CourtListener 10870227•Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 6/4/26 Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PRESERVE WILD SANTEE et al., D085121
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00041478-CU-MC-CTL)
CITY OF SANTEE et al.,
Defendant.
HOMEFED FANITA RANCHO, LLC,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Katherine A. Bacal, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble; Mallory & Natsis, Jeffree A. Chine and
Heather S. Riley, for Appellant.
Center for Biological Diversity, John Buse and Peter J. Broderick, for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
No appearance for Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
The General Plan for the City of Santee (City) imposed a maximum
residential capacity for development of land known as Fanita Ranch at
approximately 1,395 units. This is how the City had for years interpreted the
effect of lot size restrictions in the General Plan.
In 2017, HomeFed Fanita Rancho, LLC (HomeFed) proposed a
multiuse development of Fanita Ranch with an increased density of up to
3,008-housing units. The proposed project was identified as inconsistent with
the General Plan’s lot size restrictions, by both the City and HomeFed in its
application materials. In 2020, the City approved the proposed project by
adopting an amendment to the General Plan to specifically allow the
increased housing density.
The General Plan amendment did not take effect, however, because
Santee citizens immediately challenged it by filing a petition for a
referendum. Santee citizens also adopted a ballot initiative, Measure N, at
the November 2020 election, which now requires voter approval for
development that would increase residential density or intensity over what
the General Plan allows in Santee.
In 2021, the City adopted an urgency ordinance to create a new
program called the “Essential Housing Program.” Under the program, a
development project that is “certified” by City staff as an “Essential Housing
Project” is “deemed ‘compliant’ ” with the General Plan, with no public
hearing and no appeal of the staff’s decision to certify a project.
2
A few months later, HomeFed obtained certification of its Fanita Ranch
project as an Essential Housing Project and, in 2022, reapplied for City
approval of development at the site. The “new” project was virtually identical
to the previous project, which along with its corresponding General Plan
amendment had been set aside pursuant to court order following unrelated
CEQA (California Environmental Quality Act) litigation. Importantly, the
new project retained the same footprint with 3,008-housing units. The City
approved HomeFed’s project, this time asserting the project was consistent
with the General Plan pursuant to the urgency ordinance it had adopted.
Preserve Wild Santee, Center for Biological Diversity, Endangered
Habitats League, and California Chaparral Institute (together, Petitioners)
sued. They filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and
HomeFed as real party in interest, contending the City’s latest approval of
HomeFed’s project violated the State Planning and Zoning Law, the
Subdivision Map Act, CEQA, and section 9241 of the Elections Code. The
trial court agreed that the City had violated these four state laws in
approving the project, and it entered judgment directing the City to set aside
all approvals and certification of the project’s Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) associated with HomeFed’s Fanita Ranch project.
HomeFed—but not the City—has appealed.
We conclude the City’s actions violated the State Planning and Zoning
Law, the Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA, but not section 9241 of the
Elections Code. Our conclusion, however, does nothing to alter the
correctness of that portion of the judgment in which the trial court ordered
the issuance of a writ of mandate directing the setting aside of all project
approvals and the certification of the project’s EIR. We therefore partially
3
reverse the judgment as to the court’s determination of the Elections Code
claim and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
I.
Impediments to Development Before HomeFed’s Acquisition of Fanita Ranch
The Fanita Ranch site covers about 2,638 acres of open space on the
City’s undeveloped northern edge. The site is surrounded to the west, north,
and east by contiguous open space. Most of the site consists of coastal sage
scrub and chaparral, and it also includes areas of native grassland, coast live
oak woodland, riparian forest, and vernal pools.
Residential development of the Fanita Ranch site has been
contemplated for decades. Both the County of San Diego and the City, after
its incorporation, identified the site as suitable for development to
accommodate regional housing needs.
In 1999, the City approved a 3,000 unit development for the site. But
the Santee voters rejected that plan by referendum.
In August 2003, the Santee City Council adopted the Santee General
Plan (General Plan). The General Plan sets out the land uses and intensities
of development permitted on all land within the City. It designates the
Fanita Ranch site as “Planned Development,” and it places limits on the
individual lot or parcel sizes within Fanita Ranch. The City has for years
interpreted these lot size limits as constraining the maximum allowable
density for the area. The General Plan does this through one of the sixteen
“Guiding Principles” intended to inform the development of the Fanita Ranch
site. The Guiding Principle for Fanita Ranch’s lot sizes specifies: 20 percent
of the residential lots are to be 6,000 square feet; 20 percent of the residential
lots are to be 10,000 square feet; and 60 percent or greater of the residential
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lots are to be 20,000 square feet. Under the City’s own interpretation of these
lot size requirements, the maximum residential capacity at the site under the
General Plan is approximately 1,395 units.
In 2005, then-owner Barratt American, Inc. (Barratt) applied for
approval of a Vesting Tentative Map and Development Review Permit.
Barratt’s proposal sought to develop the site with 1,380 single-family
dwelling units, 15 live-work units, commercial uses, parks, and open space.
The City certified a Final EIR (FEIR) for the Barratt project and approved it
for development in 2007, and then certified a Revised FEIR (RFEIR) in 2009.
The City’s approvals of the FEIR and the project were the subject of
litigation in Preserve Wild Santee et al. v. City of Santee et al., San Diego
Superior Court case No. 37-2008-00075168-CUTT-CTL (Fanita I), and
Preserve Wild Santee et al. v. City of Santee et al., San Diego Superior Court
case No. 37-2009-00097042-CU-TT-CTL (Fanita II). In Fanita I, the trial
court determined the 2007 FEIR was deficient with respect to its plans for
wildfire safety mitigation. This court affirmed the trial court’s determination
in part, holding that the FEIR improperly deferred certain mitigation
measures and failed to adequately analyze water supply impacts and impacts
to a specific butterfly species. (Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 260, 270–286 (Preserve Wild Santee).)
Fanita II was filed while the Fanita I appeal was pending. It
challenged the City’s return to the limited writ issued in Fanita I, as well as
the adequacy of the 2009 RFEIR. The trial court determined the RFEIR
continued to inadequately address required fire safety measures. (See
Preserve Wild Santee, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 267–268, fn. 5.) In 2013,
the City vacated its approvals for the Barratt project. It also decertified both
the 2007 FEIR and 2009 RFEIR.
5
In April 2013, the City adopted a General Plan Housing Element
Amendment, which projected the Fanita Ranch site would permit the
development of 1,380 single-family residential units plus 15 live/work units,
for a total of 1,395 housing units.
II.
HomeFed’s Initial Project Proposal
Sometime after litigation over the Barratt project ended, HomeFed
acquired the Fanita Ranch site. In 2017, HomeFed proposed its own
development project for the site, which was ultimately approved in 2020
(2017 Project). The 2017 Project included the building of either 2,949
housing units or 3,008 housing units, depending on whether a school was
included in the plan. The 2017 Project was identified as inconsistent with the
General Plan’s requirements for development on the Fanita Ranch site, by
both HomeFed’s application materials and the City’s planning and
environmental review materials. Accordingly, the City and HomeFed agreed
an amendment to the General Plan would be required to allow development
of housing beyond 1,395 units.
To allow the anticipated increase in housing on the site, HomeFed
proposed an amendment to the General Plan to ensure the 2017 Project was
consistent with the General Plan. The proposed amendment would change
the site’s land use designation from “General Plan” to “Specific Plan,” and
alter or eliminate the 16 General Plan policies in place to govern development
on the Fanita Ranch site.
A City Council resolution approving the 2017 Project stated that “a
General Plan Amendment (GPA) is required” for the project to proceed. The
City conceded a GPA was required because, among other things, the 2017
Project exceeded the maximum allowable housing units for the site under the
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General Plan’s policies. The Draft EIR for the 2017 Project also
acknowledged, “[T]he adopted Santee General Plan land uses for the project
site [without amendment] . . . allow 1,395 residential units.” The City’s
Housing Element, which is a part of the General Plan, similarly and
specifically stated the Fanita Ranch site has “capacity for 1,395 units, in
accordance with [General Plan] Guiding Principles 1-3.”
III.
The City’s Approval of the 2017 Project with the Proposed GPA
On September 23, 2020, the City Council approved the 2017 Project. It
did so by adopting the proposed GPA and other necessary project approvals,
and by certifying the EIR for the project. The adopted GPA made two
changes to the General Plan: (1) it changed the land use designation for the
site in the Land Use Element from “Planned Development” to “Specific Plan,”
and (2) it amended the text of the General Plan, including the “Guiding
Principles” for development of the Fanita Ranch site to permit increased
housing intensity on the site.
IV.
Santee Citizens Submit a Referendum Petition on the GPA
Just over a month after the City adopted the GPA, on October 29, 2020,
Santee citizens submitted a qualified referendum petition on the GPA to the
City Clerk. (See Elec. Code, § 9237.) The qualifying petition prevented the
GPA from taking effect. The City then had two options for addressing the
referendum petition: (1) it could repeal the subject ordinance outright; or
(2) it could submit the ordinance to the voters for approval or rejection. (Id.,
§ 9241 (section 9241).)
7
On January 13, 2021, the City Council chose to submit the referendum
to the voters at the November 8, 2022 election. Consequently, as the City
acknowledged in its Sixth Housing Element, “the developer cannot move
forward with actual construction of the Fanita Ranch project until the
referendum is resolved,” because the GPA subject to the referendum “is
necessary for the development [of the] Fanita Ranch project.”
V.
Santee Citizens Pass Measure N
In the meantime, Santee voters adopted a ballot initiative—Measure N
or the “Santee General Plan Protection Initiative”—at the November 8, 2020
election, which took place just over a week after citizens filed the GPA
referendum petition with the City Clerk. As adopted by voters, Measure N
now requires voter approval for development that would increase residential
density or intensity over what the General Plan allows. Measure N expressly
states that its purpose is to “protect the Santee General Plan from unwise
densification and intensification amendments” and “protect the residents of
Santee from overdevelopment with resultant traffic gridlock.” After its
adoption, Measure N’s requirements were incorporated into the Land Use
Element of the General Plan.
VI.
The Court-Ordered Repeal of the GPA
Multiple environmental groups filed a new CEQA lawsuit challenging
the sufficiency of the City’s environmental review for the 2017 Project
(Preserve Wild Santee, et al. v. City of Santee, case No. 37-2020-00038168
(Fanita III)). In that action, the trial court determined the City had not
adequately considered or disclosed the 2017 Project’s wildfire safety and
evacuation impacts. On April 26, 2022, the trial court issued a writ of
8
mandate directing the City to set aside all project approvals, including its
adoption of the GPA.
Approximately one month later, in May 2022, the City set aside all
approvals for the 2017 Project and repealed the ordinance adopting the GPA.
Soon after, the City Council voted to remove the qualified referendum on the
GPA from the November 2022 ballot.
VII.
The City’s Creation of a New “Essential Housing Program”
Previously, on August 25, 2021, the City adopted Ordinance No. 592
(Ordinance 592 or the Ordinance), by which it created a new program called
the “Essential Housing Program.” Among other things, the Ordinance gives
the Director of Development Services (Director) and planning staff the ability
to certify a proposed housing development project as an “Essential Housing
Project.” In turn, the Director’s certification allows the City to deem the
proposed project “ ‘compliant’ ” with the General Plan. In this way, the
Essential Housing Program provides a method for the City to avoid formally
reviewing a proposed project for actual consistency with the General Plan.
And it allows such projects to be approved without the adoption of a General
Plan amendment to ensure consistency.
The Ordinance purports to place itself at the top of the hierarchy of all
other City land use standards. It states: “In the event of a conflict between
this Ordinance and any other City code, plan, or policy, the provisions of this
Ordinance shall control with regard to Essential Housing Projects.”
However, the Ordinance also states that it shall not be “construed to relieve
the City or Applicant from complying with state law, including without
limitation the Subdivision Map Act . . . and the California Environmental
Quality Act.”
9
The mechanism by which a project is “certified” under the Essential
Housing Program is through review by the Director and City staff “for
compliance with the Objective criteria set forth in the Credits Assessment
Guide.” The Director may certify a project if it “achieve[s] at least 50 credits,
as described [in the Credits Assessment Guide], and at least 10 of the credits
must come from the Housing Category.” Notably, some of the housing
category credits can be obtained through a “contribution” of varying amounts
of money to the “City’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund to facilitate affordable
housing in support of Program 7 of the Housing Element.” There is no public
hearing. And there is no appeal of a Director’s decision regarding
certification under the program.
The City passed the Ordinance as an urgency ordinance. This allowed
it to take effect immediately.
VIII.
The City Approves a Renewed Application for the Fanita Ranch Project after
the Director Certified It as an Essential Housing Project
A few months after the City adopted the Ordinance, in late November
2021, HomeFed submitted an “Essential Housing Program” application for
the Fanita Ranch Project. On December 27, 2021, the Director “certified” the
Fanita Ranch Project as an “Essential Housing Project.” The certification
document contains no project documents, a project description, maps, or other
information that might permit members of the public to understand the scope
and nature of the proposed project being “certified.” The same day, the City
issued a notice of CEQA exemption for the Director’s certification. No
hearing or action by the City Council was undertaken in connection with this
notice.
10
Because the City’s prior approvals for the 2017 Project had been set
aside or repealed in May 2022, HomeFed sought new approval of the Fanita
Ranch Project. According to a “Notice of Availability of the Draft
Recirculated Sections of the Final Revised EIR” (Draft REIR) for the newly-
proposed project that the City circulated for public review and comment, the
“new” project (the 2022 Project) retained the same footprint and design as the
2017 Project, with one modification—the reincorporation of a road extension
that had originally been part of the 2017 Project but had been eliminated
through the approval process.
In seeking the City’s approval for the 2022 Project, HomeFed did not
propose a General Plan amendment, as it had done with respect to the
virtually identical 2017 Project. The Draft REIR asserted that no
amendment to the General Plan was required to ensure the 2022 Project’s
consistency because the Director had “certified” it as an “Essential Housing
Project.”1
On September 14, 2022, after a public hearing, the City Council voted
to approve the 2022 Project, certify the related Final REIR, adopt a vesting
tentative map, and adopt other project approvals and findings. The findings
1 In various publicly available documents and statements, the City or its
representatives had been asserting the opposite—i.e., that an amendment to
the General Plan would be necessary for development of the site. For
example, the City’s Housing Element Update, which was published
February 9, 2022, indicated “the developer cannot move forward with actual
construction of the Fanita Ranch project until the referendum [regarding the
GPA] is resolved.” And in a June 13, 2022 article in East County Magazine,
the article’s author referred to the City’s Mayor as having “noted that
because the [Fanita Ranch] project would need an amendment to the city’s
General Plan, it would require a public vote,” consistent with Measure N’s
mandate.
11
adopted by the City included a four-page analysis of the 2022 Project’s
consistency with the General Plan. There, the City asserted “the project is
generally consistent with the 16 Guiding Principles,” but then also stated,
“the project is consistent with the Santee General Plan pursuant to Urgency
Ordinance No. 592.” Elsewhere, however, the findings conceded the Project
“does not . . . meet minimum lot size requirements” set out in the General
Plan.
IX.
The Current Litigation
This brings us to the current litigation. A month after the City
approved the 2022 Project without amending the General Plan, Petitioners—
a group of entities concerned about the environmental effects of the 2022
Project—filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court.2 The operative
first amended petition (Petition) originally alleged five causes of action, but
at the time of the hearing on the merits, the following four causes of action
remained:
(1) The first cause of action for a violation of California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), based on the
inadequacy of the environmental impact report, the findings,
and the statement of overriding considerations;
(2) The second cause of action for a violation of the State Planning
and Zoning Law, based on inconsistency with the General
Plan;
(3) The third cause of action for a violation of the Subdivision
Map Act, based on inconsistency with the General Plan; and
2 Petitioners filed the petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 1085 (for cause of action 5) and 1094.5 (for causes of
action 2 and 3), as well as under Public Resources Code section 21168, et seq.
(for cause of action 1).
12
(4) The fifth cause of action for a violation of the Elections Code,
based on approval of the 2022 Project despite the City’s repeal
of the General Plan Amendment after a referendum on the
amendment qualified for the ballot.
Petitioners’ requested relief was an order (1) directing the City to
vacate and set aside certification of the REIR and all associated project
approvals, (2) directing the City to comply with the State Planning and
Zoning Law, the Subdivision Map Act, the Elections Code, and all applicable
regulations; and (3) declaring the City’s certification and approval of the 2022
Project violated all of the asserted state statutes, and further stating the
certification and approval are invalid.
The trial court ruled in favor of Petitioners on each remaining cause of
action. Specifically, the court concluded the City violated both the State
Planning and Zoning Law and the Subdivision Map Act by approving a
project that is inconsistent with the General Plan. And the City violated
CEQA by failing to disclose and discuss inconsistencies with the General
Plan.3 Finally, the trial court determined the City violated the Elections
Code by approving the 2022 Project, in essentially the same form as the 2017
Project, within a year of repealing the Ordinance in which it adopted the GPA
required by the 2017 Project and which was the subject of a referendum.
3 Although the trial court concluded the City violated CEQA by failing to
disclose and discuss inconsistencies with the General Plan, it rejected
Petitioners’ other theories as to how the City violated CEQA, such as the
allegations the City failed to recirculate notice, provided insufficient
responses to comments from the public, and failed to disclose, analyze and/or
mitigate biological impacts, wildfire and safety impacts, and transportation
and traffic impacts.
13
The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the City to rescind its
approvals of the 2022 Project and entered judgment for Petitioners.
HomeFed has appealed from the trial court’s judgment. The City has not.
DISCUSSION
HomeFed challenges every aspect of the trial court’s judgment.
First, it asserts the court erred in concluding the City violated the State
Planning and Zoning Law and the Subdivision Map Act by approving a
project that is inconsistent with the General Plan. In its view, the record
demonstrates there is substantial evidence to support the City’s conclusion
that the 2022 Project is consistent with the General Plan.
Second, HomeFed asserts the trial court erred in concluding the City
violated CEQA on the ground the City failed to disclose and discuss a major
inconsistency between the 2022 Project and the General Plan. On this point,
HomeFed argues, alternatively, that CEQA does not require an agency to
“resolve” an inconsistency between a project and a general plan, and
therefore any inconsistency is “not a CEQA issue”; but even under CEQA’s
requirement that an EIR disclose and discuss inconsistencies with a general
plan, the Final REIR at issue here sufficiently “disclosed and analyzed
potential inconsistencies with the General Plan and applicable development
standards.”
Third and last, HomeFed challenges the trial court’s conclusion that
the City violated Elections Code section 9241 by approving the 2022 Project
within a year of repealing the ordinance in which it adopted the GPA
proposed by HomeFed for the 2017 Project.
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Except for the last, we reject each of HomeFed’s contentions. We agree
that no Elections Code violation has been shown, but conclude the trial court
did not err in concluding the City violated the State Planning and Zoning
Law, the Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA.
I.
The 2022 Project Is Inconsistent with the General Plan and
Its Approval Violated State Law
The trial court determined the 2022 Project is inconsistent with the
General Plan, and this determination underpinned its ultimate conclusions
that the City violated the State Planning and Zoning Law, the Subdivision
Map Act, and, ultimately, CEQA. HomeFed thus seeks to reverse these
conclusions primarily by demonstrating the City did not abuse its discretion
when it deemed the 2022 Project consistent with the General Plan. HomeFed
attempts to do this by offering two broad legal theories for its assertion of
consistency.
First, HomeFed argues there is substantial evidence to support the
City’s finding that the 2022 Project is consistent with the General Plan under
established legal standards for assessing a project’s consistency with a
General Plan. Second, it asserts that even if there is not sufficient evidence
of consistency under generally applicable standards, there is a unique reason
why the City’s consistency determination is supported by the record here: the
City’s certification of the Project as an Essential Housing Project under the
Ordinance’s Essential Housing Program is sufficient to establish the 2022
Project’s General Plan consistency. We discuss both theories in further
detail, and explain why we are not persuaded by either.
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A. The Role and Significance of the General Plan in Land Use Decision-
Making and Development
“Land use regulation in California historically has been a function of
local government under the grant of police power contained in article XI,
section 7 of the California Constitution.” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of
Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1151.) “To ensure that localities pursue
‘an effective planning process’ ([Gov. Code,4] § 65030.1), each city and county
must ‘adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan’ for its own ‘physical
development’[.] (§ 65300.)” (Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v.
Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 141, 152 (Orange Citizens).) Thus, a general
plan is required by the State Planning and Zoning Law (§§ 65000, et seq.; the
SPZL).
Under the SPZL, a general plan must set forth “objectives, principles,
standards, and plan proposals.” (§ 65302.) A general plan may be issued in
“any format,” including “a single document” or “a group of documents relating
to subjects or geographic segments of the planning area” (§ 65301, subds. (a),
(b)), so long as it “comprise[s] an integrated, internally consistent and
compatible statement of policies for the adopting agency” (§ 65300.5). It also
must include development policies, “diagrams and text setting forth
objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals,” and seven predefined
elements—land use, circulation, conservation, housing, noise, safety, and
open space. (§§ 65302, subds. (a)–(g), 65303.)
When adopting general plans, localities must “confront, evaluate and
resolve competing environmental, social and economic interests.” (Orange
Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 152, quoting Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board
4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.
16
of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 571 (Goleta Valley).) A “general plan
[thus] provides a ‘ “charter for future development” ’ ” and sets forth the
legislative body’s “fundamental policy decisions about such development.”
(Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807,
815.)
In order to ensure the fundamental policy decisions set out in a general
plan derive from thoughtful consideration of varying points of view and the
public’s interests, the process of adopting a general plan “is structured to
transcend the provincial. Public participation and hearings are required at
every stage, in order to obtain an array of viewpoints.” (Goleta Valley, supra,
52 Cal.3d at p. 571, citing §§ 65351, 65355.) State law requires that
“ ‘[d]uring the preparation or amendment of the general plan, the planning
agency shall provide opportunities for the involvement of citizens, California
Native American Indian tribes, public agencies, public utility companies, and
civic, education, and other community groups, through public hearings and
any other means the planning agency deems appropriate.’ (§ 65351.)”
(Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 152–153.) Further, “[a] legislative
body must refer its proposal to a number of listed public entities before
adopting or amending a general plan. (§ 65352.) Planning commissions must
hold at least one public hearing and make a written recommendation to the
legislative body; legislators must hold at least one public hearing before
acting on the recommendation. (§§ 65353–65356; see § 65354.5 [a planning
agency authorized to approve or amend a general plan must ‘establish
procedures for any interested party to file a written request for a hearing by
the legislative body’ and must provide public notice of any hearings].)” (Id. at
p. 153.)
17
“Because of its broad scope, long-range perspective, and primacy over
subsidiary land use decisions, the ‘general plan has been aptly described as
the ‘‘constitution for all future developments’’ within the city or county.’ ”
(Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 152.) Uniquely important for our
purposes in this case, “ ‘ “[t]he propriety of virtually any local decision
affecting land use and development depends upon consistency with the
applicable general plan and its elements.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 153, italics added.)
The requirement of consistency with a general plan is imposed by
statute through the SPZL: “County or city zoning ordinances shall be
consistent with the general plan of the county or city.” (§ 65860, subd. (a),
italics added; see § 65867.5, subd. (b) [“A development agreement shall not be
approved unless the legislative body finds that the provisions of the
agreement are consistent with the general plan and any applicable specific
plan.”].) In addition, under the Subdivision Map Act, a city may only approve
a map that is “consistent with the local general plan or an existing specific
plan.” (Golden State Homebuilding Associates v. City of Modesto (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 601, 606; §§ 66473.5, 66474.)
A land-use enactment that conflicts with a general plan “is invalid at
the time it is passed.” (Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 544 (Lesher).) “The court does not invalidate the
ordinance. It does no more than determine the existence of the conflict. It is
the preemptive effect of the controlling state statute, the [SPZL], which
invalidates the ordinance.” (Lesher, at p. 544.) In this way, “ ‘the
requirement of consistency . . . infuse[s] the concept of planned growth with
the force of law.’ ” (Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 153.)
We review an agency’s decision regarding consistency with a general
plan “by ordinary mandamus, and the inquiry is whether the decision is
18
arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or
procedurally unfair.” (Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 782.) “A city’s determination that a development
approval is consistent with its general plan has been described by some
courts as ‘adjudicatory’ and by others as ‘quasi-legislative.’ Where a
consistency determination involves the application of a general plan's
established land use designation to a particular development, it is
fundamentally adjudicatory. In such circumstances, a consistency
determination is entitled to deference as an extension of a planning agency’s
‘ “unique competence to interpret [its] policies when applying them in its
adjudicatory capacity.” ’ ” (Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 154–155
[cleaned up].) Therefore, a reviewing court is to “defer to a procedurally
proper consistency finding unless no reasonable person could have reached
the same conclusion” on the evidence before it. (Id. at p. 155.)
On appeal from a petition for writ of mandate, a reviewing court
applies the same standard of review as the trial court and reviews the local
agency’s action de novo. (Hamilton & High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 528, 547.)
B. The 2022 Project Is Facially Inconsistent with the General Plan under
Established Standards for Assessing Consistency
In HomeFed’s view, under established legal standards for reviewing an
agency’s determination of a project’s consistency with a general plan, the trial
court erred by concluding the 2022 Project is inconsistent with the General
Plan. HomeFed’s argument is: A general plan does not need to be followed in
every respect for consistency to exist because no project can be in perfect
conformity with every policy in a general plan. The City is entitled to weigh
the competing policies set out in the General Plan and reach an outcome that
is “consistent” with the General Plan when the “overall” picture is considered.
19
And here, the City found that the 2022 Project is “in harmony with the
General Plan’s policies and objectives,” and, according to HomeFed, this
finding is supported by substantial evidence. As HomeFed explains, the City
determined the 2022 Project was “in conformity with the vast majority of [the
General Plan’s] Guiding Principles and the policies and objectives of the
Housing Element and the remaining General Plan Elements,” even though it
is “not in conformity with Guiding Principles . . . regarding (i) minimum lot
sizes . . . in the development.” HomeFed thus contends that the record
demonstrates the 2022 Project is sufficiently consistent with the General
Plan. We are not persuaded.
“ ‘ “An action, program, or project is consistent with the general plan if,
considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and policies of the
general plan and not obstruct their attainment.” ’ ” (Orange Citizens, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 153.) Conversely, a project is inconsistent with the general
plan if it (1) “frustrate[s] the general plan’s goals and policies” (Napa Citizens
for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 342, 378) or (2) “if it conflicts with a general plan policy that is
fundamental, mandatory, and clear” (Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v.
County of Orange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 782 (Endangered Habitats)).
Even where a great number of aspects of a project will further the
objectives and policies of the general plan, a single facial inconsistency with a
specific land use element or designation in a general plan may nevertheless
undermine a municipality’s consistency finding. (See Orange Citizens, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 156–158 [concluding project that included low-density
residential development was facially inconsistent with general plan where a
land use element in the general plan designated project site to be open
space].) This is because “in determining whether a project conflicts with a
20
general plan, ‘the nature of the policy and the nature of the inconsistency are
critical factors to consider.’ A project is inconsistent with a general plan ‘if it
conflicts with a general plan policy that is fundamental, mandatory, and
clear.’ In other words, a project’s consistency with a general plan’s broader
policies cannot overcome a project’s inconsistency with a general plan’s more
specific, mandatory and fundamental policies.” (Spring Valley Lake Assn. v.
City of Victorville (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 91, 100–101 [cleaned up].) “A ‘clear’
inconsistency with even a single ‘fundamental, mandatory and specific land
use policy’ may be ‘enough to scuttle a project.’ By contrast, a local agency has
‘ “some discretion” ’ when it comes to a relatively ‘amorphous’ policy (such as
a policy of ‘ “encourag[ing]” development “sensitive to natural land forms, and
the natural and build environment.” ’ ” (Joshua Tree Downtown Business
Alliance v. County of San Bernadino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 677, 697 [cleaned
up], italics added.)
Here, the lot size restrictions in the General Plan use the word “shall,”
which renders the policy mandatory. (See San Francisco Tomorrow v. City &
County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498, 520 [use of “must” or
“shall” in a general plan policy indicates it is mandatory].) The lot size
restrictions also appear fundamental to the General Plan. The Land Use
Element in the General Plan sets out a range of allowable development
densities for land in the City, and the density of development on a site is
fundamental to land-use planning. For example, in Orange Citizens, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pages 156–158, the facial inconsistency the Supreme Court
identified involved a land use element designating open space, whereas the
proposed project included a plan for light residential development on that
land. The Supreme Court implicitly determined the open space requirement
of the General Plan—i.e., a housing density of zero—was fundamental to the
21
General Plan. Similarly, here, the nature of the restriction on lot sizes on the
Fanita Ranch site, and the resultant density limitations that the City itself
drew from those restrictions, are critical to other land-use decisions in the
surrounding areas and touch on virtually every area of planning, such as
traffic, safety, and conservation. We therefore conclude the lot size
restrictions are fundamental to the Land Use Element of the General Plan.
And, finally and importantly, the lot size restriction is specific, not
amorphous. It provides an objective, quantitative mandate for lot sizes that
leaves no room for subjective interpretation. Indeed, the City has been
interpreting and applying the lot size restriction standard in the same way,
consistently, for years.
Relying on Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 411–
416 (Holden), HomeFed argues the “Guiding Principles here provide [only] a
‘blueprint’ for flexible and innovative development, not mandatory
standards.” This argument is not well taken. In Holden, the court upheld a
city’s finding of consistency generally, despite the existence of an
inconsistency with density standards. But in Holden, the density
designations in that city’s general plan were “not rigid” and included
provisions expressing that the density could “be adjusted or modified,” and
the provided density was merely “recommended.” (Id. at p. 417.) Unlike the
density designations in Holden, the lot size standards in the General Plan are
not mere recommendations, nor do they include language suggesting they are
not rigid. For the reasons we just explained, including the plain text of the
General Plan, the lot size restrictions are mandatory. HomeFed’s attempt to
analogize the City’s consistency finding for the 2022 Project to a city’s finding
of consistency in Holden is therefore misplaced.
22
Moreover, the record does not support HomeFed’s contention the City
engaged in a “balancing” of the various policies in the General Plan or
deciding that other policies should be given more weight. Nor does it support
HomeFed’s assertion that the City made a factual, record-based conclusion
that the 2022 Project was “in harmony with the General Plan’s policies and
objectives.” To the contrary, it is clear that the City determined the project
was not required to be consistent with the policies of the General Plan,
because it had exempted the project from an express finding of consistency by
virtue of the Director’s “certification” of the project as an Essential Housing
Project under the Essential Housing Program.
Indeed, by its terms, Ordinance 592, which created the Essential
Housing Program, purports to allow the City to avoid consideration of the
policies and/or mandates set out in the General Plan altogether. It does this
by “deeming” a project to be in compliance and consistent with the General
Plan if it “achieve[s] at least 50 credits” based on a checklist of criteria. As a
result, a project “certified” by the Director as an Essential Housing Project
under the City’s program would never require an amendment to the General
Plan, whether or not it suffered from an actual-in-fact inconsistency with the
policies and/or requirements of the General Plan. Thus, it is clear the City
did not do any weighing of the policies set out in the General Plan to conclude
the 2022 Project was consistent with it. Instead, the City simply “deemed”
the 2022 Project consistent because it was certified as an Essential Housing
Project under criteria that are different from the policies and mandates set
out in the General Plan.
Beyond this, both the City and HomeFed have essentially conceded
that the proposed development in the 2022 Project lacks consistency with the
General Plan. Specifically, in connection with the virtually identical 2017
23
Project, the City and HomeFed both repeatedly acknowledged (1) the General
Plan’s lot size restrictions were effectively a density restriction and (2) the lot
size restrictions are fundamental, specific, and mandatory. At all times prior
to the submission of the 2022 Project application, both parties stated
numerous times that a General Plan amendment was necessary for approval
of the 2017 Project.
We see no principled reason to defer to the City’s most current
determination that the 2022 Project is “consistent” with the General Plan
because it was “deemed” consistent under the Essential Housing Program,
despite the project’s deviation from the lot size requirements set out in the
General Plan. For many years, the City interpreted its General Plan to
require an amendment to the lot size restrictions for the building of any
additional housing beyond 1,395 units in Fanita Ranch. There has been no
material change to the General Plan or to the development as originally
proposed in the 2017 Project that would account for the City’s current
determination that the 2022 Project is consistent with the General Plan. The
only thing that has changed between the approval process for the 2017
Project and the 2022 Project is the City’s voters passing an initiative
requiring voter approval for any future General Plan amendments that seek
to increase residential density or intensity over what is set out in the General
Plan and the City adopting Ordinance 592.
C. The City’s Certification of the Project as an Essential Housing Project
Under its Emergency Ordinance 592 Is Not Sufficient to Establish
General Plan Consistency
HomeFed next argues even if there is not sufficient evidence of
consistency under generally applicable standards, the City’s certification of
the 2022 Project as an Essential Housing Project under the Ordinance’s
Essential Housing Program is sufficient to establish its General Plan
24
consistency. For this theory, HomeFed relies on various state housing laws
and seeks to use the Essential Housing Program’s purported “authorization”
under those state housing laws to support its claim of consistency. We
address these state housing laws and explain why HomeFed’s second theory
also fails.
1. The Housing Accountability Act does not mandate approval of the
2022 Project.
HomeFed contends the Housing Accountability Act (§ 65589.5; the
HAA) applies to General Plan consistency determinations “in the housing
context.” In its view, “recent amendments to the HAA prohibit local agencies
from disapproving or conditioning housing projects based on subjective
standards.” It asserts two provisions of the HAA require that the consistency
of a project involving housing “be evaluated using only ‘objective’ standards—
those that are ‘uniformly verifiable’ and ‘involve no personal or subjective
judgment by a public official.’ ” As it interprets these HAA provisions,
HomeFed argues the General Plan’s Guiding Principles “are not objective
under this test,” but instead are “broad, aspirational statements designed to
guide discretionary decision-making and balance multiple competing goals,”
such that the HAA prohibits reliance on these Guiding Principles to
disapprove of its project.
The two HAA provisions that HomeFed relies on are subdivisions (f)(4)
and (f)(9) of section 65589.5. Subdivision (f)(4) of section 65589.5 provides:
“(4) For purposes of this section, a housing development project or
emergency shelter shall be deemed consistent, compliant, and in
conformity with an applicable plan, program, policy, ordinance,
standard, requirement, or other similar provision if there is
substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable person to
conclude that the housing development project or emergency
shelter is consistent, compliant, or in conformity.”
25
Subdivision (f)(9) provides:
“(9) For purposes of this subdivision, ‘objective, quantifiable,
written development standards, conditions, and policies’[5]
means criteria that involve no personal or subjective judgment by
a public official and are uniformly verifiable by reference to an
external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and
knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and
the public official before submittal, including, but not limited to,
any standard, ordinance, or policy described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (o). Nothing herein shall affect the obligation of the
housing development project to comply with the minimum
building standards approved by the California Building
Standards Commission as provided in Part 2.5 (commencing with
Section 18901) of Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code. In
the event that applicable objective, quantifiable, written
development standards, conditions, and policies are mutually
inconsistent, a development shall be deemed consistent with the
criteria that permits the density and unit type closest to that of
the proposed project.”
Even assuming HomeFed is correct about the contours and requirements of
section 65589.5, subdivisions (f)(4) and (f)(9) of the HAA, and even assuming
some of the General Plan’s Guiding Principles could be considered subjective,
there is nothing discretionary or subjective about the Fanita Ranch lot size
requirements set out in the General Plan. The lot size requirements involve
no subjective judgment, and they are uniformly verifiable by reference to the
5 The phrase “objective quantifiable, written development standards,
conditions, and policies” is used in multiple other subsections of section
65589.5, but the one that appears to apply to housing projects generally is
subdivision (f)(1), which states in relevant part: “Except as provided in
paragraphs (6) and (8) of this subdivision, and subdivision (o), nothing in this
section shall be construed to prohibit a local agency from requiring the
housing development project to comply with objective, quantifiable, written
development standards, conditions, and policies appropriate to, and
consistent with, meeting the jurisdiction's share of the regional housing need
pursuant to Section 65584.”
26
General Plan, rendering them objective on their face. (§ 65589.5, subd. (h)(9)
[objective standard is one “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a
public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and
uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the
development applicant or proponent and the public official”].) In fact,
HomeFed’s application for the 2017 Project conceded the maximum number
of units permitted by the lot size restrictions in the General plan was 1,395,
and multiple City documents repeatedly stated the lot requirements
permitted a maximum of 1,395 residential units at the site.
Moreover, the HAA, by its terms, applies only to projects that are
already consistent with applicable local planning standards, including, of
course, a general plan, with two notable exceptions not present here. (See
Snowball West Investments L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
1054, 1085 [“the HAA has made clear from its inception in 1982 that it only
applies ‘[w]hen a proposed housing development project complies’ . . . with
the local ‘general plan, zoning,[’] and development policies” (quoting
§ 65589.5, subd. (j)(1))].) The HAA is intended to place limitations on a city’s
ability to disapprove of an already conforming housing development project.
(See § 65589.5, subd. (j).) It does not allow for the excusal of a lack of
consistency with a general plan, other than for an extremely limited subset of
projects: (1) certain below-market housing projects, and (2) emergency
shelters. (§ 65589.5, subd. (d)(2)(A).) The fact that the HAA allows
inconsistency for a small subset of projects demonstrates the Legislature did
not intend to override the consistency requirement for all other projects.
27
For these reasons, even assuming the HAA does what HomeFed claims
it does with “subjective” planning standards, the HAA cannot save HomeFed
from the mandatory objective standard for the Fanita Ranch lot sizes set out
in the General Plan.
Later in its briefing, HomeFed again returns to the HAA for assistance
in its appeal. There, it relies on the HAA to argue in summary fashion that
the statute’s provisions require the 2022 Project be “deemed consistent”
(italics added) with the General Plan. In HomeFed’s view, because the City
“did not identify any inconsistencies with objective development standards,”
the project must necessarily be “deemed consistent.” In support of this
argument, HomeFed refers to section 65589.5, subdivision (j)(2)(B).
Subdivision (j)(2) addresses a circumstance in which a local agency has
determined a proposed project is not consistent with a general plan or other
applicable land use and therefore has proposed to disapprove of the project
based on the perceived inconsistency. Under subdivision (j)(2), if the project
is a housing project and the agency determines it to be “inconsistent, not in
compliance, or not in conformity” with local standards, the agency is required
to “provide the applicant with written documentation” of the inconsistency
within a specific timeline (depending on other aspects of the project). The
failure of a local agency to provide the required written documentation within
the specified timeline results in the project being “deemed consistent” with
the local standards. (§ 65589.5, subd. (j)(2)(B).) This measure ensures local
agencies provide housing project applicants with notice and an explanation of
the intention to disapprove of a project early in the planning process so the
developer can address the inconsistency.
28
We disagree with this argument too, and the case that HomeFed relies
on—Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 277, 292,
318, 327–328 (Ruegg)—confirms our reading of subdivision (j)(2)(B). Ruegg
involved the City of Berkeley denying a qualifying housing project’s
application and failing to provide the requisite notice to the project applicant
of the project’s purported inconsistency. But that is not what occurred here.
In this situation, the City approved the project, after “deeming” it consistent
with the General Plan by virtue of the Director “certifying” it as an Essential
Housing Project. Subdivision (j)(2)(B) imposes no requirement of notification
within a specific timeline when a project has been determined to be
consistent with local land use standards and criteria. Because the City’s
position was that the 2022 Project is consistent with local land use standards,
it had no reason to give the developer notice of an inconsistency under the
HAA. Therefore, the lack of notice or explanation of an inconsistency within
the timeline specified in the HAA—an inconsistency that was only identified
by the trial court in this litigation, not by the City—cannot now be used as a
way to require that the Project be “deemed” consistent under section 65589.5,
subdivision (j)(2)(B) of the HAA.
2. HomeFed is not entitled to rely on the City’s “certification” of the
2022 Project under the “Essential Housing Program” to avoid the
need for General Plan consistency.
HomeFed asserts that “state housing law affirmatively authorized the
City’s Essential Housing Program [as created by Ordinance 592] and
protected the [2022] Project’s right to rely on that Program without requiring
a General Plan Amendment.” In its view, because certain other state
statutes authorized the City to create the “Essential Housing Program,” the
City was entitled to rely on its “certification” of the 2022 Project under this
Program as conclusively rendering it “consistent” with the General Plan.
29
HomeFed is incorrect. HomeFed has not demonstrated state statutes
authorize the City’s version of the “Essential Housing Program,” and, even if
that were the case, it would still be incorrect that such authorization of the
Essential Housing Program would permit the City to avoid its duty to make a
determination as to actual General Plan consistency and to obtain a General
Plan amendment where an inconsistency exists.
Local land use planning and decision-making involves a clear hierarchy
of applicable standards and rules. A general plan is “located at the top” of
this hierarchy. (DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 773.) This is
why every local land use decision is assessed in terms of its consistency with
the area’s general plan. (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 570.)
In this instance, however, the City relied on the Director’s certification
of the 2022 Project as an Essential Housing Project, which means only that
the Project obtained enough “credits” under the Essential Housing Program.
These “credits” are granted when the Director determines the project is
consistent with any number of factors set out in the Essential Housing
Program. These factors, however, do not reflect the standards and policies
set out in the Santee General Plan for any particular area. One example is
the Essential Housing Program permits a proposed development to obtain
credits toward certification through a developer’s contribution of money to
the City’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund. Thus a certification under the
Essential Housing Program does not guarantee a project’s consistency with
the General Plan.
In some cases, it is possible that facial consistency with the General
Plan will exist for a project certified under the Essential Housing Program.
But as we have explained, the 2022 Project is facially inconsistent with the
30
General Plan with respect to the lot size requirements. Thus, by utilizing the
certification process to “deem” the 2022 Project consistent with the General
Plan without actually assessing it for consistency, the City has failed in its
duties under state law. Certification under the Essential Housing Project
does not require the consistency finding that it is necessary under state law
to support a city’s land-use approval. (§ 66473.5; Woodland Hills Residents
Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 825, 837–838 [law requires
“express finding” that proposed subdivision is consistent with applicable
general plan].)
Moreover, the certification is completed by the Director, not the City’s
legislative body, which is the body required to make the finding of
consistency. (See Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 922 [stating City Council must make finding of
consistency, but failure to do so was not prejudicial where no claim of
inconsistency had been asserted].) Here, the Santee City Council delegated
its exclusive authority to make findings of consistency by allowing the
Director to certify the 2022 Project as an Essential Housing Project and then
rely solely on that certification to conclude the 2022 Project should be
“deemed” consistent with the General Plan. By employing this different
process, the City Council avoided having to itself assess individualized
information about the 2022 Project. It considered no maps, schematics, or
even a project description, to assess whether the Project was consistent with
the General Plan. An agency’s finding of consistency must “bridge the
analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision.” (Save
Livermore Downtown v. City of Livermore (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1130.)
That did not happen here. In the absence of any raw evidence from which to
31
complete an analysis of consistency, the City has necessarily failed to bridge
the analytical gap between evidence and an ultimate determination.
By using the Essential Housing Program certification process to “deem”
the 2022 Project consistent, the City also failed to provide the notice and
hearing required to amend a general plan to ensure conformance. Under
state law, where there is a proposal that would “affect” the “intensity of uses
of real property” through passage of a general plan or amendment of a
general plan, specific notice and a hearing are required. (§ 65353, subd. (b).)
Instead, the City used the Essential Housing Program certification process to
avoid providing public notice and an opportunity for the public to be heard on
the issue of the increased density of housing proposed to be developed
through the 2022 Project.
Put simply, the certification process for the Essential Housing
Program does not meet state statutory standards that are required for a
City’s amendment of a General Plan, nor does the 2022’s Project’s
certification under the program by the Director support a finding of actual
consistency with a General Plan. Where, as here, a project is facially
inconsistent with a fundamental, mandatory and clear General Plan policy,
the City’s “certification” of the project—and the use of the “certification” to
“deem” the project consistent—is insufficient to rectify that facial
inconsistency or to render the City’s approval of the 2022 Project lawful
under the SPZL or Subdivision Map Act.
3. The Density Bonus Law (DBL) does not permit the City to ignore
the General Plan inconsistency
HomeFed next argues the DBL permits increased general housing
above what a general plan may allow for projects that provide for certain
types of housing. It asserts the 2022 Project includes those specified types of
housing. It alternatively argues that the DBL “authorized” the City to adopt
32
its “Essential Housing Program.” In its view, because a specific provision of
the DBL—section 65915, subdivision (n)—authorizes local agencies to adopt
“supplemental incentives and waivers” for housing, the DBL must have
authorized the City to “lawfully exercise[ ] its discretion to grant waivers and
incentives under the [Essential Housing] Program, [thereby] eliminating any
purported inconsistency with the Guiding Principles and obviating any need
for a GPA.” We disagree.
The DBL’s purpose “is to encourage and provide incentives to
developers to include low- and moderate-income housing units in their
developments.” (Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 933,
940.) It allows certain qualifying projects to apply for and receive a limited
density increase on a property above the maximum density otherwise allowed
for the site. But to qualify for the DBL program, a project must provide a
specific percentage of state-law defined affordable housing units, or other
specifically defined units. (See § 65915, subd. (b).) The density increase
provided by the DBL is permitted on a sliding scale, proportional to the
percentage of units the project sets aside as affordable (with differing levels
of affordability). (Id., subd. (f).)
Importantly, the DBL limits its own application: “When an applicant
seeks a density bonus for a housing development within, or for the donation of
land for housing within, the jurisdiction of a city, county, or city and county,
that local government shall comply with this section. A city, county, or city
and county shall adopt an ordinance that specifies how compliance with this
section will be implemented. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (s),
failure to adopt an ordinance shall not relieve a city, county, or city and
county from complying with this section.” (§ 65915, subd. (a).)
33
Here, there is nothing in the record, and HomeFed cites nothing,
indicating it applied for, or received, a density bonus for the 2022 Project
under the DBL’s state density bonus standards. In fact, HomeFed’s
development application stated it was not seeking any incentives, waivers, or
concessions for the project under the DBL. The application also stated the
total number of “Affordable Units” was “0,” and the total number of “Density
Bonus Units” was also “0.” There is no reference to the DBL in the various
City documents related to the project. And there is no indication in the 2022
Project application that the Project would include any of the minimum
percentages of state-defined affordable housing.
HomeFed seems to suggest that despite its asserted lack of reliance on
the DBL in submitting its application, the Project nevertheless qualified for
the DBL’s state bonus housing density because it provided “445 senior units,”
and “150 low- and moderate-income units (on- and off-site), a $2.6 million in-
lieu fee for very low income housing, and providing 1,650 acres of open space
and other public benefits.” None of these claims as to why the Project
“qualifies” for additional housing under the DBL are relevant, given that
HomeFed never sought a DBL density bonus, on these or on any other
purported qualifying factors, and HomeFed expressly disclaimed that it was
seeking any density bonus under the DBL.6
6 HomeFed seeks judicial notice of two documents: (1) an “HCD [Dept. of
Housing and Community Development] Letter of Technical Assistance to City
of Los Angeles, July 31, 2024,” and (2) a “California Assembly Select
Committee on Permitting Reform Final Report—March 2025.” It asserts the
first document is relevant to this appeal because “it explains that state
Density Bonus Law preempts rigid adherence to local policies when they
conflict with the state’s pro-housing objectives,” and the second is relevant
because “it explains procedural obstacles to housing production and
recommends reforms to streamline permitting including addressing the use of
CEQA to thwart housing.” We deny HomeFed’s request because, in our
34
Further, HomeFed’s purported justifications for “bonus” housing under
the DBL are themselves unpersuasive. First, it is not at all clear that the
Project’s units that HomeFed now refers to as “senior units” meet the
definition of “senior citizen housing development,” as defined in the statute,
and HomeFed does not explain how these units would qualify the Project as a
“senior citizen housing development.” This omission is fatal to HomeFed’s
attempted reliance on “senior units” to claim the DBL allows an increase in
density for the Fanita Ranch site without an amendment to the General
Plan. Second, the DBL does not allow for a payment of a money “in-lieu” fee
to provide for a density bonus, nor does it allow for increased density for
planned open space. (§ 65915, subd. (b).) Beyond this, the DBL has very
specific ratios of bonus density that it permits for certain amounts of
developed affordable housing. There is nothing suggesting the 2022 Project
would be entitled to an almost 100 percent density “bonus” under the DBL
based on “150 low- and moderate-income units,” only some of which are
planned “on” the Fanita Ranch site.7
HomeFed also takes a slightly different tack in relying on the DBL by
asserting subdivision (n) of section 65915 permits local agencies to extend
DBL-like benefits to projects that do not meet the state’s minimum DBL
requirements. HomeFed is effectively suggesting that Ordinance 592 is a
assessment, these documents are not relevant to our determination of the
issues on appeal. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County
of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 796, fn. 30 [appellate court may
deny request for judicial notice of materials not relevant to court’s
determination of issues on appeal].)
7 HomeFed notably refers only to “150 low- and moderate-income units
(on- and off-site),” without specifying how many of those units are planned for
the Fanita Ranch site.
35
local density bonus law, and, as such, the existence of Ordinance 592 allows
the City to ignore General Plan policies in favor of approving additional
housing. But subdivision (n) of section 65915 does not authorize a city to
approve a project that is inconsistent with a General Plan in the absence of
any indication the inconsistency results from a density bonus connected with
the inclusion of low-income housing units. It states in full: “If permitted by
local ordinance, nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a city,
county, or city and county from granting a density bonus greater than what is
described in this section for a development that meets the requirements of
this section or from granting a proportionately lower density bonus than what
is required by this section for developments that do not meet the
requirements of this section.” (§ 65915, subd. (n), italics added.) This
paragraph refers to the very detailed density bonus tables provided in
subdivision (f) of the DBL. And contrary to HomeFed’s suggestion (that the
DBL has authorized the City to provide an unlimited “density bonus”
regardless of the General Plan’s Housing Element requirements), this
provision indicates the Legislature intended to permit a jurisdiction to grant
a density increase that is proportional to the number of qualifying units
provided on the site, even if the project does not meet the minimum number
of qualifying units to be entitled to a density bonus under the state statute.
Moreover, nothing in subdivision (n) of section 65915 purports to
authorize a municipality to allow a project to be “deemed” consistent with a
general plan because it meets an entirely different set of standards, such as
the credits needed for certification under Essential Housing Program. And
nothing in the record indicates the City created the Essential Housing
Program pursuant to this provision of the DBL, or that the DBL forms the
basis for the City’s certification of the 2022 Project as an Essential Housing
36
Project. Notably, Ordinance 592 does not invoke or refer to the DBL, and the
DBL is not mentioned in staff reports or supporting documents surrounding
the 2022 Project. Nor did the City make any findings related to the DBL, or
any low income or other DBL-qualifying housing in connection with the
Project.
Beyond all this, HomeFed fails to explain how even the general
authorization of a program such as the Essential Housing Program by the
DBL would also authorize the City to override the state law requirement of
general plan consistency. HomeFed does not analyze whether such assumed
authorization creates a conflict with either the SPZL or Subdivision Map Act,
or, if so, how such a conflict should be resolved. In the absence of any
attempt to demonstrate how the state statutes operate together or to provide
a cogent framework for how to analyze their relationship if or when a conflict
arises, HomeFed has failed to demonstrate the DBL allows the City to do
what it did here.
4. The City’s general police power and Section 36947 do not give the
City authority to rely on the Essential Housing Program to avoid
General Plan consistency.
HomeFed next claims the City “adopted the [Essential Housing]
Program under its municipal police power and Government Code section
369[3]7.” Here, HomeFed argues the Essential Housing Program was a
response to “the City’s acute housing crisis and the prolonged delays and
barriers to housing development created by procedural and litigation
obstacles.” Missing from this argument, however, is any explanation as to
how the general power the City possesses to adopt ordinances (i.e., through
section 36937) authorizes it to use that power to legislate in a way that
violates state statutory requirements, such as the SPZL and the Subdivision
Map Act. The omission is fatal.
37
The allegation by Petitioners is that by utilizing the Essential Housing
Program as the basis for excusing General Plan inconsistency, the City has
violated both the SPZL and the Subdivision Map Act (among other things).
There is no question the City has the authority to adopt ordinances, and even
urgency ordinances such as Ordinance 592. But the question in this
litigation is not whether the City had the authority to adopt the Essential
Housing Program. It is whether the City can rely on the Essential Housing
Program to excuse the 2022 Project’s facial inconsistency with the General
Plan and approve the Project despite that inconsistency.
5. HomeFed has not demonstrated it has a “vested right” to rely on
the Essential Housing Program
In a conclusory argument, HomeFed asserts it has a vested right to the
approval of the 2022 Project based on the existing law at the time it
submitted its application for the project. HomeFed cites section 65589.5,
subdivision (o), asserting because the Essential Housing Program was “in
effect at the time of [the 2022 Project] application,” the “City
was . . . prohibited from eliminating or modifying its terms as relates to the
Project.” This argument fails to persuade us, too.
Section 65589.5, subdivision (o), ensures an agency does not adopt new
land use regulations and apply those to a project after the submission of a
project application. For example, subdivision (o)(1) states in relevant part, “a
housing development project shall be subject only to the ordinances, policies,
and standards adopted and in effect when a preliminary application
including all of the information required by subdivision (a) of [s]ection
65941.1 was submitted.” Subdivision (o)(2) provides some exceptions,
allowing for four circumstances in which later adopted ordinances, policies
and standards may nevertheless be applied to a project for which an
application has already been submitted.
38
What HomeFed’s argument ignores is that at the time it submitted its
application, the General Plan standards, including its lot size requirements,
were also in place. Thus, the General Plan standards were “in effect” and
necessarily also apply to the 2022 Project application. Subdivision (o) of
section 65589.5 does not operate to give the Essential Housing Program
priority over the General Plan standards and policies, both of which were in
effect at the time HomeFed applied to develop the 2022 Project. This
provision therefore offers HomeFed no assistance.
In sum, we reject both theories offered by HomeFed for how the City’s
determination of General Plan consistency is supported by the record. Like
the trial court, we conclude no reasonable person could have determined the
2022 Project is consistent with the General Plan. (See Orange Citizens,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 155.)
D. The City Violated CEQA By Certifying an EIR That Fails to Disclose or
Discuss the Inconsistency
In a separate set of arguments, HomeFed contends the trial court
“improperly treated a planning law dispute as a CEQA violation” and thus
erred in concluding the City violated CEQA. In a CEQA case, we review
“ ‘the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision.’ ” (Protecting Our Water
& Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479,
495 (Protecting Our Water).) “The ultimate inquiry . . . is whether the EIR
includes enough detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in its
preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by
the proposed project.’ The inquiry presents a mixed question of law and fact.
As such, it is generally subject to independent review. However, underlying
factual determinations—including, for example, an agency's decision as to
which methodologies to employ for analyzing an environmental effect—may
warrant deference. Thus, to the extent a mixed question requires a
39
determination whether statutory criteria were satisfied, de novo review is
appropriate; but to the extent factual questions predominate, a more
deferential standard is warranted.” (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6
Cal.5th 502, 516 (Sierra Club) [cleaned up].)
HomeFed asserts the question whether a project is consistent with a
general plan is “not a CEQA issue” because CEQA “does not require an EIR
to resolve or eliminate potential inconsistencies with a general plan, nor does
CEQA require that a project be consistent with a general plan as a condition
of EIR certification.” From these contentions, HomeFed asserts the court
erred in determining that the facial inconsistency between the City-approved
Fanita Ranch development and its General Plan—a mere “planning law
dispute,” according to HomeFed—necessarily equated to a CEQA violation by
the City.
Although we consider these issues anew, applying the same standards
as the trial court (see, e.g., Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th 479, 495),
it is worth clarifying the inaccuracy of HomeFed’s assertions about the
approach taken by the trial court. We see nothing to suggest the court
determined the City violated CEQA because the certified Final REIR did not
“resolve” the inconsistency between the 2022 Project and the General Plan.
Nor does the record show that the court considered the Final REIR
inadequate merely because the Project is inconsistent with the General Plan.
Instead, the court determined the Final REIR failed to adequately disclose
the inconsistency between the 2022 Project and the General Plan. And as a
consequence of this failure, the Final REIR also failed to address, discuss or
consider the effect of this inconsistency. We agree with the trial court’s
analysis and reach the same conclusion on this record.
40
CEQA requires an EIR to disclose to the public and discuss any
inconsistency between the reviewed project and the general plan. (CEQA
Guidelines, § 15125(d) [“The EIR shall discuss any inconsistencies between
the proposed project and applicable general plans, specific plans and regional
plans.”]; see Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1552, 1566 [“ ‘ “while there is no requirement that an EIR itself be consistent
with the relevant general plan, it must identify and discuss any
inconsistencies between a proposed project and the governing general
plan” ’ ”].) Because an adopted plan may affect existing physical
environmental conditions, the EIR typically must address the applicable
general, specific, or regional plan as part of the baseline against which the
project’s likely substantial impacts are to be analyzed. (See ibid.) In other
words, to assess the potential impacts of a proposed project on the physical
environment, it is necessary to compare the project against what has already
been set out as the planned impact. As stated in the CEQA Guidelines, the
purpose of the requirement that an EIR disclose and discuss any
inconsistencies “is to give the public and decision makers the most accurate
and understandable picture practically possible of the project's likely near-
term and long-term impacts.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a).)
Consequently, the failure of an EIR to disclose a general plan
inconsistency—and the failure to discuss the inconsistency that necessarily
follows from the failure to disclose—renders the EIR insufficient. “ ‘[W]hen
the informational requirements of CEQA are not complied with, an agency
has failed to proceed in “a manner required by law” and has therefore abused
its discretion.’ ” (Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of
Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 386 (Napa Citizens).)
41
In HomeFed’s view, the City’s Final REIR adequately “disclosed and
analyzed potential inconsistencies with the General Plan and applicable
development standards, while ultimately concluding that the Project was
General Plan consistent.” This argument is belied by the record. The 2022
Final REIR excised all discussion of the 2020 amendment to the General Plan
from its discussion of the Project. The removal of this discussion is shown in
strikethrough edits. Instead, the Final REIR simply asserts that “the
proposed project would implement development generally consistent with the
16 Guiding Principles” set out in the General Plan. This is not enough to
disclose the significant inconsistency between the density of housing in the
approved 2022 Project and the density the City admitted was required by the
General Plan’s lot size restrictions.
Nor is HomeFed correct that the Final REIR sufficiently disclosed and
discussed the inconsistency by including a “detailed, policy-by-policy
evaluation in Table 4.10-1, spanning approximately 25 pages and analyzing
consistency with each applicable General Plan policy.” A review of the Final
REIR’s discussion of the consistency evaluation identifies no reference to the
lot size limitations for the Fanita Ranch site in the General Plan. In fact,
documents reflecting edits demonstrates other references to the lot size
restrictions that had previously been in the environmental report were
eliminated. The Final REIR also avoids discussing the density or intensity of
the proposed housing, generally, in the section HomeFed cites. The Final
REIR thus does not address the 2022 Project’s lot size inconsistency with the
General Plan’s lot size limitations. This constitutes the failure to proceed in
“ ‘ “a manner required by law” ’ ” and is therefore an abuse of discretion.
(Napa Citizens, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)
42
E. Petitioners’ SPZL, Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA Challenges Are Not
Time-Barred
HomeFed contends Petitioners’ claims are time-barred under CEQA
and section 65009 in an effort to escape the determination that the City
violated the SPZL, Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA. HomeFed claims the
Petition is an attempt to “relitigate the [Essential Housing] Program’s
application,” and thus asserts Petitioners are challenging either the City’s
adoption of Ordinance 592 or the City’s “certifi[cation of] Fanita Ranch under
the [Essential Housing] Program.” HomeFed then complains that because
Petitioners have never filed a timely challenge to either the City’s adoption of
the ordinance or the City’s certification of the Project, their claims must be
untimely. We reject this argument.
HomeFed misconstrues what Petitioners have challenged by their
Petition. Petitioners allege the City has violated the SPZL and the
Subdivision Map Act by approving the 2022 Project, certifying the EIR for the
Project, and adopting findings in support of the Project’s approval and
certification of the Final REIR on September 14, 2022, as well as by filing the
Notice of Determination for the 2022 Project with the County Clerk on
September 15, 2022. The Petition does not assert a violation of state law
arising from the City’s adoption of Ordinance 592, nor does it challenge the
Director’s certification of the Project under the Essential Housing Program.
The record demonstrates Petitioners’ claims under the SPZL,
Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA were timely filed. The Petition was filed on
October 14, 2022, 30 days after the approval vote and 29 days after the City
filed the Notice of Determination. The filing of the Petition therefore met
both the 90-day statute of limitations applicable to challenges to local
planning and zoning decisions (see Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33
43
Cal.4th 757, 767 [action challenging conditions of permit brought within 90
days of final administrative action was timely]; Honig v. San Francisco
Planning Dept. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 520, 526 [section 65009, subd. (c)
“establishes a short, 90–day statute of limitations, applicable to both the
filing and service of challenges to a broad range of local zoning and planning
decisions”]) and the even shorter 30-day statute of limitations for a CEQA
challenge triggered by the filing of a facially valid notice of determination
(Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 48 [if a valid notice of determination has been filed, any
CEQA challenge to that decision must be brought within 30 days].)
F. The City’s “Approval” of the 2022 Project Did Not Constitute a Violation
of Elections Code Section 9241
Petitioners alleged the City violated section 9241 of the Elections Code
by approving the 2022 Project within one year of it repealing the GPA after a
citizen referendum required the City to place the GPA on the ballot. The
trial court agreed. HomeFed raises multiple challenges to the court’s
conclusion that there was an Elections Code violation. We are persuaded by
one of HomeFed’s arguments and conclude the error is sufficient to warrant
reversal of the judgment as to the Elections Code claim, only.
Under the California Constitution, “[t]he legislative power of this State
is vested in the California Legislature . . . but the people reserve to
themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.” (Cal. Const., art. IV,
§ 1.)
The referendum power allows voters to weigh in on laws that have
already been passed. Any voter or group of voters gathering enough
signatures for a referendum can place a legislative enactment on the ballot
for a vote. A referendum suspends operation of the law in question, unless
44
and until it is approved by a majority of voters. (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1111.)
Section 9241 of the Elections Code (section 9241) contains a provision
prohibiting local jurisdictions from approving the same or similar legislation
for a one-year period after a referendum has qualified for placement on the
ballot and either the people have rejected the legislation by majority vote or
the legislation subject to the referendum has been repealed by the local
jurisdiction.
After the City approved the 2017 Project, certified its EIR, and
approved the corresponding GPA the City considered necessary for approval
of that project, a group of Santee community members gathered a sufficient
number of signatures to referend the GPA. Once the referendum was filed
with the City in late October 2020, the City faced a decision: (1) repeal the
GPA or (2) place the referendum on the ballot for a vote. The City opted to
place the referendum on the ballot for the election scheduled to take place in
November 2022.
But as the referendum and ballot process moved forward, a court
directed the City to set aside all 2017 Project approvals, including the GPA
and the EIR certification. The City complied with the court order by setting
aside all project approvals and repealing the GPA on May 25, 2022. Because
the GPA had been repealed, in June 2022, the City removed the referendum
from the ballot for the November 2022 election.
Just a few months later, on September 14, 2022, the City voted to
approve the virtually identical 2022 Project and certify its EIR. But as
should be clear, by this point, the City decided it no longer needed to amend
the General Plan because the 2022 Project was “deemed” consistent with the
General Plan due to its certification as an Essential Housing Project.
45
Petitioners assert the City’s approval of the 2022 Project violated section
9241’s one-year stay provision because the approval occurred less than one
year after the City repealed all approvals related to the 2017 Project, which
was virtually identical to the 2022 Project and was the subject of the
qualifying referendum.
Among other things, HomeFed argues that section 9241 does not apply
to the City’s September 14, 2022 approval of the 2022 Project because that
approval was “adjudicative” and not “legislative.”
Section 9241 applies only to prohibit repeat legislative actions.
“ ‘Courts have long observed that “[t]he power of referendum applies only to
acts that are legislative in character.” ’ ” (Move Eden Housing v. City of
Livermore (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 263, 275–276 (Move Eden I).) HomeFed
asserts the City’s approval of the 2022 Project is considered “quasi-
adjudicative” in nature, not legislative, and it therefore cannot be the subject
of section 9241.
We agree. Typical land-use project approvals—separate from a general
plan adoption or amendment—are not legislative, but are instead
adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory: “The well-settled functional distinction
between [legislative and adjudicatory decisions] is set out in Patterson v.
Central Coast Regional Com. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 833 [130 Cal.Rptr. 169].
‘ “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be
applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual
application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” . . . “Wherever an
act undertakes to determine a question of right or obligation, or of property,
as the foundation upon which it proceeds, such act is to that extent a judicial
one, and not the proper exercise of legislative functions.” ’ ” (Landi v.
Monterey County (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934, 936 [cleaned up]; see Land
46
Waste Management v. Contra Costa County Bd. of Supervisors (1990) 222
Cal.App.3rd 950 (Land Waste); Citizens for Jobs & the Econ. v. County of
Orange (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1332.) Thus, “[a]djudicatory acts include the
granting of variances and conditional use permits, and the approval of
tentative subdivision maps.” (Landi, at p. 936.) In contrast, local agencies
perform a legislative function when they enact or amend general plans and
zoning ordinances. (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1139, 1152.)
Consequently, the City’s “approval” of the 2022 Project itself, including
the approval of all subdivision maps, conditional use permits, variances, etc.,
involved adjudicatory acts; in the absence of the adoption of a General Plan
amendment, no legislative act was undertaken in connection with the 2022
Project. In contrast, the City undertook a legislative act during its 2017
Project’s approval process by adopting the GPA. And the citizen referendum
challenged only this act—i.e., the passage of the ordinance through which the
City adopted the GPA. The referendum did not attempt or purport to place
on the ballot a vote regarding the City’s general approvals of the 2017 Project
or its certification of the corresponding EIR. The referendum properly sought
only a vote on whether to approve the General Plan Amendment.
But because of the process by which the City approved the 2022
Project—i.e., its use of the Director’s certification of the Project under the
Essential Housing Program to “deem” the Project consistent with the General
Plan—the City avoided adopting an amendment to the General Plan. And
because of this, the City’s approval of the 2022 Project did not involve the sole
“legislative” aspect of the 2017 Project’s approval process that would have
been subject to section 9241’s one-year prohibition.
47
The difference in the manner by which the City approved the 2017
Project versus the 2022 Project leaves an open question, though. For
purposes of section 9241’s year stay provision, is it nevertheless possible for
an ordinance or set of ordinances to be considered “essentially the same” as a
prior ordinance or set of ordinances where the new ordinance does not involve
the same legislative act, or a similar legislative act, as the ordinance
originally challenged by referendum? According to a recent appellate
decision in Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th
1282 (Move Eden II), the answer to that question is no.
“In interpreting the stay provision in section 9241, courts have
interpreted the word ‘ordinance’ to include not only an identical enactment
but also a subsequent enactment that is ‘essentially the same’ as the original
enactment.” (Move Eden II, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1301.) And, in
trying to understand whether a subsequent enactment is “essentially the
same” as the prior enactment, one must consider what the original legislative
act was: “[W]e construe ‘ordinance’ as used in the phrase ‘the ordinance shall
not again be enacted by the legislative body for a period of one year’ (§ 9241)
to refer to a subsequent enactment that is ‘essentially the same’ with respect
to a legislative act or acts that made the original enactment subject to the
referendum power in the first place. A subsequent enactment violates section
9241 if, during the stay period, it readopts one or more legislative decisions in
an identical or insufficiently modified form (as in Lindelli [v. Town of San
Anselmo (2003)] 111 Cal.App.4th 1099). But section 9241 does not prohibit a
city from readopting administrative acts that do not have the effect of
undermining the stay as to any legislative act in the original enactment.”
(Move Eden II, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1305–1306.) Stated more
succinctly, “the relevant comparison is with the legislative act or acts in the
48
original enactment that made the enactment subject to the referendum
power.” (Id. at pp. 1301–1302, italics added.)
Petitioners rely on the holding in Move Eden II to claim they should
prevail on the issue. They assert, “Here, the original legislative act subject to
the referendum power was the City’s 2020 approval in the first instance of
the Fanita Ranch Project, including the [GPA] that was necessary to bring
the proposed project into conformity with the General Plan.” But this
framing too broadly defines the “original legislative act” that was the subject
of the referendum. The original legislative act was not “the City’s 2020
approval . . . of the Fanita Ranch Project.” The original legislative act—and
the only act that was subject to the referendum—was the City’s adoption of
the GPA. Its adoption was the “legislative act . . . that made the original
enactment subject to the referendum power in the first place” (Move Eden II,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1301). A faithful application of Move Eden II
requires us to accurately define the original legislative act in order to assess
the subsequent act against which it is being compared. Petitioners have
failed to do that here.
Therefore, in considering whether the City’s subsequent enactment or
enactments is/are “substantially the same” as the enactment subject to the
referendum and is thereby subject to section 9241’s one-year stay, we must
ask whether it has “readopt[ed]” the “one . . . legislative decision[ ]”—i.e., the
GPA—“in an identical or insufficiently modified form.” (Move Eden II, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1301.) It is clear the City did not readopt an
amendment to the General Plan in identical or insufficiently modified form.
In fact, it did not adopt any amendment of the General Plan, despite the 2022
Project’s inconsistency with the General Plan. This omission by the City, in
fact, leads to our prior conclusion the City violated state laws that require
49
actual consistency between the proposed project and a general plan, and/or
disclosure and discussion of an inconsistency. Because the City did not
readopt an amendment to the General Plan in identical or substantially
identical form, the City did not violate the one-year prohibition on repeat
legislative actions set in section 9241.
We acknowledge the conclusion we reach in connection with the section
9241 claim may seem unusual in light of our determination that the City’s
conduct in approving the 2022 Project violated other state law requirements.
It may also be somewhat ironic to conclude the City cannot be held liable for
a violation of the Elections Code’s one-year legislative prohibition as a direct
result of the actions the City took with respect to development of the Fanita
Ranch site. But, if anything, this result highlights the tactic the City chose to
pursue here, as it points out precisely how the City cut the public out of a
crucial decision-making process that it was intended to participate in.
As the record reveals, before 2022, all parties agreed that the proposed
development of the Fanita Ranch site in the 2017 Project (and in its virtually
identical offspring, the 2022 Project) required an amendment to the General
Plan. In fact, everyone agreed the 2017 Project was inconsistent with the
General Plan because it did not meet the General Plan’s lot size
requirements. But by creating a new program to certify the 2022 Project as
an Essential Housing Project and then using the fact of its certification to
“deem” the virtually identical 2022 Project consistent with the General Plan,
the City avoided having to amend the General Plan to ensure the Project
would reflect actual consistency with it. And by avoiding the need to amend
the General Plan, the City has effectively taken away the voters’ power to
challenge (by referendum) or change (by initiative) the policies set out in the
General Plan with respect to the Fanita Ranch site. It has also bypassed the
50
will of the voters as expressed in Measure N, the proposition Santee voters
adopted that requires voter approval for any development that would
increase residential density or intensity over what the General Plan allows.
All of this demonstrates how the City’s use of the Essential Housing Program
to “deem” the 2022 Project consistent with the General Plan without
considering whether true consistency exists has undermined the state’s
system of land use regulation, and allowed the City to bypass the normal
processes—required by state law—that exist to empower voters in legislative
decision-making by the City with respect to land use decisions.
Thus, although we ultimately conclude the City’s actions did not violate
Elections Code section 9241, this result stems directly from the City’s failure
to ensure actual consistency of the Project through a legislative action it had
previously considered necessary for consistency—the adoption of an
amendment to the General Plan. The absence of an amendment to the
General Plan to ensure facial consistency with a standard that is mandatory
and clear leaves the 2022 Project inconsistent, which constitutes a violation of
the SPZL and the Subdivision Map Act. Further, as we have explained, the
lack of disclosure of the inconsistency renders the City’s certification of the
Final REIR unlawful, as well. Consequently, although Petitioners cannot
prevail on their Elections Code claim, there is no question they remain
entitled to the relief granted by the trial court in connection with their claims
of violations of the SPZL, Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed only with respect to
declaratory relief determination in paragraph 3 that the City violated “the
Elections Code.” To the extent this determination may affect collateral
matters such as the recovery of costs and/or attorney fees, the trial court may
51
undertake any additional proceedings it deems necessary. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed. Petitioners, who are respondents in this
appeal, are awarded costs on appeal.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
52
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