People v. Quintero CA2/1

CourtListener 9447404Calctapp28 nov 2023

Testo completo

Filed 11/28/23 P. v. Quintero CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B328668

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA142993)
v.

VALENTIN QUINTERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Valentin Quintero filed in the superior court a petition
for resentencing pursuant to the predecessor to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 The court denied the petition without an
evidentiary hearing because Quintero failed to make a prima
facie showing for relief. Quintero appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A. Quintero’s Attempted Murder Convictions
On April 13, 2017, Quintero drove his girlfriend, Alexiz
Orona to Melissa S.’s home. Orona got out of “Quintero’s
car, pulled out a handgun, and fired shots at [Melissa S. and
Johnnyne R].” (People v. Quintero (Sept. 2, 2020, B300920)
[nonpub. opn.].) As the intended victims “attempted to move to
safety, Quintero told Orona, ‘Finish her, finish them.’ Thereafter,
Orona fired another shot at [the individuals].” (Ibid.)
In May 2018, the People charged Quintero with the
attempted murders of Melissa S. and Johnnyne R., among other
crimes. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) The case was tried to a jury in
June 2019.
Regarding the attempted murder counts, the court
instructed the jury that “[e]very person who attempts to murder
another human being is guilty of a violation of . . . sections 664
and 187. [¶] Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought. [¶] In order to prove attempted
murder, each of the following elements must be proved[:] [¶] 1. A
direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing
another human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent
to kill unlawfully another human being.”
Regarding the liability of aiders and abettors as principals
in a crime, the court instructed: “Principals include: [¶] 1. Those
who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime,
or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the commission of the crime.
[¶] When the crime charged is attempted murder, the aider
and abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all
the participants as well as that person[’]s own mental state. If
the aider and abettor’s mental state is more culpable than that
of the actual perpetrator, that person’s guilt may be greater than
that of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, the aider and abettor’s
guilt may be less than the perpetrator’s, if the aider and abettor
has a less culpable mental state.”
Regarding direct aiding and abetting, the court instructed:
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he
or she: [¶] (1) [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) [w]ith the intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and
[¶] (3) [b]y act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
the commission of the crime. [¶] Mere presence at the scene of
a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime
does not amount to aiding and abetting. [¶] To be guilty as an
aider or abettor, the defendant’s intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime by the
perpetrator must be formed before or during the commission of
the crime. [¶] Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed
and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and
abetting.”

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The court further instructed the jury as to “compelling
another to commit crime” (capitalization omitted) as follows:
that “[a] person who, by threat, menace, command or coercion,
compels another to commit any crime is guilty of that crime.”
The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
The jury found Quintero guilty of the attempted
murders and found not true allegations that Quintero acted
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury
further found that a principal in the crimes personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The court sentenced
Quintero to 12 years in prison. Quintero appealed.
In his direct appeal, Quintero argued, among other
arguments, that the court erred in instructing the jury as
to compelling another to commit a crime. In September 2020,
we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v.
Quintero (Sept. 2, 2020, B300920).) Regarding the alleged
instructional error, we held that the instruction was supported
by evidence that, after Orona fired her gun at the intended
victims, Quintero told her, “ ‘Finish her, finish them,’ ” and
Orona then fired another shot at the intended victims.

B. Quintero’s Resentencing Petition
In November 2022, Quintero filed a petition to vacate
his attempted murder convictions and be resentenced pursuant to

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section 1172.6.2 He requested the appointment of counsel, which
the court granted.
In February 2023, the People filed a response to Quintero’s
petition, asserting that Quintero is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because the jury was not instructed on “the
natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and was instructed
that they could not find him guilty of attempted murder unless
the People proved that he “had the intent to kill the victim.”
The People supported the response with the jury’s verdicts, the
instructions to the jury, and our 2020 opinion.
Quintero, through counsel, filed a reply stating that
he “submits on the prosecution’s informal response to [his]
resentencing petition.”
At the conclusion of a hearing held in March 2023, the
court denied the petition because Quintero “is not eligible for
resentencing in this matter as . . . his jury was not instructed
as to felony murder, nor natural and probable consequences.”
Quintero timely appealed. We appointed counsel to
represent him.

C. The Instant Appeal
Quintero’s appointed counsel filed a brief identifying no
issues on appeal and requesting that we follow the procedures
outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232
(Delgadillo) and exercise our discretion to conduct an
independent review of the record.

2 Quintero’s form petition states that it is filed pursuant
to section 1170.95. By the time he filed his petition, however,
section 1170.95 had been renumbered as section 1172.6. (See
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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Quintero filed a supplemental brief in which he contends:
(1) The evidence at his 2019 trial does not support his conviction;
(2) Evidence of statements made by intended murder victim
Johnnyne R. is hearsay; (3) “[T]he prosecution knowingly
introduced and encouraged false testimony”; (4) Evidence
introduced to impeach his alibi defense was used “to intentionally
confuse . . . and misguide the jury”; (5) He was misidentified
as the driver of the car; (6) After four days of deliberation, the
“judge exhausted the jury into taking a vote,” which “violated
[his] due process and right to a fair trial”; and (7) The absence
of Johnnyne R. at trial “prejudiced” him because it suggested
to the jurors that the witness was injured or dead. Quintero
further contends that the jury’s finding that he did not act
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation establishes a
prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.

DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6 applies to attempted murders only when the
conviction is “based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
When, as here, the defendant seeks to vacate an attempted
murder conviction under section 1172.6 and the record of
conviction shows that the court did not instruct the defendant’s
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
defendant is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (Coley,
supra, at pp. 548–549; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
198, 205–206; cf. People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043,
1055, 1059; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85, 92, fn. 5.)
“The jury instructions are part of the record of conviction
and may be reviewed to make the prima facie determination.”
(People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)

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Here, the jury instructions given in Quintero’s 2019 trial
establish that, to find Quintero guilty of attempted murder, the
People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the direct
perpetrator acted with the specific intent to kill and that he,
as an aider and abettor, harbored the same or a more culpable
mental state. His jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or any other theory by which
malice could be imputed to him based solely on his participation
in the crime. He was therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of
law.
The first seven of Quintero’s contentions identified above
are not cognizable on appeal from an order denying a petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6. As our colleagues in the
Fourth District recently explained, section 1176.2 is intended
“to permit the resentencing of defendants who were properly
convicted under the law that applied at the time, but ‘could
no longer be convicted of murder’ [or attempted murder]
because of recent legislative changes. [Citations.] A petition
thus supplements a defendant’s traditional direct appeal by
providing an opportunity to make arguments that did not
exist at the time of the appeal, but have arisen since 2019 as
a result of recent statutory amendments.” (People v. Burns
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867.) The first seven contentions
Quintero raises in his supplemental brief, like the contentions
the petitioner raised in Burns, have “nothing to do with the
legislative changes to California’s murder law effected by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . and Senate
Bill No. 775 [(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)]. Accordingly, he did not
satisfy the section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) condition as part

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of his required prima facie showing.” (Burns, supra, at p. 867.)3
Any relief for the errors Quintero now asserts was available
to him by “appeal from the judgment of conviction. His failure
to raise the[se] argument[s] on direct appeal forfeited [such]
claim[s] [citation], and the subsequent petition process created by
the Legislature when it enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 did nothing
to change the applicable law so as to resurrect . . . argument[s] he
had already abandoned.” (Burns, supra, at p. 868, fn. omitted.)
We therefore reject Quintero’s first seven contentions.
The last of Quintero’s contentions—that the jury’s finding
that he did not act willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
establishes a prima facie showing for relief—is also without
merit. A finding that a defendant’s attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated requires the defendant
be sentenced to prison for life with the possibility of parole.
(§ 664, subd. (a).) If that finding is not made, attempted murder
is punishable by imprisonment for five, seven, or nine years.
(Ibid.) Although the finding that Quintero did not act willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation thus reduced his possible
punishment, it does not negate the finding implied in the jury’s
verdict that Quintero acted with the intent to kill. The jury’s
finding that he did not act willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation, therefore, does not aid Quintero in establishing a
prima facie showing for relief.
Quintero and his counsel request that we exercise our
discretion to independently review the record to determine

3 Subdivision (a)(3) of section 1172.6 sets forth the
requirement that the “petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”

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whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. (See Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 230.) We have conducted that review
and conclude that no arguable issues exist.

DISPOSITION
The order from which defendant has appealed is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.

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