People v. Dunlap CA2/3

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Filed 6/8/26 P. v. Dunlap CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B344075

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA099666)
v.

ANTHONY TERRELL DUNLAP,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
Owen P. Martikan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Julie A. Harris and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury found Anthony Terrell Dunlap guilty of five counts
of second degree robbery based on two separate incidents at
Macy’s stores. The trial court denied Dunlap’s pretrial motion for
mental health diversion. The court found Dunlap ineligible for
diversion after concluding the prosecution rebutted the statutory
presumption that Dunlap’s qualifying mental disorders were a
significant factor in his commission of the offenses. (Pen. Code,
§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)1 On appeal, Dunlap contends the
evidence was insufficient to support this determination. He also
asserts the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of grand theft as to three of the five
counts.
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s finding that Dunlap is ineligible for diversion under
section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2). We also conclude the trial
court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of theft. We therefore affirm the order and
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case concerns two separate incidents during which
Dunlap stole fragrances from Macy’s stores and assaulted and
threatened store loss prevention officers. The first took place on
January 12, 2023, in Santa Clarita, and the second on March 14,
2023, in Northridge. The cases were consolidated, and the People

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
charged Dunlap with five counts of second degree robbery in
violation of section 211.2
The jury found Dunlap guilty of all five counts. The trial
court sentenced Dunlap to a total prison term of six years. The
court suspended execution of the sentence and placed Dunlap on
five years of formal probation. At Dunlap’s request, the court
ordered as a condition of probation that he complete a two-year
residential drug and alcohol treatment program.
Dunlap timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Mental Health Diversion
A. Background
In May 2024, Dunlap, through counsel, filed a motion for
mental health diversion in which he stated he consented to
diversion and agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion.3 He attached a conditional acceptance to a residential
treatment program for drugs and alcohol.
Dunlap submitted a psychological assessment in support of
the motion. In the assessment, a psychologist diagnosed him
with opioid use disorder, stimulant use disorder—cocaine type,
unspecified schizophrenia spectrum/other psychotic disorder, and

2 The operative first amended information alleged two counts
(counts 1 & 2) as to the Santa Clarita incident and three counts
(counts 3 to 5) as to the Northridge incident.
3 On November 4, 2024, the trial court granted Dunlap’s
request to proceed in propria persona. On December 3, 2024,
after empaneling the jury but before testimony began, Dunlap
requested reappointment of counsel. The trial court appointed
counsel.

3
major depressive disorder. The psychologist noted that Dunlap
was 34 years old with no history of psychiatric hospitalization,
counseling, or a previous mental disorder diagnosis.
The psychologist opined that Dunlap’s mental disorders
played a significant role in his offenses. The psychologist stated
that because of Dunlap’s “multiple disorders including Major
Depression and Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum/Other
Psychotic Disorder,” his “capacity for impulse control would
already be compromised.” The psychologist further explained
that “the concurrent use of Opioid and [stimulants] at the time of
the offenses likely significantly impaired his judgment and
decision-making abilities. Substance use can magnify the
symptoms of depression and psychosis, potentially leading to
disorganized thinking, emotional instability, and erratic
behavior, all of which may have been influential factors in his
criminal conduct.” The psychologist also opined that Dunlap’s
symptoms “could respond to mental health treatment,” and, as
the title of a heading, wrote: “5. The defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion.”
Dunlap submitted a probation pre-conviction report with
his motion. The report described Dunlap’s January 12, 2023
robbery at a Macy’s store in Santa Clarita. In that incident, a
loss prevention officer saw Dunlap placing multiple boxes of
fragrances and a Coach beanie into a black trash bag. When
Dunlap left the store without paying, the officer confronted him
and identified himself. Dunlap dropped the bag and began
reaching inside, and a second loss prevention officer grabbed
Dunlap’s arm. Dunlap said he was going to grab his phone, so
the officer let his arm go, and Dunlap began walking away from
the officers while rummaging through the bag. A loss prevention

4
officer again tried to grab Dunlap’s arm. Dunlap dropped the bag
and swung his arm towards the officer, causing the officer’s hat to
fall. He began “pushing” the officer’s face. A different loss
prevention officer grabbed Dunlap’s other arm. Dunlap struggled
to get away and yelled, “ ‘Get em!’ ” Dunlap was yelling towards
a vehicle with Florida license plates, which was parked at the
front curb of the store. A loss prevention officer approached and
photographed the car’s license plate. The car sped away. The
officers handcuffed Dunlap and recovered the black trash bag,
which contained “numerous unpaid items valuing approximately
$3,780.” Dunlap told law enforcement he had planned to resell
“the perfume” to obtain money to purchase a house.
Dunlap also included police reports from the Northridge
Macy’s incident and from a recent arrest at a Macy’s in Pasadena.
As detailed in one report, on March 14, 2023, Dunlap went to a
Macy’s in Northridge. Around 12:00 p.m., a loss prevention
officer, Michael Yalogo Rubio, observed a man, later identified as
Dunlap, and a woman, later identified as Dernesha Gregoire, in
the store’s perfume section. Rubio notified two other loss
prevention officers. Dunlap and Gregoire left the perfume area
without taking anything. They returned approximately 15
minutes later carrying large bags. The loss prevention officers
watched as they put perfumes in the bags. When Dunlap and
Gregoire walked out of the store without paying, Rubio identified
himself as a loss prevention officer and said he needed to talk to
them about the items in the bags. Dunlap replied, “ ‘Fuck you,
let us go or I’m gonna pop you.’ ” Dunlap and Gregoire began to
“assault” Rubio. The other two loss prevention officers pulled
Dunlap off Rubio. While they were attempting to take Dunlap
into custody, he “produced a black metallic object from his

5
pocket.” The loss prevention officers “disengaged,” fearing it was
a weapon. Dunlap and Gregoire left the location with some of the
merchandise.
A responding Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
officer reviewed a security video of the incident. The video
showed Dunlap and Gregoire returning to the store with empty
bags, which they filled with perfumes. The video also showed
Dunlap and Gregoire leaving the store, Rubio confronting them,
and Dunlap and Gregoire “punching and scratching Rubio.” The
two other loss prevention officers “rushed to help.” Dunlap then
produced a “black object from his pocket,” and the loss prevention
officers disengaged. Dunlap and Gregoire left the store with
some of the property they had already taken. Rubio saw Dunlap
and Gregoire drive away in a vehicle with a Florida license plate.
LAPD officers observed “vandalized property at [the] scene
that was destroyed while attempting to take the suspects into
custody.” Rubio told the LAPD officers that Dunlap struck the
back of his head, but he did not have any visible injuries. The
other two loss prevention officers had visible injuries.
Later the same day, Dunlap and Gregoire were arrested for
robbery and mayhem at a Macy’s in Pasadena. According to the
police report, loss prevention officers saw Dunlap and Gregoire
gathering boxes of fragrances in their arms. Gregoire also placed
fragrances in two plastic bags. When a loss prevention officer
approached them, they ran outside the store. Three officers
circled Dunlap and told him to drop the items. He refused and
pushed the officers with his elbows, trying to escape, and dropped
the merchandise. Dunlap hit all three officers, approximately
five times each, as they attempted to handcuff him. Meanwhile,
Gregoire had run to an idling vehicle with a Florida license plate,

6
but she returned when she saw Dunlap struggling with the
officers and began assaulting an officer. Both Dunlap and
Gregoire bit one of the officers.
Pasadena police officers arrived. They arrested Dunlap
and Gregoire on robbery (§ 211) and mayhem (§ 203) charges.
Law enforcement recovered 35 packages of fragrances outside the
store, totaling almost $4,500. During the struggle, all three
officers sustained bite marks and other injuries. One also had a
“slightly torn” and bleeding ear.
The Pasadena police report stated that Dunlap and
Gregoire “work together in an organized theft ring.” Both had
outstanding warrants for prior thefts. The report further noted
that Dunlap and Gregoire used the same car in the Northridge
and Pasadena incidents, a rental car with Florida license plates.
In a written opposition to the motion, the prosecution
argued Dunlap was a member of an “organized retail theft ring,”
the charged offenses were part of a “crime spree,” and theft was
Dunlap’s “livelihood.” The prosecution asserted that Dunlap’s
mental disorders were not a significant factor in the charged
crimes. The opposition argued the crimes were “pre-planned,
organized, and somewhat sophisticated,” noting there were
similar facts in the two charged incidents and cases pending in
Pasadena and the Antelope Valley. However, the opposition did
not offer any evidence about the Antelope Valley incident.4 The

4 As in other proceedings, in mental health diversion cases,
“argument by counsel ‘is not evidence in the case and cannot be
relied upon to support the trial court’s order.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 491, 492 (Harlow)
[prosecution offered no evidence about prior conduct so it could
not rebut statutory presumption].)

7
prosecution further contended that Dunlap had actively
attempted to avoid detection by engaging in three of the crimes
far from the Antelope Valley, where Dunlap lived and already
had a pending criminal case.
In June 2024, the trial court denied Dunlap’s motion
without prejudice. The court recognized that Dunlap’s diagnosis
created a presumption that his mental disorders were a
significant contributing factor in the commission of the charged
offenses, under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2). However, it
found clear and convincing evidence rebutted the statutory
presumption. The court concluded that the Santa Clarita,
Northridge, and Pasadena robberies were specific, planned acts.
The court reasoned that the incidents involved casing stores,
targeting “large amounts of fragrances,” the use of a bag as a
“tool,” and Dunlap’s coordination with another person.5 The
court also stated that it was hard to “take a leap as to what the
relationship is between the mental illness and the crime that was
committed. Here, I think, because I have the description of three
separate incidents, I feel that is clear and convincing evidence in
this court’s mind that reflects that presumption.” The court thus
found Dunlap ineligible for diversion.
On November 15, 2024, Dunlap, now representing himself,
made an oral motion for reconsideration of his motion for

5 There is evidence that Dunlap looked at the fragrance
section of the Northridge store before returning with a bag. The
probation report, which was the only source of evidence regarding
the Santa Clarita robbery before the trial court when deciding
the motion for diversion, does not provide any indication of casing
at the Santa Clarita store. The police report regarding the
Pasadena store incident also does not provide details suggestive
of casing.

8
diversion. On November 25, the trial court reheard and again
denied Dunlap’s motion. The court stated that it had previously
agreed to deny the motion without prejudice in the event there
was new information about the “manner in which the crime was
committed” that might change the outcome as to the nexus
between Dunlap’s mental health and the crimes. Dunlap replied
by informing the court of his participation in substance abuse
treatment and other programs while in jail. He also said that he
had undergone a new psychological evaluation and would soon
receive the results. The court found that this did not change “the
facts of the way this happened, and that was the basis [on] which
the court denied the motion.”
B. Applicable legal principles and standard of
review
Section 1001.36 provides in relevant part: “(b) A defendant
is eligible for pretrial diversion pursuant to this section if both of
the following criteria are met: [¶] (1) The defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder . . . [¶] (2) The defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a
mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.”
To determine whether a defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense, “[a]
court may consider any relevant and credible evidence, including,
but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health

9
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
If a defendant meets the eligibility requirements in
subdivision (b), then the court must determine if the defendant is
suitable for diversion as set forth in section 1001.36,
subdivision (c). A defendant is suitable for diversion if four
criteria are met: “(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health
expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing,
contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment”; “(2) The defendant consents
to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial”;
“(3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a
condition of diversion”; and “(4) The defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
In addition, a trial court must also be “satisfied that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment
needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).)
Finally, “even where defendants make a prima facie
showing that they meet all the express statutory requirements,
the court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion.
[Citations.] But this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised
‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing
law.” ’ [Citations.] That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of
the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual

10
and the community.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 882, 892–893.)
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health
diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual
findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) “A court abuses its
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (People v. Moine
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
“[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-
established principles governing review for sufficiency of the
evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996; accord,
Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688.)
C. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that the statutory presumption was
rebutted
We disagree with Dunlap’s contention that the record
lacked “substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that petitioner’s mental

11
disorder ‘was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)” (Lacour v. Superior Court
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 402 (Lacour).)
It is undisputed that Dunlap met the eligibility
requirements in section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1), relating to a
diagnosis of a qualifying mental disorder. Regarding the second
eligibility factor, Dunlap’s psychologist concluded that his mental
disorders “may have been influential factors in his criminal
conduct,” citing his “compromised” “capacity for impulse control,”
and his impaired judgment and decision-making abilities due to
his use of substances. She further opined that Dunlap’s
substance use and mental disorders together would have caused
“disorganized thinking, emotional instability, and erratic
behavior . . . .”
The statutory presumption was thus triggered, requiring
the trial court to find that Dunlap’s mental disorders were a
significant factor in the commission of the offenses. To overcome
this presumption, the People were required to produce clear and
convincing evidence that Dunlap’s mental disorders were not a
motivating, causal, or contributing factor in his commission of the
offenses. The People produced such evidence in this case.
Dunlap and at least one other person targeted three different
Macy’s stores, took a specific type of item, and used the same
getaway car which had out-of-state license plates. Even though
there was no evidence to indicate how much of the advance
planning Dunlap personally did, his participation in multiple
incidents using the same modus operandi could reasonably be
interpreted as showing organized thinking, a lack of impulsivity,
and control over his behavior.

12
This was sufficient to establish that it was highly likely
Dunlap’s mental disorders were not a factor in the crimes.
(Harlow, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.) The facts of these
sequential crimes directly refuted the evidence that Dunlap’s
mental disorders caused him to have disorganized thinking,
emotional instability, or erratic behavior, which caused,
motivated, or contributed to his involvement in the offenses.
Instead, the trial court could reasonably view Dunlap’s actions as
methodical, organized, and highly rational conduct. This was
clear and convincing evidence that permitted the trial court to
conclude that Dunlap had engaged in a considered pattern of
conduct with distinct financial aims.
This case is thus unlike Lacour, in which the trial court’s
ruling denying mental health diversion was based on the absence
of evidence that the defendant’s mental disorder was a factor in
the commission of the offense. (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th
at p. 404.) The trial court here permissibly relied on the evidence
delineating the probable manifestations of Dunlap’s mental
disorders on his behavior and evidence regarding the crimes,
which was inconsistent with the description of how the mental
disorders could be anticipated to affect Dunlap. The evidence
that Dunlap went to different branches of a particular store on
three separate occasions, targeted a specific high-value object,
coordinated with another person in a getaway car with out-of-
state license plates, and had a plan to resell the stolen items,
rebutted the claim that impaired judgment, disorganized
thinking, emotional instability, or erratic behavior played a role
in Dunlap’s commission of the crimes. The trial court could
reasonably conclude it was highly probable Dunlap’s mental
disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in

13
his commission of the charged offenses. The court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion.
II. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support a Theft
Instruction on Counts 3 to 5
Dunlap also contends that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on theft as a lesser included offense on counts 3
to 5, regarding the incident at the Northridge Macy’s. We
disagree.
A. Background
The evidence at trial was largely consistent with the facts
we have detailed above. At trial, Rubio testified that when
Dunlap and Gregoire left the Northridge store without paying for
the items they had put into bags, Rubio approached, identified
himself, and said that he needed to speak with them about the
merchandise they had. The loss prevention officers told Dunlap
and Gregoire that they needed to return to “do paperwork in the
office,” but they “tried to get away,” so the officers attempted to
handcuff them. When Rubio brought Gregoire inside the store,
she tried to run away and slapped and bit him. Security officer
Austin Barry “brought [Dunlap] inside the store by reasonable
force.” Security officer Ronnie Ogassian was “kind of sitting
back” while Barry “made contact with” Dunlap.
Barry tried to de-escalate the situation by telling Dunlap
that they only needed to do paperwork. Barry eventually became
“exhausted” trying to handcuff Dunlap and let him go. Dunlap
pulled out an object without saying anything. Barry believed the
object was a weapon, so he retreated. Barry then “realized it
wasn’t” a weapon, but by then, Dunlap had “charged” at Rubio, so
Barry tried to pull him off. Barry testified that he thought the
object was a pair of sunglasses.

14
Rubio had just handcuffed Gregoire’s left wrist when
Dunlap, now free, struck Rubio in the back of his head with his
fist. Dunlap also used an eight-foot metal sign to hit Rubio in the
back and on his head. Barry and Ogassian tried to pull Dunlap
off Rubio. During the struggle, Dunlap punched Barry, Barry fell
to the floor, and Dunlap kicked Barry as he tried to get up. While
Dunlap hit Rubio with the metal sign, Rubio removed Gregoire’s
handcuffs and then told her and Dunlap to leave.
Rubio testified that, at that point, Dunlap pulled out a
black object and said something like he was going to “cap us” or
“pop you.” Dunlap was “trying to get more physical,” and he also
threatened Barry and Ogassian with the sign.
Dunlap “grabbed” Gregoire and left, first picking up some
of the perfumes.6 Rubio told them not to take the unpaid-for
items. Dunlap and Gregoire continued exchanging words with
the security officers. Dunlap “made more threats,” then walked
off. Dunlap and Gregoire took over 10 packages of perfume.
Rubio saw them leave in a car with Florida license plates.
Barry and Ogassian had marks and scrapes on their bodies.
Rubio had bumps and bruises on the back of his head and back.
Glass fixtures inside the store were broken. The incident was
captured on surveillance video.
At trial, defense counsel requested a grand theft instruction
as to counts 3 to 5. Counsel argued that during the Northridge
incident, Dunlap used force not to obtain the stolen property but
“in response to a physical assault by un uniformed [sic]
individuals.” The trial court denied the instruction, finding no

6 Rubio testified that during the struggle, some of the
unpaid-for merchandise was inside the store and some was
outside. Barry testified that all of the merchandise was outside.

15
evidence that Dunlap was “simply trying to break away” from the
loss prevention officers’ use of force, such that Dunlap’s use of
force was independent from his taking of the property.
B. Applicable legal principles and standard of
review
Theft is the felonious taking of another’s personal property.
(§ 484, subd. (a); see also § 487, subd. (a) [grand theft is taking
property over $950].) “Robbery is defined as ‘the felonious taking
of personal property in the possession of another, from his person
or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear.’ (Pen. Code, § 211.) . . . In California, ‘[t]he
crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time
of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative
safety.’ [Citation.] It thus is robbery when the property was
peacefully acquired, but force or fear was used to carry it away.”
(People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994.) The defendant’s
intent to take the property must occur before the use of force.
(Id. at p. 995; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055–
1056.) “Theft is a lesser and necessarily included offense in
robbery . . . .” (People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351.)
“[A] trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is
substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v.
Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 104.) “Substantial evidence in this
context is that which a reasonable jury could find persuasive.
[Citation.] In deciding whether there exists sufficient evidence to
support a requested instruction, trial courts should resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. [Citation.] However, speculation

16
is not evidence and will not warrant the giving of an instruction
on a lesser included offense.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘On appeal, we review independently the question
whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser
included offense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th
513, 538.) “[I]n doing so we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant.” (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
C. Evidence of theft
Dunlap argues there was evidence suggesting he had
abandoned any intent to steal when he used force. He relies on
evidence that he was not holding the stolen merchandise during
his use of force, and that he fought the loss prevention officers to
free himself and Gregoire. We conclude this evidence was
insufficient to warrant a theft instruction.
It is undisputed that Dunlap exited the store with items he
had not purchased before the loss prevention officers stopped
him. The officers forced him inside after he refused to return. As
Barry struggled to handcuff Dunlap, Barry became exhausted
and released him. Dunlap then used force on both Barry and
Rubio. As Dunlap hit Rubio with the sign, Rubio released
Gregoire. Rubio told them to leave, and Dunlap pulled out a
black object, verbally threatened the officers, and also threatened
all three officers with the sign. After Rubio again told them to
leave but not to take the merchandise, Dunlap made some kind of
threat and walked away after retrieving some of the stolen items.
The evidence established that Dunlap formed an intent to
steal the property, left the store with it, then used force to remain
in possession of it, even if also to free himself and Gregoire, only
dropping it briefly as he used force. Dunlap argues he used force

17
to free Gregoire and responded to the officers’ use of force. The
record supports this. But there is no evidence that he acted solely
in self-defense, or to free her, and not to effectuate the robbery.
We measure his intent over the course of the robbery. A
“ ‘[d]efendant’s guilt is not to be weighed at each step of the
robbery as it unfolds. The events constituting the crime of
robbery, although they may extend over large distances and take
some time to complete, are linked by a single-mindedness of
purpose. [Citation.]’ ” (Miller v. Superior Court (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 216, 223, quoting People v. Estes (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 23, 28 (Estes); accord, People v. Carrasco (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059.) Here, there was evidence that Dunlap
intended to steal before his use of force and fear and still
intended to do so afterwards.
Dunlap relies on People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61,
68 (Pham) for the proposition that “[i]f defendant truly
abandoned the victims’ property before using force, then, of
course he could be guilty of theft, but not of an Estes-type
robbery.” Dunlap appears to urge us to conclude that he
abandoned his intent to steal simply because he dropped the
stolen items. However, “[t]here was nothing more than sheer
speculation to support the scenario now advanced by [Dunlap]
that the idea of taking [or re-taking Macy’s] property did not
arise until after” his use of force and threats to the security
officers. (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 277.) There is no
evidence that Dunlap, having initially left without paying for the
goods, abandoned this intent during his use of force, only to
regain it moments later.
That Dunlap did not retain continuous possession of the
items does not, by itself, establish abandonment. In Pham, John

18
Guevara discovered the defendant removing objects through the
trunk of Guevara’s car. (Pham, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.)
As Guevara approached, the defendant fled with a bag of items.
(Ibid.) Guevara caught the defendant by his shirt. (Ibid.) The
defendant dropped the bag and punched Guevara several times.
(Ibid.) Steve Oravec, who was with Guevara, caught up and
grabbed the defendant. (Ibid.) The defendant continued to
struggle, kicking, punching, biting, and kneeing Guevara and
Oravec. (Ibid.) Guevara and Oravec eventually “subdued” the
defendant until the police arrived. (Ibid.) Inside the bag, the
police found items belonging to Guevara and Oravec that had
been in Guevara’s car. (Ibid.)
The defendant in Pham made an argument related to the
one Dunlap asserts here. The defendant argued there was
insufficient evidence he took property using force or fear, pointing
to the “undisputed evidence showing that he [had] dropped the
stolen goods just as [the victim] apprehended him and that he
never touched the bag again.” (Pham, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 64–65.) The Pham court rejected this contention, observing
that “[a] very slight movement is sufficient for asportation
[citation], and there is no requirement that the robber have
manual possession of the property.” (Id. at p. 65.) The court
reasoned that “the asportation or carrying away of the property
occurred when defendant removed the victims’ property from
Guevara’s car and began to flee. The asportation continued while
defendant struggled with the victims and prevented them from
immediately recovering their goods.” (Ibid.)
Here, Dunlap’s “possession and asportation of the victims’
property began when [the] defendant started to walk away from
[the store] with the loot and continued throughout the time [the]

19
defendant forcibly resisted the victims’ attempts to take back
their property.” (Pham, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)
There was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably
conclude he abandoned the property and then only used force to
escape, rather than concluding he used force to escape with the
property. As in Pham, Dunlap’s use of force was in an attempt to
escape with the stolen items. “The use of force or fear to escape
or otherwise retain even temporary possession of the property
constitutes robbery.” (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766,
772; see also Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 27.) Further, it
was undisputed that Dunlap made threatening statements as he
was leaving the Macy’s and immediately retrieved the items he
had dropped.
Finally, Dunlap argues that the jury could have reasonably
concluded there was no evidence that he used force against
Ogassian. He appears to assert that a theft instruction was
therefore warranted as to the count pertaining to Ogassian. We
disagree. There is evidence that Dunlap threatened all three
officers verbally and with a large metal sign. Ogassian was also
visibly injured in the scuffle. Robbery occurs “whether a
perpetrator relies on force or fear to gain possession or to
maintain possession against a victim who encounters him for the
first time as he carries away the loot.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43
Cal.4th 249, 265, italics added.) Even if Dunlap did not make
physical contact with Ogassian, there was evidence that he used
fear against all three officers to escape with the property.
The trial court properly denied Dunlap’s requested theft
instruction.

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DISPOSITION
The order and judgment are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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