In re V.V. CA3

CourtListener 10873224Calctapp10 giu 2026

Testo completo

Filed 6/10/26 In re V.V. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)

In re V.V. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile C104575
Court Law.
(Super. Ct. Nos. 23JV01101,
SISKIYOU COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN 23JV01098, 23JV01099,
SERVICES AGENCY, 23JV01100, 23JV01103)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant, C.V. (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Father contends that
the court erred in (1) denying his request to change a court order under section 388 based
on “new” evidence; (2) denying his motion to continue the section 366.26 hearing;
(3) precluding the presentation of new evidence in support of the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception; and (4) finding that the exception did not apply. We will affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father is the biological father of V.V., Ch.V., M.V., H.V., and B.V. (collectively
the minors). M.S. is the minors’ half-sister from a different father and is not part of this
appeal. The minors’ mother is M.C. (mother) (collectively we refer to father and mother
as the parents). Mother did not appeal the orders made at the 366.26 hearing and is not
subject to this appeal.
On February 8, 2023, the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency
(Agency) filed an original petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(l) and (d). The
petition alleged the minors suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious
physical harm as a result of the parents’ failure or inability to supervise or provide regular
care to the minors. The petition further alleged the minors suffered sexual abuse or there
was a substantial risk the minors would be sexually abused.
The petition alleged that the Yreka Police Department responded to a report of
possible sexual abuse by father and physical abuse by mother. The minors denied that
the parents physically disciplined them except for Ch.V., who stated that his parents hit
him when he gets into trouble. Officers shared two videos with the Agency. One
depicted mother yelling at, slapping, and grabbing the minors. The other showed mother
throwing a cell phone at Ch.V. In February 2023, mother was arrested for assault (Pen.
Code, § 245) and child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) based on the videos.
M.S. reported she was sexually abused by father, alleging he touched her chest,
vagina, and buttocks. M.S. further reported she orally copulated father approximately 10
times and that father attempted to vaginally penetrate her when she was about 10 or 11
years old. She was unsure if penetration actually occurred but recalled that “it hurt.”
M.S. also stated that father told her it was “our secret” and that “they would go to jail if
anyone found out.”
In February 2023, M.S. further reported that father attempted to touch her again
“very late at night” while the others were sleeping when the family was staying at a

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motel. The petition further alleged that father made M.S. watch videos on his computer
of “weird black model naked girls doing things to naked boys,” which she clarified were
adults. The minors reported “continuous fighting” between the parents that became
physical, which scared them. According to a paternal relative, the parents often fought in
front of the minors, both verbally and at times physically. The minors also stated they
had never been to a doctor because father “does not like doctors.” Mother obtained a
temporary restraining order against father and left the motel. At the time, father was
participating in a court-ordered mental health diversion program.
At the February 9, 2023, detention hearing, the juvenile court found the
continuance of the minors in the home of the parents was contrary to their welfare,
ordered the minors detained, and continued the matter for a jurisdictional hearing.
On March 30, 2023, the Agency filed a jurisdiction and disposition report that
recommended the juvenile court find the allegations in the petition to be true, declare the
minors dependents of the court, and offer reunification services to the parents.
On May 8, 2023, the court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
The court found adopting the report’s recommended findings was in the best interests of
the minors. It also found the allegations in the section 300 petition to be true by a
preponderance of the evidence, declared the minors dependents of the court, ordered the
parents to participate in reunification services, and continued the matter for a six-month
review hearing.
On September 21, 2023, the Agency filed a six-month review report, which
recommended that the minors remain in foster care and the parents continue to participate
in reunification services. The report indicated that earlier in the month mother had been
arrested for torture and child endangerment against the minors. The report also indicated
that, prior to her arrest, mother had participated in parenting classes, anger management,
a psychological evaluation, individual counseling, and had secured housing. Mother did
not consistently submit to drug testing and had tested positive for alcohol and THC on

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separate occasions. Father was also arrested for torture, child cruelty, and lewd and
lascivious acts with a minor under 14. Before his arrest, he participated in individual
counseling, mental health diversion court, and had a psychological evaluation. Father did
not complete an anger management assessment, consistently participate in parenting
classes, or comply with substance abuse services, testing positive for cannabis 11 times.
At the six-month review hearing on October 2, 2023, the juvenile court continued
reunification services and set the matter for a 12-month review hearing.
On March 15, 2024, the Agency filed a 12-month review report. The report
recommended that the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a hearing
pursuant to section 366.26, to determine an appropriate permanent plan for the children.
Both parents remained incarcerated. While incarcerated, mother obtained her high school
diploma and completed services provided by the Agency. During father’s incarceration
he completed some services provided to him by the Agency and worked on an anger
management workbook, but he continued to minimize his involvement in the removal of
the minors. The minors did not visit with the parents due to their respective
incarcerations.
On April 22, 2024, the juvenile court held a readiness conference. Father advised
the court that he wanted to represent himself in the proceedings, upon which the juvenile
court relieved father’s counsel and set a contested 12-month review hearing. The court
continued the case several times and held the contested 12-month review hearing on
August 26, 2024. The court admitted the 12-month review report into evidence without
objection. Father requested the court extend reunification services for another six months
and examined Corina Long, a social worker from the Agency, about the report and
reunification. The court found that because both parents were in custody there was not a
substantial probability of the minors’ return to the parents within 18 months of entering
foster care and that reasonable services had been provided. The court found that the
Agency established by a preponderance of the evidence that the return of the children to

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their parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the children; terminated reunification services as to
both parents; and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On September 3, 2024, father filed a “Notice of Intent to File a Writ Petition to
Review Order Setting Hearing Under WIC § 366.26.” On December 10, 2024, the
Agency filed a memorandum with the juvenile court, requesting that the section 366.26
hearing be continued to June 9, 2025, to allow for additional permanency planning, which
the juvenile court granted.
On February 7, 2025, the Agency filed a status review report, which indicated that
both parents remained incarcerated, the minors expressed a desire to be adopted by their
caregiver and recommended that the minors remain dependents of the juvenile court. The
court held a status hearing on February 24, 2025, and adopted the recommended findings
in the report.
On May 16, 2025, this court denied father’s petition for extraordinary writ relief
with request for stay. On May 29, 2025, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report that
recommended terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the minors’
permanent plans. The parents remained incarcerated. The court held a contested section
366.26 hearing on June 9, 2025, and continued the hearing to June 30, 2025, due to
pending hearings in the parents’ respective criminal cases.
Prior to the hearing, father filed a declaration with attached information regarding
the disadvantages of adoption and permanent separation of children from their biological
fathers and a motion to continue the June 30, 2025, hearing.
On June 30, 2025, the same date as the contested section 366.26 hearing, father
filed an opposition to the section 366.26 report’s recommendation to terminate father’s
parental rights. He also filed a section 388 petition requesting the court grant a
“rehearing or reconsideration of the Jurisdiction/Disposition report and orders,” citing
“new evidence” that had become available. In his petition, father stated the evidence was

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“not previously considered by the court due to a combination of procedural barriers and
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Father claimed his attorney “did not submit this
evidence at the dispositional hearing, despite it being available,” and that he did not have
access to the evidence while he was incarcerated, although he conceded that he “did have
access to the [evidence] during the initial phases of the case.”
The juvenile court denied father’s request to continue the hearing, finding that it
had been more than 10 months since services were removed, two and a half years since
removal of the minors, and that the criminal case did not constitute good cause to
continue the matter.
As to the section 388 petition, the court denied the petition, finding it was “not the
proper procedure to go back in time, two years, and have another jurisdiction/disposition
hearing. [¶] And even if we were to do so, I don’t find that the evidence that you have
submitted would have changed the findings and the orders that were made.” Father
stated he did not have anything else to submit aside from what was in his section 388
petition.
The juvenile court admitted the section 366.26 report into evidence. The court
asked father if he had any witnesses he would like to call. Father then testified that there
was a beneficial bond between him and the minors, he was the primary caregiver, and the
minors loved him. He argued that when he was not incarcerated he attended every visit
and did not miss a day of work. The paternal grandmother also testified that father was
the primary caregiver for the minors, that father’s relationship with the minors was
beneficial to the minors, and that it would not benefit the minors if father was not in their
lives. The Agency requested that the juvenile court adopt the proposed recommendations
and findings in the section 366.26 report.
The juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence that the minors
would be adopted, that the minors’ current placements had indicated a desire to adopt the
minors, and that reunification services were previously terminated. The court addressed

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father’s arguments regarding the beneficial relationship exception. The court found
regular visitation had not occurred in the approximately 18 months that father was
incarcerated and when visitation did occur there were “significant issues,” including one
of the minors being injured. It also found that the minors had “improved physically and
emotionally since” being removed from the parents. As such, the court found the benefit
of placement in a new adoptive home outweighed the harm the minors could experience
by a loss of a significant positive emotional relationship with father and terminated the
parents’ parental rights.
Father timely appealed the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I.
Section 388 Motion
Father’s section 388 motion sought a rehearing on “all issues addressed in the
Jurisdiction/Disposition Findings and Orders filed on May 8, 2023.” The motion alleged
new evidence had become available that was not considered at the jurisdiction/disposition
hearing because his attorney failed to present it. Father claims the juvenile court
improperly denied his section 388 motion. We disagree.
Section 388, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: “Any parent or other person
having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court ... may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action
in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court ... for a hearing
to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the
jurisdiction of the court.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (d) of section 388 states in
pertinent part: “If it appears that the best interests of the child … may be promoted by
the proposed change of order, ... the court shall order that a hearing be held.”
The statute does not define “new evidence,” but case law does. In In re H.S.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103, 108-109, this court held that “the term ‘new evidence’ in

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section 388 must be construed to include the three requirements of new evidence,
reasonable diligence, and materiality found in section 657 and 1008 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
Here, the “new evidence” was screenshots of a video that father described as
demonstrating that his “accuser” (presumably one of the minors in this case) made false
accusations against him. Father conceded in the motion that the “new” information was
not in fact new because it was available at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing but
not presented due to “ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of [his] right to self-
representation, and administrative errors within the jail system.” As father has not raised
a claim here on appeal of either ineffective assistance of counsel or related to the trial
court’s denial of self-representation (which we note the trial court granted before the
contested 12-month review hearing), we conclude this evidence does not constitute “new
evidence” for purposes of section 388.
There is another wrinkle with father’s section 388 motion. Dependency appeals
are governed by section 395, which provides in relevant part: “A judgment in a
proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final
judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as from an order after judgment.”
“A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order
is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.”
(In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) “In other words, ‘A challenge to
the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for
which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ (Steve J. v. Superior Court
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.) The rule serves vital policy considerations of
promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme,
and preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier
orders. (In re Janee J. [(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198,] 207.)” (In re Jesse W. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) Here, father could have appealed the jurisdiction and

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dispositional orders from May of 2023, but he did not. He cannot now challenge them
via the vehicle of section 388.
Father also contends that the trial court precluded him, “by way of interruption,”
from explaining the other evidence that he had wanted to present at the section 388
hearing. We do not so interpret that colloquy. As we view the record of the hearing, the
trial court gave father the opportunity to explain what new evidence he had and any
interruptions by the court were to try and get father to slow down his speech so that the
court reporter could keep up with him. Once father had concluded, the trial court stated:
“This is not the proper procedure to go back in time, two years, and have another
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. [¶] And even if we were to do so, I don’t find that the
evidence that you have submitted would have changed the findings and the orders that
were made in connection —,” to which father then interrupted and stated, “I’ve got more
evidence —,” and the juvenile court responded, “No.” We find the juvenile court gave
father sufficient time to explain what new evidence he wanted to present, but the point of
father’s evidence was to revisit decisions made at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing held
nearly two years earlier and, as we have indicated, to which the time to appeal had long
passed. We find no abuse of discretion.
II.
Motion to Continue
Four days before the scheduled 366.26 hearing, father filed a motion to continue
the hearing. He claimed that because he had been working on filing and preparing for
hearings on multiple motions in his criminal case and had limited access to the law
library at the jail where he was incarcerated, his ability to prepare for the permanency
planning hearing, including filing a written opposition to the recommendation to
terminate his parental rights, had been limited. Father contends the trial court improperly
denied his motion to continue. We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a

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continuance in a dependency case for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard.
(Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 637.)
Section 352 provides that the juvenile court may “continue any hearing” under the
dependency law “beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to
be held” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)), provided there is “good cause” (id., subd. (a)(2)) and a
continuance would not be “contrary to the interest of the minor” (id., subd. (a)(1)). In
evaluating the minor’s interest, the court “shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need
for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable
environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court found that it had been more than 10 months since services
were terminated, two and a half years since removal of the minors, and that
accommodating a criminal case did not constitute good cause to continue the matter. The
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue.
We note that father began representing himself in this case when the juvenile court
granted his request to do so on April 22, 2024. The matter was then set for a contested
12-month review hearing, which finally occurred on August 26, 2024. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to both father and
mother and set the matter for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. On
May 29, 2025, the Agency filed its section 366.26 report, recommending that parental
rights be terminated and adoption be selected as the permanent plan for the children.
Quite simply, we find father had sufficient time to prepare for the section 366.26 hearing
and that he chose to prioritize his criminal matter over this case did not provide good
cause to continue the hearing.
III.
Beneficial Relationship Exception
Father claims that the juvenile court precluded presentation of new evidence,
including photographs evidencing the minors’ happiness in father’s presence during visits

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and newly obtained video clips from interviews with the minors. Father further claims
the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply.
At the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, a juvenile court must
choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. …
The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If
the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court
to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would
be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is the
so-called beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)
[beneficial parental relationship exception]; In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629
(Caden C.).)
The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of
any circumstances that constitute an exception to the termination of parental rights.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) The parent “must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted.
Moreover, the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent — the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 636.)
As discussed ante, we conclude that the juvenile court did not preclude father from
submitting “new evidence” because much of what father wished to present did not
constitute “new evidence.” Even if the juvenile court had considered any evidence
discussed by father, it indicated that would not have changed its findings. We agree.

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Father contends that his devotion to his children, their enjoyment of visits with
him, and the anguish he would feel if they were to be adopted, satisfy the beneficial
parental relationship exception to adoption. We do not question father’s love for his
children or his desire to parent them. But as father notes, the focus of determining the
importance of the parent-child relationship is on whether severing that relationship would
have a detrimental impact on the children that outweighs the benefit of adoption. Here,
the juvenile court found that the exception did not apply based on the evidence that father
had not visited with the children since August of 2023, and the minors were thriving in
their current placements with caretakers who were willing to adopt them. It is not enough
for a parent to show loving contact during pleasant visits. (In re C.F. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) Interaction between a natural parent and child will almost
always confer some benefit to the child. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567,
575.) What the parent must establish for the beneficial parental relationship to adoption
to apply is that a minor has such a significant, positive emotional attachment to the parent
that the benefit of maintaining it outweighs the benefits a minor would obtain from
adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) The record here does not
support that.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

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