People v. Payne CA5

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Filed 5/10/24 P. v. Payne CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F085863 & F085865
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. SUF20408 &
v. SUF20409)

RANDY LYNN PAYNE,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.

Three Strikes Project, Stanford Law School and Michael S. Romano for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Randy Lynn Payne (defendant) is serving a prison term of 25 years to life imposed
under the original version of California’s “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds.
(b)–(j), 1170.12). (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The
qualifying offenses were petty theft with prior theft convictions (felony petty theft) and
attempting to elude police while operating a vehicle with willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of people or property (felony evading). Defendant has repeatedly sought to be
resentenced based on changes in the law, but with little success.
This appeal arises from long-delayed proceedings under the Safe Neighborhoods
and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47), but it concerns the denial of relief under the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36) and section 1385, subdivision (a).
Defendant was eligible for Proposition 47 resentencing as to his felony petty theft
conviction, and he was in fact resentenced as a misdemeanant for that crime. Felony
evading is not a Proposition 47-eligible offense, but the proceedings allowed the trial
court to reconsider its prior denials of a Romero motion (see People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)) and a petition for resentencing under
Proposition 36.
The trial court found it “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety” to grant relief pursuant to Proposition 36. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) Defendant’s
renewed Romero motion was denied for the same reason, with the additional finding that
defendant “does not fall outside the … spirit [of the Three Strikes law].” After receiving
the trial court’s ruling, the defense changed its position and argued that determinate
sentencing for the felony evading offense was mandatory in conjunction with the
Proposition 47 resentencing. The argument was rejected.
Now, on appeal, defendant continues to argue that determinate sentencing was
mandatory. In the alternative, he claims (1) the trial court abused its discretion and (2)
his life sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm
the judgment.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PRIOR APPEALS
We have previously granted requests by defendant and the People to take judicial
notice of our records in defendant’s earlier appeals. The parties did not request judicial

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notice in the current appeal, but their briefs cite to our unpublished opinions in those prior
appeals. On the court’s own motion, judicial notice is hereby taken of our records and
opinions in People v. Payne, case Nos. F026894, F067838, F071909, and F079012.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; see, e.g., In re Nelson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 114,
119, fn. 2; Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 795, fn. 3; Mayer v. C.W. Driver
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 61.)
FACTUAL, LEGAL, AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
“What is commonly referred to as the Three Strikes law ‘consists of two, nearly
identical statutory schemes’: the first enacted by the Legislature in March 1994
[citation], and the second enacted by ballot initiative in November 1994 [citation].”
(People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 378, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.).) As
originally conceived, the law “required that a defendant who had two or more prior
convictions of violent or serious felonies receive a third strike sentence of a minimum of
25 years to life for any current felony conviction, even if the current offense was neither
serious nor violent.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 680.) Such defendants
were presumed incorrigible and thus deserving of “‘longer prison sentences and greater
punishment.’” (People v. Sasser (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1, 11; see People v. Vargas (2014) 59
Cal.4th 635, 638.)
Defendant, now age 60, has an extensive criminal record. By the time the Three
Strikes law was enacted in 1994, he had already suffered three qualifying felony
convictions. Defendant also has a history of substance abuse.
In February 1996, at the age of 32, defendant stole motor oil from a gas station in
Merced. He fled in a stolen car and attempted to evade a pursuing California Highway
Patrol officer on Highway 99. After reaching speeds of over 100 miles per hour,
defendant lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a stationary object. The incident
resulted in criminal charges, a jury trial, and convictions of felony evading (Veh. Code,
§§ 2800.1, 2800.2) and felony petty theft (Pen. Code, former § 666.)

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In September 1996, defendant was sentenced as a third strike offender. The trial
court imposed concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life. A defense motion to dismiss
the Three Strikes allegation and/or punish the crimes as misdemeanors was denied. This
court later ordered the punishment for felony petty theft stayed (§ 654), but the judgment
was otherwise affirmed. (People v. Payne (May 26, 1998, F026894) [nonpub. opn.]
(Payne I).)
In November 2012, by enactment of Proposition 36, section 1170.126 created a
resentencing process for third strike offenders serving life terms for nonserious and
nonviolent felony convictions. An eligible petitioner “shall be resentenced [as a second
strike offender] unless the [sentencing] court, in its discretion, determines that
resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) In exercising its discretion, “the court may consider: [¶] (1) The
petitioner’s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the
extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of
the crimes; [¶] (2) The petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while
incarcerated; and [¶] (3) Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to
be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (g).)
In December 2012, defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing under
Proposition 36. Because the original trial judge had retired, the matter was assigned to
the Honorable Mark V. Bacciarini. Although defendant was eligible for relief under
section 1170.126, subdivision (b), resentencing was found to pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. Judge Bacciarini cited, inter alia, the fact defendant had been
clinically diagnosed with a mood disorder “that leaves [him] with a ‘fluctuating ability to
cope,’” as well as a substance abuse problem. Other factors included defendant’s
disciplinary issues while incarcerated.

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In November 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 47. A few weeks later,
on December 17, 2014, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief under
Proposition 36. (People v. Payne (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 579, 584 (Payne II).) The
Payne II appeal did not involve any issues regarding Proposition 47.
“Proposition 47 reclassified as misdemeanors certain drug- and theft-related
offenses that previously were felonies or wobblers.” (People v. Valencia, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 355.) A wobbler is an offense punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony at
the discretion of the sentencing court. (§ 17, subd. (b); People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th
782, 789.) Both of defendant’s 1996 convictions were wobblers, but only felony petty
theft has been reclassified as a misdemeanor by Proposition 47. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
“Proposition 47 also added a provision allowing felony offenders ‘serving a
sentence for a conviction’ for offenses now reclassified as misdemeanors to petition to
have their sentences recalled and to be resentenced.” (People v. Valencia, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 355.) “Like Proposition 36, Proposition 47 gave resentencing courts
discretion to decline to impose a lesser sentence if resentencing ‘would result in an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’” (Id. at p. 351.) However, a trial court’s
discretion to deny resentencing is more limited under Proposition 47 than under
Proposition 36.1
In March 2015, defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus
based on Proposition 47. Defendant drafted and filed the petition himself. He later

1A trial court’s discretion to deny resentencing for a Proposition 47-eligible conviction is
circumscribed by section 1170.18, subdivision (c), which defines “unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony”
described in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). Commonly known as “super strikes,” those
felonies consist of rape, sexual abuse of minors, homicide offenses, possessing a weapon of mass
destruction, and all other serious or violent felonies punishable by life imprisonment or death.
(§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I—VIII); People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242.) In
2017, the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 47’s narrow definition of
dangerousness does not apply to resentencing proceedings under Proposition 36. (People v.
Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 377.)

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drafted and filed a motion for reconsideration of his 1996 Romero motion. A hearing
took place in May 2015, with a deputy public defender appearing on defendant’s behalf.
Judge Bacciarini denied the motion for reconsideration, stating, “I don’t believe I have
any jurisdiction to recall or reconsider that sentence.” The judge noted defendant’s
eligibility for partial relief under Proposition 47 but declined to take further action “until
the proper petition is before me.” Defendant filed a notice of appeal, but he dismissed the
appeal before any briefing was submitted.
In January 2018, defendant filed another pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus
based on Proposition 47. The trial court set a hearing date and appointed counsel to
represent defendant. The hearing was continued several times at defense counsel’s
request. Finally, in September 2018, defense counsel filed a petition for relief based on
Proposition 47 and pursuant to Romero, and for reconsideration of the previous denial of
relief under Proposition 36.
By early 2019, defendant’s petition was still pending and he had become
dissatisfied with his appointed counsel’s representation. Defendant was eventually
allowed to argue the petition himself, and he did so with only minimal success. The trial
court ordered the felony petty theft conviction “amended to a misdemeanor,” but all other
relief was denied. In other words, the life sentence for felony evading was left
unchanged. Defendant appealed the ruling.
In September 2019, while his fourth appeal was pending, defendant appeared
before the Board of Parole Hearings (parole board) for an initial parole consideration
hearing. The parole board found defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety
and was therefore unsuitable for parole at that time. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2281,
subd. (a).) Parole was denied for a minimum of three years. (§ 3041.5, subd. (b)(3)(C).)
In People v. Payne (Sept. 21, 2021, F079012) [nonpub. opn.] (Payne IV),
defendant alleged his waiver of counsel during the Proposition 47 proceedings was
invalid under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. This court accepted the

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People’s concession of reversible error and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
The remittitur issued in November 2021.
On remand, defendant was represented by Stanford Law School’s Three Strikes
Project. The Three Strikes Project is a collective of law professors, staff attorneys, and
law students who advocate for criminal law reform and provide pro bono legal services
for defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes law. (See
<https://law.stanford.edu/three-strikes-project/#slsnav-litigation-reform-education> [as of
May 9, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/E3RZ-J44Z>.) The Three Strikes Project
continues to represent defendant in this appeal.
In May 2022, defendant filed a document entitled “Petition For Resentencing
Pursuant To Proposition 47 and People v. Buycks [(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857].” (Some
capitalization omitted.) Relying on Buycks and language in this court’s Payne IV
opinion, defendant sought reconsideration of his previously denied Romero motion. (See
Buycks, at p. 893 [noting “the Courts of Appeal have concluded that, under the recall
provisions of [Proposition 47], the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every
aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall”].) The petition did
not discuss or reference Proposition 36.
Defendant’s petition noted his “participation in prison rehabilitation and
vocational programming.” With exception of a fighting incident in 2004, defendant had
been a nonviolent inmate. His record of disciplinary issues had been relatively minimal
since 2017, showing marked improvement from a spate of substance abuse violations in
2016.
The petition further alleged defendant “walks with a cane and … also suffers from
a seizure disorder which further limits his physical capabilities. [Citation.] Other
physical infirmities include hepatitis C, hypertension, kidney stones, and liver fibrosis.”
The petition cited to exhibits providing support for these allegations, but the exhibits are

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not part of the record on appeal. The defense later provided, in a supplemental filing with
the trial court, evidence defendant has also been diagnosed with cirrhosis.
On May 25, 2022, the People filed an opposition to defendant’s petition. The
opposition was supported by multiple exhibits, including a 108-page transcript from
defendant’s September 2019 parole suitability hearing. Another exhibit showed the
parole board had denied, in May 2020, a petition filed by defendant to advance the date
of his next parole suitability hearing. The latter document summarized the parole board’s
reasons for having denied parole in 2019: “(1) inmate’s recent history of serious
misconduct in prison involving substance abuse; (2) inmate’s recent prison behavior
indicative of a lack of impulse control; (3) a lack of relevant self-help programming and;
(4) inmate’s Relapse Prevention Plan [did] not adequately address substance abuse
issues.”
On May 31, 2022, the hearing on defendant’s resentencing petition was continued
by mutual agreement of counsel. The record indicates this occurred in light of the
possibility defendant might soon be paroled. A second parole suitability hearing was
reportedly scheduled for August 25, 2022.
In July 2022, the People filed a supplemental opposition brief with an additional
exhibit. The exhibit was a “Comprehensive Risk Assessment” prepared for the parole
board the previous month by forensic psychologist Steven Arkowitz, Psy.D. Included in
Dr. Arkowitz’s report was the following summary of defendant’s history of disciplinary
issues in prison:

“[Defendant] has received approximately 22 Rule Violation Reports
(RVRs). These have included (though not limited to) the following
infractions: mutual combat (2004), possession of a hypodermic syringe
(2008), and possession of inmate manufactured alcohol (2012). Of note, in
2016 he received approximately 12 RVRs for use of a controlled substance
(morphine). Most recently, he received RVRs for refusing to accept
assigned housing in April and May of 2022. In addition, he has received
many administrative and counseling-only RVRs, most recently in 2019.…
[¶] … [¶] In terms of his May 2022 RVR for refusing to accept assigned

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housing, [defendant] stated that his mental health and medical diagnoses do
not allow for him to be housed in a dorm. He said he felt discriminated
against due to his disability but staff members are now assisting him.”
The record on appeal does not expressly disclose what happened at defendant’s
second parole suitability hearing. However, given the arguments in his appellate briefing
and the fact the proofs of service show he is still incarcerated, it appears defendant was
denied parole a second time.
Defendant’s resentencing petition was heard on September 30, 2022. During the
hearing, the defense proffered expert testimony from a former California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) official, Richard Subia. The witness opined that
defendant “does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Following the
expert testimony and argument by counsel, the matter was taken under submission.
In December 2022, the trial court issued a 10-page ruling. Relief was granted
under Proposition 47 as to the only Proposition 47-eligible offense: felony petty theft.
The trial court found defendant “does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety” under Proposition 47’s narrow definition of dangerousness. (See fn. 1, ante.)
Accordingly, the felony petty theft conviction was redesignated as a misdemeanor.
As for defendant’s felony evading conviction, the trial court reconsidered its prior
denial of relief under Proposition 36. It again found that resentencing defendant as a
second strike offender “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”
(italics added) under the broader discretion conferred by section 1170.126, subdivision
(g). The following explanation was provided:

“Since the 2013 ruling denying relief [under Proposition 36],
[defendant] has continued to engage in the same concerning pattern of
behavior and has not sufficiently availed himself of opportunities to
program. This is compounded by his well-established drug problem, lack
of impulse control, and lack of insight into the dangerousness of his past
behavior.

“[Defendant] continued to struggle with impulse control and drug
addiction after the court’s 2013 ruling. In 2016, [defendant] tested positive
for morphine over 10 times in a controlled institutional setting. In 2017, he
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was given counseling for refusing to submit to a drug test. To his credit, it
appears [defendant] has maintained sobriety since 2017.

“Though not for testing positive for narcotics, [defendant] has
continued to violate other rules and has received multiple rule violations
reports (RVRs). In 2017, he received a counseling RVR for disobeying an
order. Three times between 2018 and 2019, [defendant] was absent from
his work assignment. He received two counseling and one administrative
RVRs as a result. In 2019, he received another counseling RVR. Finally,
in 2022, he received RVRs for refusing to accept assigned housing in April
and May.

“It appears [defendant] has engaged in some programming, though
inconsistently. His records indicate he has refused to complete assigned
packets. In April and May 2022, around the same time he was refusing a
housing change, he also refused to complete the Remote Programming
Engagement Packet Homework as part of Integrated Substance Use
Disorder Treatment (ISUDT). [Defendant] claims he was unable to
complete the packets due to his dyslexia but fails to mention what efforts, if
any, he made to get assistance or accommodations to complete his
assignments.

“[Defendant] was interviewed by Dr. Steven Arkowitz for the
preparation of his 2022 Comprehensive Risk Assessment (CRA). It is
apparent in the report that [defendant] has not developed concrete strategies
for how he will handle challenges, temptations, and stressors if released.

“This court agrees with Dr. Arkowitz[’s] assessment that, ‘[b]ased
on his lengthy history of noncompliance, his response to supervision
continues to be highly relevant to his risk of violence.’ The court also
agrees with Dr. Arkowitz in that [defendant] tended to minimize and
provide somewhat superficial explanations for some of his poor criminal
and/or rule-breaking behavior. The court also observed this tendency in
[defendant]’s 2019 parole hearing.

“The court agrees with Dr. Arkowitz’s assessment that [defendant]
‘will likely experience significant stressors when released. He will likely
be exposed to drugs; antisocial individuals; and challenging interpersonal
situations. He displayed a minimal understanding of these potential
difficulties.’ [Defendant] has struggled with narcotics, impulse control, and
following rules or orders that he disliked in an institutionalized setting. The
court has little confidence [defendant] will be able to properly manage these
issues if released; he lacks insight and lacks the concrete tools/skills needed
due to refusing to properly engage in programming designed to assist him.

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As such, [defendant] continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public
safety.

“The court considered Mr. Subia’s testimony and written report in
coming to its decision. The court did not find Mr. Subia’s testimony and
report to be helpful to [defendant]. Mr. Subia’s testimony and report
reiterated information otherwise in the record. Mr. Subia simply came to a
different conclusion. The court disagrees with Mr. Subia’s conclusion.

“The court has no doubt that [defendant] is sincere in his desire to
change and be released. However, [defendant] needs to put action behind
his desires and demonstrate consistent behavior. [Defendant] needs to
work on self-help programming, gain insight to his triggers, and make
concrete plans to handle difficult situations and control his impulses.
[Defendant] plans to reintegrate into society by staying and receiving
services through Options Recovery Services. However, [defendant] needs
to demonstrate he can comply with services in prison before the court can
have confidence [defendant] will comply with services outside of prison.

“[Defendant] does have several medical conditions, such as cirrhosis
of the liver, epilepsy, and mobility issues. However, his medical conditions
do not impact his ability to be violent and dangerous. [Defendant] could
still easily engage in reckless and dangerous activities similar to the ones
that led to this commitment offense.”
The trial court also denied the Romero motion. The ruling briefly explains:
“[Defendant] is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and thus it is not in the
interest of justice to grant relief. Further, [defendant]’s criminal history and institutional
record demonstrate that [defendant] does not fall outside the scheme’s spirit.”
On January 17, 2023, the defense filed a sentencing memorandum concerning
defendant’s resentencing under Proposition 47. However, contrary to all prior
submissions, the defense now argued that relief under Proposition 47 as to the petty theft
conviction somehow triggered automatic relief as to the felony evading conviction. The
trial court rejected this argument, and defendant appealed.

11.
DISCUSSION
I. Automatic Resentencing Claims
A. Buycks Argument
Defendant claims entitlement to determinate sentencing on the felony evasion
offense based on the “full resentencing rule” discussed in People v. Buycks, supra, 5
Cal.5th 857. The quoted term was used in Buycks to describe the following principle:
“[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’” (Buycks, at p. 893.) It was noted the
full resentencing rule has “been applied to recall and resentencing provisions enacted by
Proposition 36,” and that “several Courts of Appeal have upheld the modification of
every aspect of a defendant’s sentence by a resentencing court following a successful
petition to recall only part of that sentence under Proposition 47.” (Ibid.)
In the post-Buycks case of People v. Hubbard (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 9, the
appellant was serving a life term under the original Three Strikes law for two felony
convictions; one was a serious felony (attempted robbery), but the other was neither
serious nor violent (felony evading). (Hubbard, at p. 11.) The Hubbard appellant was
thus eligible for Proposition 36 resentencing on only one of his two commitment
offenses, which was of little practical benefit to him. However, the Third Appellate
District held the trial court had jurisdiction to also consider a renewed Romero motion in
conjunction with the Proposition 36 proceedings. (Hubbard, at pp. 12–13.)
In Payne IV, this court discussed Buycks and Hubbard and generally concluded,
under the same rationale, defendant could seek reconsideration of his previously denied
Romero motion and Proposition 36 petition in conjunction with resentencing under
Proposition 47. We cited People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 for the proposition
“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when

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resentencing a defendant.” (Valenzuela, at pp. 424–425.) The Payne IV opinion did not
suggest or contemplate that relief under Proposition 36 would be automatic.
Proposition 36 allows “persons presently serving an indeterminate term of
imprisonment” under the former Three Strikes law to petition for resentencing as a
second strike offender. (§ 1170.126, subds. (a), (f).) As discussed, “Proposition 36 did
not make resentencing automatic; its provisions directed the trial court to evaluate
whether early release would pose ‘an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”’
based on the defendant’s criminal history and other factors.” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 852.) Defendant argues section 1170.126 does not apply to him because
he was not “presently serving” a Three Strikes sentence during the proceedings on
remand. He contends the granting of relief under Proposition 47 as to the petty theft
conviction meant his “entire sentence was vacated and he was required to be sentenced
anew” under the current version of the Three Strikes law. Because felony evading is not
punishable by a life term under the current version of the Three Strikes law, defendant
claims his “life sentence must be reversed.”
Defendant’s novel argument is not supported by the cases upon which he relies.
He selectively quotes from Buycks for the sweeping proposition “that when resentencing
a defendant, a trial court ‘must’ apply the law in effect ‘at that time.’” What Buycks
actually says is this:

“[A]t the time of resentencing of a Proposition 47 eligible felony
conviction, the trial court must reevaluate the applicability of any
enhancement within the same judgment at that time, so long as that
enhancement was predicated on a felony conviction now reduced to a
misdemeanor. Such an enhancement cannot be imposed because at that
point the reduced conviction ‘shall be considered a misdemeanor for all
purposes.’ (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).) Under these limited circumstances, a
defendant may also challenge any prison prior enhancement in that
judgment if the underlying felony has been reduced to a misdemeanor
under Proposition 47, notwithstanding the finality of that judgment.”
(People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 894.)

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Court opinions are not authority for propositions not considered therein. (People
v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 169, fn. 5.) The Buycks opinion merely holds “a person
may petition for recall of his or her current sentence under [Proposition 47], upon which
the trial court, when it resentences on the eligible felony conviction, must also resentence
the defendant generally and must therefore reevaluate the continued applicability of any
enhancement based on a prior felony conviction.” (People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 894.) Incidentally, the imposition of a life term under the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement; it is an alternative penalty. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527; People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244.)
The other cases cited in defendant’s briefing are similarly inapposite. (E.g.,
People v. Valenzuela, supra, 7 Cal.5th 415; People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
376; People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198.) Valenzuela and Walker dealt with
whether redesignation of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47
necessarily invalidated the appellants’ other convictions or enhancements. (Valenzuela,
at pp. 418–419; Walker, at pp. 203–204.) Here, the redesignation of defendant’s petty
theft conviction to a misdemeanor did not invalidate or otherwise affect his felony
evading conviction.
The Salgado case arose from a discretionary recall of sentence and resentencing
under former section 1170, subdivision (d), which has since been renumbered as section
1172.1. (People v. Salgado, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 378.) The statute provides “an
exception to the common law rule that the court loses resentencing jurisdiction once
execution of sentence has begun.” (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455
[discussing former § 1170, subd. (d)].) The issues in Salgado concerned retroactivity of
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). The opinion does not discuss
Proposition 36 or the Three Strikes law.
Defendant argues Salgado “held that when a sentence is recalled, the trial court
‘must apply all changes in law that reduce sentences … in effect at the time of the

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[re]sentencing hearing.’” Again, context is key. In the cited portion of Salgado, the
appellate court was merely reciting the language of the applicable statute. (People v.
Salgado, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 381, quoting § 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) We do not
view Salgado as supportive of defendant’s position regarding Proposition 36.
The Attorney General relies on People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646. The issue
in Conley was whether defendants sentenced to life terms under the former Three Strikes
law but whose judgments were not final when Proposition 36 was enacted were entitled
to automatic relief under the new law. (Conley, at pp. 655–656.) The California
Supreme Court held they were not. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that while
Proposition 36 “reduce[d] previously prescribed criminal penalties,” it “also establish[ed]
a new set of disqualifying factors that preclude a third strike defendant from receiving a
second strike sentence.” (Conley, at p. 659.) “The recall procedures in … section
1170.126 were designed to strike a balance between these objectives of mitigating
punishment and protecting public safety….” (Id. at p. 658.) The court was unwilling to
construe Proposition 36 in a way that would allow defendants sentenced under the former
Three Strikes law to circumvent the parts of Proposition 36 that were designed to screen
out dangerous offenders. (Id. at pp. 659–660.)
Although Conley is not directly on point, we agree it is the most analogous and
instructive authority among those cited in the parties’ briefing. “Proposition 36 made
resentencing contingent on a court’s evaluation of a defendant’s dangerousness.” (People
v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 726, citing People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 658–659.) “There can be no doubt that [Proposition 36] was motivated in large
measure by a determination that sentences under the prior version of the Three Strikes
law were excessive. … But voters were motivated by other purposes as well, including
the protection of public safety.” (Conley, at p. 658.)
The remand proceedings in this case occurred in the context of Proposition 47
resentencing. Proposition 47 and Proposition 36 were aimed at “two very different

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populations of offenders.” (People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 376.) “[T]he two
groups are not similarly situated for purposes of resentencing because one group consists
of recidivist serious or violent offenders, who may have the propensity to commit serious
or violent felony crimes[,] and the other generally consists of low-level offenders.”
(Ibid.)
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has already determined that
Proposition 47 did not amend Proposition 36. (People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp.
351–352.) Citing uncodified provisions of Proposition 47 and parts of the voter guide,
the court observed that “neither the initiative’s text nor its supporting materials describe
any intention to amend the criteria for the resentencing of recidivist serious or violent
felons.” (Valencia, at p. 357.) Defendant fails to persuade us that, by virtue of obtaining
relief under Proposition 47 for one commitment offense, he is entitled to bypass the
public safety provisions of Proposition 36 and secure further, automatic sentencing relief
for a separate conviction that is outside the scope of Proposition 47.
B. Equal Protection Claim
In the final section of his opening brief, defendant argues his sentence “violates
the Equal Protection Clause because similarly situated defendants have a right to have
their sentences reevaluated under new law—Penal Code section 1172.75—but [he] does
not.” Defendant barely explains the subject matter of section 1172.75 before pivoting to
a short discussion of People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, which has since been
overruled by the California Supreme Court (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834,
866). The Hardin discussion is followed by a conclusory, single-sentence paragraph that
reads:

“Because there can be no rational justification to differentiate [defendant]
from a similarly situated defendant who has a new sentencing opportunity
because he or she received an additional enhancement under section
667.5(b), [defendant] must also be entitled the benefit of section 1172.75
and a chance to reevaluate his current sentence.”

16.
Section 1172.75 concerns prior prison term enhancements. “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense … is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute requires the
CDCR to “identify those persons in [its] custody currently serving a term for a judgment
that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)” and provide the information
to the appropriate sentencing court. (Id., subd. (b).) The sentencing court, in turn, “shall
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
“The party raising an equal protection challenge has the burden of establishing
unconstitutionality.” (Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095,
1111.) Defendant’s equal protection claim is insufficiently developed in the opening
brief and not even mentioned in his reply brief. Nor was it mentioned during oral
argument. As presented, the claim makes little sense. Defendant alleges the deprivation
of an equal “opportunity for reevaluation of [his] entire sentence” and “opportunity for a
new sentence and possible release.” But defendant was afforded those very opportunities
in the proceedings on remand. He falls well short of meeting his appellate burden.2

2It is possible defendant is alluding to section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), under which
the resentencing court must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The Three Strikes Project
participated as an amicus curiae in People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
978, review granted March 12, 2024, S283305, where the issue was whether section 1172.75
entitles third strike offenders with prior prison term enhancements to automatic resentencing
under Proposition 36 even if they were previously denied relief under section 1170.126 based on
findings of dangerousness. The majority decision in Guevara holds such automatic relief is not
compelled by section 1172.75, and that such a construction of the statute would amount to an
unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 36. (Guevara, at pp. 984–987.) To date, all
published cases on the subject have agreed with the Guevara majority. (People v. Santos (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 666; People v. Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, rev. granted Apr. 24, 2024,
S284259.) Here, defendant does not argue that section 1172.75 entitles similarly situated third
strike offenders to automatic resentencing in circumvention of section 1170.126. He merely
contends such individuals have “an opportunity for a new sentence and possible release [from
prison].” It is therefore unnecessary for us to take a position on the issue presented in Guevara.
17.
II. Romero Claim
Defendant alternatively claims the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion.
Rather than addressing the trial court’s stated reasons for its ruling, defendant argues his
case “is materially indistinguishable from” People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
1007, where an appellate court reversed the denial of a Romero motion for abuse of
discretion. Given the limited scope of defendant’s argument, our analysis will focus on
the differences between this case and Dryden.
A. Additional Background
Defendant’s briefing describes his commitment offenses as “shoplifting a can of
motor oil from a gas station and speeding away from arresting officers.” The statement is
both inaccurate and unduly minimizing of the underlying incident. This is somewhat
ironic considering one of the trial court’s reasons for denying the renewed Romero
motion was defendant’s “lack of insight into the dangerousness of his past behavior.”
Defendant stole 36 cans of motor oil from a gas station (three cases, each
containing 12 cans). He fled in a Toyota Camry after two employees “rushed outside to
confront [him]” and “started banging on the side of the car and yelling at [him] to stop.”
(Payne I, supra, F026894.) What happened next is detailed in the Payne I opinion:

“At approximately 10:02 a.m., California Highway Patrol (CHP)
Officer Paul Speers received a radio dispatch reporting a gold Toyota
Camry being driven in a reckless manner northbound on Highway 99.
Officer Speers was driving a marked patrol vehicle equipped with red and
blue overhead lights. Officer Speers stopped along the highway and
positioned his car to watch northbound traffic. At approximately 10:04
a.m., he saw a gold Toyota Camry traveling approximately 70 miles per
hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.

“Defendant, who was driving the Camry, was the only person
Officer Speers could see in the car. Defendant looked directly at Officer
Speers as he passed him. Officer Speers pulled behind defendant, and

(See People v. Abarca (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 475, 480 [“‘An appellate court is not required to
examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties’”].)

18.
defendant immediately accelerated. Officer Speers activated his vehicle’s
overhead lights and turned on the siren.

“Defendant continued to drive. For several hundred yards, the
Camry traveled with two wheels on the center divider and two wheels in
the number one lane. He later crossed the roadway and drove onto the
shoulder. Other vehicles moved out of the way to avoid collisions with
defendant. At times, defendant drove at speeds well over 100 miles per
hour. Despite the fact Officer Speers was wearing his CHP uniform and
pursued defendant in a marked CHP car with flashing lights and siren,
defendant did not stop. [¶] As defendant approached the city limits of
Livingston, he drove onto the shoulder to attempt to drive around stopped
traffic at the red traffic light. Defendant lost control of the car, flipped over
and struck a power pole.” (People v. Payne I, supra, F026894).)
The Payne I opinion further explains some of the reasons why defendant’s original
Romero motion was denied in 1996:

“[The trial court] noted the seriousness of defendant’s attempt to
evade arrest. While the officer was attempting to stop defendant, he
himself was afraid of having an accident. Defendant passed a number of
cars while speeding on the freeway, on the shoulder and on the divider,
resulting in the car rolling and hitting a pole. At times, defendant was
driving at 110 miles per hour. The car was demolished. The court opined
defendant was very fortunate nobody was killed.

“Defendant was 33 at the time of sentencing. He has a criminal
record dating back to 1982 when he was 19 years old. In his probation
report, defendant admits a drug problem and contends the drug problem is
the reason for his criminal activity. In 1982, defendant was convicted of
attempted burglary and taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent. In
1983, he was convicted of burglary, second degree burglary, fighting in
public, and carrying a concealed weapon. In 1984, he was convicted of
burglary. In 1985 he was convicted of two counts of petty theft with a
prior. In 1986, defendant was again convicted of petty theft with a prior,
and, in 1988, of receiving stolen property. In 1989, he was convicted of
burglary. In 1991, he was convicted of burglary and robbery. In 1992 and
1994, defendant sustained three burglary convictions.” (Payne I, supra,
F026894.)
B. Legal Overview
California’s Three Strikes law was designed to restrict the discretion of trial courts
when punishing recidivist offenders “‘to ensure longer prison sentences and greater

19.
punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felony offenses.’” (People v. Sasser, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
11, quoting § 667, subd. (b).) However, as recognized in Romero, section 1385
authorizes trial courts to strike prior conviction allegations in cases brought under the
Three Strikes law if it will further the interests of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.) A request for such relief is commonly known as a
Romero motion. The granting or denial of a Romero motion is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.)
Like other sentencing schemes based on recidivism, the basic premise of the Three
Strikes law is “‘that the defendant’s current criminal conduct is more serious because he
or she previously was found to have committed criminal conduct and did not thereafter
reform.’” (People v. Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 638.) When ruling on a Romero
motion, the sentencing court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“A prior strike conviction is not considered ‘remote’ for the purposes of mitigation
where the defendant has not demonstrated a prolonged period of rehabilitation … in the
interim.” (People v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) “In analyzing whether a
defendant’s prior criminal conduct was ‘remote,’ a trial court should consider whether the
defendant ‘was incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening time and thus had little
or no opportunity to commit’ additional crimes.” (Ibid.) Thus, in cases where a Romero
motion is reconsidered after a lengthy period of incarceration, the defendant’s custodial
conduct will carry more weight than the mere passage of time in determining his future
prospects. (See Vasquez, at p. 390; People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107

20.
[“older strike convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness unless the defendant has
used them as a pivot point for reforming his ways”].)
C. The Dryden Case
In People v. Dryden, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, the Sixth Appellate District held
that a trial court’s “strict application of the Three Strikes law … resulted in a sentence so
out of proportion to the offenses as to be an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The
appellant, James Dryden, was convicted of two counts of assault with a dangerous or
deadly weapon. He had struck two teenaged victims with a “hollow bamboo stick” (id. at
p. 1028) during “a late-night, spontaneous altercation” at a fast-food restaurant (id., at p.
1031). Dryden was “51 years old, homeless, and intoxicated” at the time of the offenses.
(Id. at p. 1013.)
The subject incident occurred in October 2013. (People v. Dryden, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.) Dryden had already suffered three prior strikes: “a 1989
conviction for residential burglary [citation]; a 2005 conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon [citation]; and a 2007 conviction for residential burglary.” (Id. at p. 1030.) After
declining to reduce the current offenses to misdemeanors and denying a Romero motion,
the trial court imposed the Three Strikes penalty of 25 years to life consecutive to a
determinate prison term of 15 years. The determinate term was based on multiple
enhancements. (Ibid.)
A forensic pathologist had testified at trial “that the bamboo stick was capable of
inflicting great bodily injury or death.” The expert “explained that although uncommon,
a blow to the ear or neck area could lacerate or dissect the vertebral artery, causing
death.” The expert “considered [one of the victims] lucky given his neck injury because
it ‘only take[s] one blow at the wrong angle’ or with the ‘head being turned that can
cause a devastating injury, which can ultimately lead to death.’” (People v. Dryden,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015–1016.) The trial court relied on this testimony at
sentencing, observing the incident “‘could have been very serious if the stick, bamboo

21.
stick or cane, as it was being used, had hit in a slightly different area.’” (Id. at p. 1028.)
“Perhaps most notably, the trial court considered whether punishment under the Three
Strikes law would be disproportionate to the severity of the current offenses, stating
‘[t]hat might apply marginally,’ but it concluded in denying the motion that a Three
Strikes sentence would not be disproportionate to defendant’s criminal history.” (Id. at p.
1030.)
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court in terms of the seriousness of the
current offenses. Focusing on the victims’ actual injuries, the appellate court noted the
defendant had “struck two members of a group of five young men with a bamboo stick,
scratching one and raising a welt on the neck of the other.” (People v. Dryden, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.) Despite evidence Dryden was the initial aggressor, the appellate
court seemed to give weight to the fact that several people had stood their ground and
fought back. The opinion notes one of the young men was a United States Marine. (Id.
at p. 1014.)
The Dryden court was particularly troubled by how much prison time the Three
Strikes penalty added to Dryden’s determinate term in light of his age. “[T]he trial court
elected to impose a sentence of 25 years to life consecutive to 15 years, de facto life
imprisonment for [Dryden,] who was 53 years old when sentenced.” (People v. Dryden,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.) “[H]ad the court struck two or all three of the prior
strikes, [Dryden] still would have been exposed to a significant sentence.” (Id. at p.
1030.)
The “most significant[]” factor in the appellate court’s Romero analysis was the
fact Dryden “had endured a violent and abusive upbringing, had been homeless since his
midteens, and had a long history of alcoholism and mental illness, all of which
contributed to his criminal conduct.” (People v. Dryden, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p.
1030.) Among other personal challenges, Dryden had been a victim of “sexual and
physical abuse” and had previously suffered a “traumatic brain injury” to which

22.
psychologists attributed his “anger control issues and debilitated daily functioning.” (Id.
at pp. 1028–1030.)
D. Analysis
Defendant’s Romero claim is entirely based on the argument his case is
“materially indistinguishable” from the Dryden case. The argument does not withstand
scrutiny. In Dryden, the appellate court found “the trial court abused its discretion by
denying [Dryden] any meaningful relief from the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Dryden,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.) Given the emphasis on Dryden’s age at sentencing
(53 years old) and characterization of his sentence as “tantamount to life in prison” (id. at
p. 1032), the phrase “meaningful relief from the Three Strikes law” basically translates to
a meaningful opportunity for release from prison.
Here, the denial of defendant’s Romero motion did not deprive him of a
meaningful opportunity to be released from prison. When the ruling was made in
December 2022, defendant was already eligible for parole. He had been denied parole in
2019, at age 56, for a period of three years. A second parole suitability hearing had either
recently taken place or was about to be held when the renewed Romero motion was
denied. Defendant remains eligible for parole now, at age 60. As such, the practical
consequences of the trial court’s ruling are not “materially indistinguishable” from those
in Dryden. The consequences are objectively less severe. (See People v. Dryden, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 [denial of Romero motion meant “de facto life imprisonment
for defendant who was 53 years old when sentenced”].)
Also “critical” to the Dryden court’s analysis were Dryden’s personal
circumstances. His criminality was attributed to “a violent and abusive upbringing,
[being] homeless since his midteens, and … a long history of alcoholism and mental
illness.” (People v. Dryden, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030.) Defendant’s background
does not include childhood abuse, homelessness, traumatic brain injury, or serious mental
illness.

23.
When defendant sought reconsideration of his Romero motion in 2018, he told the
trial court: “I lived in a large and loving family of 7 children under doting and exemplary
parents. Out of all my siblings I was the only one to ever get into any kind of trouble. At
the tender age of 17 I found myself experimenting with cocaine. It wasn’t long before I
was trapped in a culture and corruption by drug addiction.”
More recently, defendant has alleged his father abused alcohol and was violent
toward his mother while intoxicated. Nevertheless, defendant has maintained he was
raised in a stable, middle-class household. Dr. Arkowitz’s Comprehensive Risk
Assessment states, based on an interview with defendant in May 2019, “[defendant]
reported a ‘wonderful’ childhood, with the exception of his father’s abusive behavior
towards his mother. His family was financially secure … and he enjoyed a very close
relationship with his mother.” “Despite the efforts of his family to steer him down a
more positive path, [defendant] ultimately chose a negative lifestyle characterized by
criminal behavior, unhealthy relationships, unstable employment, and a serious substance
abuse problem. Thus, by the time of the commitment offense, [defendant] had not only
established an extensive criminal record with prior prison terms, he developed an
entrenched antisocial and self-serving mindset that justified the use of criminal behavior
to meet his needs and/or solve problems.”
Defendant further contends his felony evading offense is “less serious compared to
the defendant in Dryden.” Reasonable minds could disagree. Dryden unwisely provoked
five young men who were not afraid to fight back. Although Dryden landed a few blows
with a hollow stick that eventually splintered into pieces, the appellate court did not view
the incident as one involving significant violence or danger. (People v. Dryden, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1014–1015, 1031.) In defendant’s case, both the trial court and the
parole board have characterized the felony evading incident as dangerous and life-
threatening. Innocent motorists had to quickly maneuver out of defendant’s way to avoid
a high-speed collision. At his parole suitability hearing in 2019, defendant did not

24.
disagree when the presiding commissioner observed that he could have killed multiple
people.
Lastly, in his reply brief, defendant alleges the trial court “disregarded” his
“positive post-conviction factors and current [health problems].” The assertion ignores
the trial court’s 10-page ruling. The ruling commends defendant for having “maintained
sobriety since 2017” and acknowledges he “does have several medical conditions, such
as cirrhosis of the liver, epilepsy, and mobility issues.” In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we must presume the trial court considered all factors relevant to the Romero
analysis. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) The weight given to those
factors is part of the trial court’s discretionary assessment.
It matters not how much an appellate court may disagree with a trial court’s
exercise of discretion, but whether other reasonable minds could have reached the same
conclusion. (See People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978; People
v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 437–438.) “Because the circumstances must be
‘extraordinary … by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of
the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long
and continuous criminal record …,’ the circumstances where no reasonable people could
disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even
more extraordinary.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Defendant has
not met his burden to clearly show the denial of his Romero motion “‘was irrational or
arbitrary.’” (Alvarez, at p. 977.)
III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Defendant alternatively contends his life sentence violates the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Similar to his Romero claim,
defendant relies on a single case: People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134. We reject
the claim for multiple reasons.

25.
“A claim a sentence is cruel and unusual is forfeited on appeal if it is not raised in
the trial court, because the issue often requires a fact-bound inquiry.” (People v. Speight
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247; accord, People v. Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
199, 212.) Appellate courts often address such claims on the merits, despite forfeiture, to
forestall or dispose of a related ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim. (E.g.,
Brewer, at p. 212; People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) But defendant’s
appellate counsel represented him in the proceedings on remand, and IAC has not been
alleged. If the defense intended to argue cruel and unusual punishment in this appeal, the
issue needed to be raised with the trial court. It was not.
Defendant and his counsel appropriately refrained from alleging cruel and unusual
punishment at resentencing since this court had already rejected the claim on two prior
occasions. This is noted in the respondent’s brief, and the Attorney General relies on the
law of the case doctrine. “[W]hen an appellate court ‘“states in its opinion a principle or
rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case
and must be adhered to throughout [the case’s] subsequent progress, both in the lower
court and upon subsequent appeal ….”’” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236,
246; see People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1217 [whether a sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law].)
In his reply brief, defendant quotes from Payne IV to argue this court’s “earlier
ruling … [only] addressed whether [his] sentence was cruel and unusual ‘under the
Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution.’” Ignoring that the Eighth Amendment
quotation was taken from his own briefing in Payne IV, defendant erroneously suggests
this court has never addressed the legality of his Three Strikes sentence under the
California Constitution. The appellate panel in Payne I unanimously rejected defendant’s
argument that his sentence “violated California and federal constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment.” (Payne I, supra, F026894.) The claim was
analyzed using the factor test articulated in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, which is the

26.
same framework under which the Avila case was decided. (People v. Avila, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1145–1149.)
Although unnecessary, we further observe that Avila is distinguishable in several
ways. The Avila appellant was 47 years old when sentenced as a third strike offender to
25 years to life plus 14 years. (People v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1139, 1144.)
His prior strikes “were from 1990 and 1992, so they were 28 and 26 years old,
respectively, when he committed the current offenses in 2018.” (Id. at p. 1141.) The
appellate court heavily downplayed the current offenses of attempted robbery and
attempted extortion, which were repeatedly characterized as the mere squashing of
oranges. (E.g., id. at p. 1147 [“It bears repeating: he squashed oranges and was
sentenced to life”].) But the “‘overarching consideration’” was the fact that “given his
age, his three strikes sentence coupled with the determinate term [meant he would] likely
die in prison.” (Id. at p. 1144.)
Here, as previously discussed, the trial court’s unwillingness to reduce defendant’s
sentence for felony evading did not foreclose his ability to be released from prison.
Defendant was already eligible for parole and remains eligible for parole. The fact the
parole board has twice deemed him unsuitable for release does not make the trial court’s
sentencing decision unconstitutional.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

DETJEN, J.
27.

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