly as follows:
“THE COURT: [Mother], are you a member or citizen of an American
Indian tribe?
5 Minor’s half-sibling lived out-of-state with his paternal grandmother.
6 In the meantime, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the
court order an additional six months of reunification services. The trial court
denied the petition.
6
“[Mother]: I do not know.
“THE COURT: Well, do you have a membership in a tribe?
“[Mother]: All I can tell you is that my father was a foster child, and I
don’t know much of his background.
“THE COURT: I’m not asking about your father, I’m asking about you.
“[Mother]: I don’t know if I’m a member of a tribe, because I would
have to look.
“THE COURT: And in the 14 months you’ve been under the Court’s
jurisdiction you have not made that inquiry?
“[Mother]: That has not something that’s come to my mind or been
asked.
“THE COURT: But you have no knowledge that you are a member?
“[Mother]: I do not have knowledge. . . .
“THE COURT: Is [minor] a member or citizen of an American Indian
tribe?
“[Mother]: No, he’s not registered, no.
“THE COURT: And you are not registered?
“[Mother]: Not of my knowledge?
“THE COURT: Well, have you ever registered?
“[Mother]: My father might have. I’m not sure.
“THE COURT: My question is have you ever registered?
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Mother]: Have I? No—[¶] . . . [¶] maybe my parents have.
“THE COURT: Have you ever received any documentation indicating
that you are a member of an American Indian tribe?
“[Mother]: No.
7
“THE COURT: Okay. [¶] Have you ever received any information or
documentation that you are a citizen of an American Indian tribe?
“[Mother]: I just know I participated in something called Indian
Princess when I was a child, and I’m not sure.
“THE COURT: That is a far cry from—
“[Mother]: Okay. [¶] Is that very different?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“[Mother]: Okay. [¶] So no, I don’t have any knowledge.
“THE COURT: Okay. [¶] I’m aware of that program, that’s a far cry
from being a member or citizen.”
The court went on to ask whether mother resided on a reservation,
whether minor had ever been a ward of a tribal court, or whether mother
possessed an identification indicating she was a citizen or tribal member.
Mother responded negatively.
The trial court concluded there was “nothing here to indicate that
ICWA would apply.”
At the continued hearing, a month later, the court found minor
generally and specifically adoptable, terminated mother’s parental rights,
and set the permanent plan as adoption.
DISCUSSION
“ ‘Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the
separation of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster
care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’ [Citation.] ICWA establishes
‘minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian
children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive
homes.’ [Citation.] California has adopted ‘various procedural and
substantive provisions’ to supplement ICWA and, following the enactment of
8
new federal regulations, ‘California made conforming amendments to its
statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to
ICWA notice and inquiry requirements.’ ” (In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
314, 320 (E.W.).)
“The juvenile court and the Agency have ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty’ to inquire whether a child for whom a section 300 petition has been
filed ‘is or may be an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)” (E.W., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 320.) Section 224.2, subdivision (b) provides, “If a child
is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department
pursuant to Section 306 or county probation department pursuant to
Section 307,” the county welfare or probation department “has a duty of
initial inquiry that ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have
an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the
parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The phrase
‘extended family members’ is defined to include adults who are the child’s
‘grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);
see . . . § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition of ‘extended family
member’].)” (E.W., at pp. 320–321.)
“If the initial inquiry creates ‘a reason to believe’ the child is a Native
American child, but there is not sufficient information to determine that
there is ‘reason to know that the child is an Indian child,’ the Agency must
make ‘further inquiry . . . as soon as practicable.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Further
inquiry includes, but is not limited to, interviewing the parents, Native
American custodian, and extended family members. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A).) If
9
this further inquiry establishes a ‘reason to know’ the child is a Native
American child, notice must be provided to the pertinent tribes. (§ 224.3,
subd. (a).)” (E.W., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 321.)
On appeal, mother raises one issue—whether the Department and
juvenile court failed to comply with their duty of initial inquiry by failing to
inquire of four extended family members, namely the maternal grandparents
and maternal aunts, “one of whom was the caretaker for [minor].”
A split of authority has developed in the courts of appeal as to whether
the prescribed initial duty of inquiry “is required where, as here, the child
has been taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant, and not
‘pursuant to section 306.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 512, 517.) Some
courts have answered in the negative. (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
492, 504, review granted July 26, 2023, S279743 [§ 224.2, subd. (b) inquiry
limited to warrantless removals]; In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, 681,
review granted July 26, 2023, S280572; In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
828, 845, review granted Nov. 15, 2023, S282054.) Other appellate courts
have responded in the positive. (In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953,
962–975, review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281447 [§ 224.2, subd. (b) inquiry
applies “no matter how the child is initially removed from home”]; In re V.C.
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 251, 260 [agreeing with Delila D.] (V.C.); In re L.B.,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 517 [same].) The issue is presently pending
before our Supreme Court. (In re Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 492,
review granted July 26, 2023, S279743.)7
7 We note there is pending legislation which, if enacted, would address
this issue. (Assem. Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1,
2023 [§ 224.2, subd. (b) is amended to read, “If a child is placed into the
temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306 or
county probation department pursuant to Section 307, or if they are placed in
10
We need not, however, weigh in on the question. Even assuming the
initial duty of inquiry as to extended family members applied, the
Department fulfilled such duty.
As we have recited, mother initially indicated she had no Native
American ancestry. In December 2021, the Department asked mother and
alleged father, M.P., about their and minor’s Indian status, and neither gave
any indication minor may be an Indian child. At the January 2021 detention
hearing, at which mother was present, the court stated there had been an
inquiry and there was “no reason to believe [minor] is an Indian child and
ICWA does not apply.” Mother said nothing to the contrary. In August 2022,
mother “again denied that she is a registered member” of any tribe or village.
Finally, apparently just before or immediately after the section 366.26
hearing, mother filed an ICWA-020 form, signed by her attorney, indicating
ICWA did not apply.
If the Department had limited its inquiry to mother’s representations,
it would not have fulfilled an initial duty of inquiry including extended family
members. However, the Department—contrary to mother’s argument—did
inquire of maternal aunt, the only other relative present, and she also stated
there was no Native American ancestry. The Department could not have
inquired of maternal grandparents, as mother inexplicably suggests, because
they were both deceased. Mother’s remaining sister, J.J., was never present
at any hearing. Nor does the record show mother ever provided any contact
information for her. Additionally, mother does not explain how not
interviewing this sister—assuming the Department had been able to find
temporary custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340, the county
welfare department or county probation department has a duty to inquire
whether that child is an Indian child.”].)
11
her—would “cast[] any doubt on the reliability of the answers already
obtained” not only from mother, but also the other maternal aunt. (See E.W.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 323.)
Moreover, even assuming error, it was harmless. The Courts of Appeal
have taken varying approaches to assessing prejudice in the context of initial
inquiry pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (b): “(1) deficient inquiry
necessarily infects the juvenile court’s ruling and reversal is automatic and
required (‘automatic reversal rule’) (see, e.g., In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
15, 32; In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 207; In re J.C. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 70, 80; In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 432–437
(Antonio R.); In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 556 (Y.W.)); (2) deficient
inquiry is harmless unless the record below demonstrates, or the parent on
appeal makes an offer of proof or other affirmative assertion of, Indian
heritage ‘presumptive affirmance rule’ (In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060,
1069); (3) deficient inquiry requires reversal where the record indicates that
there was readily obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully
upon whether the child is an Indian child (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 (Benjamin M.)); and (4) deficient inquiry is harmless
unless the record contains information suggesting a ‘reason to believe’ the
child is an Indian child (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 779, review
granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.)).” (V.C., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 260–261.)
We join with many other courts in declining to apply either the
automatic reversal rule (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 999–
1003; Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 782–784) or the presumptive
affirmance rule (V.C., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 261; Dezi C., at p. 785).
12
We note some divisions of this court have opted to follow the “ ‘readily
obtainable information’ ” test as set forth in Benjamin M. (See In re L.B.,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 519; V.C., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 262.)
However, we need not choose between the approach in Benjamin M. or that
in Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at page 769. Any error was harmless under
either of these “middle ground” approaches. (See In re K.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 566, 614, 616.)
Under Benjamin M., it is not “likely” any information obtained from
J.J. would “bear meaningfully upon whether [minor] is an Indian child,” or
“would have shed meaningful light on the inquiry that the agency had the
duty to make.” (Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) That one
maternal aunt would have meaningful information neither mother nor the
maternal aunt with custody did not report, is not remotely probable,
especially since the sisters grew up in the same household with the same
parents. Thus, this is not a case “where the probability of obtaining
meaningful information” through “continued inquiry” is “reasonable in the
context of ICWA.” (Ibid.; Adrian L., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 351–353
[any error harmless because a “review of the record as a whole does not
disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had
information that would have borne meaningfully on whether [minor] is an
Indian child”].)
For the same reasons, we conclude the record does not “contain[]
information suggesting a reason to believe” minor may be an Indian child
under ICWA. (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) “There is reason to
believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court,
social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the
parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for
13
membership in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or
eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information that
indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds
for reason to know enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of
subdivision (d).” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (d), in turn, provides, “There is reason to
know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child under any of the
following circumstances: [¶] (1) A person having interest in the child . . . or a
member of the child’s extended family informs the court that the child is an
Indian child. [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the child’s
parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native
village. [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding . . . informs the court that it
has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child. [¶]
(4) The child who is the subject of the proceedings gives the court reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. [¶] (5) The court is informed that the
child is or has been a ward of a tribal court. [¶] (6) The court is informed that
either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating
membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (See Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779 [“[A] reviewing court would have ‘reason to believe’
further inquiry might lead to a different result if the record indicates that
someone reported possible American Indian heritage and the agency never
followed up on that information; if the record indicates that the agency never
inquired into one of the two parents’ heritage at all (e.g., Benjamin M., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 740); or if the record indicates that one or both of the
parents is adopted and hence their self-reporting of ‘no heritage’ may not be
fully informed (e.g., [In re A.C. (2022)] 75 Cal.App.5th [1009,] 1015–1016).”].)
14
None of those situations are present here. Mother did not report any
Indian heritage. Rather, she stated only that she had participated in an
“Indian Princess Program” with her father (maternal grandfather), and she
did not know much of his background because he was a foster child. The trial
court was aware of the program mother mentioned, stating “that’s a far cry
from being a member or citizen.” Additionally, the trial court then
questioned mother at length regarding her background, and mother denied
ever registering for membership, denied that she ever received any
documentation that she belonged to any tribe, and denied that minor had
ever been registered with any tribe. Finally, mother was not adopted.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying mother’s section 388 petition and granting a
restraining order are affirmed. The order terminating mother’s parental
rights and selecting adoption as A.Y.’s permanent plan is also affirmed.
15
_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Siggins, J.*
A168831, In re AY
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
16
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