CourtListener 9506098•People v. Hernandez CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 5/21/24 P. v. Hernandez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B325129
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA063293
v.
BRIAN HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shellie Samuels, Judge. Vacated and remanded.
Richard B. Lennon and Peter S. Westacott, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Brian Hernandez (defendant), who pled no contest to one
count of attempted murder and one count of attempted robbery in
2010, successfully petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 Consistent with the parties’ stipulation, the court
redesignated the attempted murder conviction as robbery in
concert and dismissed the attempted robbery conviction. The
court then found circumstances in aggravation justified the
imposition of the high term of imprisonment, based mainly on the
trial transcript from a codefendant’s trial and the Court of Appeal
opinion affirming that codefendant’s conviction. The parties
agree, as we do, that the court erred in relying on facts not
admitted by defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt
in his case. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2010, defendant pled nolo contendere to two
counts: attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1) with
an allegation that a principal personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211;
count 2). The court sentenced defendant on count 1 to the upper
term of nine years plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement and
on count 2 for one year to run consecutively, for a total sentence
of 20 years.
In January 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2). The court appointed
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
counsel to represent him. The prosecution conceded defendant
had stated a prima facie case for relief and subsequently agreed
he was entitled to be resentenced.
The parties disagreed, however, on the appropriate
sentencing term. Specifically, the prosecution stipulated that the
conviction on count 1 should be redesignated as first-degree
robbery in concert (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and asked the
court to impose the upper term of nine years. The prosecution
also asked the court to stay the sentence on count 2 under
section 654. At the first resentencing hearing, defendant’s
counsel asked the court to impose the low term on count 1 due to
mitigating circumstances, namely the defendant’s age (20) at the
time of the offense and his acceptance of responsibility early in
the case. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b).)
Counsel also noted that, due to the early entry of defendant’s
plea, no factual record existed to support a finding of aggravating
circumstances that would justify the imposition of the middle or
upper terms. The prosecution responded that the court could find
aggravating circumstances by relying on the trial transcript and
the Court of Appeal opinion relating to codefendant Michael
Stevens’s trial. Defendant’s counsel objected, citing California
Rules of Court, rule 4.420. The court indicated that it needed
additional time to consider the arguments of counsel and other
materials before it could rule on the petition.
The court held a further resentencing hearing on
October 17, 2022.2 The court granted defendant’s petition,
2 Due to corruption of the court reporter’s disk, no transcript of the
hearing is available. The parties appeared before the court on May 4,
2023 to settle the record on appeal.
3
vacated the conviction for attempted murder, redesignated
count 1 as first-degree robbery in concert (§§ 211, 213,
subd. (a)(1)(A)), found factors in aggravation, and sentenced
defendant to the upper term of nine years plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Specifically, the
court found that defendant brought a loaded gun to the robbery,
put the gun to the victim’s head, then tossed the gun to another
person and told that person to shoot the victim, which he did. The
court explained that in finding factors in aggravation, the court
reviewed and relied on defendant’s plea, the transcript of the trial
of codefendant Michael Stevens, and the Court of Appeal opinion
in Stevens’s case. The court also vacated the conviction on and
dismissed count 2 pursuant to the parties’ agreement.
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
The only issue before us is whether the sentencing court
properly selected the upper sentencing term. We agree with
defendant and the Attorney General that the court erred in doing
so.
1. Standard of Review
We review the court’s choice of term for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.) An
abuse of discretion is found where the court “ ‘relies upon
circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that
otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
4
2. The court abused its discretion in imposing the upper
term of imprisonment.
As noted, the court found that circumstances in
aggravation justified its selection of the upper term. Specifically,
the court found defendant possessed a loaded gun, used that gun
to threaten the victim, transferred that gun to the shooter, and
directed the shooter to kill the victim. The court derived these
facts from defendant’s plea, a transcript of the trial of a
codefendant, and a Court of Appeal decision affirming that
codefendant’s conviction. As defendant argues, and the Attorney
General concedes, the court was not permitted to rely on those
sources to make factual findings for sentencing purposes.
Section 1170, subdivision (b),3 provides, in pertinent part:
“(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the
statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). [¶]
(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b) [“The
3 The Legislature amended this statute effective January 1, 2022.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (b)(1)–(6), by amendment.) The Attorney General properly
concedes defendant is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of the
amended statute. (See, e.g., People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 922, 927.)
5
court may only choose an upper term when (1) there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of an upper term, and (2) the facts underlying those
circumstances have been (i) stipulated to by the defendant,
(ii) found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury, or
(iii) found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the judge in a court
trial.”].)
Defendant did not stipulate to the truth of the facts
underlying his convictions because he pled nolo contendere under
People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. A West plea of nolo contendere
does not admit a factual basis for the plea. “Such a plea … allows
a defendant to plead guilty in order to take advantage of a plea
bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.” (People v.
Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424; see In re Alvernaz (1992)
2 Cal.4th 924, 932 [a plea of nolo contendere does not admit
factual basis for the plea].) Accordingly, the court was not
entitled to rely on defendant’s plea in making its factual findings.
Moreover, whatever facts the jury found true in the trial of
codefendant Stevens, and whatever facts were recited in the
appellate decision affirming his conviction, cannot be used
against this defendant to increase the term of his sentence. (E.g.,
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281 [noting that
under the Sixth Amendment “any fact that exposes a defendant
to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a
judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by
a preponderance of the evidence”]; cf. People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [noting appellate opinion in a codefendant’s
case is not part of a different defendant’s record of conviction].)
And because the court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing in
connection with defendant’s resentencing, it received no evidence
6
on which it could rely to find circumstances in aggravation
beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent the court relied on defendant’s use of a
handgun as an aggravating circumstance, it further erred.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) provides in pertinent part, “The
court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any
enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
provision of law.” The presence and use of a handgun in the
commission of the underlying offense formed the basis of the
10-year sentence enhancement imposed under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). The same facts cannot also be used to impose the
upper term of imprisonment.
Finally, it is unclear whether the court considered the
mitigating circumstance proposed by defendant. We note, for
purposes of remand, that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides
in pertinent part, “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] … [¶]
(B) The person is a youth or was a youth as defined under
subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of
the offense.”4 Defendant was 20 years old when the robbery was
committed.5
4 A “youth” “includes any person under 26 years of age on the date the
offense was committed.” (§ 1016.7, subd. (b).)
5 We leave the determination and balancing of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to the sound discretion of the court.
7
In sum, the court relied on facts that were neither admitted
by defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt in this
case to find factors in aggravation and impose the high term of
imprisonment. The court abused its discretion in doing so and the
matter must be remanded for resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for
resentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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