People v. Berry CA1/2

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Testo completo

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Berry CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165932
v.
RONALD CRAIG BERRY, (Del Norte County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. CRF22-9035)

A jury convicted Ronald Craig Berry of possessing a firearm as a felon.
(Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); undesignated statutory citations are to this
code.) On appeal, he claims his conviction must be reversed for two reasons:
The prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act
in reasonable self-defense, and section 29800 violates the Second Amendment
to the federal Constitution as construed in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (Bruen). We reject
both contentions and affirm.

BACKGROUND
The incident resulting in Berry’s conviction arose from a romantic
triangle involving him, Heather B., and Patrick D. Berry, a felon, had a
young child with Heather. She had been letting Berry stay with her in the
house of her recently deceased mother even though there was, in her view, no
longer any “love between us,” and even though Berry had often abused her.

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As for Patrick, Heather had an “off and on” romantic relationship with him.
Berry was angrily jealous and had threatened to kill Patrick many times; the
two men hated each other.
On an afternoon in September 2021, Heather gave Patrick a ride. After
learning they were together, Berry found them and ran Heather’s vehicle off
the road. He and Patrick exchanged heated words, and Patrick challenged
Berry to fight, but the encounter ended without physical violence.
A few hours later, Heather returned home, where she found Berry
with her neighbors and friends, Lonnie H. and his wife (collectively,
neighbors). After Berry assured Heather and the neighbors that it would “be
okay,” and that he was “not that mad,” the neighbors left to go shopping.
Heather and Berry calmly spent an hour in the house, and she put their child
to bed.
The calm ended when Patrick arrived at the house in his pickup truck.1
Heather went outside and asked him to leave. He refused. Berry then came
outside with a shotgun that had belonged to Heather’s mother. He fired at
least one shot at Patrick. Then Patrick rammed his truck into the house’s
front porch and fled on foot. Heather, after videorecording part of the
incident on her phone, drove away with her child and called 911.
As the incident began, the neighbors were on their way home from the
store. Nearing Heather’s house, they saw Patrick’s truck in her driveway and
pulled over. Soon thereafter, Lonnie called 911. In a recording of his call
played for the jury, he told the dispatcher he had “seen two guys just about to

1 At trial, the jury heard conflicting accounts of exactly how the
ensuing confrontation unfolded. “In light of the sufficiency of the evidence
contentions that follow, we set forth the facts here in the light most favorable
to the judgment.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 625, fn. 5.)

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kill each other” in Heather’s front yard. He added, “they both have guns.”
When the dispatcher asked, “They both have guns? Did you see that?”
Lonnie said, “I did see—I saw one.” The dispatcher then put Lonnie on hold
because she was getting another call.
The call was from Heather. In a recording of her 911 call played for the
jury, she said Berry “just shot at my boyfriend with a shotgun and he’s in my
house right now and my boyfriend just tried to drive his truck into my house.”
She then clarified that Patrick “was trying to run into . . . [Berry] because he
was shooting at him.” She thought she had it “all on video.” She added that
Berry had tried “to run [her] off the road” earlier that day.
That night, a deputy videorecorded an interview of Heather.2 In the
recording, which was played for the jury, Heather described the relationships
among Berry, Patrick, and herself, adding that Berry had run her and
Patrick off the road that day. That evening, she said, Patrick pulled up in the
driveway; she went out to tell him to leave; and he refused. Berry “flip[ped]
out” and “came out with a shotgun and told him to leave.” Heather said she
went inside to get her child. She tried to go back out the front door, but Berry
“shot the shotgun off” at Patrick.
Heather confirmed she saw Berry shoot at Patrick: Berry had been
“almost still in the house” and Patrick had been in his truck, she said,
adding, “He didn’t get out of the truck at all.” Heather said she then went
out the back door and got in her mother’s truck. Patrick then drove his truck
into the front porch. Heather emphasized that Patrick “ran the truck after”

2 The video Heather took on her phone during the incident was played
for the jury. As it began, she was in the house and Berry stood in the open
front doorway holding a rifle and shouting expletives. Heather tried to go out
the front door, but Berry prevented her. Patrick could be heard calling,
“Heather, get out here now,” and “come on.” She went out the back door.
After she got in her mother’s truck, a shotgun blast could be heard.

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Berry because Patrick did not “have a gun or anything to protect himself.”
The deputy asked, “So the truck’s run into the house . . . [¶] . . . as a defense
from [Berry] shooting him?” and Heather replied, “Yes. Because [Berry] shot
at him first.”
Law enforcement officers found a single, spent shotgun shell on the
front porch. Heather found her mother’s shotgun in bushes by the house.
Berry was eventually arrested, jailed, and charged with one count of
possessing a firearm as a felon. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1) (§ 29800(a)(1)).) From
jail, he had a recorded phone conversation with Heather. In the call, which
was played for the jury, he admitted, “I possessed the fucking gun. I fired a
shot at the fucking dude, so . . . I’m guilty.” He also said he and his lawyer
were working “on a self-defense” claim. He told Heather to tell Patrick, “no
matter what happens he cannot be arrested for anything. He needs to
understand that.” He added, “Let’s say . . . that the neighbors say I saw him
with a fucking pistol[,] he cannot be charged with a crime.” Heather indicated
she understood, and later told Berry she loved him.
At trial, Heather’s testimony differed from her recorded accounts on the
night of the incident. Her testimony was more favorable to Berry, and when
asked about specific misconduct she had ascribed to him—such as running
her off the road—she often denied recalling it. As for the confrontation with
the shotgun, she depicted Patrick as the aggressor. After she told him to
leave, she testified Berry “might have come out, and . . . yelled a little bit at
Patrick,” who then “proceeded to come towards [Berry] in his truck.” When
Patrick did so, she did not think Berry was holding the shotgun. She also
testified, contrary to her prior account, that she thought Patrick had opened
his truck’s door. Although she acknowledged she “didn’t see” a gun in his
hand, she testified she was now “pretty sure” he had one. Asked how she

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knew that, Heather replied, “[a]fter watching the video.” She did not explain
her answer or identify a part of the video showing Patrick.
Lonnie testified for the defense, describing the circumstances of his 911
call. Before making the call, he “caught a glimpse” of Berry walking out the
front door and saw Patrick “get out of his truck with what looked like a gun
in his hand.” In the 911 call, as quoted above, Lonnie first said both men had
guns but then said, “I saw one.” At trial, he confirmed he saw only one gun,
and testified it was “[t]he one [Patrick] had.” He denied seeing Berry with a
shotgun but admitted hearing a shot that sounded like a shotgun. At that
point, he turned to his wife to say it was time “to get out of there.” As they
pulled away, he heard two “smaller caliber” shots, then another shotgun
blast. Finally, Lonnie acknowledged Berry was a friend, but claimed he
would not lie for anyone in court.
The trial court instructed the jury the prosecution had “the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Berry] did not temporarily possess a
firearm in self-defense.” The court gave CALCRIM No. 2514, which stated
that Berry’s possession of a firearm was not unlawful if he reasonably
believed he faced an imminent danger of great bodily injury and reasonably
believed he could avoid the danger only by an immediate use of force; if a
firearm became available to him without planning or preparation on his part;
if no other means of avoiding the danger was available; and if he possessed
the firearm no longer than reasonably appeared necessary for self-defense,
and used it reasonably under the circumstances.
In his closing statement, defense counsel did not dispute that Berry
had possessed a firearm as a felon; he relied solely on a theory of reasonable
self-defense. The jury found Berry guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon
and the court sentenced him to six years in prison.

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DISCUSSION
I.
Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction.
Berry’s first argument is that the prosecution did not offer sufficient
evidence to enable the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did not
act in reasonable self-defense. To determine if sufficient evidence supports
the verdict, we “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) For that purpose, the
testimony of a single witness can suffice, so long as that testimony is not
physically impossible or inherently improbable. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Resolving conflicts and inconsistencies in the
testimony is the jury’s “exclusive province.” (Ibid.) We neither reweigh the
evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses; if the circumstances
reasonably justify the jury’s findings, we may not reverse simply because
they “might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
Although the text of section 29800(a)(1) unqualifiedly bars felons from
possessing firearms, the California Supreme Court has held that they are
nonetheless entitled to do so temporarily as necessary to defend themselves
from an immediate risk of great bodily injury. (People v. King (1978)
22 Cal.3d 12, 20, 24.) As summarized above, CALCRIM No. 2514 lists six
elements of such reasonable self-defense. All six must be present to make a
felon’s temporary possession of a firearm lawful. (Ibid.) Under that
instruction, a jury can thus find a defendant guilty if it finds beyond a

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reasonable doubt that any one of the elements was absent. (See, e.g., People
v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 557.) To conclude that sufficient evidence
enabled the jury to make such a finding, we need consider only the first
element: whether Berry reasonably believed he was in “imminent danger of
suffering great bodily injury” when he took possession of the shotgun. (Ibid.)
To find that element disproven, the jury could have credited Heather’s
contemporaneous accounts, given in her 911 call and her recorded interview,
that Patrick had no gun and tried to hit Berry with his truck only after Berry
came out with a shotgun and fired at him. In her testimony, Heather
acknowledged her recollection was better on the night at issue than six
months later at trial. The accounts she gave that night were not “physically
impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1181.) They constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Berry possessed the shotgun—and fired it—at a point
when Patrick was merely sitting in his truck refusing to leave, and that
Berry thus had no reasonable basis to perceive an imminent threat of great
injury. (See People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1018 [evidence of
lack of aggression by assault victim enabled jury to find defendant did not
reasonably perceive imminent threat].)
On appeal, Berry notes Patrick had an ongoing dispute with him, had
challenged him to fight earlier that day, and had refused to leave Heather’s
property when asked. But this argument asks us to reweigh the evidence,
which is not our role. (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Berry
also relies on Lonnie’s testimony that he saw Patrick with a gun and
Heather’s testimony that, at the time of trial, she believed he had one. But
the jury was free to disbelieve that testimony. Heather acknowledged she did
not see Patrick with a gun. While she referred without explanation to the

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video she had taken, Berry has never contended the video showed Patrick at
all, let alone with a gun. As for Lonnie, he specified in his 911 call he saw
“one” gun, without saying more. Only at trial did he state that the one gun
he saw was a pistol held by Patrick. But Lonnie acknowledged seeing Berry
and hearing a shotgun blast, and Berry admitted holding and firing a
shotgun. A reasonable jury could disbelieve Lonnie’s testimony that the one
gun he saw was a pistol held by Patrick. (See People v. Jones (1990)
51 Cal.3d 294, 314 [“it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness”].)
II.
Section 29800(a)(1) is Not Unconstitutional.
Next, Berry contends section 29800(a)(1) violates the Second
Amendment as construed in Bruen, which changed the law governing how
courts must analyze constitutional challenges to statutes restricting the right
to bear firearms. (See Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct at pp. 2125–2126.) But several
courts have addressed—and rejected—that contention. (People v. Odell
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 (Odell) [rejecting challenge under Bruen to
section 29800(a)(1)]; People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 480
(Alexander) [same]; accord, People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301–
1302 [similar; rejecting challenge to statute barring felons from possessing
ammunition].)
Alexander and Odell held that the change in analytic method mandated
by Bruen did not affect the constitutionality of statutes barring felons from
possessing firearms. (Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; Alexander,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478–480.) We have held that Bruen “did not
expand ‘the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun,’ ” and that
felons are “squarely in a category where gun possession is off-limits due to
their prior criminal conduct.” (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 165–166

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[rejecting facial constitutional challenge to section 25850, barring possession
of a loaded firearm, and citing Alexander and Odell with approval].)
Alexander and Odell foreclose Berry’s challenge to section 29800(a)(1).
He does not try to distinguish those cases based on factual differences from
his case. (See In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157 [facial challenge
considers only a statute’s text, not its application to individual
circumstances].) Nor does he claim any California authority has disagreed
with those decisions. He deems the reasoning in Alexander “flawed” but
makes only arguments raised and rejected in that case. (Alexander, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478–480.) We continue to agree with that opinion and
with Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pages 316–317, so we reject Berry’s
constitutional challenge to his conviction.

DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

STEWART, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MILLER, J.
MARKMAN, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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