CourtListener 10874445•People v. Shen CA6
Testo completo
Filed 6/12/26 P. v. Shen CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051141
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1775180)
v.
JASON SHEN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Defendants Panpan Huang, Jason Shen, and Lin Tao were convicted of multiple
offenses including first degree felony murder, robbery, and sex offenses stemming from a
string of brothel robberies in Northern California. On appeal, defendants raise multiple
arguments, including that (1) Tao’s confession should have been excluded because his
waiver under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) was invalid; (2) the
jury was prejudicially misinstructed on the actual killer theory of first degree felony
murder; (3) there is insufficient evidence for Huang’s conviction of felony murder as a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life; (4) the trial court
prejudicially erred in admitting expert testimony on firearm toolmark analysis; (5) the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence that Shen possessed automotive oil filters;
(6) California’s prohibition on semiautomatic pistols with a threaded barrel violates the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; (7) the trial court exceeded its
authority by imposing several restraining orders; and (8) there is a clerical error in Shen’s
abstract of judgment that requires correction.
We will strike three of the restraining orders as to all the defendants and agree that
Shen’s abstract of judgment must be corrected. We otherwise affirm the judgments.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Information
The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendants Huang, Shen, and
Tao with the following 13 counts: murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)1 with a
robbery-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), four counts of second
degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2, 9, 10, and 13), three counts of rape by force, violence,
duress, menace or fear (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 5, 6, and 11), two counts of sexual
penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 7 and 12), and oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 8).2 For the count of murder, it was alleged that each
defendant, if not the actual killer, acted with reckless indifference to human life and was
a major participant, and as to Tao, it was alleged that he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Tao and Shen were charged
with possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); count 3), and Tao alone was
charged with assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 4).
B. The Trial
1. The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Huang and Shen hired Tao and two
other accomplices, An Yan and Jun Li, over the social media platform WeChat with
promises of a high-paying job recovering money from sex workers. The men traveled to
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
As to counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12, it was alleged that all three defendants engaged
in tying or binding the victims (§ 667.61, subd. (b)) and committed sexual offenses
against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)).
2
various residential brothels in the San Francisco Bay Area to rob sex workers. During the
robbery of a San Jose brothel, Tao fatally shot a man who worked there.
a. The Milpitas Incident
On September 27, 2017, several men rushed into an apartment in Milpitas where
S.D. worked as a sex worker. S.D. was bound and shocked with a stun gun; she also felt
a gun at her head. The men demanded money from S.D. and raped her. One man used
an eggplant to penetrate S.D.’s vagina. S.D. believed there were at least two or three
men, and one of them shaved her head. The men took S.D.’s bank card, threatened her
for the password, and left with her cell phone as well.
Surveillance videos from the apartment showed a white van entering the parking
garage before the incident. Inside the apartment, officers found a clump of hair near the
front entrance area, an eggplant, a condom wrapper, and a Bank of America receipt. The
receipt had two of Huang’s fingerprints, one of Shen’s fingerprints, and two of S.D.’s
fingerprints. Huang’s fingerprint was found on a condom wrapper.
That day, bank records showed that S.D.’s bank card, in addition to being used to
withdraw $500, was also used at a 99 Ranch Market in Daly City and at an Apple Store
in Palo Alto. Store surveillance video showed Tao, Yan, and Huang inside the 99 Ranch
Market and Shen and Jun Li entering the Apple store around the time the card was used.
b. The South San Francisco Incident
On September 27, 2017, Cuiwei Guo went to her apartment because her sublessee
(who operated a brothel) reported that the apartment’s surveillance video was no longer
visible. Guo found two women and two men in restraints, as well as one naked woman
who answered the door. One of the women told Guo that she had been sexually
assaulted.
c. The Fremont Incident
On September 28, 2017, at a brothel in Fremont, employee Y.W. opened the door
for three men. Two of the men went upstairs, and the third man went to the bathroom.
3
The third man emerged wearing a mask, and one of the other men came downstairs and
pointed a gun at Y.W.; Y.W. was then restrained, her eyes covered with a towel.
X.D. was upstairs. One of the men, whom she later identified as Tao hit her in the
face, raped her, and forced her to orally copulate him. A man wearing a mask pointed a
gun at her and demanded her money before also raping her. A third man, whom X.D.
later identified as Jun Li, joined the others in her bedroom. X.D. recalled that Jun Li had
visited the brothel before. Jun Li digitally penetrated X.D.’s vagina. At some point, X.D.
heard someone yell for Tao to leave, but Tao responded that he had not ejaculated yet.
Although Y.W. recounted that all three men were masked, she identified Yan
through a photograph and thought both Jun Li and Tao looked familiar. Surveillance
footage near the apartment showed that a white minivan passed near the residence around
the time of the robbery.
d. The San Jose Incident
Y.G. managed a brothel with Xingjian Li at an apartment complex in San Jose.
On September 28, 2017, Yan arrived at the brothel, and Tao and Jun Li came shortly after
with guns. The men restrained Y.G. and Xingjian Li, and Tao kicked Y.G. and struck
him with the gun. While the men went to look for money, Xingjian Li was able to free
himself and ran. But Y.G. heard a gunshot. The three intruders left, taking suitcases and
other items. Y.G. found Xingjian Li lying in the kitchen, injured with an apparent
gunshot wound. Y.G. recalled that Shen had visited the day before.
Officers later found a spent casing with a headstamp reading “WIN 9-millimeter
luger” near the base of a couch. Xingjian Li was taken to the hospital, where he died
from his injury, a single gunshot wound. The wound trajectory was consistent with his
being shot while climbing over a pony wall or partition, with his body parallel to the
ground.
Surveillance video from that evening showed a white Dodge Caravan minivan
turning into the apartment complex’s parking garage. Yan, Jun Li, and Tao can be seen
4
near the parking garage. Later that evening, Jun Li, Yan, and Tao can be seen leaving the
lower level parking garage; Yan and Jun Li are carrying suitcases and Tao is carrying
boxes.
e. Additional Investigation
Officers determined that the five suspects stayed at a Motel 6 in San Jose two days
before the Milpitas robbery. Officers also determined that the suspects stayed at a
Wyndham hotel in San Jose on September 28, 2017, the night of the San Jose shooting.
Surveillance videos from that evening showed a white Dodge Caravan entering the
Wyndham hotel parking lot and all five suspects—Huang, Shen, Tao, Jun Li, and Yan—
in the hotel lobby carrying luggage consistent with that taken in the San Jose robbery.
The Dodge Caravan was registered to Larry Ding Yue. Yue reported renting the
van to Huang three days before the Milpitas robbery.
When police located the Dodge Caravan, they found a black zip tie and a parking
pass for the San Jose Wyndham hotel. Huang’s semen was found on the third row seat.
Two cigarette butts—one matching Huang’s DNA—were found in the interior driver’s
side door. Huang’s fingerprints were on the van’s steering wheel. Fingerprints of all five
suspects were found on the interior side of the van’s third-row window.
All five suspects were arrested. In Shen’s home, police found live nine-millimeter
ammunition, a nine-millimeter Glock pistol, a bag of zip ties, luggage, and (in the same
room as the gun) Napa automotive oil filters. The ammunition found in Shen’s home
matched the headstamp of the gun casing collected from the San Jose incident. Shen’s
DNA was on the gun’s handle.
An expert in firearms analysis and comparison opined that the cartridge collected
from the San Jose incident was fired from the gun found at Shen’s house. The expert also
opined that the same gun fired the bullet that was recovered from Xingjian Li’s body.
According to the expert, oil filters can be used as a makeshift silencer.
5
f. Tao’s Statements to Detective Meeker
Detective Brian Meeker interviewed Tao with the assistance of a Mandarin
language interpreter. Tao told Meeker that he had responded to a job advertisement and
had communicated with the employer through WeChat. Tao was offered $20,000 to help
collect money owed by sex workers and was told the job would take two or three days.
Tao was driven from Los Angeles to San Jose with men he had not met before.
Tao was told that he and the other men would be robbing and taking the money from the
sex workers by force. Tao and the others visited seven brothels and used a taser at some
of them. Several of the men had guns, and Tao was given one before the San Jose
robbery.
When Tao and his accomplices arrived at the San Jose brothel, Tao and one of his
accomplices drew their guns, and two men who worked at the brothel were restrained.
While Tao and another accomplice went to another room and tied up the sex workers, one
of the men broke free and tried to flee. Tao warned him not to move, raising his gun and
firing it once. The man said he would not run anymore, and Tao tied him up again, then
left with his accomplices and luggage from the brothel.
g. Yan’s Testimony
Yan testified for the prosecution pursuant to a plea agreement. Yan identified
defendants Huang, Tao, and Shen at trial as his coparticipants. He identified Jun Li as
one of the four other men by photograph. At the time of the offenses, Yan had recently
moved from China to Southern California. Yan contacted Huang over WeChat after
Huang posted about a job that had good pay. Yan later met Huang and Shen in person:
They discussed Yan’s prior military and police experience, and Huang said he was
looking for help finding women who owed him money who worked at massage parlors.
At a second meeting before the trip, Huang and Shen explained to Yan how
massage parlors operated. They told Yan to pose as a customer to gain access. Once
inside, Yan and the others were to subdue the occupants and communicate to Shen and
6
Huang that the “condition is clear.” Shen and Huang would then “come in to do the
rest.” Huang told Yan that he would be paid at least $20,000 per week.
Huang and Shen picked up Yan, Tao, and Jun Li in a white Dodge van. On the
drive to Northern California, it was reiterated that the men would be collecting debts
from massage parlors by force.
Yan recalled that seven or eight brothels were robbed on the trip, each robbery
following a similar pattern. Huang gave Yan a gun. Shen supplied guns to Tao and Jun
Li. The gun Shen provided Tao for the San Jose robbery had some type of silencer on it,
but at 12 to 18 inches long and four inches in diameter, the silencer was jettisoned before
the San Jose robbery as too large to fit into a backpack. Tao and Jun Li sometimes used
stun guns during the robberies, which Huang had supplied. The brothel appointments
were made by either Shen or Huang. At the brothels, Yan, Tao, or Jun Li would enter
first, posing as customers to gain access before drawing their weapons and subduing the
occupants. Huang and Shen entered later, their faces covered.3 All five men would
search the apartment for valuables, and some of the men would sexually assault the
workers. Huang and Shen told Yan, Tao, and Jun Li that if they encountered resistance,
they could fire a gunshot to scare the occupants; Huang and Shen suggested muffling the
sound by firing against the sofa. Shen said that if anyone in the brothel were to be shot,
the remaining occupants should also be killed.
Yan’s account of the four charged robberies largely tracked the victims’ accounts.
At the Milpitas brothel, Huang raped one of the sex workers and asked Yan to get a “big
object” to put inside the woman’s vagina. Shen had the woman’s bank card, which was
used for a cash withdrawal and to purchase goods at an Apple Store. At the South San
Francisco brothel, the men found two customers and subdued everyone who was inside.
3
Tao and Jun Li did not wear a mask during the robberies, and Yan wore a mask
only once. According to Yan, the men would not have been permitted to enter the
brothels had they entered with masks first.
7
Huang and Shen sexually assaulted one of the women. Yan also sexually assaulted one
of the women. At the Fremont brothel, Tao, Huang, and Shen sexually assaulted the
women inside.
As for the San Jose robbery, Yan recalled that Shen had been to the brothel earlier
and gave the group information about the location. Shen told the men to expect two
women and two male “shop keepers.” Shen said that the two men, if resistant, could be
intimidated by gunfire. Shen reiterated that if any of the occupants were shot, the men
were to kill the others inside. Shen gave Tao and Jun Li guns to use during the robbery,
and Huang drove the men to the location. They found two men and two women inside
the brothel, and all four were then restrained with zip ties.
One of the men tried to take off his restraints, and Yan told him not to move. But
the man freed himself, jumping on top of a countertop that separated the living room and
the kitchen. Tao came out of the room, and Yan saw Tao fire the gun. The man fell over
into the kitchen, bloodied. The man said he would not run again, and Yan restrained him.
Yan and his accomplices searched the apartment and left, taking two luggage containers,
a backpack, and cigarettes.
Huang and Shen picked up Yan, Jun Li, and Tao with the van, and Shen asked if
they had used the gun. Tao admitted that he had fired his gun. Shen blamed Yan, Tao,
and Jun Li for not eliminating all witnesses, and Shen and Huang both seemed angry,
saying “nasty words” to them. The group went to a hotel, and Huang and Shen left that
night. Yan made his way back to the Los Angeles area the next day. Yan deleted the
WeChat texts between him and Huang.
After their arrest, Huang gave Yan a letter that asked Yan and Tao to “plead out”
to the crimes. Yan wrote back to Huang and asked for $20,000 in exchange for his
testimony that Huang was “clean” and that “[e]verything was done by [Jun Li] and
[Shen].”
h. Shen’s Background
8
In June 2015, an undercover officer with the San Gabriel Police Department called
a brothel under investigation and spoke to Shen to arrange an appointment. Upon arrival
at the brothel, the undercover officer met Shen, who explained the brothel’s process.
The parties stipulated Shen was convicted of section 266, subdivision (f), selling a
person for immoral purposes, and was placed on probation, and that Shen was still on
probation in September 2017.
2. Huang’s Defense
Huang testified on his own behalf. Huang was born in China to successful
parents. He started working as a tour guide in the United States in 2014 and was active in
a WeChat tour guide group.4 Huang met Shen after a prior client asked for an interpreter.
Huang denied Yan’s account. Huang testified that he was merely a hired tour
guide and driver for Yan. According to Huang, Yan posted an advertisement that said he
was looking to hire a car to go to San Francisco. Yan told Huang that two or three others
would accompany him on his trip, and he wanted to visit a few friends’ houses. Huang
then drove a van, accompanied by Shen, and picked up Yan, Tao, and Jun Li for the trip.
Huang drove Yan to various addresses provided by Yan, with Shen making reservations.
Huang knew the men were visiting brothels because Shen had called and asked what the
businesses were. The group visited five to seven brothels. When Huang came to pick up
Yan, Jun Li, and Tao at the San Jose brothel, the men said they had to leave immediately,
and Yan told Huang that someone had been shot. According to Huang, he then realized
that the men had been committing robberies, and he begged Yan to let him go. Yan said
that he would find and kill both Huang and Shen if they did not keep quiet. Huang and
Shen later drove the van back to Los Angeles, leaving Yan, Jun Li, and Tao in Northern
California.
4
Several fellow tour guides testified that they knew Huang as a tour guide and
believed that he was hard working and busy.
9
3. Tao’s Defense
An expert in gunshot residue analysis and detection received a shirt associated
with Tao that he sampled for gunshot residue and found no residue. But the expert
acknowledged that the absence of residue could be explained by the distribution of
particles other than on the sampled areas, or the loss of deposited particles before
sampling.
4. The Verdict and Sentencing
In November 2022, the jury convicted all three defendants of all charges as
alleged, finding true the special circumstances and enhancements. The trial court
sentenced Shen and Huang to life without the possibility of parole consecutive to a
determinate term of 24 years. The trial court sentenced Tao to a term of life without the
possibility of parole consecutive to 67 years to life. All three defendants timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Tao’s Confession
Before trial, Tao’s counsel moved to suppress his confessions from a succession of
post-arrest interrogations by four different law enforcement agencies, and the trial court
excluded all but the first confession, to Detective Meeker. On appeal, Tao argues that his
Miranda waiver in this first interview was not knowing or intelligent. We find no error
in the trial court’s admission of Tao’s confession. Despite initial mistakes in the
translation of Tao’s Miranda rights, Tao was advised fully of his rights a second time and
affirmatively indicated on the record that he understood them.
1. Additional Background
The San Jose Police Department was the first agency to interrogate Tao. Tao
spoke in Mandarin during the interview, and Meeker was assisted by a Mandarin
interpreter, Tony LaRosa. Detective Raul Martinez also participated in the interview.
The officers started by asking Tao about his name and other information,
including where he worked and whether he used WeChat. Martinez then read Tao his
10
Miranda rights with LaRosa interpreting. There were several issues with LaRosa’s
interpretation in this first advisement: When Tao was told that he had the right to remain
silent, LaRosa asked Tao if he understood that right. When Tao replied, “Um,” La Rosa
interpreted this as “[y]es.” LaRosa similarly misinterpreted as “yes” Tao’s identical reply
when asked if he understood his “right to speak and receive help and counsel from an
attorney.” When Martinez advised, “If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you free of charge before any questioning if you want,” LaRosa interpreted
this in Mandarin as “if you like to have an attorney, but if you cannot afford one, the
court can assign an attorney for you.” This time, when asked if he understood this right,
Tao answered that he did.
LaRosa then disclosed that he needed to correct the advisement about having an
attorney present; Martinez instead suggested that they “start over” to ensure that Tao
understood his rights. LaRosa told Tao, “[S]ince I just made a mistake, … we will say it
again.” In this second attempt, LaRosa interpreted the following advisements, with Tao
affirmatively responding “I do” when asked if he understood each one: “You have the
right - the right to remain silent”; “Otherwise, anything you say can be used against you
in court”; “Prior to questioning, you have the right to speak to an attorney and receive
help and counsel from the attorney. You have the right to have an attorney present
during questioning”; “If you want to hire an attorney but cannot afford one, the court will
appoint you one”; and “do you understand everything that was just said.” The San Jose
detectives then proceeded to interview Tao with LaRosa’s assistance.
After the San Jose detectives concluded their interview, Fremont Detective
Richard Hamblin interviewed Tao with another officer interpreting. Detective Hamblin
started his interview with Tao about a minute after the San Jose interview, and the
interview lasted approximately 50 minutes. During the interview, Hamblin asked Tao
through the interpreter whether Tao still understood the rights that had been read to him
earlier. Tao replied, first, “Um,” then “Just now, they said it.” Tao then said, “I don’t
11
remember clearly,” so Hamblin advised Tao of his rights a second time. When the
interpreter told Tao in Mandarin, “If you can’t afford an attorney, the court will be
appointed to you [sic]. Do you understand?” Tao replied, “Yes. When can I hire an
attorney?” Hamblin responded, “So the process is and I apologize, this is not my county,
but you’ll go to booking, um, you’ll get an arraignment and they’ll issue you, if you can’t
afford one, an attorney at that time.”5 In Mandarin, the interpreter rendered Hamblin’s
statement as follows: “I apologize this is not my county, but he just explained that sorry,
this is not my county, but after you finish booking here, you will go to court, uh, to do …
anyway, appearing in court. When you appear in court, the court will ask you.” Hamblin
did not advise Tao that he had the right to an attorney before any questioning. Hamblin
then proceeded to interview Tao.
Given Hamblin’s erroneous response to Tao’s question about when he could
obtain an attorney, the trial court excluded the statements made by Tao during this second
interview and the subsequent interviews with the officers from the Milpitas and South
San Francisco police departments. With respect to the San Jose interview, the trial court
found that during the second recitation of Tao’s Miranda rights as translated by LaRosa,
Tao affirmatively stated that he understood his rights. The trial court acknowledged that
Tao’s later exchange with Hamblin and the interpreter reflected that he could not fully
remember the rights that were read to him earlier. But the trial court concluded that this
was not evidence that Tao’s earlier waiver during the interview with San Jose officers
was unknowing.
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘As a prophylactic safeguard to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, … law enforcement agencies [must] advise a suspect, before
5
Hamblin testified at the hearing that he had believed that Tao was asking about
the “court process” and “how that would play out.”
12
any custodial law enforcement questioning, that “he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” ’ ” (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012)
55 Cal.4th 203, 215 (Sauceda-Contreras).) The prosecution “ ‘ “bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that [a defendant’s] waiver [of Miranda
rights] was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 16. (Miranda-
Guerrero).) A waiver is “ ‘ “knowing in the sense that it was ‘made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 157 (Suarez).)
“When evaluating the admissibility of a defendant’s statements on appeal, we
accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence,
and we independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found
by the trial court whether the statements were illegally obtained.” (Miranda-Guerrero,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 16.)
3. Analysis
Applying independent review, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of
Tao’s statements to the San Jose detectives. Tao’s unequivocal agreement when asked if
he understood each of his correctly administered and translated Miranda rights, together
with his demonstrated willingness to answer the detectives’ questions about his
participation in the crimes, met the prosecution’s burden of showing a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Although Tao relies on circumstances before his
advisement and after his confession in urging a contrary conclusion, his arguments are
unpersuasive.
Undisputedly, LaRosa initially misinterpreted both Tao’s right to counsel and
Tao’s equivocal answers when asked if he understood his rights. (Sauceda-Contreras,
13
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 215 [defendant has right to appointed attorney prior to
questioning].) But LaRosa acknowledged his mistake not only to the detectives but to
Tao and then proceeded to accurately interpret a “ ‘ “fully effective” ’ ” new Miranda
advisement. (Miranda-Guerrero, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 17, italics omitted.) Tao clearly
responded to these second advisements by stating “I do” when asked if he understood the
rights being read to them. Indeed, the fact that Tao demurred when asked if he
understood LaRosa’s first bungled translation supports the reliability of his later
affirmation that he understood the second, correct rendition.
The validity of Tao’s waiver is not undermined by his contention that the San Jose
police officers, before any Miranda advisement, misleadingly asked him about his use of
WeChat and the make and model of his car under the guise of “personal data.”
Miranda’s prophylactic rule does not prevent officers from “speak[ing] freely to [an
unwarned] suspect in custody provided ‘ “the speech would not reasonably be construed
as calling for an incriminating response.” ’ ” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th
1063, 1086–1087; People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 536–537 [an interrogation
includes questions that the police should know is reasonably likely to produce an
incriminating response].) “[R]outine booking questions and responses as to a defendant’s
identity and other statistical information do not render involuntary a later waiver of
constitutional rights.” (People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 159.)
In this case, the pre-Miranda questions were largely biographical and meant to
elicit certain, non-incriminating background information. We recognize that some of
these pre-advisement questions may have been investigative in nature: Questions about
Tao’s wireless provider and his WeChat screen name appear designed for use in
obtaining data from third parties about Tao’s mobile phone and his communications. But
Tao’s claim is not that his answers to these questions—or fruits, if any, derived from his
answers to them—should have been suppressed as unwarned, nor has he identified any of
the pre-Miranda statements that were admitted against him at trial. He argues only that
14
the fact of these questions bears on the effectiveness of his express waiver. But he does
not explain how these questions would reasonably be construed as calling for an
incriminating response. Although a number of defendants reported using WeChat in
communicating among themselves and with others, nothing in the record suggests a basis
to construe the question about WeChat as calling for a response any more incriminating
than an admission of using a cell phone, or social media, or any other messaging
platform.6 (See People v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 87 [“[t]he fact that
information gathered from these routine questions or casual conversations turns out to be
incriminating does not alone render the statements inadmissible”].) Indeed, none of the
WeChat logs were introduced at trial; nor did the trial turn on the defendants’ use of
mobile phones. The officers’ initial colloquy with Tao did not render deficient the
subsequent advisement or Tao’s statement that he understood his rights.
Tao nonetheless argues that his statements during the subsequent interview by
Fremont officers suggested that he had not understood his rights when he submitted to the
San Jose interview. We disagree. At the outset of the Fremont police interview, Hamblin
asked Tao if he “still underst[ood]” the rights that “they”—the San Jose officers—“read
[Tao] … [b]efore”; Tao said only, “I don’t remember clearly.” (Italics added.) The
context makes clear that Tao was communicating only that he lacked sufficient memory
of the advisement to presently understand them, not that he had lacked comprehension
when he expressly affirmed his understanding more than two hours earlier and submitted
to interrogation by the San Jose detectives. (See, e.g., Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 163, 162 [comment by defendant at end of interview that he “ ‘cannot understand
what rights I can have’ ” did not alter conclusion that defendant had validly waived rights
the day prior when defendant told officers he understood his rights, signed a Miranda
6
As Yan explained, WeChat is popularly used in China and among Chinese
Americans.
15
form, and had no questions].)7 Nor does Tao’s asking Hamblin when he could hire an
attorney call into question his understanding in the prior interview. Tao’s question to
Hamblin about hiring an attorney followed his third advisement that he had a right to
appointed counsel at no cost. The timing of Tao’s question thus suggests that he wished
to explore the logistics of retaining counsel.
We note as well that Tao may have been asking for clarification from Hamblin of
the discrepancy between the translation of Hamblin’s rendition of the Miranda warning
and what Tao had heard LaRosa accurately translate in the interview with San Jose
police: Unlike the San Jose officers, Hamblin never readvised Tao that he had the right
to counsel “before any questioning.” Hamblin in his answer to Tao’s query compounded
this omission by suggesting that the soonest Tao could consult with counsel would be
after his arraignment. But this mistake goes to the trial court’s exclusion of Tao’s
statements to Hamblin, not Tao’s duly advised waiver in speaking earlier with the San
Jose detectives. Nothing in Tao’s later exchange with the Fremont officer supports an
inference that in his earlier interrogation by San Jose police, he did not understand that he
could remain silent or that his right to counsel could be exercised before any questioning
commenced.
Nor does Tao’s experience as a recent immigrant from China require a different
conclusion. A defendant’s background is a relevant consideration in determining whether
a waiver is knowing and intelligent (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 160), and Tao argues
that he had limited understanding of the American legal system, given that criminal
defendants in China have no right to remain silent. But Tao was advised of his rights by
7
Suarez is factually distinguishable in that the interviewer responded by having
the defendant confirm that he had understood his rights when he waived them. (People v.
Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 163.) But the logic of Suarez is persuasive—a defendant’s
ambiguous post-waiver statements do not necessarily undermine the validity of the
waiver when made.
16
LaRosa in his native tongue, Mandarin, and LaRosa’s second advisement informed him
of his right to remain silent. Not only did Tao affirm that he understood each right, but
he also said nothing to suggest a contrary understanding of their meaning, whether
informed by knowledge of Chinese law or any other circumstance. The California
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant’s ignorance of the legal system does
not necessarily detract from the validity of an express waiver. (See Miranda-Guerrero,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 17–19 [rejecting claim that defendant’s waiver was unknowing
due to his relative youth, limited education, lack of experience with the American legal
system, and his difficulty understanding English]; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831,
841 [finding a defendant’s Miranda waiver to be knowing even though defendant
claimed his knowledge of the legal system “came mainly from Mexican soap operas”];
see also Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 160 [that defendant spent his whole life
“ ‘working in fields or pastures’ ” did not render him “incapable of understanding his
rights”].) Nothing in the record affords us a basis to deviate from these authorities.
In our independent judgment, the undisputed facts before the trial court reflected
that Tao then understood his rights before being questioned by the San Jose detectives.
Therefore, Tao’s express affirmation that he understood his rights and his willingness to
answer the officers’ subsequent questions constituted a valid waiver. (See Suarez, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 158.) The trial court thus did not err in admitting his confession at trial.
B. Instructional Error
The prosecutor proceeded under the theory that Tao was guilty of first degree
felony murder as the actual killer. On appeal, Tao argues that the jury instructions
erroneously permitted the jury to convict him as the actual killer even if he only
proximately caused Xingjian Li’s death but did not personally kill him.8 Although we
8
Although Tao did not object to the instructions in the trial court, “failure to object
to instructional error will not result in forfeiture if the substantial rights of the defendant
are affected.” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 (Mitchell); § 1259.)
17
agree that the instructions were flawed, the sole theory pursued at trial was that Tao fired
the fatal gunshot. Accordingly, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
1. Additional Background
At trial, the jury was instructed on the theory of first degree murder for an actual
killer for Tao as follows: “To prove that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder
under this theory, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed Robbery,
as charged in Count 2; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit Robbery; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. While committing Robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person.”
The instructions specified that “[a] person who was the actual killer may be guilty of
felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” Further,
“[i]t is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act causing death
occurred while the defendant was committing the Robbery.” The jury was instructed on
causation that an act “causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A natural
and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen
if nothing unusual intervenes.”
The jury was also instructed on the elements of the enhancement that Tao had
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which required the jury to find that Tao
“personally discharged a firearm during the commission of that crime,” that he “intended
to discharge the firearm,” and that his “act caused the death of a person.” The instruction
on the personal use enhancement explained that “[a]n act causes death if the death is the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have
happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable
person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established
by the evidence.”
18
During closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated that Tao was guilty of felony
murder as the actual killer. Echoing the instructions, the prosecutor argued that the third
element of felony murder as the actual killer required that the jury find that “while
committing the robbery Lin Tao caused the death of another person.” The prosecutor
argued that Tao could be guilt of felony murder even if the killing was “unintentional,
accidental or negligent.” And as for the intentional discharge allegation, the prosecutor
again argued that the jury was required to find that “Lin Tao caused the death of another
person.”
2. Analysis
We review de novo “whether the [jury] instruction accurately states the law” and
“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury
to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.” (Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 579.) Tao correctly notes that an actual killer liable for felony murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(1) must be the one who personally inflicts the fatal act.
(People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 152 (Garcia) [actual killer under § 190.2,
subd. (b) is the one who “personally kills the victim”]; People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 4 [actual killer under § 189, subd. (e)(1) “refers to someone who
personally killed the victim and is not necessarily the same as a person who ‘caused’ the
victim’s death”]; People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 91 (Vang) [accord].) The
instructions here—for felony murder and the special circumstance alike9—did not make
this clear. Instructions like those at issue here have been found flawed to the extent they
permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of felony murder as the actual killer “based on
general causation principles.” (Garcia, at p. 156, fn. 33; Vang, at p. 91.)
9
The special circumstance instruction did not define actual killer, though it
specified that an actual killer need not have acted with an intent to kill or with reckless
indifference to human life.
19
But despite the omission of a correct “actual killer” definition in the instructions,
however, reversal is not required because the error was harmless. When jury instructions
permit a guilty verdict under both valid and invalid legal theories, reversal is required
unless “after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all
relevant circumstances, [we] determine[] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 (Aledamat) [applying prejudice
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 to alternative-theory instructional
error].) Under this standard, we “ ‘examine[] what the jury necessarily did find and ask[]
whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without also
finding the missing fact as well.’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 592.) “[I]f
‘ “[n]o reasonable jury that made all these findings could have failed to find” ’ the facts
necessary to support a valid theory, the alternative-theory error was harmless.” (Ibid.)
Here, the jury found true the enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision
(e)—a finding Tao does not challenge—and thus found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Tao personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. The jury’s finding means it
necessarily found that Tao personally killed Li, as the evidence at trial established that
Xingjian Li died from a single gunshot wound. Because only one act caused Li’s death
and because there is no dispute that Tao was the one who committed that act, no
reasonable jury could have found that Tao caused the death of Li by firing his gun
without also finding that he personally committed the fatal act—the firing of the gun.10
(People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 871 [any rational juror would have found
10
In contrast, both Garcia and Vang involved evidence from which the jury could
have concluded that the defendant did not personally kill the victim but instead
committed some other act—passing duct tape to an accomplice who taped the victim’s
mouth (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 150), or committing the kidnapping, causing
the victim to jump out of a vehicle to escape (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 79–
80))—that in turn proximately caused the victim’s death. (See Garcia, at pp. 156–157
[asphyxia]; Vang, at p. 91 [traumatic injury].)
20
the defendant to have personally killed victim when the evidence was that the victim was
killed by an attack where defendant and accomplice “jointly strangled” victim to death].)
Because the instructional error here is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
reversal is not required. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.)
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Huang’s Murder Conviction and
Special-Circumstance Allegation
Under the current iteration of the felony-murder statute, a nonkiller accomplice to
the commission of an enumerated felony that results in death may be liable for murder if
the accomplice was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710
[observing that § 189 as amended “codifie[s] the understanding of those requirements
elucidated in [People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)] and [People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark)]”].) Likewise, for those who are not the actual killer, the
felony-murder special circumstance can be found true only if the person aids or abets the
murder with the intent to kill or aids an abets the underlying felony as a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 190.2, subds. (c) & (d).)
On appeal, Huang challenges his murder conviction and special circumstance on
the theory that insufficient evidence supported the determination that he was a major
participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.11 We disagree and find that sufficient evidence supports his conviction.
11
The felony-murder rule applies only if a death occurs during the perpetration of
certain enumerated felonies, including robbery. (§ 189, subds. (a) & (e).) The prosecutor
was thus required to prove that Xingjian Li was killed during the perpetration of a
robbery to establish liability under the felony-murder rule. Huang does not challenge
whether there was sufficient evidence of an underlying robbery.
21
1. Major Participation
Whether an accomplice is a major participant in an underlying felony turns on
circumstances including: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying
or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) The Supreme Court has clarified that
“[n]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient,” and that all the factors may be weighed to determine whether the defendant
was a major participant. (Ibid.)
To be sure, Huang was not present when Xingjian Li was killed; according to Yan,
Huang and Shen were still waiting outside when Tao fired the fatal shot.12 He thus was
in no immediate position to prevent the shooting or to render aid. (See Banks, supra,
12
In support of his claim of insufficient evidence, Huang argues in part that Yan’s
accomplice testimony was not corroborated as section 1111 requires. But even if
corroboration were inadequate, “[e]vidence erroneously admitted is properly considered
in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its
erroneous admission.” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311.) More
importantly, ample independent evidence corroborated Yan’s testimony—S.D.’s
testimony about the man who both raped her and used an eggplant to penetrate her
vagina, Huang’s fingerprint on a condom wrapper at the Milpitas brothel, Huang’s semen
in the van, and the surveillance videos linking the defendants and the van Huang rented.
Section 1111 does not require independent corroboration of every facet of an
accomplice’s testimony; independent evidence is sufficiently corroborating if it so
connects the defendant to the crime such that a jury may reasonably find the accomplice
to be truthful. (See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 543.)
22
61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5.) But there is ample evidence from which a jury could infer
that Huang was nonetheless a major participant in the robbery.
Yan testified that Huang was the one who posted the job advertisement that led to
the brothel robberies, and Yan characterized both Huang and Shen as the leaders of the
group. Yan testified that Huang had told him that the women they intended to rob owed
him money and that the robberies would take place in massage parlors. Further, Yan
testified that Huang was the driver and that both Huang and Shen made the arrangements
to visit the brothels. Other evidence corroborated that Huang was in a leadership
position, as he was the one who rented the van from Yue. There was thus substantial
evidence that Huang had a significant role in planning the string of underlying robberies,
one of which ultimately led to Xingjian Li’s death, and that he was actively involved in
carrying out his own plans. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; People v. Rodriguez
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 749, 769–770 (Rodriguez) [evidence sufficient to show defendant
was major participant when he was obviously part of ongoing conspiracy to commit
armed robberies].)
There was also evidence that Huang supplied the guns or at least had control or
access over them. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Yan testified that Huang gave
him a gun to use during the robberies and that Huang also gave Tao and Jun Li stun guns.
And there was evidence that Huang knew of the potential dangers of the robbery, given
that he was present when Shen told Yan, Tao, and Jun Li that all witnesses should be
killed if any of the men had to use their firearms. (See In re Harper (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 450, 463 (Harper) [petitioner’s knowledge that plan was to either kill or
subdue manager suggested major participation].)
Furthermore, there was evidence that Huang knew of Yan’s background as a
police officer and former member of the Chinese military—and, given the robberies that
preceded the shooting in San Jose, which involved the use of force and sexual assaults
perpetrated against the sex workers by the men—a jury could reasonably infer that Huang
23
was aware that his accomplices would not shrink from violence and were willing to use
force.
Finally, Huang’s actions after the fatal act further suggested that he was a major
participant. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 802.) After Tao shot Xingjian Li, Huang
drove Yan, Tao, and Jun Li away from the scene, and Tao told Huang and Shen that he
had fired his gun. Yan testified that Shen and Huang both seemed angry, saying “nasty
words” to the rest of the men, rather than expressing concern or attempting to alert the
authorities to help the victim. (See Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 462 [failure to
assist victim weighed in favor of finding major participation]; People v. Montanez (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 245, 280.)
Taken together, the foregoing is substantial evidence to support the jury’s
determination that Huang was a major participant in the underlying robbery.
2. Reckless Indifference
In Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, the California Supreme Court addressed the
mental state of reckless indifference to human life, holding that it comprises both
subjective and objective components. (Id. at p. 617; People v. Emanuel (2025)
17 Cal.5th 867, 884 (Emanuel).) “The subjective element” of reckless indifference “is
the defendant’s conscious disregard of [known] risks”; its objective element considers
“what ‘a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, at p. 617.)
“ ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent
felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly
creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement.” (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808; Emanuel, at
p. 884.) Factors to be considered include: (1) a defendant’s knowledge of weapons, use
of weapons, and number of weapons; (2) a defendant’s physical presence at the crime and
opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) the duration of the crime;
(4) a defendant's knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of killing; and (5) a defendant’s
24
efforts to minimize the risks of violence during the felony.13 (Clark, at pp. 618–622;
Scoggins, at p. 677 [applying Clark factors].) Like the factors considered in Banks,
“ ‘[n]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Clark, at p. 618.)
As with the Banks factors, we recognize that some Clark factors do not support a
finding of reckless indifference to human life. Huang was not physically present at the
San Jose brothel when Xingjian Li was shot; he thus had no opportunity to restrain Tao.
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 889.) There is also little to suggest that the duration of
the San Jose robbery itself was particularly long. (Emanuel, at p. 886 [prolonged crime
creates “ ‘ “greater window of opportunity for violence” ’ ”].)
But several of the other Clark factors support the finding of reckless indifference.
As discussed in our analysis of the Banks factors, there was evidence that Huang knew
that his accomplices were armed, as Yan testified that it was Huang who handed him a
gun to use. A defendant’s “awareness that a firearm will be used in the commission of
the underlying felony is … significant.” (Rodriguez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 771–
772.)
And as described ante, there was evidence that Huang knew of his codefendants’
likelihood to kill and use violence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) Xingjian Li
was killed after the defendants had already engaged in several armed robberies of
brothels, during which gratuitous violence was used against the sex workers and
customers. There was testimony that Huang himself participated in the rape, sexual
assault, and sexual humiliation of the earliest charged robbery and that he was present
13
The high court in Clark acknowledged “the interrelationship” between major
participation in an underlying felony and reckless indifference to human life. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 614.) The two requirements significantly overlap, “ ‘for the
greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 615.) But these two requirements
still require individual consideration. (Id. at p. 616.)
25
and aware that his codefendants also engaged in sexual assault. And although he had
undisputed control of the van, he continued to participate in the succeeding robberies.
Furthermore, Huang’s lack of effort to minimize the risk of violence weighs in
favor of a finding of reckless indifference. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887.) There
was evidence that Huang and his accomplices were aware that they would encounter
resistance at the San Jose brothel. (Cf. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 811 [nothing in the
record to suggest a likelihood of resistance and to need to meet resistance with lethal
force]; Emanuel, at p. 896 [lethal force was used when met with “unexpected
resistance,” which did not suggest reckless indifference to human life].) Yan testified
that Shen had been to the San Jose brothel earlier and had reported back to the group that
they should expect two men who were managing the brothel. The group was undeterred,
and Tao, Jun Li, and Yan went to the brothel armed. (Cf. Emanuel, at p. 887 [need to
minimize risk of violence less pressing if no weapons are used].) The evidence thus
suggested that Huang knew that he was undertaking more than a “ ‘ “garden-variety
armed robbery” ’ ” of unsuspecting sex workers and that the crime would involve at least
several men who were trafficking the women. (Id. at p. 884.) This “ ‘elevated the risk to
human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery.’ ” (Id. at p. 895.) Indeed,
resistance appeared to be anticipated—Yan testified that Shen reiterated to the men
multiple times—in Huang’s presence—that if anyone in the brothel was shot, the rest of
the men were to kill the remaining witnesses. (See Emanuel, at p. 885.)
Finally, Huang’s actions after the shooting also suggest reckless indifference.
While none of the men made good on Shen’s proposal to kill all witnesses, Huang neither
rendered aid nor sought medical intervention once told someone had been shot; instead,
he drove the men away from the scene and eventually fled to Southern California. (In re
Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 54 [failure to stop or render aid to victims suggests
reckless indifference].) Huang argues that it was unclear whether Xingjian Li was
seriously injured. But a jury could reasonably infer that Yan and the others on leaving
26
the brothel told Huang of the shooting, and that Huang would also know from their
customary use of restraints that the other occupants of the brothel would be unable to
render aid.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence thus supports the
jury’s determination that Huang acted with reckless indifference to human life.
D. Admission of Expert Testimony on Firearm Toolmark Comparison
At trial, over defendants’ objection, criminalist Matthew Riles testified that the
firearm manufacturing process gives each gun certain “ ‘individual characteristics’ ” that
will leave marks like scratches and impressions on fired bullets. Even when two guns are
manufactured in succession with the same tooling methods and no intervening sharpening
of the machinery, Riles testified that it is possible to determine to “a practical certainty”
which gun fired a given bullet Comparing a bullet test-fired from the gun recovered from
Shen’s home to the fired shell casing found at the San Jose brothel, Riles opined that the
“agreement” between the test-fired bullet and the fired shell casing was “significant
enough” to suggest that they were fired from the same gun. Comparing the test-fired
bullets with the bullet retrieved from Xingjian Li’s body, Riles believed there was
sufficient “agreement of the[] stria” to conclude that the bullets were fired from the same
firearm. Shen and Huang argue on appeal that firearm toolmark comparison is not
generally accepted within the scientific community and is subject to exclusion,
notwithstanding People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, under Sargon Enterprises, Inc.
v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 (Sargon) and Evidence Code
section 802.
We need not address whether the trial court erred in admitting the expert
testimony, because the admission of Riles’s testimony was harmless. It is not reasonably
probable that Shen and Huang would have received a more favorable verdict absent the
error. (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 939–940; see also People v. Azcona
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 528 (conc. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.) [applying People v.
27
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) standard of prejudice to claim of People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 and Sargon error].)14
Even without the testimony on firearm toolmarks, there was overwhelming
evidence that the nine-millimeter handgun used to kill Xingjian Li was under Shen’s
control, and that both Shen, like Huang, had a leadership position in the scheme. Yan
testified that it was Shen who gave the firearm to either Tao or Jun Li. Live
nine-millimeter ammunition was found inside Shen’s home, and the ammunition found in
Shen’s home matched the headstamp from the gun casing collected from the San Jose
shooting. Shen’s DNA was also found on the butt of the gun.
Nor did the prosecution case against Shen depend on identifying the gun recovered
from his home as the source of the fatal gunshot. Yan testified at length about how Shen
and Huang planned the robberies. Shen’s documented prior human trafficking
experience also gave credence to Yan’s testimony that Shen and Huang planned the
brothel robberies. Surveillance videos also circumstantially corroborated Yan’s account
of all the appellants’ involvement: Officers were able to determine that the five suspects
all stayed at the Motel 6 in San Jose on September 25, 2017, and the Wyndham hotel in
San Jose on September 28, 2017, the day of the shooting in San Jose; that Shen was with
14
Shen argues that we should reverse unless the putative error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, on the theory that permitting a verdict based on the expert’s
improper facts or inferences lessened the prosecutor’s burden of proof in violation of his
constitutional right to due process of law. But “ ‘even erroneous admission of evidence
does not offend due process unless it is so prejudicial as to render the proceeding
fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1, 20; People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 [a trial may be rendered fundamentally unfair
if there are no permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence and the evidence is
“ ‘ “of such quality as [to] necessarily prevent[] a fair trial” ’ ”].) Riles’s toolmark
analysis was not the linchpin of the prosecution’s case, or even the prosecution’s
strongest evidence linking Shen’s armory to the fatal gunshot. We accordingly cannot
conclude that Riles’s testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. (See
Covarrubias, at pp. 20–21.)
28
Huang and the others carrying luggage resembling that taken from the San Jose brothel;
and that Shen after the Milpitas incident was at the Apple store in Palo Alto where S.D.’s
bank card was used. Shen’s DNA was also found on the Wyndham parking pass
recovered from the van. And at the scene of the Milpitas incident, officers found a Bank
of America receipt that had two of Huang’s fingerprints, one of Shen’s fingerprints, and
two of S.D.’s fingerprints.
And with respect to the San Jose incident, Y.G. identified Shen as having visited
the brothel the day before the robbery, further corroborating Yan’s account of Shen’s role
in scouting target locations and supplying intelligence on what to expect on entry.
In sum, the firearm toolmark testimony added little to the overall weight of the
evidence that corroborated Yan’s testimony and implicated Shen as a leader of the group
who not only supplied the firearm Tao used in the San Jose shooting but instructed the
crew to kill as needed. The admission of expert testimony was therefore harmless as to
Shen because it is not reasonably probable that he would have received a more favorable
verdict in the absence of error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
We likewise conclude that any error would have been harmless as to Huang, as
Huang’s sole argument on prejudice is that the toolmark evidence bolstered the
prosecution theory that Shen supplied the gun, which in turn bolstered Yan’s testimony
that Huang and Shen planned the robberies. Given the ample evidence corroborating
Yan’s testimony about the leadership role of both Shen and Huang, it is not reasonably
probable that Huang would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of any
assumed error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
E. Admission of Evidence of Automotive Filters
At trial, over Shen’s objection, the prosecutor introduced photographs of the
automotive oil filters found in Shen’s bedroom. The firearms expert, Riles, testified that
an oil filter can function as a “low[-]cost … DIY … suppressor [for] a firearm” that
would avoid “federal tax to ATF” and “certain background checks.” Shen now argues on
29
appeal that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the filters and by further
admitting expert testimony about how silencers can be made from them. Because the oil
filters were a relevant link between Shen’s weaponry and the San Jose shooting, and
because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice, the
trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Relevant evidence is
that having a “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) But “[a] trial court may
exclude otherwise relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed
by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time.” (People v. Scott
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490 (Scott); Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence is unduly prejudicial
under Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘ “when it is of such nature as to inflame the
emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the
point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’
emotional reaction.” ’ ” (Scott, at p. 491.) But unless the dangers of undue prejudice
substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value, the trial court should overrule an
objection under Evidence Code section 352. “On appeal, we review the trial court’s
ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (Scott, at p. 491.)
Here, the oil filter evidence was relevant and probative as to the disputed issues at
trial—Shen’s role in the robberies and his connection to the gun Tao used in San Jose.
(See Evid. Code, § 210.) Because Yan had testified that the gun Shen provided Tao had
been equipped with a type of silencer before the silencer was rejected as too large to be
practicable, Shen’s possession of oil filters that could be used for a silencer supported an
inference that he was in fact the one who provided the gun to Tao. Furthermore, that
Shen was found with the gun and the silencer-making materials in his home supports the
inference that the gun was his, further demonstrating the extent to which he may have had
a leadership or organizational role in planning the offenses.
30
Shen nonetheless argues that the evidence was not probative because Yan
described the silencer at trial as resembling a water bottle, not an oil filter. But Shen
misconstrues the evidence—Yan testified the silencer during interviews as approximately
the size of a water bottle because the officers had used the water bottle as a size reference
when getting his statement. Yan did not previously state that the silencer was a water
bottle or was shaped like one.
Shen alternatively argues that the oil filter evidence was unnecessary to prove his
possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605), because an assault weapon includes a
semiautomatic pistol with “[a] threaded barrel, capable of accepting a flash suppressor,
forward handgrip, or silencer” (§ 30515, subd. (a)(4)(A), italics added), even if no such
accoutrements are in fact attached to the barrel. But the prosecutor is not limited to the
minimum quantum of evidence to support the charges. That evidence of the oil filters
was not strictly necessary to prove that the gun was an assault weapon does not render the
evidence irrelevant. (See, e.g., People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 191 [trial court
does not abuse discretion solely by admitting evidence that is not strictly necessary to
prove the People’s case].) Moreover, evidence that oil filters were found in Shen’s home
was not probative solely as to the charge of possession of a firearm. The evidence was
also probative as to Shen’s role in the robberies, which bore on whether he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Finally, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by
its potential for prejudice. There is little about the oil filter evidence that would evoke an
emotional reaction from the jury. (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 491.) The admission of
the evidence did not consume an undue amount of time—the oil filters were introduced
photographically, and the statements by the investigating officer and Riles about the use
of oil filters as makeshift silencers were relatively brief. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) The
trial court thus did not exceed the bounds of reason by concluding that the evidence was
admissible under Evidence Code section 352.
31
F. Second Amendment Challenge
Tao challenges his conviction for possession of an assault weapon, arguing that
section 30605 is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Section 30605
criminalizes possession of an assault weapon, which is further defined under
section 30515, subdivision (a)(4)(A) to include a semiautomatic pistol that has a threaded
barrel.15 But to succeed in making his facial challenge, Tao must “ ‘void the statute as a
whole by showing that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be
valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” ’ ” (In re T.F.-G.
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 911.) “ ‘[T]he “minimum” our cases have accepted is a
showing that the statute is invalid “in the generality or great majority of cases.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) We conclude that Tao’s facial challenge under the Second Amendment fails. (See
People v. Bocanegra (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1236 (Bocanegra); People v. Crenshaw
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1169 (Crenshaw); People v. McCowan (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
1071 (McCowan).)
1. The Second Amendment
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) In other words, the Second Amendment confers
“an individual right to keep and bear arms.” (District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
554 U.S. 570, 595 (Heller).)
Recent jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court has clarified the
scope of the Second Amendment. In Heller, the United States Supreme Court considered
15
The Attorney General argues that Tao has forfeited his claim for failing to raise
it in the trial court. But Tao’s facial challenge to the statute “requires us to ‘consider
“only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of
an individual,” ’ ” and is thus not forfeited by a failure to object below. (People v.
Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 583–584; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
889.)
32
the constitutionality of a law that banned handgun possession in the home and required
“any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock.” (Id. at
p. 628.) The high court concluded that the law was unconstitutional because it
“amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen
by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense, which was “central to the
Second Amendment right.” (Ibid.) But Heller also cautioned that “right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited.” (Id. at p. 626.) And that nothing in its holding
“should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” (Id. at pp. 626–627.)
Following Heller, the United States Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle
& Pistol Assn., Inc v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), which extended Heller to
recognize “an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.”
(Bruen, at p. 10, italics added.) Bruen also set forth a framework for evaluating whether
a firearm regulation violates the Constitution: “When the Second Amendment’s plain
text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Id. at p. 24.) Bruen thus “requires courts to assess whether
modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and
historical understanding.” (Id. at p. 26.)
Courts have generally interpreted Bruen as enacting a two-step burden-shifting
framework where the party challenging the firearms regulation bears the initial burden on
the first step and the government bears the burden on the second step. (Rocky Mountain
Gun Owners v. Polis (10th Cir. 2024) 121 F.4th 96, 113; Bevis v. City of Naperville
33
(7th Cir. 2023) 85 F.4th 1175, 1194; see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.) In step one,
Bruen considered whether the individuals challenging the regulation were a part of “ ‘the
people’ ” that the Second Amendment protects, whether the weapons at issue are in “ ‘in
common use’ ” today for self-defense, and whether the Second Amendment protects the
individual’s “proposed course of conduct.” (Bruen, at pp. 31–32.) And in step two,
Bruen considered whether the challenged regulation was “consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (Id. at pp. 33–34.)
Despite Bruen’s analysis—which considered whether the weapons at issue were in
“common use” in the first step—there has been some dispute in the lower courts as to
whether the “common use” analysis is properly considered at Bruen’s first or second step.
(Duncan v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2025) 133 F.4th 852, 866, fn. 2 [“ ‘[t]here is no consensus on
whether the common-use issue’ is a threshold, textual inquiry or a historical inquiry”];
see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 31–32.) Nonetheless, several courts have concluded
that the common-use analysis properly lies in Bruen step one. (See United States v.
Alaniz (9th Cir. 2023) 69 F.4th 1124, 1128 [placing common-use analysis in first step];
Nat. Assn. for Gun Rights v. Lamont (D.Conn. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 63, 88; McCowan,
supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094 [“the common-use requirement is to be assessed at the
first Bruen step, as it goes to the scope of the right, rather than to whether the regulation
at issue is constitutionally permissible”].) We follow these cases, as well as the plain text
of Bruen, which considered the common-use analysis at step one: Logically, the firearms
at issue must be in common use today for self-defense, otherwise the “plain text” of the
Second Amendment would not protect an individual’s conduct. (Bruen, at p. 24.)
2. Analysis
Applying the principles laid out above, Tao is unsuccessful in his Second
Amendment challenge because he has not met his burden to demonstrate that a
semiautomatic pistol with a threaded barrel is a weapon in common use such that the
Second Amendment’s plain text applies. (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.)
34
The predecessor statute to section 30605, section 12280, was enacted by the
Legislature in 1989 as part of the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989
(Stats. 1989, ch. 19, § 3). (People v. James (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 662, 676 (James).)
The law was enacted in response to “[t]he crisis created by the proliferation and use of
assault weapons.” (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482.) And in enacting the
legislation, the Legislature stated at former section 12275.5 and presently in
section 30505 that “the proliferation and use of assault weapons pose a threat to the
health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state.” (§ 30505, subd. (a).) In response
to this threat, the Legislature chose to “restrict[] the assault weapons specified in
Section 30510 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and
capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is
substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human
beings.” (Ibid.) In 1999 amendments to the law, the Legislature “took a third approach
to designating assault weapons—defining them in [former] section 12276.1,
subdivision (a) in terms of generic characteristics.” (Kasler, at p. 478; see Stats. 1999,
ch. 129, § 7, pp. 1805–1806.) Former section 12276.1 is the predecessor to
section 30515, which further defines an assault weapon to include a semiautomatic pistol
that has a threaded barrel. (§ 30515, subd. (a)(4)(A).)
Relevant here, multiple cases have considered section 30605 and its predecessor
statute, former section 12280, subdivision (b), and have found that various semiautomatic
assault weapons are not protected by the Second Amendment. (See James, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 676 [Second Amendment “does not protect the right to possess
assault weapons or .50-caliber BMG rifles”]; People v. Zondorak (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
829, 836 [“ban on AK series rifles does not impinge on rights protected by the Second
Amendment”].) Three post-Bruen cases have similarly rejected Second Amendment
challenges to section 30605’s prohibition on assault weapons. (Bocanegra, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1250 [assault weapons like the AR-15 style rifle are “dangerous and
35
unusual weapons”]; Crenshaw, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 1179 [§ 30605 does not
violate U.S. Const., 2d Amend.]; McCowan, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094
[defendant failed to demonstrate assault weapons are commonly used today for
self-defense].)
First, in Bocanegra, the Third District rejected an as-applied challenge to
section 30605 at Bruen step one, concluding that “the Second Amendment’s plain text
does not cover defendant’s conduct” as weapons like the AR-style rifle found in the
defendant’s car were not “ ‘weapons … typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes.’ ” (Bocanegra, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1250.)
Second, in Crenshaw, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at page 1178, the First District
rejected a facial challenge to section 30605, observing that the defendant failed to present
“any cognizable evidence or empirical support for his claim that the assault weapons
banned by section 30605 are in common use.” (Crenshaw, at p. 1178.) In particular,
Crenshaw noted that the defendant’s argument “requires the development of a more
robust factual record, particularly on the prevalence of the gun at issue here,” as appellate
courts typically only consider the evidence in the record. (Id. at pp. 1178–1179.) Thus
the inquiry before the Crenshaw court—whether the assault weapon at issue is one
commonly used for self-defense—“is not an inquiry that turns on the review of abstract
and generalized legal concepts,” rendering the court “not well suited to address this
constitutional challenge on appeal for the first time.” (Id. at p. 1179.)
And most recently in McCowan, the First District again rejected a facial challenge
to several firearm regulations, including section 30605. (McCowan, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.) The defendant in McCowan cited to “two news articles and
several federal court cases” for the proposition that “assault weapons are not unusual”
because of their popularity among Americans. (Id. at p. 1094.) But the McCowan court
declined to rely on these factual conclusions absent evidence in the appellate record that
assault weapons were indeed popular. (Ibid.) Further, the defendant did not present any
36
evidence about the objective characteristics of assault weapons or their common uses;
thus, the First District held that it could not find that assault weapons were not
particularly dangerous. (Id. at p. 1095.)
We see no reason to deviate from the precedents unanimously rejecting facial
challenges to section 30605’s prohibition on assault weapons. Without citation to any
authority or any evidence, Tao offers only the conclusory argument that a semiautomatic
pistol with a threaded barrel as defined under section 30515, subdivision (a)(4) is covered
by the Second Amendment because “[s]uch a weapon is no more dangerous or unusual
than the pistols” discussed in Heller and Bruen. Tao then distinguishes semiautomatic
pistols with a threaded barrel from semiautomatic assault rifles such as AK-47’s and AR-
15’s, which courts have found to be “dangerous and unusual.” (Bocanegra, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1250; Rupp v. Bonta (C.D.Cal. 2024) 723 F.Supp.3d 837.)16 But
Tao’s arguments about whether a semiautomatic pistol with a threaded barrel is
commonly used for self-defense is not one that is solely reliant on an analysis of either
section 30515, subdivision (a)(4)’s or section 30605’s text. And because this issue was
not developed below, there is nothing in the appellate record that can guide our analysis.
Nor has Tao provided evidence about the common use of semiautomatic pistols with a
threaded barrel and whether these weapons are used for self-defense. On this record, we
cannot adequately assess whether Tao has met his burden on Bruen step one. That AK-
47’s and AR-15’s are distinguishable from the weapon at issue here does not
automatically render such weapons commonly used for self-defense.
Thus, Tao’s constitutional challenge necessarily fails at the first step of the Bruen
analysis. And because he has not met his burden to satisfy Bruen step one, we need not
16
In Miller v. Bonta (S.D.Cal. 2023) 699 F.Supp.3d 956, a federal district court
held that section 30605 violates the Second Amendment. (Id. at pp. 1010–1011.) The
district court then issued an order enjoining section 30605’s enforcement. But the Ninth
Circuit stayed the order pending appeal, and the appeal is currently in abeyance.
37
consider his additional argument that the government failed to establish that the
prohibition of semiautomatic pistols with a threaded barrel is consistent with the United
States’ historical tradition of firearm regulation. (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.)
G. Restraining Orders
Shen, Huang, and Tao argue that three of the protective orders issued by the trial
court under section 136.2 exceeded the court’s authority and should be vacated. We
accept the Attorney General’s concession that the protective errors must be vacated. The
trial court issued protective orders for multiple victims in this case, including Y.G., Guo,
and Y.W. But restraining orders under section 136.2 are authorized only for victims of
certain specified offenses including certain domestic violence crimes, sexual offenses like
rape, gang-related crimes, or crimes requiring registration as a sex offender. As neither
Y.G., Guo, or Y.W. are victims of an enumerated crime, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to issue these orders (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 996), and
issuance of a restraining order in excess of jurisdiction can be corrected at any time
(People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381–382). We therefore strike the three
restraining orders protecting Y.G., Guo, and Y.W. as to each defendant.
H. Clerical Error
Lastly, Shen argues that the abstract of judgment contains a clerical error and
erroneously indicates the trial court “stayed” the punishment on the special circumstance.
The Attorney General concedes that this is a clerical error that this court can correct.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–188.) We agree that this error requires
correction and that the abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect that the
punishment on the special circumstance was not stayed.
III. DISPOSITION
The protective orders issued against defendants for victims Guo, Y.G., and Y.W.
are stricken as to all defendants. As to Shen, the trial court is directed to modify Shen’s
abstract of judgment to delete the notation that the punishment for the robbery-murder
38
special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) was stayed, and a modified
abstract of judgment shall be forwarded to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The judgments are otherwise affirmed.
39
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
GROVER, Acting P. J.
DANNER, J.
People v. Shen et al.
H051141
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