CourtListener 10865878•People v. Jackson CA2/4
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Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Jackson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B340777
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA120231
v.
TYSHAUN JACKSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and remanded
for an evidentiary hearing.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2012, a jury convicted appellant Tyshaun Jackson and
his codefendant of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd.
(a)) and other offenses, and found that a principal was armed
with a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd.
(a)(1)). At Jackson’s trial, the court instructed the jury that it
could convict him of murder if murder was a natural and
probable consequence of an assault with a handgun that he aided
and abetted. In other words, the jury was instructed on the now-
invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine, which
allowed it to convict Jackson of murder without necessarily
finding that he harbored malice.
In 2020, the trial court denied Jackson’s petition for relief
under former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), concluding
the record of conviction demonstrated he was ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. In 2024, Jackson filed another petition for
relief under section 1172.6, which the trial court denied based on
the fact that Jackson had already previously petitioned for, and
been denied, that same relief in a prior proceeding.2
On appeal, Jackson argues his case should be remanded for
an evidentiary hearing because he is prima facie eligible for
section 1172.6 relief. The Attorney General does not attempt to
refute Jackson is prima facie eligible for such relief. But the
Attorney General asserts the trial court’s order denying relief
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the
Penal Code.
2 It appears the trial court may have mistakenly believed
Jackson had an additional section 1172.6 petition denied in 2022.
The augmented record suggests, and the parties agree on appeal,
that the 2022 proceeding involved a habeas corpus petition and
not a section 1172.6 petition.
2
should nonetheless be affirmed under collateral estoppel
principles “even if [Jackson’s] initial [petition] was incorrectly
denied.”
We agree with Jackson. Although the Attorney General is
correct that the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied, an
equitable exception to that doctrine arises when there has been a
significant change in the law since the initial ruling that
warrants reexamination of the issue. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 454 (Curiel).) As discussed in greater detail below,
we conclude Jackson’s case falls within that equitable exception.
Because the record demonstrates Jackson is prima facie eligible
for relief under case law that has emerged since his original
petition was denied in 2020, we remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
RELEVANT LAW
In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section
188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it applies to murder and to require, with certain exceptions
under the felony murder rule, that a defendant act with malice to
be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) In 2021, through
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551),
the Legislature clarified that the amendments made by Senate
Bill No. 1437 were also intended to eliminate any other theory of
imputed-malice murder liability. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
A defendant seeking relief under section 1172.6 must attest
to the following: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
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proceed under a theory of . . . murder . . . under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder . . . following a trial . . . at which the petitioner could
have been convicted of murder . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder [under current law].”
(§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)–(3).)
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court
“shall appoint counsel” for petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) The trial court then assesses whether the petitioner
is prima facie eligible for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) If the court
determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears
the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(3).)
DISCUSSION
Although the elements of collateral estoppel are present
here, we conclude the equitable resolution of this case is a
remand for an evidentiary hearing.
“ ‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given
conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine
of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’ ” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) The doctrine is intended to
“ ‘protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical
4
issue with the same party or his privy,’ ” while “ ‘promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.’ ” (Ibid.)
Collateral estoppel has five elements. “ ‘ “First, the issue
sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that
decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have
been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth,
the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451–452.)
While satisfaction of these elements is necessary to invoke
the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel, it is not always
sufficient. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 454.) Even if the
elements are satisfied, “ ‘ “the doctrine will not be applied if such
application would not serve its underlying fundamental
principles” of promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the
parties.’ ” (Ibid.)
We agree with the Attorney General that all five essential
elements are present. Application of issue preclusion, however, is
inequitable under the facts of this case. When the trial court
concluded Jackson was prima facie ineligible for relief in 2020, it
did so based on an outdated interpretation of the statute.
Although the trial court acknowledged that Jackson’s jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
the court reasoned he was prima facie ineligible for relief because
the prosecution never argued that theory to the jury. The court
stated: “At no time did the defense or prosecution argue that
theory at trial. The only [homicide] theory [the parties argued to
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the jury] was that [Jackson] was an aider and abettor of a
planned assassination.”
Nearly three years later after the trial court denied
Jackson relief on that basis, our colleagues in Division One
issued an opinion that undermines the trial court’s conclusion.
(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1188 (Lee).) Lee
explained:
We acknowledge that the prosecutor in closing proceeded
solely on the theory that Lee personally committed a
provocative act, with no suggestion that he was liable
because of a provocative act committed by someone else.
The jury instructions, however, were not so limited, and
permitted the jury to convict Lee based on the act of a
surviving accomplice. We do not know if, based on the
evidence, the jury might have convicted Lee on this latter
theory, because we do not have the full record before us.
We therefore are unwilling to conclude, based solely on the
prosecution’s closing argument and summary of the
evidence, that the jury necessarily convicted Lee as a
provocateur as opposed to a nonprovocateur accomplice.
(Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1188.)
Following Lee, we conclude the trial court was incorrect in
determining Jackson is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. Although it appears the trial court is correct the
prosecutor did not argue Jackson was guilty of murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury instructions
were not so limited. (See Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1188.)
As a result, it is theoretically possible the jury could have
convicted Jackson of murder, using the natural and probable
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consequences instruction, without finding that he harbored
malice.
Lee constitutes a significant development or clarification of
the law. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of Lee
when it issued its order, foreclosing a re-examination of Jackson’s
arguments would be unfair. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
454 [an exception to collateral estoppel is when there is a
significant change in the law].)3 We therefore remand the matter
for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
We note that a different panel of this court, in resolving
Jackson’s direct appeal prior to the enactment of former section
1170.95, agreed with Jackson that the trial court committed
instructional error under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155
(Chiu), but concluded that error was harmless because “there
[was] no evidence an assault escalated into murder; rather, the
assault in this case was indistinguishable from the murder.”
(People v. Jackson (B256011, May 26, 2016) [nonpub opn.].) This
conclusion does not render Jackson prima facie ineligible for
3 We cannot, at this juncture, weigh the evidence adduced at
Jackson’s murder trial to conclude as a matter of law that he was
convicted of murder under the theory that he harbored malice, as
doing so would constitute improper factfinding, and would risk
improperly bypassing Jackson’s right to an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (See Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 971–972 [courts should not engage in factfinding or
weigh evidence at the prima facie stage].) Jackson’s point on
appeal is well-taken that the trial court in 2020 may have
engaged in improper factfinding to deny him section 1172.6 relief
as a matter of law when it concluded: “I don’t think the evidence
supports even an argument for natural and probable
consequences.”
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section 1172.6 relief. The question of whether Chiu error is
harmless is different from whether a defendant is prima facie
eligible for section 1172.6 relief. (See People v. Campbell (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 350, 371–375 [concluding an appellate court’s
ruling on direct appeal that Chiu error was harmless is a
different analysis than whether the defendant is entitled to
section 1172.6 relief].) As explained above, the record of
conviction does demonstrate Jackson is prima facie eligible for
section 1172.6 relief because the natural and probable
consequences doctrine instruction left open the possibility that
the jury could convict him of murder without finding he harbored
malice. Furthermore, Jackson’s direct appeal panel concluded
the Chiu error was harmless based on weighing the evidence
presented at Jackson’s trial, which is precluded at the prima facie
stage of section 1172.6 proceedings. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 971–972.)
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Jackson relief and remand
the matter for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). We express no opinion on the ultimate outcome
of that proceeding.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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