People v. Somerville CA3

CourtListener 10866357Calctapp29 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/29/26 P. v. Somerville CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE, C102004
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. STKCRFE20220001128)

ROBERT ALSTON SOMERVILLE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Robert Somerville was living in a commercial building in Stockton.
Early one morning, he woke to the sound of someone trying to get inside the building.
Not realizing there was a fire outside and firefighters were trying to get in, defendant
grabbed his gun, announced he had a firearm, told the perceived intruders to move away,
and shot “a couple rounds at the door.” Firefighter Captain Max Fortuna (captain) was
struck and died. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder.
Defendant contends his conviction should be reversed for four reasons: (1) the
presence of uniformed firefighters and a fire engine at trial denied him a fair trial; (2) his
counsel’s closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (3) the trial court
prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the right to defend real or personal
property; and (4) cumulative prejudice from these errors warrants reversal. We find no
error to accumulate and affirm. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Early in the morning on January 31, 2022, a fire department dispatcher received
multiple calls regarding a fire near the Crosstown Freeway and Aurora Street in Stockton.
The dispatcher instructed Engine 2 to respond and described it as an outdoor fire. A few
minutes later, an alarm company called the dispatcher to report an audible alarm at a
commercial building at an address on South Aurora Street. The dispatcher then updated
Engine 2 on the building alarm and location.
Engine 2 arrived carrying three firefighters – the driver, a probationary firefighter,
and captain. After opening the outer property gate with a saw, probationary firefighter
started spraying the area. Captain told them they needed to get inside the building, so he
and driver went to a roll-up door and started cutting into the padlocks with a saw and an
angle grinder.
Meanwhile, inside the building, defendant was asleep in his room. One of his
employees (employee) was also inside the building sleeping in a trailer. Defendant woke
to the sound of cutting noises in the back of the building that made him think someone
was trying to break in. He didn’t know there was a fire happening. He did smell smoke,
but it smelled the “same way [as] when you’re cutting metal.” He “went out there and
said, ‘Move away from the building. I have a firearm.’ ” After “nobody said anything,”
he “squeezed a couple of rounds at the door,” specifically “down in the corner” because
he was “not trying to shoot anybody.” He just wanted to “scare them off” because he:
(1) had a “problem with people trying to break in,” (2) had “a lot of valuable equipment
in there,” (3) had a “problem in the back trailer with homeless people,” and (4) figured
people brazen enough to break in had to be armed. He also had macular degeneration
and could not see well in the dark. At some point, he woke employee and told her to call
for help, which she did by calling 911 twice. Employee later testified that defendant
saved her life that day by waking her up.

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Back outside, captain suffered a single gunshot wound to the chest that perforated
his heart.
Defendant was not sure why police detained him. When detectives told him a
firefighter had been shot, he inquired if the firefighter had been badly injured. He asked
for more information about the firefighter’s condition and was shocked to learn he had
died. He asked about the firefighter’s age and if he had a family.
Detectives questioned defendant for about an hour that morning. At first,
defendant said he told employee to call the police after he fired, but later he said he told
her to call the “fire department. Or 9-1-1” before he fired. Defendant also told detectives
he never heard a fire alarm until after he had fired the shots, and he insisted he never
intended to shoot anyone. He told the detectives he had “just used poor judgment” (and
“there’s nothing I can say to express the remorse that I feel right now for this guy and this
family. . . . I’m fucking going to prison. I know that. I guess it’d be like negligent
homicide, or something along that line.” He admitted, “I just did something stupid that
an intelligent person probably should have used a little bit more forethought.”
Defendant was charged with murder. At the start of the trial, the court instructed
the jury to not “let bias, sympathy, prejudice or public opinion influence [its] assessment
of the evidence or [its] decision.” Closing arguments emphasized this instruction: the
prosecution advised the jury not to let sympathy for the fire department or defendant
come into its analysis, and defense counsel advised the jury not to base its decision on
feeling bad for captain’s family or coworkers. The trial court repeated the bias
instruction after closing arguments.
The trial court also read instructions on homicide (CALCRIM No. 500), self-
defense (CALCRIM No. 505), defense against harm to person within home or on
property (CALCRIM No. 506), robbery, burglary, and larceny (CALCRIM Nos. 1600,
1700, & 1800), second degree murder with malice aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520),

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voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570) and imperfect
self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571), and involuntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 580).
The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder. After denying
defendant’s motion for new trial and his motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d
118, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in prison.
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Firefighter and Firetruck Presence at Trial
A. Additional Background
The court considered and granted several media requests to cover various pretrial
proceedings. Defendant asked the court to exclude “victim impact evidence” from the
courtroom including firefighter uniforms, arguing this evidence compromised
defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court denied the motion but allowed defendant to
revisit the issue if he felt the balance had become prejudicial.
On the first day of trial, counsel noted there were “approximately 30 or more
[uniformed] firemen outside” ready to come in. The court (1) commented that the
courtroom could not seat that many and (2) gave priority seating to defendant’s and
captain’s audience. The court also cautioned that it might have some spectators removed
if it became inherently prejudicial or put undue pressure on the jury. After the audience
was seated, the court stated the courtroom could seat 36 people, and it did not feel there
was an overwhelming number of people in uniform that would affect defendant’s right to
a fair trial. In particular, there was one person in uniform on the right side and a handful
on the left.
One week later, defense counsel noted counsel had been keeping track of the
uniform presence. Counsel reported as follows: on day one, there were 7 to 8 firemen;
days two and three, 15; day four, 12; and day five, 17 to 18. The court responded that it
had been “keeping a lookout” and there was “never more than half with firefighters.”

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The court observed a mixture of civilians and uniformed firefighters, with the majority
being civilians. The next trial day, the court noted “there were only two uniformed
officers.”
After the jury rendered its verdict, defendant filed a motion for new trial. Among
other things, he argued that the uniformed firefighter presence denied him a fair trial,
claiming there were over 25 uniformed firefighters in the courtroom at times and the
hallway was “packed with clusters of firefighters in uniform” in the morning and after
lunch. At the hearing on the motion, defendant also argued that “[E]ngine 2 [had] circled
this courthouse almost every day during the lunch hour.”
The court denied the motion, citing (1) its records on the number of uniformed
firefighters in the courtroom; (2) the fact that the jury went to the jury room rather than
the hallway during breaks; (3) the fact that it did not witness or become aware of any
intimidating conduct; (4) the fact that the jury never saw more uniformed firefighters than
civilians; (5) the right of firefighters to watch the trial just like any member of the public;
and (6) the jurors’ agreement during voir dire not be influenced by hearing a firefighter
case or having firefighters in the audience.
B. Contention and Analysis
Defendant contends the presence of uniformed firefighters in the courtroom and
the circling of Engine 2 during the lunch hour denied him a fair trial. In support, he cites
the number of firefighters in the hallway in the morning and at lunch and the many media
requests indicating the “local community’s close and strong relationship with the
firefighters.” We are not persuaded.
We do not address the Engine 2 issue on the merits. Defendant did not mention
this issue until oral argument on his motion for new trial and did not provide justification
for his delay. For these reasons, we consider this issue forfeited. (See Tindall v. County
of Nevada (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 78, 90 [raising issue for first time in oral argument on
motion insufficient to preserve for review]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 513

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[waiver results from defendant’s failure to object to purported misconduct].) By contrast,
defendant adequately preserved the uniformed firefighter issue, so we turn to its merits.
“In determining whether the presence of uniformed officers denies a defendant’s
right to a fair trial, a reviewing court must look ‘at the scene presented to jurors and
determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an
unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not
found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the
inquiry is over.’ ” (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 757.) “We evaluate the
level of prejudice attributable to a particular courtroom scene based on the ‘ “totality of
the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1015 (Ramirez).)
Those circumstances “may include the number of uniformed officers present, the location
and grouping of the officers in the gallery, the ratio of uniformed officers to plainclothes
spectators, the officers’ conduct, the charged crime, the arguments of counsel, and the
local community’s relationship with law enforcement officers.” (Id. at pp. 1015-1016.)
The question is whether “ ‘ “an unacceptable risk [was] presented of impermissible
factors coming into play.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1016.) “At the same time, we consider whether
the discernible ‘degree of prejudice’ was justified by other interests, such as the officers’
right to attend trial like any other member of the public.” (Ibid.) “Ultimately, our review
must be deferential to the trial court, whose handling of the challenged scene we evaluate
only for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. At the beginning and end of trial,
the court instructed the jury against letting bias influence its decision, and both parties
reinforced that instruction in closing arguments. The court noted it never saw more
uniformed firefighters than civilians in the courtroom, and that observation does not
conflict with counsel’s statements on the record. And counsel never objected to
firefighter presence in the hallways. The court also avoided unnecessary juror exposure
to spectators by returning jurors to the jury room during breaks. Even assuming the

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multiple media requests evidenced a “close and strong relationship” between the
community and the firefighters, as defendant argues, we conclude the court properly
exercised its discretion to guard against any improper influence or pressure without
impairing the firefighters’ rights to attend the trial. For these reasons, we conclude the
presence of uniformed firefighters at trial was not inherently prejudicial. And because
defendant does not contend there was actual prejudice, we reject his fair trial claim. (See
Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1018.)
II. Closing Argument
A. Additional Background
Defense counsel’s closing argument spread across two days and spans 98 pages of
the reporter’s transcript. We summarize his main points and the comments defendant
highlights.
Counsel began by sharing his plan to explain “how and why [defendant was] not
guilty.” He then described the tough nature of the case with its “significant issues” and a
“courtroom full of spectators.” After describing the burden of advocating in criminal
court as an “incredible burden” placed on the prosecution and the defense, he mentioned
the People’s burden “to prove stuff beyond a reasonable doubt.” He then referred to
“people accused [like defendant]” and described an “incredible burden to carry that every
day to the courthouse, you know. Like every day this burden of convincing the jury that
[defendant] is not guilty,” a burden that “the attorneys and the [c]ourt, we live with every
day.” He also described the burden on firemen who work 24-hour shifts and likened it to
the burden on the attorneys and the court in these cases. He explained that this burden is
shared with the jury. He then referred to “[t]his burden that we have, the burden that [the
prosecution] has to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, that burden. The burden of
defending [defendant] when he’s accused to have killed the fireman. This is something
for all of us now.” During the remainder of closing argument, counsel referred to the

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prosecution’s burden of proof nine other times and described it in detail and as a “very
very high burden.”
Throughout his argument, counsel asked the jury to consider defendant’s
perspective of the incident – it was early in the morning, dark outside, defendant had a
history of people trying to break in, and defendant woke to the sound of someone trying
to get in. Defendant suffered from macular degeneration, the prosecution offered no
evidence about his ability to hear, an audible alarm could not be heard in either of
employee’s 911 calls, and employee did not know a fire crew was present when she
called. Under these circumstances, defendant had no reason to believe there was a fire or
fire crew on site, thought his life was in danger, and acted reasonably under the
circumstances. Counsel went over the self-defense instruction in detail and argued
defendant met its elements. Counsel also specified that he hadn’t “talked about any of
the law, the murder and the manslaughter, simply because it doesn’t apply.”
Counsel insisted the prosecution could not prove malice. He reminded the jury
that defendant woke up employee and told her to call 911. By doing so, defendant saved
employee’s life. Counsel argued defendant’s selfless behavior did not line up with that of
a murderer or one who has an intent to kill. And counsel referred to the warning he
yelled before firing, arguing this is not something “malice murderers” do. Defendant’s
behavior upon being detained was also inconsistent with malice aforethought. Defendant
was in shock and remorseful, expressed concern for captain’s family, and never admitted
to intentionally killing someone. Counsel urged the jury to view defendant as a human
who makes mistakes. And he reminded them of defendant’s statement that he should
have used more forethought as evidence that defendant lacked malice aforethought.
Counsel directed blame to the City of Stockton and the dispatcher. In his view,
the city’s failures created the conditions surrounding the building that made this incident
inevitable. And the dispatcher should have reported a structure fire, which would have

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produced a higher number of vehicles and firemen at the scene, and should have called
employee back to tell her a fire crew was present.
Throughout his argument, counsel made references to Greek mythology,
philosophy, music, science, history, art, and literature.
After the court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, defendant made a
Marsden motion. He made this motion over one year after the jury rendered its verdict.
Among other things, he argued: (1) forethought and malice had not been proven; (2) he
should have been charged with involuntary manslaughter at most; (3) “in actuality, [he]
would have been acquitted”; and (4) counsel’s closing arguments were “grossly
deficient.” The trial court found no grounds to appoint a new attorney.
B. Concession Regarding Lesser Included Offenses
Defendant contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to decide the
objective of his defense when counsel conceded that the lesser included offenses did not
apply. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of
counsel. (McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. 414, 421.) “To gain assistance, a
defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel.” (Ibid.) “Some decisions . . .
are reserved for the client – notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury
trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” (Id. at p. 422.) “When a client
expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defen[s]e’ is to maintain innocence of the
charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by
conceding guilt.” (Id. at p. 423; emphasis omitted.) “The constitutional right recognized
in McCoy applies in limited circumstances; it is only implicated where defense counsel
concedes guilt ‘over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection.’ ” (In re
Maury (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 645, 679.)
Here, McCoy does not apply because counsel never conceded guilt. While McCoy
forbids counsel from conceding guilt of the charged offense over his client’s objection

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(see People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1039), it does not forbid counsel from
asserting innocence of the charged offense and rejecting the application of lesser included
offenses. Even assuming McCoy applies, the record shows defendant did not object until
after a verdict was rendered. There is no McCoy error where a defendant complains
about a concession only after trial. (People v. Palmer (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 281-
282.) Also, the record does not reflect an intransigent and unambiguous objection to
counsel’s strategy. In his Marsden motion and hearing, defendant generically objected to
counsel’s closing argument, insisted the prosecution had not proven malice and
forethought, and argued defendant should have been charged with involuntary
manslaughter at most and “in actuality would have been acquitted.” These are not
intransigent and unambiguous statements that defendant did not want counsel to reject the
lesser included offenses in favor of an acquittal. (See Palmer, at p. 282 [defendant
muddied the waters of his defense].)1 For these reasons, defendant does not show McCoy
error.
Alternatively, defendant argues counsel’s statement regarding the lesser included
offenses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. To show ineffective
assistance, a defendant must prove counsel’s performance fell “outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
690.) Defendant fails to meet that burden. Counsel’s decision to “guard against a
compromise verdict” and “ ‘utilize an all-or-nothing’ ” strategy is a tactical decision.
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489,
531 [“Failure to argue an alternative theory is not objectively unreasonable as a matter of
law”].) We do not second-guess those decisions “ ‘in the harsh light of hindsight.’ ”
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)

1 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address defendant’s contention that he
never had an opportunity to raise a timely objection.

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C. Other Statements
Defendant contends counsel’s closing argument was ineffective for other reasons.
Specifically, he contends counsel rambled extensively, backpedaled, confused the facts,
refused to argue the elements of murder, and pointed to irrelevant facts, facts not in
evidence, and historical references. We conclude counsel’s argument was not
constitutionally deficient.
Although the right to effective assistance extends to closing arguments,
“[r]eversals for ineffective assistance of counsel during closing argument rarely occur.”
(People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 51, 57.) This is because “[t]he decision of how
to argue to the jury after the presentation of evidence is inherently tactical.” (People v.
Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498.) Closing argument should “ ‘sharpen and clarify the
issues for resolution by the trier of fact,’ [citation] but which issues to sharpen and how
best to clarify them are questions with many reasonable answers.” (Yarborough v.
Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 6.) “Judicial review of a defense attorney’s summation is
therefore highly deferential.” (Ibid.)
Applying that highly deferential standard here, we conclude the closing argument
was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. As covered, counsel
chose to argue that, consistent with defendant’s statements to law enforcement,
defendant’s actions were justified. Consistent with that decision, counsel presented the
evidence in that light, portraying defendant as a sympathetic person who acted reasonably
under the circumstances and giving the jury other entities to blame like the city and the
dispatcher. Defendant contends counsel’s reference to defendant’s ability to hear was
improper because it was based on a fact not in evidence. But the fact that defendant’s
hearing ability was not in evidence was precisely counsel’s point. In making that point,
counsel emphasized the prosecution’s burden of proof and attempted to provide a source
of reasonable doubt. We also do not agree that counsel erred by referring to defendant’s
“acts of kindness or empathy.” Those acts showed defendant’s general regard for human

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life, potentially undermining an implied malice element. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988 [implied malice requires conscious disregard for human life].) One
such act was defendant waking employee. Defendant contends mentioning this act was
problematic because counsel ignored defendant’s contradictory statements as to when he
woke employee. But counsel’s point had nothing to do with timing; instead, his point
was that defendant acted selflessly by waking employee and saving her life. “The mere
fact that the[se] issue[s] could have been argued differently, or with a different emphasis
or focus, does not establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th
408, 471.)
Defendant also faults counsel for making numerous historical references and
backpedaling some points. These concerns are not persuasive. “Closing argument is as
much an art as a science” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1251), and
defendant’s concerns fall in the art portion. Counsel tried to build credibility with the
jury, in a case involving substantial inculpatory evidence and a sympathetic victim, by
admitting issues that were subject to debate and using illustrations from history and
literature. (See ibid.; People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1242.) Counsel’s effort
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Lastly, defendant faults counsel for suggesting defendant bore some of the burden
of proof. Defendant makes too much of isolated remarks. At the beginning of his closing
argument, counsel referred to the “burden of convincing the jury that [defendant] is not
guilty,” but he did so just after referring to the People’s burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. And he made this statement while speaking broadly of various burdens
– the burden on firemen who work 24-hour shifts, the burden on attorneys and the court
in these types of cases, the burden on defendant of coming to court everyday, and the
burden on the jury to render a verdict. Counsel then repeatedly referred to the People’s
burden throughout his argument and described the reasonable doubt standard in detail.
Considering the totality of counsel’s statements regarding the burden of proof, the court’s

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instruction on that burden, and the court’s instruction that the jury must follow its
instructions over contrary attorney comment, we see no prejudice from counsel’s isolated
statements regarding defendant’s burden. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687
[defendant must show deficient performance prejudiced defendant]; People v. Krebs
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 335 [we presume jurors followed court’s instructions].)
III. Jury Instruction on Right to Defend Real or Personal Property
A. Additional Background
In his motions in limine, defendant requested the jury instruction on the right to
defend real or personal property (CALCRIM No. 3476). The court cited People v.
Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470 as leading it to believe the instruction might be
appropriate. The prosecution had no objection, and the court agreed to give it. But the
prosecution later changed its position, and the court ultimately agreed with the
prosecution, concluding that CALCRIM Nos. 505, 506, and 3477 covered the issues and
CALCRIM No. 3476 was “not an appropriate instruction . . . in this case.”
B. Duty to Give CALCRIM No. 3476
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 3476. Specifically, he contends deadly force can be used to
defend a dwelling, and the instructions the court gave did not cover that defense.
Applying de novo review, we disagree. (People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978,
990 (Morales).)
CALCRIM No. 3467 codifies Civil Code section 50, which allows a property
owner to use reasonable force to protect his or her property from imminent harm. But
“the intentional use of deadly force merely to protect property is never reasonable.”
(People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360.) “The defendant must also show
either self-defense or defense of others, i.e., that he or she reasonably believed the
intruder intended to kill or inflict serious injury on someone in the home.” (Ibid.)

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The law on homicide helps explain this issue. Section 197 provides that homicide
is justifiable “ ‘[w]hen committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against
one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony.’ ”
(Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Ceballos “limited the meaning of ‘felony’ in
[section 197] because . . . many modern felonies do not involve a danger of serious
bodily harm.” (Morales, at p. 991, citing Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 477-478.) “Ceballos
therefore read section 197 as permitting the use of deadly force to prevent a felony only if
the felony is ‘forcible and atrocious.’ ” (Morales, at p. 991, citing Ceballos, at p. 478.)
According to Ceballos, examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem,
and robbery. (Morales, at p. 991, citing Ceballos, at p. 478.) But Ceballos qualified that
not all burglaries would trigger the right to use deadly force in self-defense. (Morales, at
p. 991, citing Ceballos, at p. 479.) A robbery “cannot trigger the right to use deadly force
in self-defense unless the circumstances of the robbery gave rise to a reasonable belief
that the victim would suffer great bodily injury or death.” (Morales, at p. 992.) “[T]he
touchstone for self-defense remains the reasonable belief of the danger of great bodily
injury or death, not the threat of a robbery in and of itself.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant was not guilty of murder if,
among other requirements, he reasonably believed he was defending a home from
someone who intended or tried to commit a robbery “whose character and manner
reasonably created a fear of death or serious bodily harm” or “violently or tumultuously
tried to enter that home intending to commit an act of violence against someone inside.”
This instruction accurately stated the law as applied to the facts. CALCRIM No. 3476
was not applicable.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MAURO, J.

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