In re Daniel T. CA2/1

CourtListener 9385544Calctapp21 mar 2023

Testo completo

Filed 3/21/23 In re Daniel T. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re DANIEL T. II et al., Persons B318532
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02124)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In these dependency proceedings Daniel T. (father) appeals
from juvenile court dispositional orders that removed his
children, Daniel T. II and I.T., from his care and denied him
reunification services and visitation. His sole contention is that
the juvenile court lacked the power to make these orders because
no evidence in the record indicates the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the
department) made sufficient inquiry about the children’s possible
Indian child status under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
Respondent concedes that an insufficient ICWA inquiry
was made but contends we can grant no effective relief at this
stage because DCFS and the juvenile court have ongoing
obligations under ICWA, and post-appeal court orders, of which
we have taken judicial notice, indicate the juvenile court has now
ordered DCFS to conduct further inquiries.
We agree, and therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
We will limit the presentation of facts to those pertinent to
the juvenile court’s ICWA finding, the sole disputed topic on
appeal.
On April 14, 2020, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions
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Code section 300 petition on behalf of Daniel T. II and I.T. based

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Undesignated statutory references will be to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

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on allegations of domestic violence between their mother and her
boyfriend. (The petition also concerned R.T., a half brother, who
is not a subject of this appeal.) DCFS later amended the petition
to include an allegation against father, who was incarcerated.
The juvenile court ultimately sustained the amended petition
only as to one count against mother.
DCFS’s detention report noted that the juvenile court had
found ICWA not to apply to these children in three prior
dependency cases. And on April 12, 2020, the mother denied
Indian ancestry in this case. (The mother is not party to this
appeal.)
At the April 17, 2020, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found a prima facie case that the children were described by
section 300 and detained them from father and the mother.
The court entered jurisdiction and disposition orders
pertaining to mother and R.T. (the half sibling) but continued the
matter several times over the course of 16 months, from October
2020 to January 2022, because father was unable to attend
hearings due to his incarceration and conflicting court
appearances.
Father appeared telephonically for the January 24, 2022,
dispositional hearing, in which the court declared Daniel T. II
and I.T. to be dependents of the court, removed them from
father’s custody, and denied him reunification services or
visitation.
The record contains no information about any ICWA
inquiry concerning father.
Father appeals.
On December 19, 2022, after father filed his notice of
appeal, the juvenile court ordered DCFS “to interview parents

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and all appropriate relatives regarding ICWA and provide a
report.” The court set the matter for a progress hearing to occur
on February 6, 2023.
DISCUSSION
Father contends no evidence in the record indicates DCFS
made sufficient inquiry about the children’s possible Indian child
status, in derogation of state law (§ 224.2) implementing ICWA
and contrary to the requirement that the department make and
document such inquiries and any responses. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) [burden on child welfare agency to provide
detailed requirements of the ICWA have been satisfied is
appropriate]; In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.)
Respondent concedes the error but argues reversal is
unwarranted because the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over
the matter, and DCFS and the court have a continuing duty and
opportunity to comply with ICWA. We agree.
An “Indian child” is an unmarried person under 18 years of
age who is (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or
(2) is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe and
is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized tribe.
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal
definitions], subd. (b) [expanding the age range stated in the
federal definition to include persons over 18, but under 21, years
of age].)
The juvenile court and DCFS have an affirmative and
continuing duty, beginning at initial contact, to inquire of family
members whether a child who is subject to dependency
proceedings is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a)
[setting forth the ”affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”];
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a) [same].)

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Our review is unnecessary in an “ICWA appeal at the
jurisdiction and disposition stage where there will necessarily be
further dependency proceedings in the juvenile court (at which
continuing ICWA duties apply) and a basis for later appeal if for
some reason the remedial ICWA investigation [DCFS] is now
undertaking falls short.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 635, 638.)
“[T]he only order which would be subject to reversal for
failure to give notice would be an order terminating parental
rights.” (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 385; see
also In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 65, superseded by
statute on other grounds; In re Damian C. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
192, 199-200; In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 187-
188; but see Nicole K. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
779, 784-785; and In re S.E. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 610, 616-
617.)
“[A]ll we could order in resolving this appeal is that the
Department and juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and notice
obligations under ICWA and related California law. Because
that is what the Department is already doing, and because we
are not in a position to micromanage that process in this appeal
(detailing, for instance, all those who must be interviewed, what
they must be asked, and what must be included in any notice to
tribes that is required), there is no effective relief we can now
provide. The juvenile court must direct that process, at least in
the first instance.” (In re Baby Girl M., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 638-639.)
This appeal is moot.

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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