Rodriguez v. Vallarta Food Enterprises CA2/1

CourtListener 10869053Calctapp1 giu 2026

Testo completo

Filed 6/1/26 Rodriguez v. Vallarta Food Enterprises CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MARIA RODRIGUEZ, B343389

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23BBCV00863)
v.

VALLARTA FOOD
ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sarah J. Heidel, Judge. Affirmed.
Vaziri Law Group, Mark Giannamore; Law Office of
Mohammed Aly and Mohammed Aly for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dunbar & Derossi and Matt D. Derossi for Defendant and
Respondent.
_______________________________
Plaintiff Maria Rodriguez appeals from a judgment entered
after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant Vallarta Food Enterprises, Inc. (Vallarta) in this action
alleging negligence and premises liability based on a slip-and-fall
incident at one of Vallarta’s stores. Because Vallarta satisfied its
burden on summary judgment and Rodriguez has not shown a
triable issue of material fact, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On April 20, 2023, Rodriguez filed a form complaint against
Vallarta, asserting causes of action for negligence and premises
liability. She alleged that on July 29, 2021, she “was proceeding
with reasonable care” at premises “negligently maintained,
owned, managed, and/or inspected” by Vallarta, “when she
encountered” a “wet and slippery substance” on the “floor in an
area where [Vallarta] knew or should have known [its] customers
would walk,” causing her to “slip and fall to her injury.”
Rodriguez further alleged that “this dangerous condition existed
for a sufficient period of time, that [Vallarta] knew about this
dangerous condition, that [Vallarta] should have remedied the
condition and/or warned persons such as [Rodriguez] of same,
and that [Vallarta’s] failure to do so, notwithstanding [its] duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, was
negligent.”
On August 12, 2021, two weeks after Rodriguez’s fall and
more than one and one-half years before she filed her complaint,
an attorney then representing Rodriguez sent a letter to Vallarta
demanding that Vallarta “take all necessary steps to preserve
any and all evidence,” specifically surveillance video of the
incident. This letter is pertinent to a spoliation of evidence claim

2
Rodriguez made in opposing the summary judgment motion that
we address (and reject) post.

B. Factual Summary
Rodriguez fell at 9:09 a.m., while she was shopping in the
produce department at a Vallarta store in Burbank.
We derive the following factual summary from evidence the
parties presented on summary judgment, including but not
limited to, video stills from a surveillance video of the incident
that Vallarta produced to Rodriguez during discovery1 and
transcripts from the depositions of Rodriguez, Evelyn Hernandez
(a Vallarta customer service manager who was working in the
store when the incident occurred), and Jose Sorto (the Vallarta
store manager who was also in the store when the incident
occurred).
1. Circumstances and inspections of the scene
before Rodriguez’s fall
As reflected in video stills from the surveillance video, at
8:20 a.m., 49 minutes before Rodriguez’s fall, a store employee
used a hose to spray water onto produce located on the store’s
“wet rack,” an area where produce was displayed and accessible
to customers. A “PIG mat” was glued to the floor next to the wet
rack. The mat had a plastic bottom and a carpeted top that could

1 In support of its summary judgment motion, Vallarta

lodged the surveillance video with the trial court. Rodriguez did
not provide the video to this court. The appellate record includes
numerous stills from the video that the parties relied on in
making their respective cases on summary judgment, including
stills showing a Vallarta employee’s inspections of the subject
area of the store prior to Rodriguez’s fall, and stills showing the
precise location where Rodriguez slipped and fell.

3
absorb liquid and prevent it from spilling onto the adjacent
linoleum tile flooring. There is no evidence in the record
regarding the quantity of liquid the mat could absorb.
The wet rack was equipped with sprinklers that could be
set to spray water onto the produce at adjustable intervals.
There is no evidence in the record revealing when these
sprinklers last activated prior to Rodriguez’s fall. Nor is there
evidence indicating that these sprinklers caused water to spill
onto the mat or the floor. Sorto and Hernandez both testified
they were not aware of such spillage occurring due to activation
of the sprinklers. Sorto testified that when customers grabbed
wet produce off the wet rack drops of water “could” fall off the
produce and land on the floor. Hernandez testified that although
the produce “[c]ould be” wet, she had never seen water on the
floor as a result of customers taking produce off the wet rack.
At 8:26 a.m., an employee ran a mop over the linoleum floor
next to the PIG mat in the wet rack area. The employee did not
bring a water bucket to use with the mop. At 8:27 a.m., the
employee placed a yellow caution cone on the linoleum floor
where he had mopped.
Beginning at approximately 8:31 a.m., another employee
conducted a formal “Gleason inspection” in the area around the
wet rack. Pursuant to Vallarta policy (in place at the time of the
subject incident), every 30 minutes an employee walks through
the entire store to ensure there are no liquids or other items on
the floor. If anything is found, the employee must clean it up
immediately. During the inspection, the employee carries a
broom, a dustpan, and a towel. If other items are needed for
cleanup (e.g., a mop), the employee must call for assistance and
stay at the location of the spill. The employee also carries a

4
“Gleason device” to electronically record information about the
inspection, including whether an area on the predetermined,
mandatory inspection route required a cleanup of liquid or a dry
item. One button on the device is pressed to record the presence
of liquid and another to record the presence of a dry item.
During the inspection of the area commencing at
approximately 8:31 a.m., the employee found no wetness on the
linoleum floor near the wet rack. She examined the floor,
walking all around the yellow caution cone. She carried a towel
in case she needed to wipe up liquid, but she did not use it. At
8:32 a.m., she used a broom and a dustpan to sweep dry items
from the PIG mat. She recorded the results of her inspection
using the Gleason electronic device.
The same employee conducted her next Gleason inspection
of the area around the wet rack beginning at approximately 9:02
a.m., and again she found no wetness on the linoleum floor. At
9:03 a.m., she used the broom and the dustpan to sweep dry
items from the PIG mat. She did not use the towel to wipe up
any liquid.
Between 8:32 and 9:09 a.m., customers walked through the
area adjacent to the wet rack at least 18 times without incident.
2. Rodriguez’s fall
Between 9:06 and 9:08 a.m., Rodriguez walked back and
forth through the area adjacent to the wet rack without incident
and noticed no wetness on the linoleum floor or the PIG mat.
At 9:09 a.m., approximately six minutes after the last
Gleason inspection of the area, Rodriguez was walking on the
linoleum floor next to the PIG mat when she slipped and fell.
Stills from the surveillance video show that Rodriguez’s position
when she slipped was above the yellow caution cone (in other

5
words, on the far side of the cone from where the camera was
located). She landed with the left side of her body on the PIG
mat and the lower part of her legs and her feet on the linoleum
floor.
After the fall, Rodriguez noticed that the back of her shorts
were wet where they made contact with the PIG mat. She
confirmed at her deposition that she never observed any water on
the mat with her eyes or touched any water with her hands. She
concluded there was water on the mat because her shorts were
wet after the fall.
Approximately one minute after Rodriguez fell, a customer
helped her stand up. Rodriguez walked back over the floor where
she had slipped and did not have an issue or slip a second time.
Nor did she observe any water on the linoleum floor. She walked
to the front of the store near the cash registers and told customer
service manager Evelyn Hernandez that she had fallen.
3. Inspection of the area after Rodriguez’s fall
Rodriguez led Hernandez to the place where the incident
occurred. Hernandez inspected the linoleum floor in and around
the area where Rodriguez said she slipped. Hernandez did not
find anything on the floor, including any wetness. Nor did
Hernandez observe any liquid on the PIG mat in the area where
Rodriguez fell. Hernandez took a photo of Rodriguez’s knee and
provided it to store manager Jose Sorto.
Sorto spoke with Rodriguez before she left the store
following the incident. After Rodriguez left the store, Sorto
inspected the area where she slipped. This was approximately 18
minutes after the fall. He had reviewed the surveillance video
and observed that she slipped on the linoleum floor in an area
above the yellow caution cone (when looking at the video or the

6
stills). He found no wetness on the floor in this area. When he
inspected the floor on the other side of the cone (below the cone
when looking at the video or the stills)—an area where Rodriguez
did not slip—he discovered little drops of water that he wiped up
with a paper towel. He took one or two photos of the wet paper
towel and sent the photo(s) to Vallarta’s corporate loss prevention
department.
A still from the surveillance video shows that at 9:37 a.m.,
approximately 28 minutes after Rodriguez fell, an employee may
have been wiping the PIG mat with a towel.

C. Rodriguez’s Discovery of Photos Taken by Vallarta’s
Employees
As part of her spoliation or concealment of evidence claim,
discussed post, Rodriguez references the photo(s) Sorto said he
took of the wet paper towel on the linoleum floor on the opposite
side of the caution cone from where she slipped.
During Sorto’s deposition, after Sorto testified about the
photo(s) he took, Rodriguez’s counsel noted that in response to
form interrogatories Vallarta identified four photographs but did
not produce them in response to Rodriguez’s document requests.
The following exchange occurred between counsel:
“[Rodriguez’s counsel:] I assume that you’re going to get
those [the photos] to me, counsel?
“[Vallarta’s counsel]: Depends on what the request was.
“[Rodriguez’s counsel]: Okay. Well, then I’ll tell you what I
do. What I always do when I was on the defense. I’ll do some
follow-up discovery.
“[Vallarta’s counsel]: That’s fine.”
This was two months before Vallarta filed its motion for
summary judgment and five months before Rodriguez filed her

7
opposition. There is no indication in the record that Rodriguez
sent a follow-up discovery request seeking production of the
photos.
To the extent Rodriguez believed the photos were
responsive to the document requests she served prior to Sorto’s
deposition, she did not file a motion to compel production of the
photos.2

D. Vallarta’s Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Moving papers
In July 2024, Vallarta filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing Rodriguez could not establish the causation
element of her causes of action. Vallarta argued, Rodriguez “has
no direct evidence of what caused her to fall, and therefore she
assumes, because she felt wetness on her shorts from landing on

2 It is not clear from the record if Rodriguez had a claim

that the photo of the wet paper towel was responsive to her
document requests. In opposing the summary judgment motion,
she highlighted the following requests, as set forth in Vallarta’s
responses to the document requests: “ALL DOCUMENTS,
including but not limited to video surveillance and photographs,
which depict the SUBJECT INCIDENT” and “ALL
DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to photographs or video
footage, which depict the area of YOUR PREMISES where the
SUBJECT INCIDENT occurred from the day of the SUBJECT
INCIDENT.” The record does not include Rodriguez’s original
document requests, and therefore we do not know how she
defined the term “SUBJECT INCIDENT” in the requests.
Without the definition, it cannot be determined if the photo of the
wet paper towel on the linoleum floor, on the opposite side of the
yellow caution cone from where Rodriguez slipped, was
responsive to her document requests.

8
an area unrelated to where she started to fall, that she must have
fallen due to wetness on [Vallarta]’s floor mat. Given that
[Rodriguez] never saw, touched, smelled, or photographed the
alleged wetness, and no wetness was ever found afterwards [at
the place where Rodriguez slipped], this amounts to guess,
conjecture, and speculation.”
Vallarta also argued there is no evidence demonstrating its
employees caused wetness by “stocking the wet rack, misting the
vegetables at the wet rack, or performing a light spot mop of the
checkered linoleum flooring near the wet rack.” According to
Vallarta’s accident reconstruction expert, who submitted a
declaration in support of the summary judgment motion, based
on the evaporation formula for liquids such as water, “No wetness
would still have been present [at the time of Rodriquez’s fall]
either on the floor or on the Pig Mat from the employees stocking,
misting, or mopping 49-43 minutes earlier.” Vallarta asserted
that in any event, it “exercised reasonable care when it placed a
bright yellow caution cone” in the area.
Vallarta further argued it did not have constructive notice
of any wetness on the floor, given its employee performed two
formal inspections of the area—one approximately six minutes
before Rodriguez fell—and no wetness was found. Vallarta also
pointed out that numerous customers walked through the area
without incident prior to Rodriguez’s fall.
2. Opposition
Rodriguez served Vallarta with a demand for an inspection
of the Burbank store where the incident occurred, and noticed the
inspection for October 12, 2024, more than three years after the
incident and 10 days before Rodriguez’s opposition to the
summary judgment motion was due. Vallarta’s counsel notified

9
Rodriguez’s counsel that Vallarta had changed the flooring in the
store on August 21, 2024. Vallarta offered to make another store
available for Rodriguez’s inspection, one with the same type of
flooring the Burbank store had at the time of the July 29, 2021
incident. On October 16, 2024, Rodriguez’s “safety and liability
expert” inspected a Vallarta store in Lancaster.
A senior forensic expert, who was not the individual who
conducted the inspection in Lancaster, but who worked for the
same engineering firm, submitted a declaration in support of
Rodriguez’s opposition to the summary judgment motion. The
expert stated that he attempted to ascertain “the proximate slip-
resistance index of the subject floor finish within the [i]ncident
[Burbank] location,” based on the inspection of the Lancaster
location, but he could not do so because Vallarta had not
produced (1) information regarding “patron and shopping-cart
counts for the exemplar [Lancaster] store”; (2) “photographs of
the condition of the floor at the [i]ncident location identifying the
wear of the subject floor at the time of the [i]ncident and
subsequently at the time of the replacement of the floor finish”;
and (3) information “regarding any applications of waxes,
sealants, or other floor additives at the exemplar location prior to
the [expert] inspection.” Rodriguez has pointed to nothing in the
record indicating she ever requested such information from
Vallarta.3
In her opposition to the summary judgment motion,
Rodriguez argued that Vallarta did not satisfy its burden on
summary judgment and that she showed triable issues of

3 The trial court sustained Vallarta’s objections to the

expert’s opinions regarding the cause of Rodriguez’s fall, and
Rodriguez does not challenge the evidentiary ruling on appeal.

10
material fact. She stated, among other things, that “the evidence
shows that [Vallarta]’s employees were actively engaged in
activities that could create wet conditions on the floor, such as
spraying produce with water and mopping without proper
equipment” (an apparent reference to the absence of a water
bucket when the employee mopped the linoleum floor before
placing the yellow caution cone). She also noted, “After the
incident, [Sorto] observed little drops of water on the floor near
the area where [she] fell, on the side opposite the wet rack.” She
further stated that the wetness on her shorts and a video still of
an employee wiping the PIG mat 28 minutes after her fall
“support a reasonable inference that the wet condition of the mat
and floor caused [her] fall and resulting injuries.”
Rodriguez asserted that, because Vallarta did not include
any facts in its separate statement of undisputed material facts
regarding its placement of the yellow caution cone, the argument
in its memorandum of points and authorities that it exercised
reasonable care by placing the cone was improper.
She also argued Vallarta could not “shift the burden to
[her] by spoliating and concealing evidence.” She referenced the
photos taken by Hernandez and Sorto on the date she fell and the
change of flooring at the Burbank store where the incident
occurred.
3. Trial court’s ruling and judgment
On November 5, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on
Vallarta’s motion for summary judgment and took the matter
under submission. On November 8, 2024, the court issued an
order granting the motion. Thereafter, the court entered

11
judgment in favor of Vallarta, and Rodriguez filed a timely notice
of appeal.4

DISCUSSION
Rodriguez contends Vallarta failed to satisfy its burden on
summary judgment, but even if the burden shifted to her, she
showed triable issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment. We disagree with her contentions and conclude
summary judgment was proper.

A. Standard of Review
A trial court should grant summary judgment “if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant may establish a right to summary judgment by
showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Once the moving defendant has satisfied this burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of

4 After the trial court entered judgment, Rodriguez filed a

motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary
judgment. The court held a hearing on the motion for
reconsideration after Rodriguez filed her notice of appeal from
the summary judgment. The court denied the motion for
reconsideration based on lack of jurisdiction and stated that even
if it retained jurisdiction, it would deny the motion on the merits.
Although Rodriguez referenced the motion for reconsideration in
her opening appellate brief, she does not raise any legal
contentions for us to review regarding the denial.

12
material fact exists as to each cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A triable issue of material fact exists where
“the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[A]n
issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not
created by speculation or conjecture.” (Horn v. Cushman &
Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807; Aguilar,
at p. 864 [“Speculation . . . is not evidence,” and it is not sufficient
to show a triable issue of material fact].)
“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering
all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers
except that to which objections were made and sustained.”
(Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65-66.) We
view the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.”
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
We “are not bound by the reasons in [the trial court’s]
summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court,
not its rationale.” (Joshi v. Fitness International, LLC (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 814, 824.) “Thus, a reviewing court ‘will affirm a
summary judgment if it is correct on any ground that the parties
had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court,
regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.’ ” (Nicoletti v. Kest
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 140, 144.)

B. Applicable Law
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability
claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and
proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court

13
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) To prevail on a cause of action
against a premises owner in a slip-and-fall case, there must be
proof “ ‘ “that a dangerous condition existed, and that the
defendant knew or should have known of it.” ’ ” (Kaney v.
Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 221.)
Grocery store owners are not insurers of their patrons’
safety but do owe them a “duty to exercise reasonable care in
keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 (Ortega).) If an owner or a store
employee has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous
condition on the premises, the owner has a duty to remedy it.
(Id. at p. 1206; Hatfield v. Levy Brothers (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798,
806; Getchell v. Rogers Jewelry (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 381, 385-
386.) To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the
store owner either directly caused the dangerous condition or had
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
(Ortega, at pp. 1205-1206; Hatfield, at p. 806.)
Where a dangerous condition is created by the premises
owner’s employee, the owner is charged with notice of that
condition. (Getchell v. Rogers Jewelry, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at
p. 385.) Where a dangerous condition is created by a third party,
the owner has constructive knowledge of that condition when the
“condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent
person to have discovered it.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p.
1207.) If “there is no direct evidence of the length of time the
dangerous condition existed, the plaintiff can demonstrate the
store owner had constructive notice of the dangerous condition by
showing that the site had not been inspected within a reasonable
period of time.” (Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 472, 477.) “[E]vidence of the owner’s failure to

14
inspect the premises within a reasonable period of time is
sufficient to allow an inference that the condition was on the floor
long enough to give the owner the opportunity to discover and
remedy it.” (Ortega, at p. 1203.) The issue of whether a store’s
inspections were reasonable is ordinarily a question of fact (id. at
p. 1213) but may be decided as a matter of law when the evidence
“is insufficient to support an inference that the defendant
proprietor failed to exercise the care required.” (Girvetz v. Boys’
Market, Inc. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 831, 832 [one and one-half
minutes was too short as a matter of law to provide constructive
notice to the store owner of the dangerous condition, a banana on
the floor].)

C. Analysis
1. Vallarta satisfied its burden
Rodriguez contends Vallarta failed to satisfy its initial
burden on summary judgment, arguing (1) because Rodriguez
testified that her shorts became wet when she landed on the mat
after her fall, Vallarta did not negate the existence of a
dangerous condition; (2) because Vallarta “did not assert any
facts whatsoever regarding the source of the water or the timing
of the spill,” “admit[ted] that is placed a ‘bright yellow caution
cone in the area’ approximately forty-three minutes before the
incident,” and the incident occurred in a “high-traffic location
where spills were frequent and expected,” Vallarta “did not
establish that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the water
on its floor”; and (3) Vallarta was precluded from shifting the
burden to Rodriguez because it engaged in spoliation of evidence.
None of these arguments has merit.
In its moving papers, Vallarta showed that as a matter of
law, Rodriguez cannot prevail on a cause of action for negligence

15
or premises liability because she cannot establish a dangerous
condition caused her to slip and fall. No one observed anything
on the linoleum floor in the place where Rodriguez slipped—not
the employee who conducted a formal inspection of the area
approximately six minutes before Rodriguez fell; not Rodriguez;
and not Hernandez and Sorto who inspected the area after
Rodriguez fell. That the incident occurred near a wet rack, where
produce is sprayed with water and customers may take wet
produce off the rack, does not establish Vallarta had actual or
constructive notice of water on the floor in the place where
Rodriguez slipped (where no water was found). Rodriguez’s
argument to the contrary would make Vallarta strictly liable for
any slip-and-fall that occurs without an obvious cause near the
wet rack. But this is not the law. “ ‘[N]egligence is never
presumed’ ” in a situation such as this. (Buehler v. Alpha Beta
Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 729, 734.) The burden shifted to
Rodriguez to show a dangerous condition caused her fall.
We reject Rodriguez’s claim that spoliation or concealment
of evidence precluded Vallarta from shifting the burden to
Rodriguez because it “hindered [her] ability to prove causation.”
At least five months before she filed her opposition to the
summary judgment motion, Rodriguez was aware of the photo(s)
Sorto took of the wet paper towel he used to wipe the little drops
of water off the linoleum floor on the opposite side of the yellow
caution cone from where she slipped. At Sorto’s deposition,
Rodriguez’s counsel did not contend the photo was responsive to
the document requests Rodriguez had already served. Rather,
counsel said he would send Vallarta “follow-up discovery”
requesting the photo (and others Vallarta identified in a response
to a form interrogatory). Rodriguez did not serve a subsequent

16
discovery request for the photos or file a motion to compel
Vallarta to produce the photos. At oral argument in this appeal,
Rodriguez’s counsel claimed Vallarta failed to preserve or
destroyed the photos but acknowledged there is nothing in the
record supporting this claim. Thus, we have no cause to reverse
the summary judgment based on spoliation or concealment of
photos. In any event, we fail to see how the photo, as described in
Rodriguez’s appellate briefing, would tend to prove causation,
given Sorto testified the photo depicted a small amount of
wetness found 18 minutes after Rodriguez fell in a location where
she did not slip.
As to the replacement of the linoleum flooring at the
Burbank store, it is not clear the evidence preservation letter
covered this, given the letter did not specifically mention the
flooring, indicate Rodriguez ever planned to inspect the flooring,
or request notice before Vallarta made improvements to the
property. In any event, Rodriguez’s inability to inspect the
linoleum flooring at the Burbank store was a problem of her own
making, as she delayed more than three years before requesting
an inspection. Finally, any inspection of the flooring would be
irrelevant to our analysis, as we conclude Rodriguez cannot
establish that there was water on the floor where she slipped (the
purported dangerous condition) and that Vallarta had actual or
constructive notice of it. Thus, we have no cause to reverse the
summary judgment based on spoliation of evidence related to the
flooring.

17
2. Rodriguez has not shown a triable issue of
material fact
Rodriguez’s claim that she slipped on water (or any hazard)
is not based on evidence. It is based on speculation, which is
insufficient to show a triable issue of material fact.
Rodriguez testified that her shorts became wet when they
made contact with the PIG mat after her fall. This does not raise
a triable issue that the linoleum floor where she actually slipped
was wet.
The evidence shows that approximately 18 minutes after
Rodriguez fell, Sorto wiped little drops of water off the linoleum
floor on the opposite side of the yellow caution cone from where
she slipped. Again, this does not raise a triable issue that the
area where Rodriguez slipped was wet.5 No one observed any
wetness there during inspections before and after her fall.
There is no evidence raising a triable issue of fact that
Vallarta had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous
condition on the floor where Rodriguez slipped. She argues that
a “reasonable juror” could find Vallarta had such notice because
its employees were “engaged in activities that could create wet
conditions on the floor.” (Italics added.) As discussed ante,
Vallarta is not the insurer of its customers’ safety, and it is not
strictly liable for every slip-and-fall that occurs in the vicinity of

5 At oral argument in this appeal, Rodriguez’s counsel

asserted that Sorto found the drops of water mere inches away
from where Rodriguez’s foot slipped. The video stills that
Rodriguez submitted with her opposition to the summary
judgment motion show otherwise. The distance is undisputably a
matter of feet, not inches.

18
the wet rack, regardless of evidence of a dangerous condition at
the actual place where the customer slipped.
Assuming for purposes of argument that there was liquid
on the floor where Rodriguez slipped, based on the evidence in
the record, it would be speculative to conclude that Vallarta
created the condition as opposed to a customer. Under a scenario
where a customer created the condition, we would have to
conclude there was no triable issue of fact that Vallarta had
actual or constructive notice of the condition, given its employee
inspected the area a mere six minutes before Rodriguez fell and
found no wetness or other hazard on the floor where Rodriguez
slipped.
Because Vallarta satisfied its burden on summary
judgment, and Rodriguez has not shown a triable issue of
material fact, summary judgment was proper.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to
recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J.

19

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.