CourtListener 2116011•People v. Easter
Testo completo
Opinion
POCHÉ, J.
Subsequent to this court’s initial consideration of this appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the holding of
Carlos
v.
Superior Court
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], applied to all
*185
cases then pending on appeal and set forth the standard of prejudice to be applied to such an error.
(People
v.
Garcia
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 539 [205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826].) Thereafter this cause was retransferred to us for the limited purpose of reconsideration in light of
Garcia.
While this case was pending in the reconsideration stage, the high court decided
People
v.
Anderson
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], which overruled
Carlos
to the extent it had held that the trial court must instruct on intent to kill in conjunction with a felony-murder special circumstance allegation where the defendant is the actual killer. Because defendant was the actual killer in this case, we find no instructional error to have occurred and affirm.
I-III
*
(6)
The Carlos issue
Subsequent to the trial in this case, the California Supreme Court held that the 1978 death penalty initiative must be construed to require an intent to kill or to aid in a killing as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance.
(Carlos
v.
Superior Court, supra,
35 Cal.3d at p. 136.) Thereafter the California Supreme Court overruled
Carlos
and held “intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance; but when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved.”
(People
v.
Anderson, supra,
43 Cal.3d at p. 1147. Thus, the trial court must instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance where there is evidence from which the jury could find that defendant was an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer.
(Ibid.)
Here, the prosecution’s theory was that defendant was the actual killer; the defense was misidentification. That defendant was an accomplice was a theory neither argued below nor presented to the jury. For this reason, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on intent to kill.
11
Defendant argues that
Anderson
cannot be applied to cases tried and appealed prior to its rendition, for to do so “would operate in an
ex post
*186
facto
manner” thereby violating the due process principles espoused in
Bouie
v.
City of Columbia
(1964) 378 U.S. 347 [12 L.Ed.2d 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697], and
Keeler
v.
Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 619 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420]. (Italics in original.) There is nothing in the least ex post facto about application of
Anderson
to this case.
It will be recalled that the rule of
Carlos
was first announced after the trial of this case and, once the new rule was found to be retroactive, it worked to defendant’s advantage: he was entitled to be retried under instructions requiring the jury to find an additional element in conjunction with the felony-murder special circumstances, an intent to kill.
Anderson
came along and in essence returned to the rule in effect at the time of defendant’s crimes and his trial: intent to kill was not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance insofar as the principal is concerned. There is nothing violative of the ex post facto clause in ordering the parties to be governed by the law as it stood at the time of the trial and at the time of the defendant’s conduct.
Nothing in
Bouie
or
Keeler
alters this conclusion. At issue in those cases was judicial construction of a criminal statute enlarging the reach of the statute from what it had been at the time of the commission of the act. In other words, as recently judicially construed, the statute would punish an act which was not criminal at the time performed. Under those circumstances the United States Supreme Court in
Bouie
did not hesitate to invoke the due process clause: “Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an
ex post facto
law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An
ex post facto
law has been defined by this Court as one ‘that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action,’ or ‘that
aggravates
a
crime,
or makes it
greater
than it was, when committed.’ [Citation, fn. omitted.] If a state legislature is barred by the
Ex Post Facto
Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. [Citation.] The fundamental principle that ‘the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred,’ [citation] must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,’ it must not be given retroactive effect. [Citation.]”
(Bouie
v.
City of Columbia, supra,
378 U.S. at pp. 353-354 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 899-900], italics in original; accord
Keeler
v.
Superior Court, supra,
2 Cal.3d at pp. 634-635.)
The situation at hand is obviously distinct from the situation addressed in
Bouie. Anderson
did not make criminal what was innocent at the time of
*187
defendant’s conduct. Nor did
Anderson
impose a punishment different from what existed at the time of defendant’s conduct. Instead, the only effect of
Anderson
is to render valid the jury instructions delivered to defendant’s jury on the felony-murder special circumstances. Therefore,
Anderson
may govern the outcome of this case on appeal without offending the due process clause.
(7)
*
The judgment is affirmed.
Anderson, P. J., and Channell, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 21, 1987, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 17, 1988.
*
See footnote,
ante,
page 183.
11
The jury was instructed: “To find the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery and/or burglary is true, it must be proved: []]] (1) That the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery and/or burglary. []]] (2) That the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery and/or burglary, or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstances referred to in these instructions is not established if the robbery and/or burglary was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.” (CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1980 rev.).)
*
See footnote,
ante,
page 183.
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