CourtListener 10869080•Davis v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 6/1/26 Davis v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
TAMMY DAVIS et al., B348322
Plaintiffs and (Los Angeles County
Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV08627)
v.
AIDS HEALTHCARE
FOUNDATION,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William F. Highberger, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas A. Myers, Jonathan M. Eisenberg; Kim Riley Law,
Andrew F. Kim and Rebecca J. Riley for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kramer Brown Hui, Jennifer Kramer, Sam Brown and Sam
Vega; Law Office of Annette Harings and Annette Haring for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
This is an appeal from an attorney fee order in a class
action that settled after several years of contentious litigation.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff class $2,274,000 in attorney
fees, 40 percent less than the lodestar they requested. Defendant
AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) contends the trial court
abused its discretion by not reducing the fee award further.
Defendant argues that the court did not properly calculate and
analyze the lodestar, scrutinize the reasonableness of counsel’s
hourly rates and billed time, make all warranted deductions, or
apply the terms of the settlement. We find no abuse of discretion
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Parties
Defendant owns and operates the Madison Hotel, a single-
room occupancy residential hotel in the Skid Row area of Los
Angeles. Defendant rents rooms at the Madison at low cost to
individuals with very low incomes. Plaintiffs, including named
plaintiff Tammy Davis, were Madison tenants.
II. Litigation
In March 2020, plaintiff Davis filed a class action complaint
asserting seven causes of action against defendant. The parties
immediately engaged in settlement discussions but were unable
to resolve the matter. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in
July 2020, and the operative second amended complaint in
November 2020. The second amended complaint asserted four
causes of action: “First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code
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Section 1941.1, Second Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code
Section 1941.3, Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code
Section 1714, and Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of
California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.”
The ensuing litigation was extensive and contentious. The
register of actions spans 138 pages and includes a cross-
complaint against third parties; multiple discovery motions,
including several seeking sanctions; motions for injunctions;
motions to disqualify counsel on both sides; motions for class
certification and decertification; and a motion for summary
judgment. According to the parties’ settlement agreement,
plaintiffs “obtained, through formal and informal discovery,
hundreds of thousands of documents, and [ ] also conducted
dozens of depositions, spoke with approximately 150 Class
Members, and hired experts who conducted site inspections of the
Madison and the Madison’s elevator.”
In April 2022, the trial court granted class certification as
to several alleged habitability issues in common areas of the
Madison. Section 17200, and the following certified issues:
plumbing problems in common areas and common bathrooms;
electricity problems in common areas; elevator outages;
unsanitary conditions in common areas; lack of locking
mailboxes; lack of deadbolts, which was the subject of a specific
subclass; lack of resident caretaker; and public nuisance based on
these conditions.
III. Settlement Agreement
The parties agreed to settle the action in September 2024.
Pursuant to a written agreement, plaintiffs agreed to release
their claims in exchange for defendant paying a gross monetary
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settlement of $575,000 and performing various nonmonetary
terms primarily related to the alleged habitability issues.
As most relevant here, the settlement agreement provided
the following, beneath the heading “CLASS COUNSEL FEES
AND LITIGATION EXPENSES”:
“The Parties have not agreed to the amount of payment for
Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation
Expenses Payment. Instead, the parties have agreed that Class
Counsel will file a separate motion seeking attorney’s fees and
allowable costs directly from the Court[.] AHF will not dispute
that Plaintiff’s Counsel have a right to fees and allowable costs,
which right will be determined by the court, but AHF retains
every argument on why the amount of fees and allowable costs
claimed should be reduced.”
“Class Counsel Fees Payment” and “Class Counsel
Litigation Expenses Payment” were collectively defined
elsewhere in the agreement as “the amounts allocated to Class
Counsel, as determined by the Court’s order on Class Counsel’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs heard at the Final Approval
Hearing, for reimbursement of reasonable attorneys’ fees and
expenses, respectively, incurred to prosecute the Action.” The
term “allowable costs” was not defined, and the settlement
agreement did not cite Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5,
which enumerates generally allowable costs.
The trial court approved the settlement agreement in May
2025.
IV. Motion for Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses
A. Motion
Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees and litigation
expenses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 in
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February 2025. They sought a lodestar of $3,675,730.75 for
4,734.3 hours of work completed through the filing of the motion
and a 2.0 multiplier, for a total of $7,351,461.50. Plaintiffs also
requested estimated attorney fees of $113,550.00 for 115 hours of
work they expected to perform subsequent to the motion’s filing;
they did not seek a multiplier on these fees. Their total attorney
fee request accordingly totaled $7,465,011.50.
Plaintiffs also sought an “award of Litigation Expenses” to
reimburse expenditures in 12 categories, including court reporter
fees, mediation, discovery software, expert fees, client
transportation, and trial equipment. The requested expenses
totaled $272,931.03. Plaintiffs additionally asked the court to
order defendant to reimburse the court for their waived filing fees
in the amount of $7,883.50.
Plaintiffs’ lead attorneys, Annette Harings and Jennifer
Kramer, each filed a declaration in support of the motion.
Kramer attached approximately 150 pages of timesheets and 10
pages of expense logs to her declaration. Plaintiffs also filed
several declarations from attorneys not involved in the case.
Those declarants generally opined that plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly
rates, which ranged from $395 to $1,210, were reasonable and
within market range. Two of the declarants further opined that
the requested 2.0 multiplier was reasonable and necessary to
ensure a fully compensatory fee.
B. Opposition
Defendant opposed the motion. It argued that plaintiffs
should not recover fees for any work performed after June 2020,
because their counsel was the cause of the breakdown in
settlement negotiations. Defendant alternatively argued that
plaintiffs’ lodestar should be reduced by 90 percent “or
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disregarded entirely” for a variety of reasons, including “lack of
experience, limited success, over-litigating, overbilling,
unreasonable hourly rates, and lack of civility.”
Defendant also challenged plaintiffs’ request for litigation
expenses. Defendant argued that it “never agreed to pay
Plaintiffs’ ‘litigation expenses,’” and instead agreed only to pay
“allowable” costs as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section
1033.5. Using the statute as a guide, defendant argued that
plaintiffs’ “expenses” included “$163,522.45 in costs that are not
allowable under California law,” namely the categories of
expenditures listed above.
Defendant filed numerous declarations in support of its
opposition, from people involved in the matter and from outside
attorneys. The declarants generally offered testimony and
opinion regarding the parties’ early settlement efforts and
plaintiffs’ counsels’ lack of civility, efficiency, and efficacy. One
declarant, a fee arbitrator, opined that plaintiffs’ counsels
misallocated administrative tasks and billed excessive time at
excessive rates; another opined their bills were “vague and
ambiguous.” Defendant also filed detailed objections to plaintiffs’
declarations.
C. Reply and Surreply
Plaintiffs filed a reply, accompanied by additional
declarations from Harings and Kramer, multiple exhibits, and
objections to defendant’s declarations. They also filed objections
to defendant’s opposition evidence. Defendant subsequently filed
a surreply, along with objections to plaintiffs’ new declarations
and a new declaration of its own.
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D. Hearing and Ruling
The trial court heard the fee motion on May 8, 2025. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court remarked that it had over 40
years of collective experience as a member of the bar and bench
and consequently was “intimately familiar with the market for
legal services” in the Los Angeles area. It further stated that it
was “familiar with the nature of the issue [sic] to be litigated and
the way in which they were litigated,” because it had supervised
the case “for over 36 months.”
The court subsequently issued a written order granting the
motion in part. In the order, it reiterated its familiarity “with the
tangled, mutually argumentative, and inefficient progress” of the
case, as well as “the twists and turns” that happened when the
matter was before another judge. It found that the “hostility
between counsel” was “an instance of ‘mutual combat,’” inasmuch
as “defense counsel have greatly complicated Plaintiff’s tasks by
its own strategic and tactical choices, greatly increasing the time
required for Plaintiff and her counsel to vindicate significant
habitability shortcomings” at the Madison. The court also found,
however, that plaintiffs “did not prevail on many of the legal and
factual theories contained in the pleading,” including “a
potentially high exposure claim under Civil Code § 1942.6,” and
failed to obtain class certification on “many theories of liability.”
On the other hand, the court was “not persuaded that any kind of
definitive settlement was in hand in 2020 as between Plaintiff
Davis, her counsel, and Defendant and its counsel as then
comprised,” particularly in light of the “troubles in bringing this
tentative settlement over the finish line” years later. The court
further found that the breakdown of the initial settlement
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negotiations marked “the start of a long course of mutual
incivility.”
The court continued: “Since the Court is going to exercise
its discretion to (1) deny a requested multiplier to the fee award,
(2) reduce the award due to incivility by 12% as to the portion
allocable to Law Offices of Annette Harings and 6% as to the
portion allocable to Kramer Brown Hui LLP (though greater
reductions for either firm could be justified), (3) reduce the award
due to Plaintiff’s failure on many of the theories of liability
originally pursued for class recovery by 18% (though a greater
reduction could be justified), and (4) reduce the award due to the
inefficiency in which Plaintiff’s counsel litigated the case due to
overstaffing, especially at court hearings and status conferences,
by 10% as to the portion allocable to Law Offices of Annette
Harings and 16% as to the portion allocable to Kramer Brown
Hui LLP (though greater reductions for either firm could be
justified) (for a total aggregate reduction of 40% as to each such
firm), the Court will go gentle on the lodestar request, as such, as
a starting point. Since this case has been pending for five years
and Plaintiff’s counsel are waiting for their money, the Court is
prepared to accept the billing rates sought to cover the entire
period, but not to endorse to other courts the rates as justified,
but simply to use them as a basis for somewhat [sic] crude, but
necessary, math exercise. The lodestar for all hours is
$3,789,280.75 ($3,675,730.75 to Feb. 13, 2025, plus $113,550.00
post Feb. 13, 2025). Applying the 40% reduction determined
above, the 60% net award is (rounded to the nearest thousand
dollars) $2,274,000, of this $1,227,960 (54%) to Kramer Brown
Hui LLP and $1,046,040 (46%) to Law Offices of Annette
Harings.”
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The court then turned to plaintiffs’ request for “expenses.”
It found that the settlement agreement permitted plaintiffs to
seek only “allowable costs,” which “is a term of art and not the
same as ‘litigation expenses,’” the term used “in introductory
language to this section and its header before Plaintiff’s counsel’s
rights are actually stated.” The court accordingly adopted
defendant’s position and awarded plaintiffs costs of $117,292.08,
inclusive of previously waived filing fees. It then noted that its
“downward adjustment of the attorney fee award was made
mindful of the semantic trap which Defendant may have set for
Plaintiff’s counsel regarding ‘allowable cost’ given the particular
phrasing used (indirect evidence of the ‘mutual combat’ of
incivility which has characterized this case to this very moment).
In simple terms, the loss here is made up by a less exacting
downward adjustment of the lodestar; the loss here is equal what
otherwise easily could be a further 7% reduction of the lodestar,
which is a matter subject to the Court’s broad discretion based on
its close experience with the litigation history here and the value
of legal services in this market[.]”
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
“The fundamental approach for an award of attorney fees is
the lodestar method.” (Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1051.) “Using that method, the trial court first
determines a touchstone or lodestar figure based on a careful
compilation of the time spent by, and the reasonable hourly
compensation for, each attorney, and the resulting dollar amount
is then adjusted upward or downward by taking various relevant
factors into account.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47
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Cal.4th 970, 985.) Those factors include “(1) the novelty of and
difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in
presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the
contingent nature of the fee award” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (Ketchum)), and (5) civility, which is an aspect
of skill. (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 734, 747.) The purpose of the adjustments is to “fix a
fee at the fair market value for the particular action.” (Ketchum,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “In effect, the court determines,
retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk
or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of
the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market
rate for such services.” (Ibid.)
In making that determination, the trial court must perform
at least some analysis; it may not merely “rubberstamp” a
request for fees. (Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 908, 921 (Snoeck).) However, it is not required to
issue a statement of decision (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
1140) or make specific findings as to every charge (Snoeck, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 921). The trial court thus may make an
across-the-board percentage cut to the lodestar figure, though it
must “‘clearly explain its reasons for choosing the particular
negative multiplier that it chose.’” (Snoeck, supra, at p. 921
quoting Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)
We review attorney fee orders for abuse of discretion.
(Snoeck, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 921.) “The “‘experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
rendered in his court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course
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subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’”” (Ketchum, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 1132.) We presume the trial court considered all
relevant factors when making its award, even if they are not
expressly discussed in the written ruling. (Snoeck, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 921.) As in all appeals, the appellant bears the
burden of showing error. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
1141.)
II. Analysis
A. Lodestar Calculation and Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred from the outset by
failing to “make an independent, careful calculation of the
lodestar.” Instead, defendant argues, the court “got the
established process exactly backwards” by making “case-specific
additions or reductions” first, and then relying upon those
adjustments “as a basis to not engage in the required lodestar
analysis.” We are not persuaded. Although the court
summarized its adjustments prior to stating the lodestar, it
calculated the figure as prescribed by multiplying the number of
hours it deemed reasonable by the billing rates it deemed
reasonable. The court’s statement that it would “go gentle on the
lodestar request, as such, as a starting point” does not
demonstrate the contrary. Rather than reducing the number of
hours included at the lodestar stage, the court went “gentle”
there and accounted for inefficiency by applying substantial
percentage reductions to the lodestar. It was within its discretion
to take that approach, which avoided duplicative reductions. (See
Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138 [“when determining the
appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these
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factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the
lodestar”].)
We are equally unpersuaded by defendant’s contention that
the court abused its discretion by “arbitrarily accepting without
evaluating the reasonableness of the number of hours … in the
lodestar calculation.” Plaintiffs’ hours were supported by billing
records and declarations, to which the court implicitly overruled
defendant’s objections. We presume the court considered these
documents. (See Taylor v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 980.) The court’s incorporation of
those documented hours into the initial lodestar accordingly was
not arbitrary. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs achieved only
limited success even though they “ran up the hours” in a variety
of ways, and the lodestar should have reflected these infirmities.
The court expressly made appreciable percentage reductions to
the fee award for both inefficiency (10%, 16%) and limited success
(18%). This is an acceptable accounting method. (See Gorman v.
Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 100
[“Instead of calculating a total number of excessive hours, the
trial court might have applied a negative multiplier.”].)
Defendant also challenges the other component of the
lodestar, the reasonable compensation for time expended.
Improperly citing an unpublished trial court opinion, defendant
contends the court failed to determine whether the billed rates
were within the range of reasonable rates charged by comparable
attorneys for comparable work. Defendant asserts the hourly
rates were “shockingly high,” and points to one of the
declarations it submitted in opposition to the motion. However,
plaintiffs submitted multiple declarations attesting to the
reasonableness of their rates, and the trial court additionally
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cited its decades of experience with the local market. It was not
an abuse of discretion or demonstration of prejudice for the court
to rely on these sources rather than those presented by
defendant.
The trial court also explained that it considered that “this
case has been pending for five years” in determining the hourly
rates. The court was permitted to consider the contingency
nature of the fee award (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132),
and “delayed payment” is part of that risk (id. at p. 1136)
because “payment today for services rendered long in the past
deprives the eventual recipient of the value of the use of the
money in the meantime” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 584).
We reject defendant’s contention that the court “relied on
only one factor,” the delay in payment to plaintiffs’ counsel, when
assessing the reasonableness of the billed rates. The trial court
also noted its forty years of experience and familiarity with the
Los Angeles legal market. Moreover, we presume the trial court
considered all relevant factors when making its award, even if it
did not expressly mention them in the written ruling. (Snoeck,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 921.)
B. Failure to Make Greater Reductions
At several points in its written order, the court
parenthetically observed that greater percentage reductions to
the fee award “could be justified.” Defendant contends the court
abused its discretion by failing to make these reductions. We
disagree.
The court has “considerable discretion to award reasonable
attorney fees.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra,
178 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) Determining the precise percentage
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by which to reduce or increase an award lies squarely within that
discretion. The court’s consideration and ultimate rejection of
further reductions in this case evinces a thoughtful exercise of
discretion, not an abuse of it. Moreover, the court did not find
further reductions were justified, only that they could be justified.
It did not abuse its discretion by ultimately concluding further
reductions were unwarranted under all the circumstances of the
case.
C. Alleged Punishment of Defendant and Revision
of Settlement Agreement
In its award of costs, the court accepted defendant’s “well
argued” position that the cost provision of the settlement
agreement authorized only an award of costs “allowable” by Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 rather than a more expansive
universe of “litigation expenses.” The court limited plaintiffs’ cost
recovery accordingly. Yet, it also characterized the cost provision
as a “semantic trap which Defendant may have set for Plaintiff’s
counsel” by using more restrictive language in the provision than
in the accompanying “introductory language” and “header.” To
account for this “indirect evidence of the ‘mutual combat’ of
incivility,” the court made a “less exacting downward adjustment”
of the lodestar than it otherwise might have.
Defendant takes umbrage at the court’s characterization of
the provision as a possible “semantic trap” and “mutual combat,”
and contends the court prejudicially “punished” defendant and
impermissibly rewrote the settlement agreement by “including
disallowed costs in the attorney fee portion of the award.” We
find no abuse of discretion in either the characterization or the
award.
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The voluminous record before this court amply supports the
trial court’s observation that the litigation of this case was
“tangled, mutually argumentative, [ ] inefficient,” and mutually
combative. “Seasoning a disagreement with avoidable irritants
can turn a minor conflict into a costly and protracted war”
(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th
at p. 747), and that is precisely what happened here. Counsel’s
interpersonal conflicts and tensions spilled over into scorched
earth litigation tactics. The court’s use of the phrase “mutual
combat” was an apt indictment of both sides, not an insult
directed solely at defendant.1
Defendant asserts it is not a “semantic trap” to use
boilerplate language in a costs provision, and suggests the court
punished it based on mere speculation. The court accurately
recognized, however, that the provision said one thing and
language elsewhere in the agreement, including the provision’s
heading, said another. The court nevertheless adopted
defendant’s interpretation of the agreement and awarded
plaintiffs less than half their requested expenses in accordance
with that interpretation. This is not indicative of punishment to
or passion and prejudice against defendant.
The court’s “less exacting” approach to the lodestar was
also permissible. As discussed above, refining and adjusting a fee
award to fit the circumstances of the case is quintessentially
discretionary. The court explained the reasoning behind its
1 In their respondent’s brief, plaintiffs alluded to a 2022
hearing at which the trial court stated that defendant engaged in
“sort of cowboy behavior” by approaching represented class
members. In its reply brief, defendant suggests this was further
evidence of the court’s “passion and prejudice” against defendant.
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percentage reduction, and that reasoning finds support in the
record. The court did not abuse its broad discretion or evince bias
against defendant by taking the costs award into consideration
when fashioning the fee award.
We are also not persuaded that the trial court
impermissibly rewrote the settlement agreement. Defendant is
correct that a court may not revise a settlement agreement (see
Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 521, 539) or rewrite by construction an unambiguous
contract. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 900, 923.) The court did not delete, modify, or
otherwise alter the terms of the agreement regarding costs by
declining to further reduce the lodestar. It recognized an
ambiguity between the narrow language of the costs provision
and the broader meaning of the defined term “Class Counsel
Litigation Expenses Payment.” Under these circumstances, the
court acted within its broad discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Plaintiffs may recover their costs of
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
MORI, ACTING P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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