People v. Mackbee CA2/2

CourtListener 9506095Calctapp21 mag 2024

Testo completo

Filed 5/21/24 P. v. Mackbee CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B317081

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA091413)
v.

CHARLES ANTHONY
MACKBEE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeralyn B. Keller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Charles Anthony Mackbee (defendant) was convicted of
murder in 2014 when he and two others orchestrated a sham
purchase of medical marijuana so they could rob the seller at
gunpoint; they shot the seller and stole his drugs. In 2021, the
trial court denied defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction
under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1 after
an evidentiary hearing at which the court found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant was a major participant in the
robbery who had acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Substantial evidence supports these findings, so we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In early 2011, Philip Williamson (Williamson) was in the
business of importing a high-grade marijuana strain called “sour
diesel” from northern California and reselling it to marijuana
dispensaries in West Los Angeles. He ran the business out of his
Westside apartment, and kept a gun. Just before March 24,
2011, Williamson had stowed in his apartment approximately 11

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For simplicity’s sake,
we will refer to the section by its new numbering only.

2
pounds of the sour diesel marijuana and somewhere between
$100,000 and $375,000 or “even more than that” in cash.
Marcel Mackabee (Marcel)2 knew Williamson and would
sometimes smoke marijuana with him. Marcel decided to rob
Williamson. Marcel enlisted the aid of defendant, his cousin;
defendant recruited Kenneth Ray Johnson, whom defendant
referred to as his “right-hand man.” Johnson and his girlfriend
lived in defendant’s garage. Defendant later said they had all
agreed to “set . . . up” Williamson to rob him “and [Johnson]
would be the shooter.”
The robbery took place on March 24, 2011. Around noon
that day, Marcel drove his 4Runner to West Los Angeles: A video
camera at a Westside 7-Eleven recorded Marcel buying Verizon
calling cards at 12:27 p.m., and the receipt for that purchase was
found in Williamson’s apartment. Marcel’s cell phone also
“pinged” off of a cell tower near that 7-Eleven at the same time,
and Marcel placed a call to defendant’s cell phone.
Later that evening, Marcel drove Williamson to defendant’s
garage in Long Beach. Defendant and Johnson met Marcel and
Williamson inside the garage. Johnson posed as a businessman;
he wore a suit and brought a briefcase. The meeting in the
garage ended when either defendant or Johnson shot Williamson
once in the head. It is unclear which of the two pulled the
trigger. Johnson told his girlfriend he did it, but defendant told
others he had shot Williamson because he wanted the money and
“the shit” from him. Defendant showed his girlfriend a
newspaper article about the robbery and said, “This is the man

2 We use his first name to avoid confusion given the
similarity of his last name to defendant’s. We mean no
disrespect.

3
that I shot,” and told his uncle he had to leave town because he
had killed someone.
Defendant, Johnson, and Marcel put Williamson in the
back of the 4Runner and dumped him in an alley in just his
underwear, socks, and a T-shirt under a flannel shirt. Beside his
body, they left a pillow whose case matched a comforter in
defendant’s mother’s room. Williamson was still alive and was
still gasping for air when paramedics found him. He died a few
days later from the single gunshot wound to the head.
After dumping Williamson, defendant came back to the
garage and took some floor mats from the unit outside. He placed
the mats into bags, poured in bleach, tied the bags, and shook
them. In the days after the robbery, defendant and Johnson
burned some of their clothes in a fire pit. Meanwhile, the garage
floor had a stain that looked like “dried up blood” and the futon in
the garage had blood spots. Defendant and Johnson repeatedly
scrubbed the garage floor with chemicals, and disposed of the
futon. After the robbery, both defendant and Johnson possessed
sour diesel marijuana, including a big bag of it that they stored in
the garage. Defendant told a friend he was “sitting on about
$20,000.”
Approximately one month after the robbery, defendant
retrieved a gun from a cabinet in the garage, took it apart, put it
in a bag, and threw it in the trash.
II. Prosecution, Conviction, and Appeal
In 2012, the People charged defendant and Johnson with
first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).3 The People also alleged

3 Marcel was charged and tried separately. His conviction
and sentence were affirmed on appeal. (People v. Mackabee (June
20, 2014, B250143) [nonpub. opn.].)

4
the special circumstance that the murder had been committed in
the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and alleged that a
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The
People further alleged that defendant had served four prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and that Johnson had served
one.
Following trial, the jury convicted defendant and Johnson
of first degree murder, and found the special circumstance and
firearm allegations to be true. The court struck the prior prison
term enhancements.
Due to the special circumstance finding, the trial court
sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole on
the murder count; to that, the court added an additional year for
the firearm allegation.
On appeal in People v. Johnson et al. (Mar. 24, 2016,
B256273), in a nonpublished opinion, this court concluded that
the trial court’s special circumstances jury instruction omitted an
element, concluded that the omission was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and vacated the special circumstance finding
and defendant’s sentence based on that finding. We also
concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a
special circumstance finding, such that the People could retry
defendant on the special circumstance allegation. We remanded
for the People to elect whether to retry the special circumstance
or to have the trial court resentence defendant without that
finding.
On remand, the People elected not to retry the special
circumstance allegation. Consequently, the trial court
resentenced defendant to 26 years to life, comprised of 25 years to

5
life for the murder plus one additional year for the firearm
enhancement.
III. Petition to Vacate Under Section 1172.6
In May 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. After appointing counsel to represent
defendant, and after receiving a response from the People and
further briefing from defendant, the trial court in March 2021
issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
On November 3, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing. The People introduced the transcripts from the original
trial; defendant introduced no new evidence and did not testify.
On November 30, 2021, the trial court issued a three-page
order denying defendant’s petition. The court stated that
although “there was substantial evidence that . . . Johnson was
the actual shooter,” “it makes no difference” because defendant
was “present and[,] under a Banks/Clark analysis,” was a “major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
IV. Appeal
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
petition to vacate his murder conviction and to resentence him
under section 1172.6.
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the “[m]alice”
element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens

6
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) As amended, liability
for murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2)
who aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is,
who acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); e.g., People v.
Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46, 58-59.)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted in now-final judgments can seek to vacate convictions
that do not satisfy the current definition of “murder.” Where, as
here, a defendant files a facially sufficient petition and the record
does not otherwise foreclose relief as a matter of law, the trial
court must issue an order to show cause and convene an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the hearing, the
People have the burden of proving to the trial court, acting as an
independent factfinder, that a defendant is guilty of murder on a
still-valid theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
As pertinent here, the trial court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty under the still-valid
theory that he was a major participant in the robbery that
resulted in Williamson’s death and that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Our task is to assess whether
“substantial evidence”—that is, ““‘evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’””—supports the trial court’s
independent finding that defendant acted with reckless
indifference. (People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.)
In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the court’s finding, drawing all reasonable inferences in support
of that finding. (Ibid.)

7
I. Pertinent Legal Principles
Because the propriety of the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s petition turns on whether substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that defendant was a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life, further explication of those terms is helpful.
A. Major participant
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our Supreme Court
defined a “major participant” in a robbery as someone whose
“personal involvement” is “substantial”; such a participant “need
not be the ringleader,” but his involvement must be “greater than
the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor.” (Banks, at p. 802;
People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281.) Courts are to
examine the totality of the circumstances when evaluating the
extent of participation, including several factors our Supreme
Court identified in Banks as relevant but not dispositive on the
issue: (1) the defendant’s role in planning the robbery; (2) his
role in supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) his awareness of
the “particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime,
weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants”; (4) his presence at the scene of the killing and thus
whether he was “in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder”; and (5) his actions after the use of lethal force. (Banks,
at p. 803; Clark, at p. 611.)
B. Reckless indifference to human life
In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th 522, our Supreme Court also spelled out that a defendant
acts with reckless indifference to human life when he
““‘knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to carry a

8
grave risk of death.’”” (Banks, at p. 801, quoting People v.
Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577, quoting Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157.) This standard “has a
subjective and an objective” component. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9
Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins).) To satisfy the subjective
component, ‘“[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the [underlying felony] is
committed,’ and . . . must consciously disregard ‘the significant
risk of death his or her actions create.’” (Ibid., quoting Banks, at
p. 801.) The key is whether the defendant evinces “a willingness
to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim,
even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as
the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, p. 617.) To satisfy the
objective component, the risk of death “‘“must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
[defendant’s] conduct and the circumstances known to him . . . ,
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
[defendant’s] situation.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677, quoting Clark, at
p. 617.)
Our Supreme Court has identified a number of
considerations bearing on whether a defendant has acted
with reckless indifference to human life. “No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803); what matters is
the totality of the considerations (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
677). Those considerations are: (1) “Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the [underlying] felony,”
and, relatedly, “[h]ow many weapons were ultimately used?”; (2)
“Was the defendant physically present at the crime,” such that he

9
had “the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim?”; (3)
“What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the [underlying] felony and the victims?”; (4)
“What was the defendant’s knowledge of his . . . confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force?”; and
(5) “What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of
violence during the [underlying] felony?” (Ibid., citing Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.)
II. Analysis
As a threshold matter, defendant argues that we are
compelled to reject the trial court’s findings that he was a “major
participant” and “acted with reckless indifference” because his
role in the robbery was “largely a mystery” and “largely
unexplained,” given the absence of any evidence of his “conduct,
thoughts, or speech at the time of the shooting.” This argument
fails legally and factually. It fails legally because defendant cites
no authority for his implicit suggestion that no jury or court can
find that a defendant was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to the value of human life unless it is known
precisely what he did, thought, or said at every second.
Defendant’s argument fails factually because it completely
ignores the evidence in the record as well as the pertinent
standard of review. That evidence, as discussed below, amply
supports the trial court’s findings.
A. Major participant
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was a major participant in the robbery of Williamson.
Defendant, Johnson, and Marcel certainly had a plan: Marcel
induced Williamson to come with him to Long Beach, ostensibly
on the promise of having a buyer lined up, and drove Williamson

10
to defendant’s garage; defendant recruited his “right-hand man”
as that buyer; and defendant and Johnson brought at least one
gun to the garage to force Williamson to hand over the marijuana
he brought for the purported sale. The robbery may have been
Marcel’s idea, but there is evidence that defendant assisted with
the planning by supplying the faux buyer as well as the location
for the transaction. Thus, defendant is simply incorrect when he
argues that “[t]here is no evidence [he] played any role in the
planning” of the robbery. The evidence also supports the
inference that defendant may have been the shooter (and hence
used a lethal weapon), because defendant admitted as much to
his girlfriend and uncle, and also had a gun in his possession
after the robbery. Thus, defendant’s assertion that there was no
evidence he was armed is unsupported by the record. Although
there was no evidence that defendant knew Johnson had engaged
in violence in the past, it is fair to infer that defendant knew of
the particular dangers posed by bringing a gun into a small,
enclosed garage in order to rob a drug dealer. Defendant
responds that there was no reason to think that a business
transaction—when Johnson got dressed up to look like a
legitimate buyer—would result in a shooting, but this argument
utterly ignores that defendant knew from the start that the
business transaction was a ruse and that the plan all along was
to rob Williamson at gunpoint. Defendant was present in the
garage when Williamson was shot, and hence in a position to stop
the shooting. And after the use of lethal force, defendant and
Johnson worked together to strip Williamson out of his clothes
and then transport and dump his body in an alleyway—all while
Williamson was still breathing.

11
B. Reckless indifference to human life
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant knowingly engaged in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death because he evinced a willingness to
kill that entailed a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a
law-abiding person would observe, and hence acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
More generally, defendant and his cohorts engaged in
conduct that carries with it a particularly high risk of violence
because they planned and carried out the robbery of an armed
drug dealer—a crime with a particularly high risk of violence.
(In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013.) Defendant
also played a central and integral role in the planning and
execution of the robbery, invoking the maxim that “the greater
the defendant’s participation in the [underlying] felony . . . , the
more likely he or she acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 147.)
More specifically, the pertinent Banks and Clark factors
confirm that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Although there is no evidence that defendant had
foreknowledge of Johnson’s propensity for violence or likelihood
of using lethal force and the record does not indicate how long
Johnson and defendant interacted with Williamson in the garage
before shooting him, most of the other factors support the trial
court’s finding of reckless indifference. Defendant knew a gun
would be used to rob Williamson; indeed, defendant said that the
plan was for Johnson to “shoot” Williamson. Defendant was
physically present at the scene of the robbery and was in a
position to render aid to Williamson after he was shot. He did
not; instead, he callously pulled off Williamson’s clothes, stuffed

12
him in a car, and dumped his body in an alleyway—all as
Williamson was still struggling to breathe. Defendant argues
that there is no evidence he was physically close enough to
Johnson to prevent Johnson from taking a sudden action to harm
Williamson. We reject this argument: The robbery occurred in a
garage, not a stadium; no one was more than a few steps and an
arm’s length away from anyone else. And defendant took no
effort to minimize the risk of violence during the underlying
felony. Instead, he helped his friend maneuver a drug dealer into
a small, enclosed space, while they were armed with a gun, in
order to wrest drugs and money from their intended victim.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

13

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.