People v. Hudson CA3

CourtListener 10865735Calctapp28 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Hudson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C101921
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22FE006481)
v.

RESHADD HUDSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Reshadd Hudson of multiple sex offenses against a
minor, and the trial court sentenced him to middle terms for a total of 32 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the middle
terms when he was entitled to the lower terms under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). We affirm. Statutory references are to the Penal Code, and rule
references are to the California Rules of Court.
BACKGROUND
Defendant began dating Doe’s mother when Doe was 11 years old and later
moved into their home and married Doe’s mother. After defendant moved into the home,
he frequently assigned Doe chores, including cleaning the kitchen. While she was
cleaning the kitchen, he repeatedly pressed his body against her, front to back. He also
created time schedules for activities such as showers and changing clothes. When the

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allotted time expired, he would routinely enter the bathroom while Doe showered or her
room while she changed clothes.
Eventually, defendant became the assistant coach of Doe’s basketball team.
Under the guise of coaching, defendant regularly engaged in sexual contact against Doe.
In the home, he forced her to orally copulate him twice, and he orally copulated her once.
He told her not to tell anyone and threatened that if she did, no one would believe her, it
would break up the family, and she would have to live with her grandmother or in foster
care.
Eventually, Doe told her mother, and Doe’s mother confronted defendant, who
admitted touching Doe. Sometime later, Doe’s mother reported defendant to the police.
The Sacramento Police Department arranged a pretext call between Doe’s mother and
defendant. During the call, defendant admitted to touching Doe and having oral sex with
her but claimed she initiated it. Defendant said his addiction to receiving oral sex caused
his poor judgment.
A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of a lewd and lascivious act by force
or fear upon a child aged 12 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1 through 3), and two counts of a
lewd and lascivious act upon a child between the age of 11 to 13 years (§ 288, subd. (a);
counts 4 and 5). It found true the enhancement allegation as to counts 1 through 3 that
defendant had substantial sexual contact with a victim under the age of 14 years old
(§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). As to all counts, the jury found true the aggravating
circumstance allegations that the manner in which the crime was carried out indicated
planning, sophistication, or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)), and defendant took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
The probation report recommended the middle term of 32 years. The prosecutor
did not file a sentencing brief. Defense counsel sought the low term of three years on
counts 1 through 3 and the low term of three years on count 4 for a total sentence of 14
years. In support, defense counsel noted defendant received an honorable discharge after

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serving in the army from 2011 to 2016, had no criminal record, and admitted his conduct
during trial. The probation report included defendant’s statement that he had suffered
childhood trauma.
The trial court considered the probation report and the general objectives of
sentencing under the California Rules of Court. The trial court noted the enhancement
allegation and aggravating factors the jury found true beyond a reasonable doubt: that
defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with Doe; the commission of the offense
indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism; and defendant took advantage of a
position of trust. In mitigation, the trial court acknowledged defendant’s military service
and his minimal criminal record. Although defendant did not provide any supporting
evidence, the trial court gave great weight to childhood trauma pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), noting with this factor, the statutory presumption for the lower term
sentence applied. However, in finding the aggravating factors outweighed those in
mitigation, the trial court stated the jury found true beyond a reasonable doubt the
aggravating factors, they were numerous, Doe was “very distraught” while testifying, and
defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct. It found that he acted with
“sophistication, planning, and some degree of thought and professionalism” and had
taken advantage of a position of trust. Accordingly, the trial court found the middle
terms appropriate.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 32 years in state prison as follows: six
years (the middle term) for a lewd and lascivious act upon a child between the age of 11
and 13 years (count 4), two years (one third the middle term) for a lewd and lascivious
act upon a child between the age of 11 and 13 years (count 5), and eight years (the middle
term) for each conviction for a lewd and lascivious act by force or fear upon a child aged
12 (counts 1 through 3).
Defendant timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing the middle terms on each of
his convictions instead of the presumptive lower terms under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6) based on his childhood trauma. He maintains the trial court relied on aggravating
factors unsupported by the evidence and failed to give proper weight to those in
mitigation. Anticipating possible forfeiture for failing to object below, defendant argues
defense counsel was ineffective. To forestall this claim, we address the merits and
conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the middle terms.
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (See People
v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion when
it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or is
unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at
all.” (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.) A court also abuses its
discretion when it “ ‘bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
671, 687.)
Section 1170 generally provides for midterm sentences. Section 1170 also
contains a presumption in favor of the lower term if certain mitigating circumstances
were a contributing factor in the commission of an offense, including if the defendant
suffered childhood trauma. (Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765; § 1170, subd.
(b)(6)(A), (B); see also rule 4.423(b)(3) & (4).)
Rule 4.421 sets forth circumstances in aggravation that a court may consider in
sentencing. If a presumptive lower term factor contributed to an offense, the trial court
may impose the middle term only if it finds that the aggravating circumstances in rule
4.421 outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)

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Initially, we reject defendant’s argument the trial court’s comment that there were
numerous aggravating factors demonstrates it did not exercise informed discretion. The
jury found true two aggravating factors and an enhancement allegation. The trial court
addressed these factors in its detailed ruling. Nothing the trial court said suggests it was
relying on additional, unspecified aggravating factors. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court exercised its informed discretion in imposing the middle terms.
We further conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing
aggravating factors against mitigating factors and imposing the middle term. Defendant
argues the trial court improperly relied on these aggravating factors, as his commission of
the offenses was not “distinctively worse than the ordinary.” To the extent defendant is
arguing the trial court abused its discretion by relying on aggravating factors not
supported by sufficient evidence, the trial court only had to find the aggravating factors
by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 202-
205.) The trial court relied on factors the jury found true beyond a reasonable doubt,
including that defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with Doe, his offenses
demonstrated sophistication and planning, and he took advantage of a position of trust.
Defendant has not challenged the jury’s findings, only the trial court’s actions and
findings. Therefore, the jury’s findings established a sufficient factual basis in support of
the aggravating circumstances, and the trial court had “broad discretion in its sentencing
determination.” (Id. at p. 205.)
Exercising its broad discretion, the trial court expressly considered in mitigation
defendant’s minimal criminal record and military service and gave great weight to
defendant’s childhood trauma. The trial court also acknowledged that trauma qualified
defendant for the presumptive low terms. However, the trial court found the aggravating
factors outweighed those in mitigation, overcoming the presumptive low terms and
supporting imposition of the middle terms. Defendant has not shown the trial court’s

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decision was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore an abuse of discretion. (Knowles,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

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