CourtListener 10872540•People v. Styles CA5
Testo completo
Filed 6/9/26 P. v. Styles CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089077
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF114746A)
v.
RAYMOND KENNETH STYLES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David E. Wolf,
Judge.
Francine R. Tone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Anna J. Benham, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Harrell, J.
In 2007, defendant Kenneth Raymond Styles was sentenced to an aggregate term
of 201 years to life, which included 2 one-year prior prison term enhancements and four
firearm enhancements. Following enactment of Penal Code1 section 1172.75, the trial
court recalled his sentence and imposed an aggregate term of 165 years to life. All four
firearm enhancements were reimposed.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court failed to exercise informed
discretion under section 1385 when it reimposed the firearm enhancements. The People
disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
I. Charges, Verdict, and Sentence
In defendant’s direct appeal, People v. Styles (Jan. 12, 2009, F054133) [nonpub.
opn.] (Styles),2 we summarized the procedural background regarding the charges, verdict,
and sentence as follows:
“On May 1, 2007, the Kern County District Attorney filed a
consolidated second amended information in superior court charging
appellant as follows:
“Counts 1 and 2—first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5,
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)) with personal use of a firearm
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)).
“Count 3—first degree burglary (§§ 460, subd. (a), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(18)) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
“Counts 4 and 5—kidnapping (§§ 207, subd. (a), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(20)) with personal use of a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b),
12022.5, subd. (a)).
“Counts 6 and 7—false imprisonment (§ 236) with personal use of a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 On October 3, 2025, we granted defendant’s request for judicial notice of the
appellate record in Styles, supra, F054133.
2.
“Counts 8 and 9—assault with a firearm (§§ 245, subd. (a)(2),
1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
“Counts 10 and 11—first degree burglary (§§ 460, subd. (a), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(18)).
“Two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c)[–](j), 1170.12,
subds. (a)[–](e)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)),
and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, [former] subd. (b)) were alleged as to
each count.
“Jury trial commenced on May 2, 2007. On May 17, 2007,
[defendant] waived his right to a jury trial of the enhancement allegations
involving prior convictions. On the same date, the jury returned verdicts
finding [defendant] guilty of counts 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 and not guilty on
counts 2, 4, [and] 5. The jury found the personal use allegations relating to
counts 1, 6, 7, 8, and 9 to be true. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on
count 10. The trial court conducted a bifurcated hearing and found all of
the prior conviction allegations thereafter to be true.
“On October 26, 2007, the [trial] court sentenced [defendant] to a
total indeterminate term of 129 years to life and a total determinate term of
[7]2 years. On motion of the district attorney, the court dismissed count
10.” (Styles, supra, F054133, fns. omitted.)
II. Factual Summary from Styles
In, Styles, supra, F054133, our court also summarized the facts related to the
convictions. We provide that factual summary here.
“Count 11/Burglary of the Collins Residence
“[Donald C.] a resident of Harvard Drive in Bakersfield, left his
home on the afternoon of April 23, 2006. When he returned home, he
found the garage door forced open and the lock punched out. [Donald C.]
noted a number of items missing from his residence. These items included
DVD players, videocassette recorders, a television, compact disks, personal
jewelry, audio books, travel bags, an antique sewing machine, a broom, and
Chinese zodiac figurines. [Donald C.] said he did not know [defendant] or
give him permission to enter his home.
“On April 24, 2006, Bakersfield Police Officer Lynn Martinez found
a beer mug in a bedroom of … [Donald C.’s] residence and dusted it for
fingerprints. One of the prints matched [defendant’s] left index finger.
3.
Bakersfield Police Detective Glen Anderson interviewed [defendant] in
custody on May 15, 2006. [Defendant] waived his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and told Anderson he had been staying with
[E.Z.] and [C.Z.] on Cottonwood Road in Bakersfield. [Defendant] told
the detective, ‘I am not innocent.’ As to the fingerprints in the [Donald C.]
home, [defendant] said, ‘ “It just can’t be. It must be a mistake.” ’
“Anderson went to [E.Z. and C.Z.’s] apartment and searched a
bedroom that he thought belonged to [defendant]. Anderson located a Tom
Clancy CD-audio book inside that room and Chinese zodiac figurines in the
living room of the apartment. [Donald C.] later identified these items as his
property.
“Counts 1[through]9/Robbery of the [E.] Household
“On May 13, 2006, [Patricia E.] and her son lived on Panorama
Drive in Bakersfield. At 9:00 a.m. two young men pounded on their front
door and demanded entry. [Patricia E.] opened the door and saw a
Caucasian male and a Hispanic male. The White male grabbed her arms
and demanded to know the location of money. He also pointed a gun in her
face. [Patricia E.] went to the dining room and pulled out a bag containing
$12,000 in cash. The Hispanic male put the cash in a backpack.
“[Patricia E.’s] son was in a pool room near the garage of the
residence. The son was age 46 and suffered from Down [s]yndrome. The
White male went to the pool room and brought [Joe E.] to the dining room.
[Patricia E.] gave the Hispanic male her Seiko watch and the White male
pulled the wedding ring from her swollen finger. The Hispanic male then
tied her up with a sheet and the White male took her car keys. The two
assailants ran out the front door. [Joe E.] untied his mother and she called
the police.
“After police arrived at the scene, [Patricia E.] gave them a
description of the two suspects. A police artist prepared a drawing of the
White male suspect but [Patricia E.] said it was only 60 percent accurate.
Kern County Deputy Sheriff Dean Marshall compiled a photographic
lineup of six men that included a picture of [defendant]. On May 18, 2006,
he showed the photographic lineup to [Patricia E.] and she identified
[defendant’s] picture as that of the White male suspect. She subsequently
identified [defendant] in court as the White male suspect.
“Sometime after the robbery, law enforcement officers returned a
watch and wedding ring to [Patricia E.] and she identified them as property
that had been taken in the robbery. On May 15, 2006, [defendant’s] parole
4.
agent placed him under arrest. The agent searched [defendant’s] room in an
apartment he shared with several other people. The agent recovered
marijuana and a pipe from [defendant’s] room. While the agent placed
[defendant] under arrest, [defendant] gave a watch to his fellow resident,
[C.Z.]
“[R.S.] knew [defendant] and his apartment mates, [C.Z.] and
[E.Z.]. [R.S.] saw [defendant] on May 13, 2006. He seemed to be in a
hurry and gave her a ring to sell. [R.S.] sold the ring to a local jeweler for
$480 in cash. Sometime later, police officers contacted [R.S.] about the
ring and she took them to the jewelry store where she had made the sale.
At that point, the jeweler had already dismantled the ring she sold to him.
“On May 17, 2006, [defendant] was in court, contacted a deputy
sheriff, and told him he wanted to speak privately with him. [Defendant]
told the deputy he wanted leniency and that he had information about a
recent home invasion robbery. The deputy told him the information would
have to be unique because the crime had been reported in the news.
[Defendant] told the deputy the victim was a woman with a ‘retarded son’
and the suspects used a bed sheet to tie up the woman. [Defendant] also
told the deputy the suspects were a Hispanic man named Manuel and
Manuel’s brother-in-law, a White male. [Defendant] also reported that both
suspects were armed with .45-caliber semiautomatic handguns.
[Defendant] also said the two men took a wedding ring off of the woman’s
finger and $15,000 cash during the robbery. Upon questioning by the
deputy, [defendant] said he had been at a ‘drug party’ when Manuel told
him about the robbery.” (Styles, supra, F054133.)
III. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.75
Defendant filed multiple sentencing statements prior to the resentencing hearing.
Defendant asserted he participated in rehabilitative activities, and he submitted evidence
in support of this assertion. Pursuant to section 1385, he asked the court to strike all prior
serious felony enhancements and all but one of the firearm enhancements. He also asked
the court to strike one of his prior strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The prosecutor did not file a response.
The trial court held the resentencing hearing on December 13, 2024. At the
hearing, defendant asked the court to strike both of his prior strike convictions, all but
one of the firearm enhancements, and all prior serious felony enhancements. The
5.
prosecutor conceded that the court should strike the now-invalid prior prison term
enhancements, but he argued the court should otherwise reimpose the same sentence.
The trial court ruled as follows:
“[D]efendant I don’t think is the same person he was back at the
time this crime as committed. This was 2006. But in 2006, the crime he
committed was luckily, you know, … no injuries, but the terror and
tra[u]ma suffered by the older mother and her 46-year-old son being taken
around the house at gunpoint, you know, very horrific. I don’t have any
additional information from them, but I can’t imagine the amount of
tra[u]ma that caused them, and they could still be suffering from that. And
as the [prosecutor] pointed out, … defendant was 40 years old when he
decided to terrorize this older woman and her son. There were two males,
armed with at least one firearm that got stuck in the woman’s face, and they
went around robbery [sic] her. So a very, very, serious crime. His rap
sheet is not good as everybody knows. It looks like it starts in 1986, and
unfortunately it starts with drugs. And I’m concerned that as recently a[s]
six years ago he’s got drug paraphernalia. That does seem to cause a lot of
problems with future violence in crime and theft crimes, but I’ll come back
to that in a minute. 1986, he’s got a false identification to a police officer
and fighting in public. 1986, it looks he goes to prison for a [health and
safety code section] 11377[, subdivision] (a). I'm going to give that very
little weight. It is currently a misdemeanor. It would not be a prison
sentence, but it does seem to indicate the problem with narcotics…. It
does look like in 1989, he violated his parole. It appears he had a parole
violation in 1990. 1992, a parole violation, and he gets convicted of a
[section] 245 [, subdivision] (a)(2) assault firearm on a person [sic] in San
Bernardino and went prison for three years. He didn’t do three years
because in 1994 he’s got violation of parole. 1995, he’s got a misdemeanor
battery out of San Bernardino. And in 1995, he’s got … another parole
violation. 1989, he's convicted of a robbery. 1997, a parole violation.
1998, a parole violation. 1998, five years prison on a robbery…. 2002,
he’s got a [vehicle code section] 10851. 2004, another … violation [of]
parole. 2005, another violation of parole…. [¶]…[¶]
“… With regards to [c]ount 1, Penal Code [s]ection 212.5[, subdivision]
(a), I’m going to deny the request for Romero. I do believe the seriousness
of the crime charged and his criminal record doesn’t merit a grant of
Romero. Although I did give it consideration given the amount of progress
he made since, but I’ll come back to that again in a moment. Probation is
denied. [D]efendant is sentenced to the Department of Corrections for the
6.
term prescribed by law of 2[5] years to life. I will enhance that by 10 years
pursuant to [section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (b) of the Penal Code. I'm
doing that because you had an elderly woman and her Down syndrome son
having a gun stuck in their face, two separate victims, and I think that
is … horrific conduct that should not be ignored and is not mitigated by the
efforts, but, again, I’ll come back to that. That will be enhanced by 10
years pursuant to [section] 12022.5[, subdivision] (a). That enhancement
will be stayed pursuant to 654 of the Penal Code until successful
completion of the sentence above and then permanently thereafter. When it
comes to the [section] 667[, subdivision] (a)s, those are the same priors as
the Romero, same conduct. And as [defense counsel] pointed out, there
was some time. I’m going, over the [prosecutor’s] objection, going to
strike the additional 10 years…. As I mentioned, [defendant] has made
significant strides to improve himself[,] and Legislature [sic] does indicate
that I need to give that great weight, and I’m doing so. That will reduce his
sentence by 10 years. [¶]…[¶]
“ … Count 6, term prescribe[d] by law [of] 25 years to life[,] enhanced by
10 years pursuant [to section] 12022.5[, subdivision] (a) of the Penal Code.
That is served consecutive to the sentence imposed in
[c]ount 1…. Count 7, probation is denied. [D]efendant is sentenced to the
Department of Corrections for 25 years to life[,] enhanced by 10 [years]
pursuant to [section] 12022.5[, subdivision] (a)[,] consecutive to the
sentence imposed in [c]ount 6…. Count 9, a [section] 245[, subdivision]
(a)(2) with two strike priors. Probation is denied. [D]efendant is sentenced
to the Department of Corrections for the term prescribed by … law [of] 25
years to life[,] enhanced by 10 years under 1202.25 (a) [sic]. Striking the
10 years under [section] 667[, subdivision] (a). Said sentenced serve
consecutive [sic]to the sentence imposed in [c]ount 7…. Count 11, a
[section] 465[, subdivision] (a) with two strike priors. Probation is denied.
[D]efendant is sentenced to 25 years to life …. The second enhancement of
10 years is stricken[,] consecutive to [c]ount 9.”
The court also struck the prior prison term enhancements and stayed the sentences
on counts 3 and 8 pursuant to section 654. Ultimately, defendant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 165 years to life.
IV. Current Appeal
On December 17, 2024, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, he
argues that the trial court failed to exercise informed discretion under section 1385 when
it reimposed the firearm enhancements.
7.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.75
The Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2020, which amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit prior prison term
enhancements to sexually violent offenses as defined in the Welfare and Institutions
Code. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; § 667.5, subd. (b); People v. Lopez (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 337, 340–341.) The Legislature subsequently passed Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which made this change retroactive by adding section 1171.1
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), which was later renumbered as section 1172.75
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).
Under section 1172.75, “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Once a trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current
judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, it “shall
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) When resentencing
the defendant, the court “may consider postconviction factors” (id., subd. (d)(3)), and
“shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing” (id., subd. (d)(2)).
II. The Record Shows the Trial Court Exercised Informed Discretion
A. Legal Standards
On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) went into effect,
amending section 1385 “to specify factors that the trial court must consider when
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deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), provides: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” As
relevant here, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) provides that, when “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case,” “all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.”
“[A]bsent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a [trial] court
must assign significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present. In practice, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the
enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1038.)
Trial courts have discretion, pursuant to section 1385, to dismiss firearm
enhancements imposed under sections 12022.53 and 12022.5. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (h),
12022.5, subd. (c).)
9.
B. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza).) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless
its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) Additionally, “an abuse of discretion
arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors [citation] or on an
incorrect legal standard.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) Finally,
“[w]hen being sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court exercising
informed discretion. [Citation.] A court acting while unaware of the scope of its
discretion is understood to have abused it.” (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688,
694.)
C. Analysis
According to defendant, the trial court failed to exercise informed discretion under
section 1385 when it reimposed the firearm enhancements. Even assuming this claim
was not forfeited, it fails on the merits. The record shows that the trial court was aware
of, and exercised, its discretion in this regard.
As defendant admits, he placed the issue directly before the trial court. In his
sentencing brief filed on December 5, 2023, he asked the court to dismiss all but one
firearm enhancement pursuant to section 1385. He reiterated this request at the
resentencing hearing. And, at the hearing, the court stated it considered the December 5,
2023 sentencing brief and ultimately addressed this request. Prior to imposing the
sentence, the court stated: “[Defendant’s] rap sheet is not good as everybody knows. It
looks like it starts in 1986, and unfortunately it starts with drugs. And I’m concerned that
as recently [as] six years ago he’s got drug paraphernalia. That does seem to cause a lot
of problems with future violence in crime and theft crimes, but I’ll come back to that in a
minute.” Then, right after imposing the firearm enhancement on count 1, the court
10.
explained: “I’m doing that because you had an elderly woman and her Down syndrome
son having a gun stuck in their face, two separate victims, and I think that is … horrific
conduct that should not be ignored and is not mitigated by the efforts, but, again, I’ll
come back to that.”
Thus, the trial court explicitly considered defendant’s future dangerousness, a key
inquiry when deciding whether to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385.
(See People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 227–231.) The trial court also
appears to have explained why it was otherwise not in the interest of justice to dismiss the
firearm enhancements.3
In sum, the issue was placed squarely before the court and the court conducted an
individualized analysis. Therefore, the record demonstrates the court exercised informed
discretion when it declined to strike the firearm enhancements.4
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. According to
defendant, the trial court erred by relying on section 654 to stay the section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) firearm enhancement attached to count 1, rather than relying on
3 It is not clear that the trial court ever continued its future dangerousness analysis
or its interest of justice analysis, as it said it would. However, to the extent defendant is
arguing that the trial court should have articulated additional reasoning on the record, that
claim is forfeited. (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406 [“ ‘A party in a criminal
case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make
or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not object to the
sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in which the stated reasons
allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly
erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various
factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” ’ ”].)
4 Even if the record were ambiguous, the result would be the same. “[T]o the extent
the record is ambiguous, the court is presumed to have properly performed its official
functions in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Under that presumption, the court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” (People v. Barber
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 814; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361
[“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law’ ”].)
11.
section 12022.53, subdivision (f). According to defendant, this shows “that the firearm
enhancements were treated in a mechanical fashion rather than through [an]
individualized, discretionary analysis.” While defendant appears to be correct that the
court relied on the wrong section when it stayed the enhancement (see People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1123, fn. 5), this does not in any way show the court
did not understand or utilize its discretion when considering whether to dismiss the
firearm enhancements.
Defendant also notes that the trial court stated it felt “somewhat in the dark
compared to … a trial [j]udge,” and that it “[did] not have all the trial information.”
According to defendant, “that acknowledgment underscores the absence of a reasoned,
enhancement-specific discretionary analysis[.]” We disagree. The fact that the court
acknowledged it would have had more information if it had conducted the trial does not
in any way show that it did not understand or utilize its discretion when considering
whether to dismiss the firearm enhancements.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to exercise informed
discretion when it reimposed the firearm enhancements fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
12.
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