In re K.C. CA2/3

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Testo completo

Filed 6/5/26 In re K.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re K.C. et al., Persons Coming B345186
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 22CCJP00042A,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 22CCJP00042B,
22CCJP00042C
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ashley Price, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother challenges the adequacy of notices the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and
specific tribes in connection with her children’s dependency cases.
She contends the Department’s failure to comply with the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) requires
reversal of the juvenile court’s ICWA findings and remand with
instructions regarding the notices.1 We conclude the evidence
supports the court’s ICWA findings and formal notice was not
required. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The sole issue raised in Mother’s appeal is ICWA
compliance. We therefore focus on the facts bearing on this issue.
Mother has three boys: K.C. (born December 2019); S.B.
(born February 2022); and R.B. (born November 2022). A.P.
(Father P.) is K.C.’s presumed father. Ri.B. (Father B.) is the
presumed father of S.B. and R.B.
The Department filed dependency petitions, alleging
Mother and Father B. had a history of domestic violence that
endangered the children. A later petition added allegations that
Mother neglected the children. The juvenile court sustained
the petitions and declared the children dependents.
1. Initial ICWA Inquiries
Mother and Father B. each filed ICWA-020 forms for S.B.
and R.B. stating the children had no known Indian ancestry.
At the initial detention hearing for S.B., the court reviewed the

1 State statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
parents’ ICWA-020 forms and found there was no reason to know
S.B. was an Indian child. At an early hearing for R.B., the
court asked Father B. about the child’s possible Indian status.
Father B. denied any Indian ancestry. Based on the parents’
ICWA-020 forms and the inquiry of Father B., the court found
there was no reason to know R.B. was an Indian child.
As for K.C., Mother filed an ICWA-020 form stating the
child has no known Indian ancestry. At the initial detention
hearing, the juvenile court reviewed the form and found ICWA
did not apply to K.C. through Mother. The court also found
Father P.—whose whereabouts were unknown—to be K.C.’s
alleged father. After the Department completed its due diligence
without locating Father P., the court made an initial finding
that it had no information to believe ICWA applied to K.C.
through Father P.
2. Maternal Relatives
In December 2022, the Department made further inquiry
of Mother, who reported that her mother (the maternal
grandmother) had told her that her father (the maternal
grandfather) “is Puerto Rican, Italian and [American] Indian.”
According to the Department’s report, Mother denied “knowing
her father’s name, any familial information or any specific
tribal information.” Mother said she “does not speak with” the
maternal grandmother, who Mother believed was “incarcerated
somewhere in either Indiana or Georgia.” Mother also said the
maternal grandmother was “unwilling to provide information”
about the maternal grandfather, as she “becomes offended”
whenever Mother asks about him. Mother could not identify
any other relatives who might have information regarding ICWA.

3
In March 2023, the Department spoke with a maternal
great aunt and maternal great grandmother. The great aunt
reported the children’s great-great-great-grandmother was
“full Native” and their great-great-grandmother was “partially
Native and Black,” but she was unable to identify a “connected
Native tribe.” The maternal great grandmother said the family
had “Native features but we are not connected to a tribe or
anything like that,” and she also was unable to identify a
connected tribe. The Department’s reports do not say whether
the social worker asked either relative about mother’s claim
that the maternal grandfather might have Indian heritage.
In April 2024, Mother again reported she “may have”
Indian ancestry; however, she could not identify a tribe or
provide further information. She made a similar report in
October 2024, but noted she had been a foster child and
did not really know her heritage.2
3. S.B.’s and R.B.’s Paternal Relatives (Father B.)
In October 2024, the Department contacted S.B.’s and
R.B.’s paternal grandmother, who reported she had no knowledge
of Indian heritage in the family. At a hearing in November 2024,
the juvenile court inquired of the children’s paternal aunt and
again of the paternal grandmother, both of whom denied
Indian ancestry.
4. K.C.’s Paternal Relatives (Father P.)
Father P.’s whereabouts remained unknown until 2023.
In July 2023, the Department received a call from Father P.’s

2 The Department also asked the children’s caregivers
whether they had heard the children’s parents or relatives
discuss Indian heritage. None had heard anything relevant.

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mother (K.C.’s paternal grandmother), who reported her son was
incarcerated (she did not know where exactly). The paternal
grandmother said she spoke to Father P. daily and she wanted
to establish paternity on his behalf. A social worker advised her
that she would need to contact K.C.’s counsel about a DNA test.
The social worker did not inquire about ICWA. A DNA test
later confirmed that Father P. is K.C.’s biological father.
In August 2023, the Department received a call from
Father P. He reported he was incarcerated in a state prison
substance abuse treatment facility and asked that his mother
be given physical custody of K.C. because he did not want the
child “adopted out.” He also identified his sisters—paternal
aunts Ashley P. and Porsha T.—as possible caregivers. The
social worker did not inquire about ICWA. The record does
not include an ICWA-020 form for Father P., nor is there an
ICWA-010 form to confirm the Department made its initial
ICWA inquiry of him.
In November 2023, the Department called the paternal
grandmother and paternal aunt Ashley P. about K.C.’s possible
placement. The social worker did not inquire about ICWA
on either call.
In February 2024, the Department received another call
from Father P. The social worker provided him with details
about K.C.’s dependency case and upcoming hearing dates,
but did not inquire about ICWA.
In April 2024, Father P. appeared at a progress hearing for
K.C. and testified regarding paternity issues. The court found
Father P. was K.C.’s presumed father. The court did not inquire
about ICWA.

5
Later the same month, the Department had another call
with Father P. about K.C.’s placement. Father P. again asked
the Department to reach out to the maternal grandmother or
the maternal aunts about the child’s placement. The social
worker did not inquire about ICWA.3
In October 2024, paternal aunt Porsha T. reported
the family had “Chiasaw [sic] and Choctaw” heritage. At a
permanency planning hearing the next month, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to investigate the paternal aunt’s claim,
conduct further ICWA inquiry of other relatives, prepare a report
of “who was interviewed, dates and places of birth of the relatives
as far back as can be ascertained,” and provide notice to the BIA
and any “appropriate tribes if necessary.” Although Father P.
was present at the hearing, the court did not ask him about
ICWA.
The Department spoke again with paternal aunt Porsha T.
She said she “believed” the family had Native American heritage,
but she did not have direct knowledge about it, and she would
have to “ ‘consult with her elders.’ ” She could not confirm the
family’s ancestry with the Chickasaw or Choctaw tribes and she
did not know if the family “had any tribal membership, is eligible
for tribal membership or resided on a tribe [sic] or reservation.”
Porsha T. declined to provide names or contact information
for other family members who might know more, stating she
was K.C.’s only paternal relative “involved with the case.”

3 The Department contacted the paternal aunt Ashley P.
later that day. A few days later the Department contacted the
paternal grandmother. The Department did not inquire about
ICWA during either conversation.

6
The Department made at least two subsequent attempts to
follow up with Porsha T. but received no response.
In November 2024, the Department filed its report on the
agency’s ICWA inquiry. With respect to K.C., the report showed
paternal aunt Porsha T. was the only relative the Department
had attempted to interview about the child’s possible Indian
heritage. The Department pledged to “continue to inquire about
Native American heritage and continue to attempt to engage
[Porsha T.],” but reported there was “no additional information”
to establish a “ ‘reason to know’ that ICWA applies to this
matter.” After receiving the report, the juvenile court continued
the permanency planning hearing and set a March 2025 hearing
for further ICWA inquiry.
In January 2025, the Department sent ICWA-030 notices
to the BIA, the Chickasaw Nation, the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, and the
Jena Band of Choctaw Indians. The notices listed Mother’s and
Father P.’s names and birthdates, but provided no information
about K.C.’s paternal grandmother or any other relatives.
Three tribes responded. The Jena Band of Choctaw
Indians stated K.C. and his parents were not members and
not eligible for membership. The Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma
stated the individuals listed were not members and were not
eligible for enrollment. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
similarly stated K.C. and his parents were not enrolled members
and were not eligible for enrollment. The Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma’s responses included the express qualification that
the tribe’s determination was “based solely on the information
that you provided” and, “[i]f a name and date of birth was not

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provided, we could not research that family member.” (Boldface
omitted.)
In advance of the March 2025 hearing, the Department
filed an updated ICWA report regarding the tribes’ responses
and requested a 90-day continuance to conduct further ICWA
investigation. The juvenile court continued the hearing to
April 24, 2025, noting, “ICWA notices remain pending.”
On March 25, 2025, Mother filed this appeal.4
DISCUSSION
1. Governing Law
ICWA and related California law define an “ ‘Indian child’ ”
as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of
an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b).) In
addition to imposing substantive requirements for the placement
of an Indian child and the termination of parental rights,
ICWA gives Indian tribes the right to intervene in state court
proceedings contemplating such actions. (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).)
Under our state law, “courts and child welfare agencies
are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire
whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in dependency
cases.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (Dezi C.),
quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) “Child welfare agencies discharge

4 Mother noticed her appeal from a March 4, 2025 order
denying her petition for modification without an evidentiary
hearing. (See § 388.) Her briefing, however, is directed
exclusively at the adequacy of the ICWA notices and makes
no argument that the juvenile court erred with respect to
the modification petition.

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this state law duty by ‘asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have
an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and
where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’ ”
(Dezi C., at p. 1125, quoting § 224.2, subd. (b).) “[F]urther
inquiry” is required if there is “reason to believe” the child
is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), and formal notice to
the relevant tribes is required if there is “reason to know”
the child is an Indian child (§ 224.3, subd. (a)).
A “reason to know” exists under any of the following
circumstances: “(1) A person having an interest in the child,
including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian
organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the
child’s extended family informs the court that the child is
an Indian child. [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child,
the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or
in an Alaska Native village . . . . [¶] (3) Any participant in the
proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization,
or agency informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child. [¶] (4) The child who
is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know
that the child is an Indian child. [¶] (5) The court is informed
that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court. [¶] (6)
The court is informed that either parent or the child possess
an identification card indicating membership or citizenship in
an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding as to whether there
is reason to know a minor is an Indian child for substantial

9
evidence. (See In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101;
cf. Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
2. Formal Notice Was Not Required
Mother challenges the adequacy of the ICWA-030 notices
the Department sent to the tribes in connection with K.C.’s case.
She contends the notices were defective because they omitted
information about Mother’s relatives—specifically the maternal
grandmother and maternal great aunt Ruth H.—and because
they omitted information about K.C.’s paternal grandmother.
Because the notices were defective in mother’s telling, she
maintains the ICWA findings as to all three children must
be reversed and the matter remanded for proper re-noticing.
We disagree. Because the evidence was insufficient to compel
a finding that there was “reason to know” any of the children
was an Indian child, formal notice was not required. (§ 224.3,
subd. (a); see In re P.H., Jr. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 992, 997–998
(P.H.).)
P.H. is instructive. In that case, the parents filed
ICWA-020 forms, with the father indicating possible affiliation
with the “ ‘Yucca Indian or Navajo’ ” tribes, and the mother
indicated the child’s maternal great-great-grandmother was
“ ‘possible Apache’ ” and that another maternal relative was
“ ‘possible Yuki.’ ” (P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) The
Department investigated by speaking with the child’s paternal
grandmother, who denied any Indian ancestry and explained
that the paternal grandfather’s family was Irish. (Id. at p. 995.)
The father himself conceded he did not know why he believed he
had Indian ancestry, explaining that as a child he had watched
western movies with his grandparents and “ ‘maybe it was all the
folklore.’ ” (Ibid.) On the maternal side, a maternal great-aunt

10
told the Department she had “ ‘no way of proving that her family
had any Yaki heritage’ ” and the child’s great-grandmother had
never claimed Indian ancestry.5 (Id. at p. 994.) The Department
nonetheless sent ICWA-030 notices to several Apache and Navajo
tribes. (Id. at p. 995.) On appeal, the father challenged the
adequacy of those notices, arguing they were defective in various
respects. (Id. at pp. 995–997.)
The P.H. court rejected the father’s challenge. The court
explained formal notice to tribes is required only where there
is “ ‘reason to know’ ” a child is an Indian child, as defined by
the six circumstances set forth in section 224.2, subdivision (d),
and none of those circumstances had been established by the
Department’s investigation. (P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 996–997.) At most, the statements by the parents and their
relatives suggested the child might have some Indian ancestry
—but, as the reviewing court observed, “ ‘tribal ancestry is
not among the criteria for having a reason to know the child
is an Indian child.’ ” (Id. at p. 997, accord In re D.F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 571 (D.F.) [“A suggestion of Indian ancestry
is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger
the notice requirement.”].) Because the predicate for formal
notice was not established, the father’s arguments about the
adequacy of the notices the Department voluntarily sent were
beside the point. (P.H., at pp. 997–998.)
As in P.H., there is no need here to distinguish between
the “reason to believe” standard that triggers further inquiry and

5 The reference to “Yaki” heritage may have been a
misspelling of “Yaqui.” (P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 997,
fn. 5.)

11
the “reason to know” standard that triggers formal notice,
because Mother challenges only compliance with the notice
requirement.6 (See P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.)
The only question presented is whether anything in the record
establishes reason to know that any of the three children is an
Indian child under any of the six circumstances listed in section
224.2, subdivision (d). Nothing does.
With respect to S.B. and R.B., both Mother and Father B.
denied Indian ancestry at the outset of the proceedings, and the
juvenile court found no reason to know either child was an Indian
child. The Department’s subsequent ICWA inquiry yielded only
vague and unverifiable suggestions of possible ancestry. Mother
told the Department she “may” have Indian ancestry but could
not identify a tribe or provide contact information for anyone

6 There do, however, appear to be gaps in the Department’s
investigation that may affect the duty of further inquiry. The
most apparent are the agency’s seeming failure to obtain an
ICWA-020 declaration from Father P. and the juvenile court’s
failure to ask him on the record whether K.C. may be an Indian
child. (See § 224.2, subd. (c).) The Department also appears
to have failed to ask K.C.’s paternal grandmother and paternal
aunt Ashley P. whether K.C. may be an Indian child and whether
either of them knows of other relatives who may have relevant
information under ICWA. (See § 224.2, subd. (b).) Because
the Department’s inquiry is ongoing as of the date of Mother’s
appeal, we can make no judgment on this record about the
ultimate adequacy of the inquiry. (See, e.g., J.J. v. Superior
Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 460–461 [challenge to ICWA
inquiry was not ripe where case was “still ongoing” and “any
perceived deficiencies with ICWA inquiry and noticing may
still be resolved during the normal course of the ongoing
dependency proceedings”].)

12
who might have more information. Maternal great aunt Ruth H.
reported the family’s great-great-great-grandmother was “full
Native” and a great-great-grandmother was “partially Native
and Black,” but she was unable to identify a connected tribe.
The maternal great grandmother told the Department the family
had “Native features” but was “not connected to a tribe or
anything like that,” and she likewise could not identify a tribe.
The paternal grandmother and paternal aunt of S.B. and R.B.
both denied Indian ancestry.
None of this constitutes reason to know S.B. or R.B. is
an Indian child under section 224.2, subdivision (d). At most,
these statements suggest that some distant ancestor may have
had Native heritage—but “ ‘tribal ancestry is not among the
criteria for having a reason to know the child is an Indian child.’ ”
(P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) Because an Indian child
must be either a “member of an Indian tribe” or “eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and . . . the biological child
of a member of an Indian tribe” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1,
subd. (b)), the suggestion of possible Indian ancestry, untethered
to any identified tribe or to any claim of tribal membership or
eligibility for membership, does not trigger the formal notice
requirement. (See §§ 224.2, subd. (d), 224.3, subd. (a); D.F.,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
The analysis is no different for K.C. Paternal aunt
Porsha T.’s initial message stating the family had “Chiasaw [sic]
and Choctaw” heritage was, at most, a suggestion of possible
tribal ancestry. When the Department followed up, the paternal
aunt could not confirm any ancestry with the Chickasaw or
Choctaw tribes, said she would need to consult with her elders,
declined to provide contact information for other relatives, and

13
never returned the Department’s calls, despite saying she would.
This sort of unverified and unspecific suggestion of Indian
ancestry does not rise to the level of reason to know a child
is an Indian child under the criteria listed in section 224.2,
subdivision (d). (See P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996–997.)
Mother nonetheless argues the ICWA-030 notices the
Department sent to the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes were
defective for omitting information about the maternal relatives
and about K.C.’s paternal grandmother. But Mother’s argument
presupposes that formal notice was required. It was not. The
juvenile court never found there was reason to know K.C. was
an Indian child—it merely ordered the Department to notice
appropriate tribes “if necessary.” The Department sent notices
while its inquiry remained ongoing—not because the threshold
for mandatory notice had been met, but as a step in its
continuing inquiry. Because no formal notice was required
in the first instance, the content of the notices cannot establish
prejudicial error. (See P.H., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 997–
998 [rejecting challenge to adequacy of notices where formal
notice was not required because there was no reason to know
the child was an Indian child].)
Finally, because formal notice was not required for any
of the three children, Mother’s argument that the content of the
notices for K.C. requires reversal of the ICWA findings for S.B.
and R.B. necessarily fails. Should the Department’s ongoing
inquiry into K.C.’s paternal ancestry yield information that
provides reason to know K.C. is an Indian child, the Department
remains obligated to provide appropriate notice at that time.
(See fn. 6, ante.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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