CourtListener 10873795•People v. Roach CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 6/11/26 P. v. Roach CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085185
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1502979-2)
RICHARD CORRY ROACH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Charles J. Umeda, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arelene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Richard Corry Roach and his codefendant David McKell
were charged with various crimes, including two counts of murder and one
count of attempted murder, in connection with a drug-related robbery in
February 2015. After McKell pleaded guilty to all the charges, Roach was
convicted by jury on all counts. With one relatively minor exception
pertaining to a gang enhancement, we affirmed the judgment of conviction
on appeal. (People v. Roach (Mar. 30, 2020, D076195) [nonpub. opn.] (Roach.)
In 2023, Roach filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code1 section 1172.6, asserting he could no longer be convicted of murder
based on recent changes to sections 188 and 189. First finding that Roach
had established a prima facie case for relief, the superior court then
conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the parties submitted the
transcripts of Roach’s trial and argued the significance of the evidence.
After taking the matter under submission, the court in a 12-page statement
of decision found that “the People ha[d met] their burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Petitioner is guilty of murder under California
law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189.”
Roach appeals, claiming that the court misapplied the governing
standard of proof and reached conclusions that are not supported by
substantial evidence. He also contends his attorney at the hearing provided
ineffective assistance by failing to emphasize damaging admissions McKell
made in a recorded jailhouse conversation with other prisoners. We are
unpersuaded by any of these arguments, and accordingly affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Roach’s petition relied solely on the transcripts of his original jury
trial, and it was heard by the same judge who presided over that trial.2 At
the outset of the hearing on the petition, the judge stated he had reviewed
the trial transcripts; neither party presented additional evidence. We
therefore incorporate by reference the full Factual and Procedural
Background from our Roach opinion. (See Roach, supra, D076195.)
In summary, the three victims were drug dealers who sold drugs from
the cover of an automobile repair business. Arturo S. and Mario P. were the
two murder victims. Hector Rivera, the third victim, survived despite being
shot in the head and having his throat slashed. Roach was a customer of the
victims who had previously purchased methamphetamine on several
occasions. The evidence showed that Roach and McKell, along with a third
individual known only as “Pocho,” planned and conducted an armed robbery
of the three victims at their auto garage, taking nearly $50,000 in cash and
15–20 pounds of methamphetamine.
Rivera provided much of the key evidence against Roach. Despite the
fact that the victims’ faces were wrapped in duct tape, Rivera was able to
create a slit in the tape that he could see through. At trial he testified to
what he saw and heard. According to Rivera, all three robbers had guns but
Pocho left the garage area at some point, leaving Roach and McKell in charge
of the victims. Rivera felt someone pull his hair from behind, then heard
Roach say “dispensa” (an apology in Spanish) just before he felt a knife pierce
his throat. Shortly thereafter, he heard gunshots on either side of him where
Arturo and Mario had been laying. He again heard Roach’s voice say
2 Although the transcripts were not initially included in the appellate
record, we granted Roach’s request to augment the record with those
materials.
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“dispensa, Hector.” Then, a gun was pressed against his scalp just before
he heard a shot and felt a bullet enter and exit his head.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court employed the proper “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard.
Roach first argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by
applying the wrong legal standard in deciding whether to grant his petition
for resentencing. In his view, the court “employed an impermissible
‘reasonable inference’ standard” rather than requiring the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is well settled that once the superior court issued an order to show
cause on Roach’s section 1172.6 petition, the burden was on the prosecution
to introduce evidence convincing the trial judge beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was guilty of murder as currently defined under California law.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 720.)3 In this
regard, the trial court “acts as an independent fact finder” to determine,
based on the applicable reasonable doubt standard, “whether the evidence
establishes a petitioner would be guilty of murder under amended sections
188 and 189.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 984.)
Here, the trial court expressly stated in both its oral and written
ruling—at the outset and in its conclusion—that it found the evidence
3 The statute reads in relevant part: “At the hearing to determine
whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
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established beyond a reasonable doubt Roach was guilty of murder under
California law as amended effective January 1, 2019.4 Roach suggests it is
ambiguous whether the court applied the proper standard. He faults the
court for using phrases like “one could reasonably assume,” “would
reasonably lead one to believe,” and “it is reasonable to assume” when
analyzing the evidence, which he believes suggests the judge was evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conclusion rather making a
factual finding himself.
We find no meaningful ambiguity in the court’s statements. We start
with a presumption that the court applied the correct legal principles.
(People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 662 [“In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed the court was aware of and applied
the proper burden of proof”].) And when speaking of the governing standard
of proof, the court here was quite clear it was requiring the prosecution to
prove Roach’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “particularly [with respect to]
the court’s explicit final ruling.” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87,
110.)
The phrases highlighted by Roach do not provide “evidence to the
contrary.” A fact finder is permitted to make reasonable assumptions (not
otherwise contradicted by the evidence) and consider reasonable inferences.
4 Early in the ruling, the court explained that “the burden of proof shall
be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Italics
added.) At its conclusion, the court expressly stated its finding “that the
People have [met] their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Italics
added.)
5
(See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 223 [circumstantial evidence “is evidence of another
fact or group of facts from which you may logically and reasonably conclude
the truth of the fact in question”].) It does so in deciding whether the
prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the
stacking of reasonable assumptions and inferences that can sometimes
ultimately dispel reasonable doubt. That is all the court was articulating in
this case. It did not apply an incorrect burden of proof.
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Roach was guilty of murder under three different theories.
The trial court analyzed the evidence and made findings based on three
different theories of first degree murder: (1) Roach was the actual killer of
one of the two victims (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); (2) Roach aided and abetted
McKell in the murder of the two victims with an intent to kill (§ 189, subd.
(e)(2)); and (3) Roach was a major participant in the underlying robbery who
acted with reckless indifference to human life (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). With
respect to each of the first two, it relied on Rivera’s testimony that he heard
“two shots fired on both sides of him indicating that [Roach] and McKell were
shooting at [Mario] and [Arturo].” In the court’s view, this physical reality
demonstrated both that Roach was the actual killer of one of the two murder
victims, and that he acted with an intent to kill. The court added that
Roach’s intent to kill was also shown by his slashing of Rivera’s throat.
With respect to Roach’s liability as a “major participant,” the court
considered the various and often-overlapping factors identified in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 to
conclude that Roach played a major role in the robbery and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. It found it significant that:
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• Roach played an active part in planning the robbery.
• Roach was armed with and personally used both a knife and
a firearm.
• Given the coordinated actions of the three robbers in
producing their guns, it could be reasonably inferred that
Roach was aware firearms would be used.
• Roach was present in the garage throughout the robbery and
was in a position to either facilitate or prevent the loss of life.
• After the victims were shot, Roach fled the scene with the
other robbers, making no attempt to render aid.
With respect to the evidence that he intended to kill the victims and
was, in fact, the actual killer of one, Roach does not seriously contest that
Rivera’s testimony, if believed, would provide substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s findings. Instead, he relies on other evidence that he
maintains makes certain aspects of Rivera’s testimony inherently incredible.
In particular, he points to a recording of a jailhouse conversation between
McKell and other inmates in which McKell purportedly confesses, claiming
credit for “popp[ing] everyone” with a “.380” and “.45” and “cut[ting] that
fool’s throat.”
Roach’s argument proceeds from the premise that McKell’s “confession”
must be true, so that Rivera must have been mistaken when he testified it
was Roach who slit his throat and shot him in the head. Using similar logic,
he asserts that Rivera must have been wrong about hearing two roughly
simultaneous shots from guns on either side because McKell admitting to
“popp[ing] everyone” and to using two different firearms. According to Roach,
there is no credible evidence that he shot or knifed anyone.
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Roach’s argument fails in its premise. Accepting that Roach’s
interpretation of the jailhouse statements is correct,5 the court was not
required to accept McKell’s admissions as the gospel truth. McKell may
well have been exaggerating his role and minimizing Roach’s to enhance his
reputation among his cellmates. And even assuming McKell was accurate
when he claimed to have shot both victims, this does not mean that Roach
did not also shoot at least one victim. Indeed, there was evidence that one
of the victims—Mario—was shot multiple times by two different guns. The
critical part of Rivera’s testimony is that he heard two shots at about the
same time from two different locations, indicating that both McKell and
Roach were firing a gun at a victim, and that both Mario and Arturo were
then silent. If the trial court accepted this testimony as true, it makes little
difference that McKell may have fired both weapons at some point in time.
Independent of Roach’s involvement in shooting or knifing the victims,
the trial court’s conclusion with regard to the “major participant” issue is also
fully supported by the evidence. Roach focuses on the evidence of his reckless
indifference to human life, where he again faults the trial judge for “fail[ing]
to acknowledge that McKell admitted that he was the one who had slashed
Rivera's throat and killed the victims.” He repeats his argument that Rivera
“could have been mistaken” when he identified Roach—whom he knew before
the incident—as the individual who said “dispensa” and slashed his throat.
As we have already explained, however, the trial court was not required to
accept all of McKell’s admissions. Moreover, it is not our function as an
appellate court to determine who was accurate and who was “mistaken”
5 Certain of McKell’s statements are unclear as to whether he is
referring to what happened generally during the robbery as opposed to what
he did personally.
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where witnesses provide inconsistent statements about an event. That is
the trial court’s job, and we are not permitted to reweigh the credibility of
witnesses. (People v. Myles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 711, 738, 739.) Rivera’s
testimony, which the court was entitled to accept, provides more than
substantial evidence to support a finding that Roach was a major participant
in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
C. Roach Fails to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Continuing his focus on McKell’s jailhouse statements, Roach contends
that his lawyer at the section 1172.6 hearing rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel because he made only one brief comment and failed to emphasize
the inconsistencies between McKell’s admissions and Rivera’s testimony. To
establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable when measured by prevailing
professional norms, and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, it is
reasonably probable the outcome would have been different. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1010.) A lawyer’s tactical decisions—what evidence
to present and what arguments to make—are accorded particular deference
and are presumed to fall “within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689.)
Here, it is important to remember that the same trial judge presided
over the trial and conducted the section 1172.6 hearing. The significance
of McKell’s jailhouse admissions was discussed by both sides in closing
argument at trial. In addition, counsel’s opportunity to argue at the hearing
came after the judge had provided counsel with a detailed tentative ruling,
which was to deny the resentencing motion. Even if defense counsel had
highlighted McKell’s jailhouse statements, it is not reasonably probable the
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judge would have suddenly reversed course and deemed Rivera’s testimony
inherently incredible. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [ineffective
assistance claim can be rejected on appeal without addressing the alleged
deficiency in counsel’s performance if it is clear the same result is reasonably
probable in the absence of the alleged error].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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