People v. Molina CA2/4

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Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Molina CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B343734

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24SFCF00666)
v.

CRISTIAN MOLINA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Cristian Molina of assault with
a semiautomatic firearm and felon in possession of a firearm. He
argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to strike his prior strike conviction under
Romero.1 We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
1. Prosecution’s Case
In March 2024, Kara Brayton texted Jeffrey Morgan asking
him to meet her at the Roxford Motel on San Fernando Road in
Sylmar. Morgan and Brayton were friends, and both struggled
with drug addiction. Brayton told Morgan she was in trouble and
was afraid of a man who would not leave her alone. She offered
Morgan drugs to help her leave the motel. Morgan arrived at the
motel at approximately 3:00 a.m.
After speaking with Brayton, Morgan went to take a
shower in her room. At about 7:00 a.m., Morgan heard someone
banging on the door. Morgan said Brayton looked scared and told
him not to open the door. Morgan got dressed, and after the
banging continued for about 20 minutes, Morgan decided to open
the door to talk to the person outside. Molina ran into the room
when Morgan opened the door. Molina punched Morgan, and
Morgan punched back. Morgan ran out of the motel room after
Molina reached for his waistband. Brayton previously told
Morgan she thought Molina had a gun. Morgan ran onto San
Fernando Road. He heard a loud bang, felt something hit his leg,

1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).

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and dropped to the ground. Morgan looked back and saw Molina
pointing a gun at him. Molina then ran back toward the motel.
Police officers responded to a call of shots fired in the area.
They found a single 9-millimeter casing on San Fernando Road.
The officers then responded to a call regarding a gunshot wound
victim. They located Morgan outside a residence with a gunshot
wound to his right leg. Morgan directed the officers to the
Roxford Motel. The officers went to the motel and spoke with the
manager. The manager told the officers about Molina’s room and
gave them the California ID card Molina used to get the room.
The officers found Brayton inside the room. She confirmed
Molina was the “same guy that came to the door” and got the
room for her.

2. Defense Evidence
Molina testified on his own behalf. He said he and Brayton
were dating in March 2024. The night before the incident, he
rented a room for them at the Roxford Motel. He left around
midnight to work for a delivery service until 3:00 or 4:00 a.m.
After returning, he left again when Brayton asked him to because
she wanted to speak with her father. Molina estimated he was
gone for two to four hours.
When Molina returned, he knocked and became worried
because he could not get ahold of Brayton. He saw Morgan, who
he did not know, after the door was opened. Molina felt scared,
angry, and confused. Molina said Morgan punched him before he
punched Morgan. Molina chased after Morgan because Molina
was scared and did not know if Morgan was going to hurt him or
Brayton. Molina pulled a gun out of his pocket to scare Morgan,
but Molina accidentally pulled the trigger with the gun pointed

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toward the floor. Molina thought Morgan tripped, so Molina
went back to the motel.
Molina did not wait for police to arrive because he knew he
was not supposed to have the gun. He said he had the gun to
protect himself and Brayton because they were in a dangerous
area. The prosecution and defense stipulated that on the day of
the incident, Molina was a person prohibited under the law from
possessing or owning a firearm.

B. The Jury’s Verdict
A jury found Molina guilty of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b))2 and possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As to the former, the jury found
true Molina personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a) &
(d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
At a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that
Molina suffered a prior strike conviction for a robbery within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)). The court further found true two aggravating
factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421: Molina’s
convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness, and the
victim was particularly vulnerable.

C. Molina’s Romero Motion and Sentence
Molina filed a motion to dismiss his prior strike pursuant
to Romero. He asserted the prior strike conviction was for a
robbery committed in 1996 when he was 19 years old. He argued

2 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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that except for a misdemeanor battery in 1995, none of his other
convictions involved physical violence. He further argued that
since his last conviction in 2018 for “possession of drugs/alcohol
in jail/prison,” he had made positive changes and had strong
support from his family and friends. He contended he was
49 years old and acted in the heat of passion when he confronted
Morgan.
The prosecutor objected to dismissal of the prior strike at
sentencing, arguing Molina’s criminal history showed a
“continuous nature[,] readiness, willingness, [and] ability” to
engage in acts of violence. The prosecutor outlined Molina’s
criminal history. After Molina sustained a juvenile petition for
burglary in 1994, he was convicted of misdemeanor battery in
1995 at age 18. In 1996, Molina was convicted of second degree
robbery and sentenced to six years in prison. In 2002, he was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced to
32 months imprisonment. In 2011, he was convicted of
misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer or
emergency medical technician and sentenced to a 24-month
probation term. In 2013, Molina was convicted of five felonies:
possession of a controlled substance for sale and illegal
possession of ammunition, for which he was sentenced to two
16-month terms of imprisonment; carrying a concealed dirk or
dagger and obstructing or resisting an executive officer, for which
he was sentenced to two four-year terms of imprisonment; and
violence against an intimate partner, for which he was sentenced
to two years imprisonment. In 2018, Molina was convicted of
possession of narcotics, alcohol, or drug paraphernalia in prison
for which he was sentenced to four years imprisonment.

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The trial court denied Molina’s request to strike his prior
strike. The court stated it looked at the “totality of the criminal
history” and found Molina had “conviction after conviction that
resulted in state prison time and so it is not a situation where
someone made a mistake as a young man, as a 19 year old and
learned from that mistake.” The court did not believe Molina was
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The court sentenced
Molina to an aggregate term of 20 years four months, which
included application of the Three Strikes law. This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION
Molina argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request to strike his prior strike conviction. We
disagree.
Under Romero, “a trial court may strike or vacate an
allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a
defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or
violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to [ ]
section 1385(a).” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158
(Williams).) A sentencing court “must consider whether, in light
of the nature and circumstances of [defendant’s] present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.) The Three Strikes law “creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33

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Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony)), and “‘carefully circumscribes the
trial court’s power to depart from this norm.’” (People v.
Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170 (Bernal).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for
abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) A
trial court abuses its discretion by declining to strike a prior
strike only if the defendant so clearly falls outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law that no reasonable person could disagree.
(Id. at p. 378.) Only extraordinary circumstances warrant a
finding that a defendant falls outside the spirit of the law. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, “the circumstances where no reasonable people
could disagree that the [defendant] falls outside the spirit of the
three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Ibid.)
The circumstances in this case were not so extraordinary.
Molina had a continuous criminal history spanning multiple
decades after suffering the prior strike. His convictions included
violent crimes (e.g., battery and violence on an intimate partner)
and other serious offenses (e.g., possession of a firearm by a felon
and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger), which the trial court
reasonably found were of increasing seriousness. Indeed, his
current offenses involved Molina unlawfully possessing a firearm
and shooting the victim as the victim was running away from
him. Molina’s convictions reflect a long criminal history and an
inability “to remain out of prison for more than a few years at a
time.” (People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 857; see
also People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 571 [“‘three
strikes law punishes not only [the defendant’s] current offenses,
but also his recidivism’”].) He did not reform his ways after
suffering the prior strike. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163.)

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The trial court also considered the mitigating factors
highlighted by Molina on appeal, including that he suffered the
strike in 1996 when he was 19 years old, that he was 49 years old
at the time of sentencing and struggled with drug addiction and
homelessness, and that he had support from family and friends.
However, the presence of mitigating circumstances is not enough
to render the court’s decision an abuse of discretion. (Bernal,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170; see People v. Avila (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141 [“remoteness of prior strikes alone is not
sufficient to take a defendant out of the spirit of the Three
Strikes law”]; cf. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [trial court
abused discretion in granting Romero motion, despite defendant’s
youth at time of prior strikes, because defendant persisted in
criminal activity].) Moreover, “judicially mandating the
predominance” of these factors would “eviscerate[ ] the trial
court’s discretion” under Romero. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 379.)
Therefore, Molina does not show the trial court abused its
discretion by finding he was within the spirit of the Three Strikes
law.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:

TAMZARIAN, J.

COGLIATI, J. **

** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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