In re C.P. CA2/5

CourtListener 9421259Calctapp18 ago 2023

Testo completo

Filed 8/18/23 In re C.P. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re C.P., a Person Coming B325963 c/w B323281
Under Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Ct. No. 19CCJP05504)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Conditionally affirmed
and remanded.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Mother.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Mother appeals from termination of her parental rights to
daughter (born August 2019), asserting substantial evidence did
not support the juvenile court’s finding that the parental-benefit
exception to adoption set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) was inapplicable.1 She also
argues the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with their inquiry duties
under section 224.2, subdivision (b)—the California statute
implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). DCFS concedes there is no record that it
inquired of maternal extended family members about Native
American ancestry, and requests we conditionally affirm and
remand for ICWA compliance.
We conclude the court properly denied the parental-benefit
exception. We conditionally affirm the termination of parental
rights and remand to allow DCFS to remedy the ICWA inquiry
errors and the juvenile court to determine anew whether ICWA
applies.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2019, the juvenile court found
jurisdiction over newborn daughter based on mother’s use of
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana during
pregnancy. The court removed daughter from mother’s custody
and ordered mother to have at least nine hours of monitored
visitation per week. The reunification plan for mother included a
drug treatment program, random drug testing, individual

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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counseling, and parenting education. Mother never reunified
with daughter.
1. Reunification Period
Mother consistently visited daughter nine hours per week;
visits at first were unmonitored. She later had overnight visits.
By September 2020, mother had relapsed, and the juvenile court
changed the visitation to monitored. Unmonitored visits would
be reinstated if mother provided four consecutive, negative drug
tests. Because mother continued to test positive for illicit
substances or altogether miss drug testing, her visitation
remained monitored for the remainder of the case.
Social workers and daughter’s caregiver consistently
reported mother had a good relationship with daughter and was
attentive to daughter during visitation. The two had a strong,
positive bond.
At the 18-month review hearing on July 20, 2021, the
juvenile court terminated reunification services because mother
had only partially complied with her case plan. The court set the
matter for a section 366.26 termination of parental rights
hearing.
2. Post-Reunification Period
While the section 366.26 hearing was pending, mother had
biweekly two- to three-hour visits with daughter, monitored in
the caretaker’s home.
Between November 2021 and June 2022, mother failed to
drug test 32 times. In July and August 2022, she tested negative
three times. Due to mother’s failure to drug test as required, on
August 23, 2022, the court ordered no visitation until mother
more consistently tested clean.

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After August 2022, mother failed to drug test, even missing
a make-up test scheduled at mother’s request. The juvenile court
kept to its word and mother did not visit daughter during the
four months preceding termination of parental rights.
On October 14, 2022, mother filed a section 388 petition
(not the subject of this appeal) requesting custody of daughter or
renewed reunification services and liberalized visits. DCFS
responded that the social worker could not get in contact with
mother, mother had not drug tested since August 2022, and
mother was not visiting daughter consistently because of her
failure to test clean.
Because daughter exhibited developmental delays as a
baby and was diagnosed with autism and speech delays as a
toddler, DCFS sought to obtain therapy and other resources for
her. On the morning of November 28, 2022, mother attended but
fell asleep during daughter’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP)
meeting. Mother subsequently declined consent for daughter to
receive recommended special education services to address
autism and speech issues.2
As a result, DCFS requested a court order to permit
daughter to participate in special education services and allow
the caretaker to provide consent. At the request of daughter’s
attorney, the court appointed daughter’s caretaker as a co-holder
of educational and developmental rights.

2 This was not the first time mother had declined services for
daughter. On September 11, 2020, mother declined consent for
daughter to receive Regional Center services for global
developmental delays, which had been discovered during an
assessment by a pediatric physical therapist. Mother eventually
gave consent, and daughter received services.

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3. Termination of Parental Rights
On December 13, 2022, the juvenile court held the
combined section 388 and 366.26 hearing; mother appeared
remotely. The court received the DCFS reports into evidence, as
well as mother’s section 388 petition, attachments, and visitation
log. The court heard argument on the section 388 petition and
denied it based on mother’s failure to drug test and her failure to
consent to special education services for daughter.
Mother presented no additional evidence for the section
366.26 hearing, nor did she testify. Her attorney asked the court
to select legal guardianship as daughter’s permanent plan,
urging the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied because
mother and daughter shared a strong parent-child relationship
established through ongoing visitation.
DCFS sought termination of parental rights, asserting
mother had not established the parental-benefit exception.
Daughter’s attorney asked the court to follow DCFS’s
recommendation and terminate parental rights. Counsel pointed
out that regular visits stopped in August 2022 because mother
refused to drug test. While there was evidence that earlier visits
had gone well, there was no indication the child would suffer
detriment if parental rights were terminated.
The juvenile court found the parental-benefit exception did
not apply. The court relied on the following: daughter had lived
outside of mother’s custody for almost her entire life, had resided
with her current caretaker for three years, and had special needs
that mother appeared unwilling to address. The court expressed
concern with mother’s addiction and concluded that maintaining
the parental relationship would lead to instability. Finding
daughter likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated

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and no exceptions to adoption applied, the court terminated
parental rights to free daughter for adoption by her long-term
caretaker.
While the court was announcing its ruling, mother
apparently had fallen asleep and was audibly snoring.
4. ICWA Inquiry
At the inception of this case, mother denied, in court and by
written attestation, having Native American ancestry. In
making its jurisdictional and dispositional findings, the court
found the ICWA did not apply.
On July 12, 2022, the court ordered DCFS to discuss with
mother and her relatives whether daughter may be an Indian
child and to include the information in the next report. In
response, on August 11, 2022, DCFS reported only that mother
denied she or any family member had American Indian heritage.
There was no indication that DCFS had contacted any relatives.
At the December 13, 2022 hearing, when the court terminated
parental rights, the court again stated the ICWA did not apply.
Even though DCFS was in contact with, or had contact
information for, the maternal great-aunt and two maternal
aunts, DCFS did not inquire with them or any other extended
family members about Native American heritage.
5. Appeals
On September 1, 2022, mother filed a notice of appeal (case
no. B323281) from the juvenile court’s August 23, 2022 denial of
an earlier section 388 petition, a petition which we do not discuss.
On December 13, 2022, mother filed a notice of appeal (case No.
B325963), appealing from termination of parental rights. On
March 9, 2023, we consolidated the two appeals for purposes of

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briefing, argument, and decision. In briefing, mother challenges
only the termination of her parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the court erred in declining to apply the
parental-benefit exception to adoption and that DCFS failed to
satisfy its ICWA inquiry duties.
1. The Parental-Benefit Exception
a. Applicable Law
The goal of section 366.26 proceedings is “to provide stable,
permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
In cases where the juvenile court terminates reunification
services, adoption is the legislature’s preferred permanent plan
for the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); see also In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) If the juvenile court finds the child is
adoptable, “the court must order adoption and its necessary
consequence, termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can
demonstrate one of the section 366.26 exceptions to adoption. (In
re Celine R., at p. 53; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 625 (Caden C.).)
Under the parental-benefit exception, the parent must
“establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,” “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629, 631.)
The first element is straightforward and focuses on
whether visitation was regular or not. For the second element,
“the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a
slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the
child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or

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“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the
child’s particular needs.’ . . . [C]ourts often consider how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As to the third element,
“[w]hat courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child
would be affected by losing the parental relationship — in effect,
what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without
the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.)
When assessing whether the parental-benefit exception
applies, “the court balances the strength and quality of the
natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against
the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment
such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for
adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Essentially, “the exception applies in situations where a child
cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the
benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two
elements – visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-
child relationship – for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) We review for abuse of discretion the
court’s assessment whether termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child. (Id. at p. 640.)

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b. The Court Did Not Err When It Found the
Parental-Benefit Exception Did Not Apply
We conclude the court did not err when it found the
parental-benefit exception did not apply. As to the first element,
although early in the dependency proceedings mother regularly
visited daughter, by August 23, 2022 mother’s drug use resulted
in the court terminating visitation until mother tested negative.
No visitation occurred from August 23 to December 12, 2022, the
date of the section 366.26 hearing.
“Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong
of the parent-child relationship exception to adoption.” (In re
C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554; see also In re J.C. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [regular visitation not present when
there were significant lapses in visitation]; In re I.R. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [“significant lapses in visits . . . fatally
undermine any attempt to find the beneficial parental
relationship exception”].)
There is no disagreement that mother failed to visit
daughter during the four months preceding termination of
parental rights. To the extent mother excuses this absence
because the trial court had cancelled visitation, we are not
moved. Between November 2021 and June 2022, mother failed to
drug test 32 times. On August 23, 2022, the court terminated
visitation until mother tested negatively. Mother apparently
never did, and the trial court maintained the visitation ban. It is
mother who is responsible for her not having visited daughter
during arguably the four most critical months of these
proceedings.

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Mother’s inconsistent visitation alone supported the denial
of the parental-benefit exception. As this element is decisive, we
need not address the others.
2. We Remand for ICWA Compliance
Mother argues that DCFS failed to inquire of extended
maternal family members about Native American ancestry, as
required by section 224.2, subdivision (b). DCFS concedes that,
even though it had relevant contact information about maternal
relatives, the record does not contain any indication that the
department discussed Native American ancestry with those
relatives.
From the department’s brief, “DCFS does not oppose a
conditional affirmance of the order terminating parental rights
and remand of the action to the juvenile court with directions to
order DCFS to inquire of the available maternal relatives
regarding whether the child may be an Indian child.” We have
reviewed the record and agree DCFS failed to satisfy ICWA’s
inquiry provisions. We therefore conditionally affirm the order
and remand for compliance.
DISPOSITION
The termination of parental rights order is conditionally
affirmed and remanded to the juvenile court for the limited
purpose of ensuring compliance with the inquiry provisions of
section 224.2. The court shall order DCFS to complete an inquiry
into daughter’s Indian ancestry by making reasonable efforts to
interview available maternal extended family members. Nothing
in this disposition precludes the court from ordering additional
inquiry of available extended relatives or others having an
interest in the child. If, after ICWA compliance, the juvenile
court determines that ICWA does not apply, the order

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terminating parental rights shall remain in effect. If the court
determines ICWA applies, it shall vacate the order and proceed
in accordance with ICWA and related state law.

RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

BAKER, J. MOOR, J.

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