People v. Scurlock CA2/6

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Filed 6/15/26 P. v. Scurlock CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344233
(Super. Ct. No. 2011035383)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

JOHN DAVID SCURLOCK,

Defendant and Appellant.

John David Scurlock appeals after the trial court found him
to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600. Appellant contends
we should reverse because the trial court erroneously denied his
speedy trial motion. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1988 and 2005, appellant was convicted of assault with
intent to commit rape. Both offenses involved appellant
victimizing women who were jogging near the beach. The
convictions qualified as sexually violent offenses under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). On July 8,
2008, the District Attorney filed a petition to commit appellant as
an SVP.
In August 2009, the trial court found probable cause for
trial. Appellant spent approximately 21 months in jail before
transferring to Coalinga State Hospital. Appellant wanted to
transfer to obtain better conditions. He had been physically
attacked while in jail.
In August 2011, appellant received another probable cause
hearing in light of In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509
(Ronje).1 The court again found probable cause.
After this second probable cause hearing, appellant and his
attorney, Benjamin Maserang, were not attempting to set a trial
date. Appellant was in sex offender treatment, which both he
and Maserang viewed as potentially helpful to his case. Between
2010 and 2013, appellant received treatment for various medical
and dental issues. The treatment he received would not have
been available at the local jail. According to Maserang, appellant
was not interested in setting an immediate trial date between
2012 and 2014.
Appellant wanted Maserang to file a motion pursuant to
People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888

1 In Ronje, the Court of Appeal concluded SVPs who had

been evaluated under a protocol which had been invalidated were
entitled to new evaluations and a new probable cause hearing
based upon those new evaluations. (Ronje, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at p. 521, disapproved in part by Reilly v. Superior
Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 655.)

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(Ghilotti).2 Maserang felt the motion would be more appropriate
as a pretrial motion rather than a standalone motion. Appellant
did not ask Maserang to immediately go to trial in order to
litigate the Ghilotti motion.
In March 2015, appellant sent a letter to the appointed
public defender complaining of difficulties with reaching
Maserang. Maserang called appellant and spoke with him about
obtaining updated evaluations.
Around May 2015, Maserang received reports, including
from Dr. Eric Simon. Maserang was concerned because Dr.
Simon had recorded his interview with appellant. Maserang
believed a jury would look unfavorably upon hearing appellant
describe the offenses. Maserang thought the matter could be
addressed by waiting for the evaluation to become stale, that
appellant was “on board” with this plan, and that they were “on
the same page” that there would not be a trial until they received
new evaluations in 2016. But in 2016 and again in 2017,
appellant refused to speak with Dr. Simon, who then had to rely
upon appellant’s 2015 statements for his 2016 and 2017
evaluations. Based upon Maserang’s communication with
appellant, it was not his understanding that appellant wanted to
go to trial without a more favorable evaluation.
In June 2017, appellant sent Maserang a letter claiming he
had not heard from Maserang in over two years. According to
Maserang, this claim was not accurate, but he and appellant had
difficulty reaching each other in 2017. In September 2017,

2 In Ghilotti, the Supreme Court held that an SVP

evaluator’s recommendations are subject to judicial review for
“material legal error.” (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 913.)

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Maserang sent appellant a letter updating him on various
aspects of the case.
In March 2018, appellant sent a letter to the chief public
defender. Appellant claimed he had not had contact with
Maserang in three years. Appellant asked the office to reassign
his case to another attorney.
In November 2018, appellant sent another letter to the
chief public defender. Appellant requested the Ghilotti motion be
filed. Appellant quoted from People v. Superior Court (Vasquez)
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36 (Vasquez): “‘Enough is enough.’” The
Vasquez court concluded the trial court did not err in finding a
17-year delay violated the due process right to a timely trial. (Id.
at p. 41, disapproved in part in Camacho v. Superior Court (2023)
15 Cal.5th 354, 392, fn. 8 (Camacho).) Appellant’s letter
continued: “I would like this motion filed and my case move
forward. Nine years, no progress is too long.”
In January 2019, Maserang requested a Marsden3 hearing
on appellant’s behalf. Appellant complained of inadequate
communication with Maserang. The court denied the motion.
Maserang did not believe appellant was urgently seeking a trial
date and instead preferred “to get rid of the case without going
through an SVP trial.” Appellant was always aware that there
was “no guarantee that it [the trial] would be a favorable outcome
for him.” In March 2019, appellant told Maserang in a letter that
he did not want to go to trial based on the belief that he was
entitled to dismissal under Vasquez.
In January 2020, the public defender declared a conflict
and was relieved. In July 2020, appellant’s new counsel filed a
motion to dismiss based on appellant’s constitutional right to due

3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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process and a speedy trial. Both Maserang and appellant
testified at the July 2022 hearing. The court denied the motion.
At the conclusion of a court trial in February 2025, the
court found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was an
SVP.
DISCUSSION
“[I]ndividuals facing commitment under the SVP Act have
a due process right to a timely trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 379.) To determine whether this right has been
violated, we consider the factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo
(1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530-532 [33 L.Ed.2d 101] (Barker): (1) the
length of the pretrial delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) the prejudice that the
delay caused the defendant. (People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1092, 1100.) Appellant fails to establish a due process violation
under any standard of review. (Camacho, at p. 383.)
As to the first Barker factor, the length of the pretrial delay
“operates as a threshold hurdle; ‘[u]ntil there is some delay which
is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance.’” (Camacho, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 383.) “If the accused makes this showing, the court
must then consider . . . the extent to which the delay stretches
beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination
of the claim.” (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 652
[120 L.Ed.2d 520].)
Here, the period from the petition’s filing until trial
exceeded 16 years. Measuring from filing until appellant wrote
the letter invoking Vasquez and stating, “‘Enough is enough,’” the
delay was over 10 years. As the Attorney General acknowledges,
a delay of over 10 years is significant and weighs in appellant’s

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favor. (See Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 383 [eight-year
delay deemed “‘significant’”].)
The second Barker factor—the reasons for the delay—is the
“‘flag all litigants seek to capture’ [citation] because the
permissibility of pretrial delay depends to a great extent on who
bears responsibility for it and why.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at pp. 383-384.)
Appellant bears primary responsibility for the delay in this
case. Some of the delay between 2009 and 2011 can be traced to
the second probable cause hearing after Ronje. Appellant is not
responsible for the delay Ronje caused. Between 2010 and 2013,
however, appellant received medical and dental treatment at the
state hospital, to which he had requested transfer. Appellant
could not have received the same treatment in jail, where he
would be housed pending an imminent trial. According to
Maserang, appellant was not interested in setting an immediate
trial date between 2012 and 2014.
When Maserang arranged for new evaluations in 2015,
appellant gave the problematic recorded interview with Dr.
Simon. Appellant was “on board” with Maserang’s strategy to let
the evaluation become stale. But appellant’s refusal to speak
with Dr. Simon in either 2016 or 2017 caused the problem to
persist.
Generally, delays sought by counsel are attributed to the
client, not the state. (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90-
91 [173 L.Ed.2d 231].) Appellant offers no reason to depart from
this rule. His case does not involve, for example, a systematic
breakdown at the public defender’s office. (See id. at p. 94.) The
second Barker factor cuts against appellant.

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Regarding the third Barker factor, assertion of the right,
the “‘issue is not simply the number of times the accused
acquiesced or objected; rather, the focus is on the surrounding
circumstances, such as the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity
of the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the
accused was represented by counsel, [and] the accused’s pretrial
conduct . . . . The totality of the accused’s responses to the delay
is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial.’”
(People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 238.)
Appellant did not clearly indicate he wanted an imminent
trial until the 2018 Vasquez letter. During that ten-year period,
he communicated other wishes to Maserang. For example,
appellant requested plea forms from his criminal conviction and
wanted Maserang to file a Ghilotti motion. But appellant did not
demand a trial for over a decade. Given his belated assertion of
the speedy trial right, the third factor weighs against appellant.
As for the final factor of prejudice, Barker identified three
functions of the speedy trial right: “(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) No presumption
of prejudice applies in the SVP context. (Camacho, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 392.)
Here, the delay did not significantly impair appellant’s
defense. At the speedy trial hearing before the trial court,
appellant testified that a family friend, his son’s grandmother,
and a brother-in-law had died during the pendency of his case.
Although appellant might have called these individuals as
character witnesses at trial, they had passed away by 2014—
years before appellant asserted his speedy trial right. Moreover,

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while appellant experienced an oppressive restriction on liberty
that could cause anxiety and concern, he also availed himself of
treatment—both physical and mental—while at the state
hospital. To the extent prejudice exists in this case, the delay did
not “undermin[e] the fairness of the proceedings.” (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393.)
Balancing the four Barker factors, appellant has not shown
a due process violation. Only the length of the delay “strongly
supports” his claim. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 394.)
Appellant bears primary responsibility for the delay and did not
demand trial before 2018. Nor did significant prejudice occur.
The pretrial delay did not violate appellant’s rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Catherine Voelker, Judge
Anthony Sabo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney
General.

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