CourtListener 10873804•Marriage of A.R. and R.R. CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 6/11/26 Marriage of A.R. and R.R. CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Marriage of A.R. and 2d Civ. No. B340171
R.R. (Super. Ct. No. D388326)
(Ventura County)
A.R.,
Appellant,
v.
R.S.,
Respondent.
A.R. appeals from a judgment entered against him in favor
of his ex-wife, R.R., on her request for a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO). The trial court granted R.R.’s request
and issued a three-year DVRO. A.R. raises due process violations
and contends the court erred when it referred discovery disputes
to a referee and imposed issue sanctions. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
R.R.’s DVRO request
A.R. and R.R. married in 2012 and had three children. A.R.
petitioned for dissolution and their marriage dissolved in 2019.
The trial court granted full physical and legal custody of the
children to R.R., and granted A.R. overnight visitation. The court
found that A.R. committed verbal and physical domestic abuse
against R.R., and ordered him to complete a 52-week batterer’s
treatment course.
After the dissolution and judgment, A.R. and R.R. spent
time together in 2019 and 2020, including during R.R.’s custodial
time. Around July 2020, R.R. discovered that A.R. had been
video and audio recording her without her consent. R.R.’s
attorney requested copies of all such recordings, but did not
receive them. In March 2021, R.R.’s attorney requested that A.R.
preserve all electronically stored information (ESI), “including
without limitation all . . . recordings of [R.R.] from last year,” and
again requested production of the ESI.
In April 2021, R.R. filed the underlying DVRO. R.R.
contended A.R. uploaded the recordings to his YouTube account
and sent links to third parties without her consent. The trial
court granted R.R.’s request for a temporary restraining order
and set a hearing on the DVRO request. Trial on the DVRO was
continued due to discovery disputes.
Discovery disputes
In February 2022, R.R. noticed A.R.’s deposition with a
request for production of documents. A.R. did not object. At his
deposition, A.R. admitted to the existence of storage devices
2
containing ESI, but he did not produce them. A.R. repeatedly
stated that he would not produce the requested devices and ESI.
In April 2022, the trial court granted R.R.’s request that
A.R. produce the ESI and numerous electronic and storage
devices to court-appointed expert John Troxel.1 The court
ordered the parties to share Troxel’s costs and denied without
prejudice R.R.’s request for a discovery referee.
After A.R. did not produce the court-ordered discovery to
Troxel, R.R. renewed her request for a discovery referee. The
trial court granted the request, and appointed Leon Bennett as
the discovery referee2 to “facilitate A.R.’s production of ESI,”
“supervise” and “hear and determine all discovery motions and
disputes,” and “report findings and make recommendations” on
such motions and disputes. The court ordered A.R. to pay the
referee’s fees.
A.R. still did not produce the devices and ESI, and R.R.
sought issue sanctions against A.R. The referee held a hearing
and issued findings and recommendations. The referee found
that R.R. had spent over two years attempting to obtain A.R.’s
ESI, to no avail. The referee also found that A.R. engaged in
spoliation of evidence and that his conduct constituted a willful
refusal to respond to discovery and comply with the trial court’s
discovery orders. The referee recommended issue sanctions
against A.R.
1 The trial court previously appointed Troxel to facilitate
and supervise the production of ESI belonging to third party
R.O., A.R.’s girlfriend.
2 The trial court previously appointed Bennett to supervise
R.O.’s discovery obligations, including completing her deposition
and producing her ESI.
3
After receiving A.R.’s objections to the referee’s
recommendations, the trial court adopted the recommendations
and imposed issue sanctions. The court ordered that A.R. would
be precluded from arguing and presenting evidence that “he did
not clandestinely conduct post-Judgment electronic surveillance
of R.R. and their children,” “did not publish recordings that were
the fruit of that illegal surveillance, and . . . did not abuse the
litigation process and further commit [domestic violence] through
it.”
Trial on R.R.’s petition for a DVRO
Trial on the DVRO spanned over seven days and numerous
witnesses testified, including A.R. and R.R. The court issued a
DVRO because it found R.R. proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that A.R. had disturbed her peace, including through
coercive control, by sharing links to videos of R.R. to others
without her permission. Among other things, the DVRO
prohibits A.R. from recording R.R. via video or audio means.
DISCUSSION
A.R. contends (1) the sanctions order and subsequent
hearing on the DVRO petition violated his substantive and
procedural due process rights; (2) the trial court violated Code of
Civil Procedure3 section 639 by appointing a discovery referee
without making mandatory findings; and (3) the court abused its
discretion by failing to independently review the referee’s
recommendations because A.R. substantially complied with
discovery. We conclude there is no prejudicial error.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4
Procedural and substantive due process
Under the Domestic Violence Protection Act, a court is
authorized to issue a protective order enjoining a party from
engaging in specific acts of harassment or abuse against a former
spouse or cohabitant. (Fam. Code, §§ 6211, subds. (a) & (b),
6218.) The person sought to be enjoined must receive notice and
a “ ‘meaningful’ ” hearing permitting them to state their position,
refute the allegations, and be afforded the opportunity to
examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses. (In re Marriage
of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 934–935.) We review
due process claims de novo. (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 141, 150.)
There is no due process violation here. Regarding the
imposition of sanctions, A.R. does not dispute that he had notice
of the sanctions request and an opportunity to oppose it. A.R.’s
attorney appeared before the referee at the sanctions hearing and
argued A.R.’s position. The referee issued a detailed
recommendation to the trial court, highlighting his review of
A.R.’s opposition, and A.R.’s lack of a sworn statement opposing
the request. The trial court later outlined its review of the record
at the hearing on the referee’s recommendation, including A.R.’s
objections.
Because A.R. requested the sanctions request be heard by
the referee rather than the trial court and participated in that
process, he cannot now claim that the reference to the referee
violated his due process rights. (Owens v. County of Los Angeles
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 121.)
We also reject A.R.’s contention that the issue sanctions
violated due process because they were punitive in nature based
on his inability to produce items he no longer possessed or had
5
already produced. A.R. conceded that he discarded certain ESI
devices, and would not produce others, even after receiving a
preservation request from R.R.’s counsel. To the extent A.R.
requests that we go inspect each device and investigate whether
they were produced, we decline to do so. Troxel conducted this
analysis and the referee found that many ESI and electronic and
storage devices had not been produced.
Nor was there a due process violation regarding the trial on
R.R.’s DVRO. A.R. appeared and testified at trial, and his
counsel cross-examined several witnesses. A.R. testified that
R.R. never consented to being recorded and told him to stop
recording her, but that he recorded R.R. “for [his] protection”
from “[f]alse allegations.” A.R. also admitted that he recorded
himself and R.R. engaging in sexual relations without advising
her of the recording. He also testified that immediately after
having sex, R.R. brought up R.O., A.R.’s ex-girlfriend, and that
A.R. uploaded a video of their subsequent argument to YouTube
to protect himself “[f]rom false accusations . . . that I’m the one
committing domestic violence.” A.R. sent links of this video to
others, including R.O. The record supports that A.R. was
afforded the full opportunity to explain his version of events and
to refute R.R.’s allegations of domestic violence.
Appointing a discovery referee
Ordinarily, the trial court resolves discovery disputes at no
cost to the parties. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 620.)
But when the trial court deems it necessary, it may appoint a
referee to “hear and determine any and all discovery motions and
disputes . . . and to report findings and make a recommendation
thereon.” (§ 639, subds. (a)(5), (d).) Courts have broad discretion
to impose a discovery referee on nonconsenting parties to resolve
6
“ ‘complicated, time-consuming discovery disputes,’ ” as the
referee’s appointment may “induce parties to take a more
reasonable approach to discovery to keep costs from mounting.”
(Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 104.)
Appointment of a discovery referee is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Reed v. Reed (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 399, 400.)
Discovery referees charge their own fees. After
determining ability to pay, trial courts may order the parties to
pay the fees “in any manner determined by the court to be fair
and reasonable, including an apportionment of the fees among
the parties.” (§ 645.1, subd. (b).) The trial court, not the referee,
must determine what is “ ‘fair and reasonable.’ ” (Taggares,
supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.) Absent a contrary showing, we
presume the trial court weighed all appropriate factors in
exercising its discretion. (DeBlase v. Superior Court (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1279, 1286.)
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion when it
appointed a discovery referee to supervise A.R.’s failure to
produce the court-ordered ESI and adjudicate related motions
and disputes. The trial court denied R.R.’s initial request for a
referee to assist with A.R.’s failure to produce ESI, but did
appoint an expert to review the ESI with costs shared by the
parties. When A.R. failed to produce the ESI, R.R. renewed her
request for a referee. By this point, it had been more than a year
since R.R. served A.R. with an ESI preservation letter, more than
three months since R.R. served A.R. with discovery requesting
his ESI, and nearly three months after A.R. testified at his
deposition that he would not produce the ESI. Given A.R.’s
refusal to produce the court-ordered ESI to R.R. and Troxel,
appointing a discovery referee was not an abuse of discretion.
7
A.R. nevertheless contends the trial court committed
reversible error because it appointed the referee without making
mandatory findings regarding his “economic inability to pay a pro
rata share of the referee’s fee,” as required under section 639,
subdivision (d)(6)(A). Because A.R. did not raise this issue below,
he may not raise it for the first time on appeal. (In re Javier G.
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464.) Prior to the hearing on R.R.’s
request for a discovery referee, A.R. did not raise this issue in his
opposition. At the hearing, A.R.—self-represented at the time—
stated the proposed order “does not comply with [Code of Civil
Procedure] 639 and 640 because I am unable to pay.” But A.R.
did not submit a sworn declaration or other documentation
demonstrating an inability to pay the referee’s fees at the time.
(McDonald v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 364, 366
[plaintiff claiming inability to pay referee fees submitted sworn
declaration stating she was homeless, had no income, could not
pay rent, and was forced to stay at friends’ houses].)
A.R. did not seek the referee’s disqualification, or file
written objections to the reference. (§ 170.6; Pedus Services, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 140, 146; §§ 641, 642.)
Instead, he continued to litigate the case and did not file a
petition for writ of mandate. (Glickman v. Krolikowski (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 527, 533 [“Immediate challenges to discovery
referee references and orders pertaining to the payment of such
referees should be made by writ petition”]; see also Solorzano v.
Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 603, 607 [plaintiffs
proceeding in forma pauperis sought writ of mandate to vacate
trial court’s order that they share discovery referee costs];
McDonald v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 366–
367 [plaintiff ordered to pay referee costs sought writ of mandate
8
vacating trial court order].) A.R. later obtained new counsel and
participated in the trial on R.R.’s DVRO petition.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Solorzano and McDonald, A.R. did
not promptly object or take other action regarding the referee’s
appointment. Thus, A.R. has forfeited this argument. (In re A.K.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 501; Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009)
46 Cal.4th 247, 264–265.)
Because he was proceeding in forma pauperis with a fee
waiver in place, A.R. maintains his forfeiture is excused. A.R.
contends he should have been “deemed by the court to have an
economic inability to pay the referee’s fees” (§ 639, subd.
(d)(6)(B)), and should not have been ordered to pay those fees.
(Solorzano, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614–615 [indigent
litigants cannot pay court-ordered fees by definition and thus
cannot be made to pay the fees of a privately compensated
discovery referee].) We conclude reversal is not warranted.
A.R. has not shown he was prejudiced by the order that he
pay the referee’s fees. The referee’s recommendation did not even
mention A.R.’s failure to pay the referee’s fees, and only raised
A.R.’s failure to pay earlier monetary sanctions in explaining why
issue sanctions were recommended. And when A.R. did not pay
the referee’s fees, the trial court ordered R.R. to advance the fees
for the referee and Troxel so they could be paid and complete
their work. Thus, A.R. was not prejudiced by the order that he
pay the referee’s fees, including his subsequent failure to pay
those fees. No miscarriage of justice on this basis has been
shown. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
A.R. also contends the discovery referee failed to file a
certification regarding disclosures of potential conflicts of
interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.924.) But A.R. did not object
9
until the start of trial, nearly two years after the referee’s
appointment. Thus, this contention is waived. (In re Marriage of
Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501.)
Adoption of discovery referee’s recommendations
A discovery referee’s findings and recommendations to the
trial court “are advisory only, and do not become binding unless
adopted by the court.” (Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
1506, 1522.) The trial court must independently consider them,
including any objections, before adoption. (Ibid.; § 644, subd. (b).)
If the trial court adopts the recommendations, they are binding
on the parties. (In re Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 161, 176.) We review their adoption for abuse of
discretion. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New
York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 589.) And we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling,
drawing all reasonable inferences in its support. (Sabetian v.
Exxon Mobil Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1084.)
Here, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
adopt the referee’s recommendation that issue sanctions be
imposed. The court noted the recommendations were “well-
founded” and “extremely thorough.” It evidenced its familiarity
with the findings and underlying facts. For example, regarding
A.R.’s admitted use of a burner phone, the court concluded that
its use was consistent with “the intent of trying to conceal its
relationship to the user and to ultimately conceal its contents
from discovery.” The court concluded issue sanctions were “the
most appropriate sanction” before “exercis[ing] its independent
judgment.”
A.R. contends the court erred in adopting the
recommendations because it purportedly offered “no meaningful
10
legal or factual analysis.” He also contends the court did not
discuss the “legal standards governing discovery sanctions”
before adopting the recommendations. But no such discussion is
required. Before adopting a referee’s recommendations, the trial
court is required to independently consider the findings and
objections from the parties. (Jovine, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1522.) The trial court did so here.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d
431, which A.R. relies on, is inapposite. In Aetna, the trial court
erred by treating a referee’s recommendations as “binding and
determinative” and entering judgment with no rehearing
procedure and no evidence that the trial court independently
considered the referee’s recommendations. (Id. at p. 436.) In
contrast here, the court held a hearing on the referee’s
recommendations, noted the documents it reviewed, and
explained its reasons for adopting the recommendations.
A.R. also contends the referee’s recommendations go “far
beyond” (italics omitted) what R.R. requested because she
requested that A.R. be “precluded from” making certain
arguments, but the referee recommended that A.R. also be
precluded “from presenting evidence.” This is a distinction
without a difference because the prohibition against making
certain arguments necessarily precludes marshalling evidence to
support them. Moreover, the referee was tasked with making
recommendations on discovery motions. And as part of his
recommendations, the referee recommended this issue sanction.
This was within the referee’s discretion, as was the trial court’s
adoption of the issue sanction.
We also reject A.R.’s contention that the trial court erred in
ordering issue sanctions. We review this claim for abuse of
11
discretion. (Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc.
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 878.) There must be a willful failure
to comply with a court order before nonmonetary sanctions are
imposed. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th
1315, 1327.) The burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion
rests on A.R. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 957.)
A.R. has not met that burden here. The court, after
adopting the discovery referee’s recommendation, imposed issue
sanctions more than three years after R.R. originally requested
A.R.’s ESI. A.R. did not produce his ESI despite being ordered to
do so. At his deposition A.R. unequivocally testified he would not
produce the ESI. He also admitted that certain electronic devices
presumably containing ESI were “gone” and no longer accessible.
Because A.R. failed to submit a sworn declaration in opposition to
the issue sanctions request, he did not rebut R.R.’s allegations.
Given A.R.’s failure to produce his electronic devices and ESI and
violation of the court’s orders, it was within the court’s discretion
to prevent A.R. from making arguments at trial regarding what
he did or did not do with those devices.
We also reject A.R.’s contention that the issue sanctions
operated as a de facto terminating sanction. Despite the
recordings, A.R. was permitted to argue a justification for
recording R.R. and to argue that her peace of mind was not
disturbed. The trial court correctly noted it was R.R., not A.R.,
who carried the burden to establish her entitlement to a DVRO.
A.R.’s contention that the referee’s findings were refuted by
undisputed evidence is also unavailing. Substantial evidence
supports the referee’s findings, and we do not reweigh the
evidence or make credibility determinations. (Weinman v. Gray
12
(1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 817, 819.) A.R. could have rebutted R.R.’s
contention that he did not substantially comply with his
discovery obligations. But as noted, A.R. did not submit any
evidence or his sworn statement in opposition. Instead, his
attorney submitted a declaration that the referee found
insufficient. The referee considered A.R.’s attorney’s argument
before ultimately recommending that issue sanctions be granted
because it found A.R. engaged in spoliation of evidence and
willfully refused to respond to discovery and comply with the trial
court’s orders. We defer to the referee’s factual findings.
(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479.)
Finally, A.R. contends the referee failed to consider the safe
harbor exception to R.R.’s ESI requests. Under section 2023.030,
subdivision (f)(1), no party will be sanctioned for failing to
provide ESI “that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten
as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic
information system.” A.R. contends that his inability to produce
ESI resulted from such routine operations, not misconduct. We
disagree.
Because A.R. did not raise this exception in the trial court,
this contention is forfeited. (Hepner v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486.) Nor does the record support that
A.R.’s failure to produce his ESI arose from “the routine, good
faith operation of an electronic information system.” A.R.
testified he would not produce his devices because he believed he
should not have to, not because of routine device maintenance.
There was insufficient evidence of good faith to support a safe
harbor exception.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
14
JoAnn Johnson, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Masson Fatini, Richard E. Masson and Susan M. Fatini-
Masson for Appellant.
Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Claudia Ribet,
Jennifer Teaford; Glucksman Law Group and William J.
Glucksman for Respondent.
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