CourtListener 10872542•People v. Carter CA6
Testo completo
Filed 6/9/26 P. v. Carter CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052267
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1652794)
v.
THEODORE JAY CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Theodore Jay Carter was convicted by jury trial of sexual
offenses against three minor victims. The jury also found true the allegation
that Carter had committed sexual acts against more than one victim. The
trial court sentenced Carter to a prison term of 105 years to life, consecutive
to one year.
On appeal, Carter contends he was deprived of his constitutional right
to the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to
(1) request a limiting instruction with respect to “ ‘fresh complaint’ ”
evidence, (2) object to the introduction of certain fresh complaint testimony,
and (3) object at trial to the introduction of one victim’s testimony from the
preliminary hearing. Carter asserts these errors were individually and
cumulatively prejudicial.
For the reasons explained below, we reject Carter’s challenges and
affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
In February 2024, the Santa Clara County District Attorney (district
attorney) filed a fourth amended information (information) charging Carter
with 15 counts of sexual crimes against minor siblings J. Doe, B. Doe, and A.
Doe, on or about dates between November 2004 and September 2014.1 The
charges comprised three counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a
child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,2 § 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1, 4 & 6),
eight counts of lewd act upon a child by force, violence, duress, menace, or
fear (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 & 14), one count of
annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1); count 3), one count of
lewd act on a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a); count 9), one count
of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age 14 and 10 or more years
younger than Carter (§ 269; count 10), and one count of lewd act on a child
aged 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 15). The information also alleged as
to counts 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11 through 14, that the charged crimes were
committed against more than one victim under section 667.61, subdivisions
(b) and (e).
In March 2024, a jury found Carter guilty on counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
10, 12, 13, and 15, guilty of the lesser offense of lewd act on a child under age
1 The information identified the minor victims by first name and the
pseudonym “Doe.” We refer to the minors by the first initial of their first
names and other persons by their initials (or the first two initials of their first
name) to protect personal privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4), (10)–(11).)
2 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) on counts 8, 11, and 14, and not guilty on count 3. The
jury also found true the multiple-victim allegation as to counts 2, 5, 7, 8, 9,
11, 12, 13, and 14.
On May 28, 2024, the trial court sentenced Carter to an aggregate term
of imprisonment of 105 years to life, consecutive to one year. The sentence
comprised consecutive terms of 15 years to life on counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12
and 13, concurrent terms of 15 years to life on counts 8, 9, 11, and 14, and a
determinate, mitigated term of 1 year on count 15. The court stayed the
punishment on counts 1 and 6 pursuant to section 654.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
A. Doe, B. Doe, and J. Doe are siblings. A. Doe is the eldest, J. Doe is in
the middle, and B. Doe is the youngest. Carter is their paternal uncle. The
siblings also have a brother, a younger sister, and two younger half-siblings.
During the sisters’ childhood, the family experienced unstable housing
and moved frequently. A. Doe, B. Doe, and J. Doe lived at times with their
mother, with their father and paternal grandparents, in motels, and with
family members including Carter, as well at times in their mother’s vehicle.
The siblings changed schools many times.
1. Prosecution Case
B. Doe, J. Doe, and A. Doe each testified, as did their mother, several
middle school classmates of J. Doe’s and B. Doe’s, the high school counselor of
J. Doe and B. Doe who contacted the police, and a clinical psychologist expert
witness.
a. B. Doe (Counts 4–9)
B. Doe was born in September 2001 and was 22 years old at the time of
trial. She lived in California with her family from 2001 until 2014 and moved
frequently in and around Santa Clara County.
3
When B. Doe was five or six years old, she lived for a period with
several family members, including Carter, in a hotel. Sometimes Carter
would watch B. Doe and her siblings while other adults were out. Carter
would play games with them, and B. Doe trusted him. The hotel was a single
room hotel with a bathroom. Because the bathroom doubled as a space in
which the family kept a rice cooker and stored things, the adults would enter
the bathroom while the children were using it. They typically would not close
the bathroom door when doing so.
The first time Carter molested B. Doe, he walked into the bathroom
while B. Doe was sitting on the toilet with her pants down. Carter closed the
door behind him. Carter told B. Doe they would play a game, and to close her
eyes and open her mouth and guess which finger he was putting in her
mouth. She felt nervous and did what he said. After starting with his
fingers, he put his penis in her mouth. She could feel that it was not his
fingers and was something different. She was “really scared.” She “just sat
there.” At one point she opened her eyes and he was standing facing her with
his hands on his hips and holding up his shirt. She could see his belly and
feel the penis in her mouth.
The same thing occurred a second time while they were still living in
the hotel. The second time, B. Doe kept her eyes closed. She remembers her
siblings being in the hotel room when the molestations happened. B. Doe
knew that she needed to listen to the adults in her life to avoid being
disciplined, which meant being put in the corner or spanked by her parents.
B. Doe also knew what Carter had done “wasn’t supposed to happen” and felt
embarrassed. She did not tell anyone.
Another incident occurred when B. Doe was seven years old and living
with her mother and siblings in Santa Clara. B. Doe’s mother would take her
4
and her siblings to visit their paternal grandmother, who lived with their
uncle (Carter) in a nearby apartment. Sometimes the siblings would be left
with Carter when their grandmother went out. Carter often played games,
which the children enjoyed.
During a game of hide-and-seek, Carter told B. Doe that they were
going to hide in his room. She was worried but complied. Carter told her to
go into the closet, then put a blanket over her. She was seated on her knees
and bottom with her back to the side wall of the closet. He sat in front of her
facing her and closed the closet door. Carter told B. Doe to open her mouth.
She felt “scared” and “knew that he was going to make [her] do something
that [she] didn’t want to do again.” Carter grabbed the back of her head and
pushed her head down onto his penis. He repeatedly pushed her head down,
using greater force when she tried to resist and pull away, and telling her
that he was not going to hurt her. Carter did this at least twice, and his tone
became more aggressive. It ended when J. Doe (who was the seeker in the
hide-and-seek game) tried entering the bedroom and asked why the door was
locked. Carter told B. Doe not to tell anyone, then got up and unlocked the
door. Afterward, B. Doe wanted to tell her family what happened but
thought she was going to get into trouble. She did not tell anyone at that
time.
Carter again molested B. Doe when she was nine or 10 years old and
living at an apartment with her mother, her mother’s partner, J. Doe, and
her younger sister and half-sister. Carter drove the siblings to and from
school and on errands. The children would play the “shotgun” game to
determine who would ride in the front passenger seat. On three or four
occasions, when B. Doe sat in the front seat, Carter reached his hand toward
her and slid his fingers inside her pants and under her underwear. Carter
5
touched B. Doe skin to skin by stroking between her vaginal lips with his
fingers. This lasted only for a few seconds because, each time, B. Doe moved
away by scooting toward the passenger door. After he removed his hand from
beneath her underwear, he would smell his hand. This happened each time
he touched her in the car. B. Doe never told or tried to get her siblings’
attention; she “just wanted it to be over and . . . acted like nothing ever
happened.”
Another incident occurred when B. Doe was in sixth grade. She and
her friend L.S. spent the night at B. Doe’s grandmother’s home in Santa
Clara, where Carter lived. B. Doe and L.S. were playing a videogame on
Carter’s PlayStation. L.S. was sitting on the floor facing the TV and B. Doe
was sitting on the edge of the bed. Carter sat behind B. Doe and put his hand
into her pants and “touched [her] butt” skin to skin. B. Doe immediately slid
off the bed onto the floor next to L.S. Carter seemed “annoyed” when she
moved away and was “breathing really hard.”
B. Doe did not tell anyone about this or the other incidents until later
in sixth grade when she told L.S. and her friend C.I., with whom she felt very
close. B. Doe and C.I. were walking to school when B. Doe confided that her
uncle (Carter) was touching her. Later that day, C.I. told J. Doe, who found
B. Doe after class and told B. Doe that it had happened to her, too. B. Doe
felt “relieved” that J. Doe found out but “also really sad” because J. Doe also
had been abused.
J. Doe texted A. Doe, who was in high school, about their uncle, but A.
Doe “didn’t really answer” their questions and just told them it would be
okay. Based on her response, B. Doe suspected that something also had
happened to A. Doe. She hoped J. Doe or A. Doe would tell an adult, though
neither did. B. Doe felt “scared and worried” because she had little sisters,
6
whom she tried to not leave alone with Carter. B. Doe moved to Texas later
that year during the spring break of 2014.
In September 2016, during ninth grade, B. Doe disclosed Carter’s
molestation with the support of her school counselor. In response, her
father’s family “disowned” her and her siblings, called them liars, and their
father told B. Doe and her sisters to kill themselves.
b. J. Doe (Counts 1–3)
J. Doe was born in June 2000 and was 23 years old at the time of trial.
J. Doe felt “[d]isgusted” by Carter because of what he did to her and her
sisters.
When J. Doe was seven or eight years old and living in San Jose or
Santa Clara, Carter asked her if she wanted a candy or lollipop, then picked
her up and carried her from the living room to a bedroom. Carter removed J.
Doe’s pants and underwear and inserted a finger inside her vagina. It was
“[v]ery uncomfortable” and J. Doe felt “[s]cared” and “nervous.” Carter then
went to the bathroom and washed his hands.
Another incident occurred when J. Doe was 12 years old. J. Doe was
staying at her paternal grandmother’s home and was getting ready to take a
shower. Before she went to the shower, Carter told her that he needed to use
the restroom. After he finished, she entered the restroom, removed her
clothes, and showered. When she got out of the shower, she noticed his phone
propped up and facing the shower like it had been recording her. She picked
up the phone to try to see if it was recording but put it down right away
because she was afraid that he would see she had taken his phone. No one
else was home. J. Doe felt she had to obey Carter because he was her elder.
J. Doe later told her friend K.R. about finding the phone.
7
J. Doe also confided in her middle school classmate, C.I. J. Doe and
C.I. were classmates, and C.I. was also B. Doe’s friend. One day during class,
C.I. told J. Doe what B. Doe had shared about their uncle, and J. Doe
understood that B. Doe had gone “through something similar.” J. Doe waited
for the bell and ran to B. Doe and told her the same thing happened to her.
They cried together but did not share details.
J. Doe eventually told her high school counselor in Texas, Stephanie
Bennett, that her uncle had touched her and her sisters inappropriately. She
and her sisters were questioned by the police. J. Doe felt anxious and
overwhelmed. Disclosing the abuse “caused a lot more pain than [J. Doe]
thought it would.” The girls’ mother tried to commit suicide after she found
out.
J. Doe testified that she has “a very bad memory” and “can’t remember
a lot of things.” She suffers from anxiety. J. Doe has a history of cutting
herself.
c. A. Doe (Counts 10–15)
A. Doe was born in November 1997 and was 26 years old at the time of
trial.
Carter molested A. Doe when she was six or seven years old, attending
second grade, and living with her parents. She and Carter were in a
bedroom. Carter was seated at the foot of the bed and had her sit on the floor
between his legs. Carter was unclothed from the waist down. His penis was
exposed. He grabbed the back of A. Doe’s head and pushed it toward his
penis, forcing her to put his penis in her mouth. He referred to his penis as a
“lollipop.” A. Doe tried to resist by pulling her head back, and he pushed her
head toward his penis again. Carter was moving her head back and forth
8
with his penis in her mouth. A. Doe could not say how many times her head
went back and forth and did not recall how the incident ended.
Later, when she was “[n]ine turning [10]” and attending fifth grade, A.
Doe lived in an apartment with her siblings, their paternal grandmother and
her partner, an aunt, Carter, and another uncle. Living with Carter was
“confusing and gross” because he would do things that are not what “you
should be doing to little kids.”
One time, Carter came up behind A. Doe while she was washing dishes
and pressed the front of his body against her back to where she could feel his
penis against her behind. Carter moved slightly side to side, rubbing his
penis against her. His penis felt hard. It felt “[g]ross and uncomfortable.”
She told him that “he had a girlfriend and this was weird.” He seemed
surprised and did not respond.
Another time, while living in the same apartment and still in the fifth
grade, Carter instructed A. Doe to go take a nap in her aunt’s room. This was
something Carter frequently told her to do, and A. Doe did what she was told
because the kids “were supposed to listen to the adults.” However, she did
not sleep but only lay down and pretended to sleep. Carter came into the
bedroom and lay on top of A. Doe. She could feel his penis on top of her
backside, and she felt scared and uncomfortable not knowing what was going
to happen.3 They were both clothed. He was wearing loose basketball shorts.
He rubbed his penis against her from side to side, like he had in front of the
sink. His penis did not feel hard. This type of touching happened a few
times.
3 The prosecutor later moved to read into the record a portion of A.
Doe’s preliminary hearing testimony regarding this incident. We discuss this
testimony in our analysis, post (pt. II.C.1.).
9
A. Doe later moved with her dad and his girlfriend, her siblings, her
paternal grandfather, and Carter to a one-bedroom residence. There was a
narrow hallway between the bathroom and bedroom, with insufficient space
for two people to pass side by side. A. Doe was passing through the narrow
area when Carter was also there. When she tried to walk past him, he put
his hand on her stomach and under her shirt. He reached down her pants
and inside the top of her underwear to the top of her pubic area but did not
touch her vagina. A. Doe could not recall how the incident ended. They
moved out of the house before the seventh grade.
When A. Doe started high school, she moved into an apartment with
her mom and siblings and her mom’s partner but continued seeing Carter, as
they would often spend weekends with their dad and paternal grandmother.
One more incident happened during this period when she was 14 or 15 years
old, on a weekend visit with her siblings to their grandmother’s apartment.
They were all play-wrestling when Carter slipped his hand through the top of
her shirt and into her bra, grabbed her breast, touched her nipple, and
squeezed. She “got extremely angry” and sat up on the floor. She believed
Carter’s action was intentional and not part of wrestling. He asked her why
she was mad and she did not respond.
A. Doe did not tell anyone at the time about these incidents because she
worried that her mother and father would accuse her of lying, and the
touching would keep happening anyway. The first person she told was a
boyfriend.
A. Doe was 17 years old, in high school, when she moved to Texas to be
with her mom and siblings. She wanted to leave California to get away from
Carter. Although around that time her sisters told her that Carter had done
something to them, she did not ask them questions or share her experience.
10
She was “shocked” because she “always thought that at least that if it was
happening to [her], it wasn’t happening to them.” A. Doe did not tell an adult
what happened to her until her sisters reported Carter’s actions to the school
counselor in Texas.
d. Fresh Complaint4 Witnesses
C.I. grew up in Sunnyvale and was friends with J. Doe as well as B.
Doe. C.I. and J. Doe are the same age. The girls hung out, walked to and
from their middle school, and were close friends. J. Doe first told C.I. that
her uncle “would, like, do things that he wasn’t supposed to do.” J. Doe did
not give specific details to C.I. B. Doe also told C.I. “it was her uncle” but did
not provide details. C.I. testified, “They just told me that their uncle was
doing stuff to them.” They were “hurt and sad,” and C.I. tried to show them
she was there for them.
L.S. testified that she recalled sleepovers with B. Doe at the Santa
Clara house and Carter, whom she knew as B. Doe’s uncle, being present. At
some point after that, B. Doe told L.S. that her uncle was touching her. L.S.
did not know who to go to or what to do so she “just kept it to [her]self.”
K.R. was a close friend and classmate of J. Doe’s in middle school. J.
Doe told K.R. that she found her uncle’s phone in the bathroom and that she
thought it was recording her while she was taking a shower. K.R. did not
know what to do and did not tell anyone but just tried to offer her friendship
as support.
4 We acknowledge that the Court of Appeal in People v. Flores (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 438, recently “encourage[d] California courts and
commentators to abandon the ‘fresh complaint’ misnomer and refer to this
evidentiary rule more accurately as the ‘prior disclosure’ doctrine.” (Id., at
p. 443.) Nevertheless, for consistency with the parties’ briefing and prior case
law, we use the phrase “fresh complaint.”
11
Stephanie Bennett is a student and family advocate—providing mental
health assessments and support for students and families—in the school
district where J. Doe and B. Doe attended high school in Amarillo, Texas. J.
Doe disclosed to Bennett that an uncle in California “did some things to her
sexually.” She described to Bennett the incident in which her uncle asked J.
Doe if she wanted a lollipop, then picked her up and carried her to a room in
the home and digitally penetrated her. J. Doe also told Bennett about a time
when her uncle set up a phone and filmed her while she was in the shower.
J. Doe told Bennett that something similar happened to her sisters,
specifically B. Doe. J. Doe appeared “[v]ery upset, tearful” and was “shaking
and [had] a hard time speaking” as she spoke to Bennett.
Bennett is a mandated reporter. She immediately notified the school’s
police liaison officers who separately interviewed both girls. Bennett was
present for the interviews. J. Doe’s demeanor was “[t]earful. Quiet but
answered – but cooperative.” Bennett stated that when B. Doe was brought
to meet with the liaison officers, she was “[c]rying and withdrawn,” making
“[l]ittle to no eye contact,” and refusing to speak. Bennett understood that a
subsequent interview was later set up with B. Doe.
2. Defense Case
Carter’s sister, mother, and mother’s boyfriend testified in his defense.
Carter’s younger half-sister De. testified that A. Doe, J. Doe, and B. Doe came
to live with their grandmother (De.’s mother) from approximately 2005 to
2008. De. never saw Carter treat the girls in an inappropriate way sexually;
he was affectionate and caring. Her experience with the three sisters
included that they could tell lies as is typical for children, and that none of
them ever expressed or exhibited problems with Carter.
12
Carter’s mother, the girls’ paternal grandmother, took physical custody
of the sisters and their siblings for a period of time. She testified that Carter
was a good uncle to the children but did not see them much because he was
working or going out. She did not recall Carter being left alone to babysit the
children, though he occasionally drove them to and from school.
II. DISCUSSION
Carter contends that his defense counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance under the federal and state constitutions by failing to
(1) request a limiting instruction with respect to fresh complaint testimony,
(2) object to the scope of certain witness testimony under the fresh complaint
doctrine, and (3) object to the introduction at trial of some of A. Doe’s
preliminary hearing testimony. Carter also asserts that the cumulative
prejudice from these errors requires reversal of the judgment.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Legal Principles
“A criminal defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to
counsel (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) includes the right
to effective legal assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009
(Mai), italics omitted.) “To make out a claim that counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance, ‘the defendant must first show
counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the
defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958; see also
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) We can
reject the claim on either element of the standard. (Strickland, at p. 687;
13
People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1008, disapproved on another
ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
“It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial
counsel. We defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions and indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Anzalone (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 380, 394; see Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “Representation
does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections.” (People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463; see also People v. Bradley (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 64, 90.) Likewise, “[c]ounsel does not render ineffective
assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably
determines would be futile.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387
(Price).)
“It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mai, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 1009.) Stated differently, when the record sheds no light on
defense counsel’s act or omission, “ ‘unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’ ” (People v.
Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206 (Huggins).)
14
B. Fresh Complaint Evidence
1. Additional Background
The district attorney moved in limine to admit evidence of the
disclosures by J. Doe and B. Doe to several friends and their high school
counselor about Carter’s conduct. The district attorney argued that evidence
of a sexual assault victim’s disclosure to a third party is admissible for a
limited, non-hearsay purpose under the standard articulated in People v.
Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746 (Brown). Applying that standard, the district
attorney sought to admit evidence of J. Doe’s disclosures to Bennett and to
her friend K.R., and B. Doe’s disclosures to C.I. and L.S.
Carter’s counsel generally objected to the admission of the evidence
because there was “significant delay in the reporting of the conduct,” which
counsel maintained brought the disclosures outside of the fresh complaint
doctrine. The trial court rejected that argument. The court noted the
evidence would not be admitted for the truth but “would include details of the
general nature of the conduct, the timing of that disclosure, and the name of
the perpetrator.” The court ruled that it would allow the proffered testimony
and would “instruct the jury that those statements are not to be taken for the
truth but are under the fresh-complaint doctrine.”
C.I., L.S., K.R., and Bennett each testified for the prosecution as
summarized ante (pt. I.B.1.d.). During C.I.’s testimony, defense counsel
objected on hearsay grounds to C.I. recounting what B. Doe told her about
what “happened with [B. Doe’s] uncle.” The trial court overruled the
objection and told the jurors that they “will also receive an instruction on how
to treat this testimony.” The court similarly informed the jury, after C.I.’s
and L.S.’s testimonies were completed, that “the last two witnesses are what
15
the law calls fresh-complaint witnesses. I will give you instructions on how to
treat their testimony at the end.”
Following the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury, and
both sides presented closing arguments. Outside the presence of the jury and
prior to the defense’s closing arguments, the court noted that it did “not see
the fresh complaint witness jury instruction.” The prosecutor responded that
she was “not sure” and could “take a look if that [sic] was one.” The court
added, “My recollection is, maybe I am wrong, but there is an instruction for
them on how to treat the fresh complaint not as for the truth, but as to the
timing.” Defense counsel did not comment on this issue or request a jury
instruction on the fresh complaint evidence.
2. Applicable Law
“Historically, under the common law fresh-complaint doctrine, evidence
that the alleged victim of a sexual offense disclosed or reported the incident
to another person shortly after its occurrence has been held admissible . . . in
a subsequent criminal prosecution for that offense.” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 748.) In 1994, the California Supreme Court in Brown clarified the
doctrine’s modern application. (Id. at p. 758.)
Under Brown, “the timing of a complaint (e.g., whether it was made
promptly after the incident or, rather, at a later date) and the circumstances
under which it was made (e.g., whether it was volunteered spontaneously or,
instead, was made only in response to the inquiry of another person) are not
necessarily determinative of the admissibility of evidence of the complaint.”
(Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 750.) Instead, “evidence of the fact of, and the
circumstances surrounding, an alleged victim’s disclosure of the offense may
be admitted in a criminal trial for nonhearsay purposes under generally
16
applicable evidentiary principles, provided the evidence meets the ordinary
standard of relevance. (Evid. Code, § 210.)” (Id. at p. 763.)
Evidence admitted under the fresh complaint doctrine is thus
“admitted for the limited purpose of showing that a complaint was made by
the victim, and not for the truth of the matter stated.” (People v. Ramirez
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522 (Ramirez); see Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 761.) “Evidence admitted pursuant to this doctrine may be considered by
the trier of fact for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony, but
not to prove the occurrence of the crime.” (Ramirez, at p. 1522.)
“On request, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the limited
purpose for which the fresh complaint evidence was admitted. [Citation.]
However, the trial court has no duty to give such an instruction in the
absence of a request.” (People v. Manning (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 870, 880
(Manning); see Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Simms (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299,
311.)
3. Analysis
Carter contends his counsel’s performance with respect to the
admission of fresh complaint evidence was deficient in two ways. He
maintains that a reasonably competent attorney would have investigated the
use of fresh complaint evidence permissible under Brown and understood
that the trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction
absent a defense request, thus requiring him to request a limiting instruction
on the fresh complaint testimony. Carter further asserts that a reasonably
competent attorney would have objected that the testimony of K.R. and
Bennett exceeded the scope of permissible fresh complaint evidence under
Brown.
17
We address each contention under the principles applicable to Carter’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. There is no dispute that Carter was
entitled under Brown and the circumstances of this case (i.e., the evidence
adduced by the prosecution) to seek a limiting instruction from the trial
court. The limiting instruction would have directed the jury to consider the
testimony regarding J. Doe’s and B. Doe’s disclosures “only for the purpose of
establishing that a complaint was made, so as to dispel any erroneous
inference that the victim was silent, but not as proof of the truth of the
content of the victim’s statement.” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 757.) The
trial court’s statements pretrial and during the prosecution’s case suggest
that the court anticipated providing such an instruction.
Carter contends that because the trial court “had been signaling
throughout trial” that it intended to give such a limiting instruction, there
can be no reasonable tactical justification for counsel’s failure to request it.
We agree that given the clear precedent for obtaining upon request a
limiting instruction on the use of fresh complaint evidence, this is not a
situation in which defense counsel might have reasonably determined that
making the request would have been futile. (Cf. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at
p. 387.)
Nevertheless, Carter has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s
failure to request the limiting instruction fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. (Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 687.) Even assuming the record on appeal discloses no rational
tactical purpose for the omission, we will not reverse a conviction for
ineffective assistance unless “there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation” for counsel’s omission. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
18
The trial record in this case contained detailed testimony by each of the
three victims as to the nature and time frame of sexual acts Carter
perpetrated on them, as well as the timing and reasons for each of their
eventual disclosures. The testimony of C.I. and L.S. corroborated B. Doe’s
testimony about the timing of her disclosures to two friends during middle
school. C.I.’s testimony further corroborated that both sisters disclosed to her
during that period. The testimony of K.R. corroborated J. Doe’s testimony
about the circumstances and timing of her disclosure about finding Carter’s
phone in the bathroom. So, too, Bennett’s testimony regarding the
circumstances of J. Doe’s disclosure and nature of the acts described by her
were consistent with J. Doe’s recounting.
Even with a limiting instruction, the jury would have been properly
able to consider that these witnesses’ testimony corroborated the timeline of
abuse testified by B. Doe and J. Doe. Defense counsel may have made the
tactical decision not to request a limiting instruction as to the fresh
complaint evidence to avoid drawing further attention to the evidence. (See,
e.g., People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 878 [concluding failure to request
limiting instruction on prior conviction was not ineffective assistance of
counsel because “counsel may have deemed it unwise to call further attention
to it”]; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 509 (Stewart) [rejecting
ineffective assistance claim where counsel may have wished to avoid
highlighting a matter “unfavorable to the defendant”]; Huggins, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 206 [deciding “counsel could have preferred not to draw the
jurors’ attention to particular comments by the prosecutor by objecting to
them”].) Moreover, the question of “whether to seek a limiting instruction is
a tactical decision properly left to defense counsel.” (People v. Griggs (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141 (Griggs).)
19
While there seems to be little doubt the trial court would have granted
a request by Carter for a limiting instruction (Evid. Code, § 355), that fact
does not preclude the possibility of reasonable defense counsel deciding that
the risk of a limiting instruction (drawing further attention to the
corroborative details of J. Doe’s and B. Doe’s disclosures) outweighed the
likely benefits such an instruction would provide. (See Griggs, supra, 110
Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.)
This explanation appears even more likely when considering that
defense counsel failed to request a limiting instruction even after the trial
court observed that the jury instructions contained no “fresh complaint
witness jury instruction.” The court’s comment to counsel took place outside
the presence of the jury, after the jury was instructed and after the
prosecutor’s closing argument, but before defense counsel’s closing argument
and jury deliberation. At that point in the proceedings, the jury had been
instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 303 that “[d]uring the trial, certain
evidence was admitted for a limited purpose” and “[y]ou may consider that
evidence only for that purpose and for no other.” Furthermore, the
prosecutor had referenced the fresh complaint testimony and its limited use
in her closing argument, reminding the jury that they “heard from three
witnesses” (C.I., L.S., and K.R.) and stating that while the jury could not use
what the sisters told their friends as “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” they
could consider the fact that the sisters told someone “close to the time it was
happening” and the circumstances in which they told.
While the jury had also been instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 200
not to treat attorney comments as the law, defense counsel could have made
the tactical decision to neither draw further attention to the evidence nor to
the potential ways it could use that evidence as corroboration for the victims’
20
testimony. (See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1053 [rejecting
ineffective assistance claim where “defense counsel might reasonably have
concluded it best if the court did not explain how the evidence could be used,”
and an instruction limiting the use of testimony “might explain how it could
be used as well as how it could not be used”].)
For these reasons, we cannot conclude on the record before us that
there simply could be no satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s failure
to request a limiting instruction under Brown regarding the fresh complaint
evidence. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) Therefore, Carter has not
demonstrated his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
do so.
Turning to the scope of the testimony, Carter contends defense counsel
was deficient for failing to object when K.R. and Bennett exceeded the scope
of permissible fresh complaint evidence under Brown. Specifically, Carter
cites K.R.’s testimony concerning not only the circumstances surrounding J.
Doe’s disclosure but “the specifics of the shower incident that [J. Doe] had
relayed to her,” including that “ ‘she noticed that her uncle’s phone was, like,
in the bathroom, set up in the bathroom when – before she got into the
shower. And . . . she thought that it was recording.’ ” Carter additionally
maintains that Bennett’s testimony “went even further in providing
impermissible details than [K.R.]’s testimony.” Specifically, Bennett testified
regarding what J. Doe told her about the nature of the abuse, stating “when
she was home alone with him, that he asked her if she wanted a lollipop and
picked her up and carried her to a room in the home and turned her around
and put his fingers in the lower part of her body. And [J. Doe] also described
a time of him setting up a phone while she was in the shower and filming
her.”
21
Under Brown, “evidence of the victim’s report or disclosure of the
alleged offense should be limited to the fact of the making of the complaint
and other circumstances material to this limited purpose.” (Brown, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 763.) The court in Brown explained that the minor victim’s
eventual disclosure of sexual assault by her mother’s boyfriend came within
the permissible “limits . . . governing the admissibility of such statements”
(id. at p. 764) because the prosecutor adduced testimony of “the context and
circumstances surrounding the disclosure” and did not “refer directly to the
incidents of molestation.” (Ibid.) The court observed that the testimony
omitted “the content of the [child’s] statements and specifically any
description of the molestation itself.” (Ibid.)
Carter argues that the details provided in each of these testimonies
exceeded the limit set by Brown because they stated not only the “ ‘fact of the
complaint’ or related circumstances, but the actual details of the offense.”
(Citing Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 755.) The Attorney General counters
that although the record on appeal does not shed light on any tactical reason
for the failure to object to the scope of testimony, the record does not preclude
a plausible, tactical reason for counsel’s alleged omission.
We need not determine whether Carter’s defense counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms because we decide Carter has not carried his burden of demonstrating
prejudice.
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Carter must
show not just that counsel’s failure “had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding, but that ‘there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
22
have been different.’ ” (In re Edward S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 387, 418
(Edward S.), quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693–694.)
Carter contends this was “a close case” because the prosecution relied
primarily upon the credibility of the three complaining witnesses and five
fresh complaint witnesses, and there were “no witnesses to the alleged
incidents, no physical evidence of abuse, and no documentary evidence to
corroborate the complaining witnesses’ testimony.” Carter asserts that other
aspects of the case also establish it was close, including the jury’s request for
readbacks of certain testimony of J. Doe, B. Doe, and A. Doe, and that the
jury acquitted Carter on count 3 (concerning the alleged recording of J. Doe in
the bathroom) and found him not guilty on counts 8, 11, and 14, but of the
lesser charges on those counts. Carter argues that, because the case was
close, defense counsel’s error undermines confidence in the jury’s guilty
verdicts, requiring reversal of his convictions.
There is general support in case law for the notion that a case that
depends almost entirely on competing witness credibility is a “close” case.
(See, e.g., Edward S., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 418; People v. Taylor
(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 622, 633–634.) Carter cites People v. Centeno (2014)
60 Cal.4th 659 for this proposition. In that case, the California Supreme
Court reversed the defendant’s conviction after a jury trial of two counts of a
lewd act on a child under the age of 14, and one misdemeanor count of
annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18, after concluding that
certain actions by the prosecutor “unduly risked misleading the jury about
the standard of proof.” (Centeno, at p. 662.) In assessing prejudice arising
from the defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misleading
conduct, our high court stated the case was “very close,” as the Attorney
General had conceded. (Id. at p. 677.) Among other factors, the court noted
23
the prosecution “depended almost entirely” on the credibility of the single
victim, who “did not voluntarily report the alleged touching,” “provided very
few corroborating details,” “repeatedly and emphatically” denied the
allegations at trial, and admitted she found many of the prosecutor’s
questions confusing. (Ibid.)
This case bears little resemblance to Centeno. Here, three victims
independently and coherently testified to a range of similar conduct by Carter
during an overlapping period of years and gave substantial corroborating
details based on where the incidents occurred, who was present in the
household, specifics of the molestation, and when and under what
circumstances each of them eventually disclosed the abuse. Considering the
totality of the evidence, the gaps in recollection and minor inconsistencies
(i.e., regarding B. Doe’s disclosure to C.I.) cited by Carter are insubstantial.
Moreover, the testimony of fresh complaint witnesses K.R. and Bennett
was relatively brief, and the details presented therein were contained in the
firsthand accounts provided by J. Doe and B. Doe. The jury “did not have to
rely on [their] secondhand statements to other people, but was able to hear
her directly and judge [their] credibility.” (Manning, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th
at p. 881.) Thus, any effect on the jury was cumulative. Further, as the jury
did not request readback of any fresh complaint testimony, there is nothing
in the record to suggest the jury placed any significant weight on that
evidence. We therefore conclude it is not reasonably probable a different
result would have been reached had Carter’s defense counsel objected to limit
the scope of the testimony. (Ibid.; see also Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1526.)
In sum, we decide that Carter has not demonstrated he received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the fresh
24
complaint evidence based on the failure to request a limiting instruction or
object to the scope of K.R.’s and Bennett’s fresh complaint testimony.
C. Preliminary Hearing Testimony
1. Additional Background
A. Doe testified about an incident when she was in the fifth grade and
Carter sent her to her aunt’s bedroom to nap. As she pretended to sleep,
Carter came into the bedroom, lay on top of her where she could feel his penis
on her backside, and rubbed himself on her from side to side. She did not
recall if his full body was on top of hers, only that she could feel his penis “on
[her] butt.” Upon additional questioning by the prosecutor, A. Doe agreed
that at the preliminary hearing, she previously testified “that [Carter’s] chest
and stomach were on [her] back and . . . his lower half was lined up with [her]
lower half.” A. Doe believed her memory as to what happened was a little
better at the preliminary hearing.
Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor sought to read into the
record the portion of A. Doe’s preliminary hearing testimony in which she
described “the defendant’s position on her body during a nap incident.” The
trial court permitted the reading, over defense counsel’s objection, as a “past
recollection recorded.”
The prosecutor read the following excerpt into the record before the
jury: “ ‘[Q.] Could you feel any part of his body on your body— [¶] [A.] Yes.
[¶] [Q.] —[W]hen he was lying on top of you? [¶] [A.] Yes. [¶] [Q.] And
what could you feel? [¶] [A.] Well, his chest and his stomach were on my
back, and the lower half of his body was on my butt. [¶] [Q.] Could you feel
anything from the lower half of his body on your butt? [¶] [A.] Yes. [¶]
[Q.] What could you feel? [¶] [A.] His penis.’ ” Defense counsel did not
reassert his objection after the prosecutor read this prior testimony.
25
2. Applicable Law
Hearsay, which may be understood as an out-of-court statement offered
for the truth of its content, “is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an
exception.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674, citing Evid. Code,
§ 1200, subd. (b).) Among the exceptions available for prior statements of
witnesses are inconsistent statements (Evid. Code, § 1235), prior consistent
statements (id., § 1236), and past recollection recorded (id., § 1237).
The past recollection recorded exception “permits evidence of a
witness’s past statement ‘if the statement would have been admissible if
made by him while testifying, the statement concerns a matter as to which
the witness has insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately, and the statement is contained in a writing which: [¶] (1)
[w]as made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing actually occurred
or was fresh in the witness’[s] memory; [¶] (2) [w]as made . . . (ii) by some
other person for the purpose of recording the witness’[s] statement at the
time it was made; [¶] (3) [i]s offered after the witness testifies that the
statement he made was a true statement of such fact; and [¶] (4) [i]s offered
after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the statement.’
(Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a).)” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 465.)
3. Analysis
Carter contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object to the admission of the portion of A. Doe’s preliminary hearing
testimony in which she stated that she “ ‘could feel [Carter’s] penis’ ” on her
butt. Although Carter does not dispute that the first part of A. Doe’s prior
testimony (concerning her uncle’s upper body position) might have satisfied
the past recollection recorded exception, he asserts the latter part of her prior
26
testimony (starting with the question whether she could “ ‘feel anything from
the lower half of [Carter’s] body?’ ”) was inadmissible.
Carter maintains that the challenged portion of the testimony is
outside the past recollection recorded exception because A. Doe’s trial
testimony shows she did not suffer “insufficient present recollection”
regarding the placement of Carter’s lower body (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd.
(a)). He further argues that even if the foundational requirements for the
exception could be met, a reasonably competent attorney would have objected
under Evidence Code section 352. Carter also contends the preliminary
hearing testimony does not come within either of the other exceptions for
prior consistent statements or for inconsistent statements (Evid. Code,
§§ 1235, 1236).
We are not persuaded that defense counsel’s failure to object
specifically to the latter portion of the preliminary hearing testimony read to
the jury fell below an objective standard of reasonableness such that there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s omission. (See Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) The trial court’s prior overruling of counsel’s
initial objection to the prosecutor’s request to introduce A. Doe’s excerpted
preliminary hearing testimony suggests the court had made its
determination that the excerpted testimony was admissible. Counsel might
have reasonably decided that further objections would be futile. (See Price,
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 387.)
In addition, defense counsel might have reasonably concluded that the
entire excerpt came within the exception for past recollection recorded, which
authorizes admission of a statement previously made under specified
conditions—all of which Carter agrees were met here—and “the statement
concerns a matter as to which the witness has insufficient present recollection
27
to enable him to testify fully and accurately.” (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a),
italics added.) A. Doe’s recollection at trial of the nap incident was not
sufficient to enable her to testify “fully” as to what had occurred, because she
could remember only generally that Carter laid on her with his penis “on
[her] butt” and not how the rest of his body was positioned. There can be no
dispute that the excerpted portion of A. Doe’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing “concern[ed]” that matter. (Ibid.) Thus, counsel might have
reasonably decided that the preliminary hearing excerpt came within the
past recollection recorded exception and any objection would have been futile.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Carter’s claim that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to object under Evidence Code section 352.
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, “[a] trial court may exclude otherwise
relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by
concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time.” (People v.
Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490 (Scott).) “Prejudice for purposes of [Evidence
Code] section 352 refers to evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 840.)
Carter contends that allowing the prosecutor to repeat the phrasing
concerning A. Doe’s ability to feel Carter’s penis while she was laying face
down on the bed was unduly prejudicial because such repetition might have
“ ‘inflame[d] the emotions of the jury’ ” and caused it to use the information
for an illegitimate purpose. (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 491.) This
argument—premised on the one-time repetition of a single phrase of
testimony regarding A. Doe’s ability to feel her uncle’s penis—is
unconvincing. The nature of the charges against Carter and detailed
testimony of the three victims about sexual conduct perpetrated by him when
they were children, including incidents involving Carter placing his penis in
28
the victim’s mouth and rubbing his body against the victim’s clothed body to
where she could feel his penis, undermine Carter’s contention that the single
repetition of A. Doe’s testimony that she could feel his penis on her was
unduly prejudicial. Given the probative value of A. Doe’s testimony that he
told her to take a nap, then entered the bedroom and laid on top of her to
where she could feel his penis, reasonable counsel may have concluded that
objecting to the repetition of the phrase about Carter’s penis on the ground of
undue prejudice was futile and would have only drawn the jury’s attention to
evidence. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 509.)
We conclude that because there is a potential, satisfactory rational
explanation for counsel’s failure to object to the last few sentences of A. Doe’s
excerpted preliminary hearing testimony, Carter’s counsel’s conduct did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonable assistance. Carter has not
carried his burden on appeal to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on this ground.5 (Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 206.)
D. Cumulative Error
Having concluded that Carter has not shown error in any of his
asserted claims, there is no prejudicial error to cumulate. (See People v.
Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 818.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
5 Carter raises other possible hearsay exceptions (for inconsistent
statements and prior consistent statements (Evid. Code, §§ 1235, 1236)) in
his appellate briefing but argues neither applies to the challenged testimony.
Because we conclude that a reasonable attorney might have determined A.
Doe’s excerpted preliminary hearing testimony was properly subject to the
exception for a past recollection recorded, we need not decide whether the
other two exceptions were inapplicable.
29
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052267
People v. Carter
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