CourtListener 9428130•People v. Orozco CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 9/25/23 P. v. Orozco CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B326874
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA120069)
v.
ANTHONY OROZCO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Carol J. Ojo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
__________________________________
In 2022, a jury found appellant Anthony Orozco guilty of
being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he contends
that insufficient evidence supports the finding that he was in
possession of a firearm and that the court erred in instructing the
jury. We conclude that substantial evidence supports Orozco’s
conviction and that any instructional error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2022, Orozco was charged by amended
information for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Orozco
pled not guilty and a one-day jury trial took place. Two
witnesses—Emiliano Estrada and Brian Prebanda—testified for
the prosecution. No witnesses testified for the defense.
Estrada, a police officer, testified that, around 9:00 p.m. on
July 13, 2022, he and his partner Prebanda were on patrol in a
high-crime area. Estrada was wearing his police uniform though
the officers were in an unmarked vehicle. As they drove
westbound through an alley, they saw Orozco walking down the
middle of the alley toward them. As Orozco neared the vehicle,
he quickly rushed to the north side of the alley toward a wrought
iron fence.1 Believing that Orozco was attempting to flee,
Estrada exited his vehicle. As he exited, he saw Orozco “making
a move as if he were moving a bag from him[self].” Estrada then
saw Orozco crouch between the wrought iron fence and an SUV.
Estrada next noticed a “strap” that “flew from the bottom portion
1 On cross-examination, Estrada acknowledged that in his
written report, he had stated he observed Orozco “make a furtive
movement to the north gate,” but explained that “for the sake of
testimony, [he] wanted to keep it in plain English.”
2
[of a photograph the prosecutor had shown Estrada] towards the
wrought iron fence.” Estrada saw the strap go over the fence.
However, there was a tarp hanging from the fence that prevented
Estrada from seeing into the property behind the fence. Estrada
scaled the fence and retrieved a bag, which contained a firearm.
Estrada saw no other people in the alley aside from Prebanda
and Orozco, and did not see anybody enter or leave the property
from where he had retrieved the bag. Orozco was arrested.
Estrada never contacted the residents of the property from where
he retrieved the bag, and he never had the firearm examined for
fingerprints or DNA. Estrada admitted that, prior to retrieving
the bag from the yard, he never saw the “bag portion” of the bag,
just the strap.
Prebanda’s testimony echoed Estrada’s. He confirmed the
pair were patrolling in an unmarked police car and encountered
Orozco walking toward them in an alley before seeing him duck
behind an SUV. Prebanda saw Estrada jump over a fence and,
when he returned, he was carrying a black bag. Inside the bag
was a loaded handgun. Prebanda saw no one else in the alley.
Prebanda did not recall finding any identification in the bag.
After the two witnesses testified, the parties stipulated that
Orozco had previously been convicted of a felony offense that
prohibited him from owning or possessing a firearm. Out of the
presence of the jury, the court discussed the jury instructions
with both attorneys; there was no mention of CALCRIM 250.
After the jury was brought back in, both parties rested and the
court instructed the jury. Included in the instructions were the
text of CALCRIM 250 and 2511; the court instructed the jury
3
with the text of CALCRIM 250 followed immediately by the text
of CALCRIM 2511.2
In closing arguments, after reminding the jury that the
parties had stipulated to Orozco’s prior felony conviction, the
prosecutor argued that she had proven Orozco possessed a
firearm through Estrada’s testimony that he had seen a bag strap
being thrown over a fence, that no one else was in the alley but
Orozco and the officers, and that a tarp hanging from the fence
prevented Estrada from seeing in the yard behind the fence;
therefore, Estrada could not have known a bag was in the
backyard unless, as he testified, he saw a bag strap thrown over
the fence. Furthermore, when the bag was retrieved, it contained
2 Both were included in the written instructions provided to
the jury. CALCRIM 250 provided: “The crime charged in this
matter requires proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and
wrongful intent. [¶] For you to find a person guilty of the crime in
this case of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon true, that person
must not only commit the prohibited act, but must do so with
wrongful intent. A person acts with wrongful intent when he or
she intentionally does a prohibited act; however, it is not required
that he or she intend to break the law. The act required is
explained in the instruction for that crime.”
CALCRIM 2511 provided in pertinent part: “The defendant
is charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of
Penal Code section 29800(a)(1). [¶] To prove that the defendant is
guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant possessed a firearm; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that he
possessed the firearm; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The defendant had
previously been convicted of a felony.”
According to the reporter’s transcript, what the court read
to the jury was substantively identical to what appeared in the
written instructions.
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a firearm. The prosecutor argued that Orozco’s actions in hiding
behind an SUV when he saw the officers approaching and in
ridding himself of the bag proved that Orozco knowingly
possessed a firearm.
Defense counsel argued that when a person was
approached by an SUV in an alley in a high-crime area, it would
be reasonable for that person to crouch and hide. Counsel also
argued that footage from Estrada’s body camera showed that
Orozco had a “large cell phone in his right hand” when Estrada
approached him, and counsel asked rhetorically how Orozco could
have thrown the bag with a “large object in [his] hand.”3 Defense
counsel further contended the footage did not show a strap flying
through the air, and there was no forensic analysis done on the
bag or the firearm to connect them with Orozco.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor pointed out that there was no
reasonable explanation for how the bag ended up over the fence,
3 The body camera footage is not in the record on appeal.
When Orozco’s counsel asked Estrada: “When you stopped
[Orozco] immediately after the bag was removed, there was an
object in his hand; correct?” Estrada responded: “I don’t
remember specifically. If that is the case, if that is what you’re
getting at, there was a phone case on the ground. So if he were to
use his hands, it would make sense for the phone case to be on
the ground, as if the phone fell out of his hand while he was
removing it.” When counsel followed up with: “I’m saying, we
were all in court and watched the video. There was a phone in
his right hand when you approached him; right?” Estrada
responded: “I didn’t focus on his hands.” When Prebanda was
asked the same question, he testified the phone was in Orozco’s
shirt pocket. No further testimony was elicited on this point.
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or how Estrada even knew there was a bag there, unless, as
Estrada testified, he saw Orozco throw it over the fence.
After the jury left to deliberate, the court asked if the
parties objected to the jury instructions as read. Neither party
objected. Subsequently, the jury found Orozco guilty. In
November 2022, the court sentenced him to three years. Orozco
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conviction
The court instructed the jury that, to convict Orozco, it
needed to find that: (1) he possessed a firearm, (2) he knew that
he possessed the firearm, and (3) he had previously been
convicted of a felony. Orozco contends “there was insufficient
evidence to show that Appellant actually possessed the firearm.”
Specifically, he argues that it was dark and Estrada saw only the
bag strap “and what he believed to be movements which he
interpreted to be removing the strap from Appellant,” but never
saw Orozco with the bag itself. Further, Estrada never contacted
the residents in the yard in which the bag was found, and did not
submit the bag or firearm for forensic testing.
“ ‘To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury
verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that
a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966,
988.) “We are not at liberty to reweigh evidence or revisit
credibility issues.” (People v. Moore (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 73, 77,
citing People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “We presume
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‘ “in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” [Citation.] This
standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is
involved.’ ” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.)
Here, Estrada testified that, as he exited his vehicle while
wearing his police uniform, he saw Orozco “making a move as if
he were moving a bag from him[self],” and then saw a bag strap
fly over a wrought iron fence. Despite being prevented by a
hanging tarp from seeing what was on the other side of the fence,
Estrada nevertheless scaled the fence and retrieved a bag, which
contained a firearm. Estrada saw no other people in the alley
aside from his partner and Orozco, and did not see anybody enter
or leave the property where the bag was retrieved. From this
testimony, a jury could reasonably deduce that Orozco was
knowingly carrying a bag containing a firearm (which he threw
over the fence when he saw a uniformed police officer).
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conviction.
B. Orozco Suffered No Prejudice From the Court’s
Giving of CALCRIM 250
“ ‘In assessing a claim of instructional error or ambiguity,
we consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury was misled.’ ” (People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1199.) Though Orozco’s counsel did
not object to the court giving CALCRIM 250, “to the extent that
[appellant] ‘argues that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury in a way that affected his substantial rights,’ [appellant]’s
‘argument may still be heard on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.)
Orozco contends the court erred in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM 250. Specifically, he argues that the court should not
have given CALCRIM 250 because it was also giving CALCRIM
7
2511, and that this error was one of “constitutional dimension,”
requiring us to reverse unless we conclude “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
The People agree that the court erred in giving CALCRIM
250, but counter that Orozco suffered no prejudice, and that we
should assess the error under the standard set forth in People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. Because we find the error harmless
under both standards, we need not decide which applies.
The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM 250 when it
told the jurors that they could not find Orozco guilty unless they
found that he possessed a firearm “with wrongful intent.” The
court elaborated that “[a] person acts with wrongful intent when
he or she intentionally does a prohibited act; however, it is not
required that he or she intend to break the law. The act required
is explained in the instruction for that crime.” Immediately
thereafter, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM 2511 by
explaining that to find Orozco guilty of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, it needed to find that he “knew that he possessed the
firearm.” Orozco argues that “[b]y giving both instructions, the
Court could have confused the jury and led the jury to return a
guilty verdict based on CALCRIM 250 without the jury
considering the knowledge requirement in CALJIC 2511.” But
Orozco does not explain, and we do not see, how being instructed
that it needed to find Orozco possessed a firearm with wrongful
intent but without necessarily intending to break the law could
have caused the jury to believe it did not also need to find that he
knew that he possessed the firearm—especially when it was
specifically instructed immediately thereafter that it did need to
make this finding. Moreover, Orozco never argued that he
unknowingly possessed a firearm—his defense was centered
8
around the supposed lack of evidence connecting the bag
containing the firearm to him. On this record, we find the court’s
giving of CALCRIM 250 to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.4
4 We find distinguishable Orozco’s citation to People v.
Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, where CALCRIM 250 was
given when the defendant was charged with three counts of
resisting a peace officer with force, four counts of resisting a
peace officer without force, and one count of a misdemeanor
possession of methamphetamine. (Id. at p. 432.) The appellate
court noted that, for the counts regarding resisting a peace
officer, the jury had been instructed of the need to find the
defendant knew the peace officer was performing his duty, and in
the possession count, it had been instructed of the need to find
the defendant “ ‘knew of the substance’s nature or character as a
controlled substance.’ ” (Id. at p. 437.) The appellate court found
the erroneous instruction with CALCRIM 250 was contradictory
because it informed the jury that “ ‘it is not required that [the
defendant] intended to break the law.’ ” (Southard, at p. 437.)
Because it was “hotly contested” whether the defendant knew
that the peace officer was performing his duty and whether the
defendant knew of the drug’s nature as a controlled substance,
the appellate court found the erroneous instruction prejudicial
and reversed. (Id. at pp. 437–439.) Here, by contrast, the People
did not need to prove that Orozco knew he was breaking the law
by possessing a firearm, only that he knew he was possessing a
firearm. Therefore, unlike in Southard, no contradictory
instructions were given.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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