People v. Tran CA4/1

CourtListener 9505028Calctapp17 mag 2024

Testo completo

Filed 5/17/24 P. v. Tran CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082106

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD249683)
VICTOR MINH TRAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance from Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, a jury convicted Victor Minh Tran of two counts of attempted

murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and two counts of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), for conduct involving two victims. The jury was
instructed as to aiding and abetting liability with respect to these counts.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The jury also convicted Tran of one count of robbery (§ 211), and one
count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) for conduct
involving a third victim. The jury was instructed as to aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, and natural and probable consequences liability with respect to
these counts.
In 2022, Tran filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on
the ground that he was convicted of “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine” and “could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” The court appointed counsel, received briefing
from Tran and the People, and held a hearing. The trial court found that the
jury instructions refuted Tran’s allegation that he was convicted of attempted
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, and thus Tran
was not eligible for relief under the statute as a matter of law. The petition
for resentencing was denied without issuing an order to show cause.
Tran filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel subsequently
filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), indicating she has not been able to identify any potentially
meritorious issues for reversal on appeal. We notified Tran of his right to file
his own brief on appeal. He elected to do so and raised two principal
arguments. First, he claims “the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to
the elements needed to convict based off a theory of aiding/abetting a specific
intent crime and that the mens rea of an aider/abett[o]r is separate from the
perpetrator.” Second, he claims that, although the jury was not instructed on
natural and probable consequences liability with respect to attempted
murder, it could nonetheless have convicted him under a natural and
probable consequences theory due to the presence of a natural and probable

2
consequences for other counts and alleged improper argument by the
prosecutor.
We have reviewed the arguments raised by Tran and relevant portions

of the record of conviction,2 and we agree with counsel that there are no
potentially meritorious arguments on appeal. We therefore affirm.
DISCUSSION
As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Delgadillo, and Tran has elected to file his own supplemental brief. Although
we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,”
we are not “compel[led to conduct] an independent review of the entire record
to identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
Tran first argues that there was instructional error with respect to the
attempted murder charges, and the jury was not properly instructed as to the
requisite mens rea. As we have repeatedly held, such alleged “instructional
errors . . . have nothing to do with the[ ] 2019 legislative changes” to the law
of attempted murder. (People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921,
935; see also People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173; People v.
Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867 (Burns).) At the time of this
defendant’s trial in 2014, it was well established that “when the charged
offense and the intended offense—murder or attempted murder—are the
same, . . . the aider and abettor must know and share the murderous intent of
the actual perpetrator.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.)
Thus, assuming defendant is correct that the jury was not properly instructed
on the requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting attempted murder, that

2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in Tran’s prior
appeal so that we may assess Tran’s arguments regarding the prosecution’s
statements. (See Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 865, fn. 3.)
3
argument could and should have been raised on direct appeal. (See Berry-
Vierwinden, at p. 936.) That is, because Tran’s instructional error argument
could have been grounds for relief before amendments to the law of
attempted murder, a conviction on the basis of such error is not “because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) This is not an arguable issue.
Tran also claims that the prosecutor made multiple improper
statements that encouraged the jury to rely on a natural and probable
consequences theory of liability. The prosecution relied on a natural and
probable consequences theory only as to the nontarget, charged offenses of
“robbery and/or assault with a deadly weapon” based on the target,
uncharged offenses of “disturbing the peace, and/or a simple battery, and/or
assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury.” The natural and
probable consequences instruction concerned a different victim and different
counts than the attempted murder counts. “[A]bsent some indication in the
record, we must presume that the jury understood and applied these
instructions.” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 806–807
(Jablonski).)
Tran first points to arguments purportedly made during voir dire,
contending that the prosecutor “[e]licit[ed] the [natural and probable
consequences] doctrine for attempted murder.” However, Tran does not
describe the alleged statements in any detail, precluding us from assessing
the potential impact on the jury. Moreover, voir dire and opening arguments
were not transcribed. “Where the appropriate record is missing or
incomplete, [appellant] must see that the defect is remedied, by requesting
augmentation or correction of the appellate record [citation] or by other
appropriate means.” (People v. Barton (1978) 21 Cal.3d 513, 520.) Tran has

4
failed to provide an adequate record or argument from which we could
evaluate the effect of any statement made during voir dire.
Second, Tran points to the prosecutor’s statement “that the only
possible intent in firing a gun is to intend to kill because ‘that’s what they do
they kill people.’ ” In fact, the prosecutor was advancing the theory that Tran
personally intended to kill the victims, stating,
“It doesn’t matter if the defendant missed or was a bad shoot.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you take out a handgun and you
aim that handgun directly at two different people, and you begin
firing round, after round, you’re [sic] only intent could be to kill
these people. That’s what guns do. They kill people and that was
his intent when he began firing at [the victims]. He was trying to
kill them.” (Italics added.)

There is no reasonable possibility that this statement encouraged the jury to
misinterpret the natural and probable consequences instruction.
Third, Tran claims that the “prosecution continued [to] reference and
[rely] on characteristic elements of CALCRIM [No.] 403,” which concerns
natural and probable consequences. As best we can tell, Tran is arguing that
the prosecution linked the natural and probable consequences theory to the
attempted murder charges in its closing. That is not a reasonable reading of
the record. In rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor first responded to
points the defense made about aiding and abetting the attempted murder,
positing that even if the jury was uncertain whether Tran fired the gun, as
the driver of the vehicle he could still be guilty as an aider and abettor. Only
then did the prosecutor discuss the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, specifically referencing the robbery charge and concluding:
“You have to keep your eye on the ball when it comes to the
evidence, and I encourage you the natural and probable
consequences of these theories were described [by the defense] as
mumbo jumbo to you. ¶ I know it might be tempting to look at it

5
as mumbo jumbo, but it’s the law. . . . If it seems a little abstract,
just give it time, read the instructions, and it will become clear.”

There is no reasonable likelihood that the sequence of these statements
confused the jury, especially in light of the prosecutor’s specific reference to
the robbery offense in connection with natural and probable consequences
and his reminder to “give it time, [and] read the instructions.” Indeed,
although the jury asked several questions, including what counts aiding and
abetting applied to, they did not ask any questions reflecting they were
confused about what counts the natural and probable consequences theory
applied to.
Fourth, Tran claims the prosecutor “complain[ed] about the theory in
CALCRIM [No.] 403 as it pertains to attempt murder charges.” This is not
supported by the record. In any case, concerns about instructional language
were raised at conferences outside the presence of the jury and could not
possibly have influenced the jurors’ interpretation of the instructions.
Finally, Tran argues the prosecutor “[e]licited CALCRIM [No.]
8[illegible] as it pertains to assault with a firearm, at which point is an
assault with a firearm upgraded to attempt to commit murder, which then
leads to the question at which point is attempt to commit murder the target
offense or the intended crime.” To the extent Tran is alleging another
misleading statement by the prosecution, there is no record support for such
claim. As best we can determine, Tran suggests that the mere fact that he
was charged with assault with a firearm could have encouraged the jury to
treat attempted murder as the natural and probable consequence of assault
with a firearm. Again, the instructions did not include a natural and
probable consequences theory with respect to assault with a firearm or
attempted murder. Absent contrary indication in the record, which Tran has

6
not identified, we must presume the jury understood its charge. (Jablonski,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Tran’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
is affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

7

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.