Simon Property Group v. RWF Holdings CA2/2

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Testo completo

Filed 5/27/26 Simon Property Group v. RWF Holdings CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SIMON PROPERTY GROUP, L.P., B347126
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 22STCV34489

RWF HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, III, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

Baker & Hostetler, David J. Richardson, Alex E. Spjute,
and Michael Patrick Brown for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Akerman, Michael R. Weiss and Benjamin R. Joelson for
Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________________
Plaintiff Simon Property Group, L.P. (Simon) appeals the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on its complaint against
RWF Holdings, Inc. (RWF), Meir Levin, and Mark Mintz
(collectively, the Defendants) asserting causes of action for
(1) violation of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA;
Civ. Code,1 §§ 3439–3440); and (2) conspiracy to commit a
fraudulent transfer. Though named as an additional defendant in
the complaint, L & M Footwear, Inc. (L&M) neither sought nor
was awarded summary judgment.2
We reverse the judgment. The record does not show
Defendants satisfied their burden of production to make a prima
facie showing as to the nonexistence of any triable issue of
material fact. In particular, we agree with Simon that
Defendants failed to introduce evidence of the value of all the
property involved in the allegedly fraudulent transfer. Without
this, Defendants could not meet their burden on the dispositive
issue of L&M’s lack of equity in that property.
BACKGROUND
Defendants Meir Levin and Mark Mintz were the sole
shareholders of L&M and are the sole shareholders of Defendant
RWF.
Levin and Mintz founded L&M in the 1990’s. L&M
operated as a footwear and apparel retailer for approximately
30 years, initially through brick-and-mortar stores and later
online as well.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
2 The trial court had earlier entered default as to L&M.
Simon did not pursue a default judgment against L&M.

2
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, L&M operated
approximately 70 retail stores and had over $100 million in
annual sales. More than 40 of its retail stores were at shopping
malls owned by affiliates of Simon.
The COVID-19 pandemic severely affected L&M’s
operations. L&M determined to close all but one of its retail
stores and reposition itself primarily as an online footwear
retailer. It stopped paying rent to Simon. Simon sued L&M in
several state courts for unpaid rent.
While Simon’s state court proceedings were pending, on
August 1, 2022, L&M made a “general assignment for the benefit
of [L&M’s] creditors” (the Assignment) as such term is defined in
Code of Civil Procedure section 493.010. The transfer was of all of
its assets to assignee Insolvency Services Group, Inc. (ISG).
The same day, immediately after ISG accepted the
Assignment, ISG and RWF entered into and consummated an
asset purchase agreement (APA) whereby RWF bought
substantially all the assets L&M had just assigned to ISG. The
purchased assets are described as all assets falling within 22
different categories listed in a schedule to the APA. One such
category is assumed contracts, which are individually listed on a
different schedule. Among these 20 scheduled assumed contracts
are three real property leases under which L&M was a tenant.
Two of these leases were of properties owned by Levin and Mintz.
The third concerned property owned by Montebello Town Center
Investors, LLC.
The consideration for RWF’s purchase was estimated at
$3.622 million, comprising cash and the assumption of debt. The
cash component was only $125,000. Included in the assumed debt
was approximately $3.373 million in debt secured by

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substantially all of L&M’s assets. L&M’s secured debt was
composed of the following loans (balances as of the date of the
Assignment): (1) from QVE Holdings, LLC (owned by Levin and
Mintz), with an outstanding balance of $1,103,000; (2) from the
United States Small Business Administration (personally
guaranteed by Levin and Mintz), with an outstanding balance of
$2,029,406; and (3) from Amazon Capital Services, Inc., with an
outstanding balance of $240,853.
In short, after these two transactions, RWF held all, or
substantially all, the assets previously held by L&M but agreed
to take on only some of L&M’s debts. The vast majority, by
amount, of L&M’s debts RWF assumed were either (i) owed to an
entity Levin and Mintz owned; or (ii) personally guaranteed by
Levin and Mintz. Disfavored unsecured creditors like Simon were
left to look to the Assignment estate for satisfaction of their
claims against L&M. It does not appear the Assignment resulted
in meaningful, if any, distributions to these creditors. After the
Assignment was made, Simon obtained judgments against L&M
in five different states in the aggregate face amount of more than
$16.6 million.
Immediately after the Assignment was made, RWF
operated its assets in substantially the same way L&M had
immediately beforehand, and there was no interruption in the
business. For example, RWF operated out of the same principal
place of business L&M had, used the same trade name and
warehouse L&M had used, was owned by Levin and Mintz in the
same proportions that they had owned L&M, and employed at
least 42 out of the 44 employees L&M did the day before the
Assignment.

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In October 2022, Simon filed a complaint against
Defendants and L&M, thereby commencing the present action.
The complaint contained two causes of action in the caption and
under separate headings: (1) violation of the UVTA; and
(2) conspiracy to commit a fraudulent transfer. No cause of action
for alter ego or successor liability was similarly listed.
Nevertheless, Simon’s prayer for relief sought a declaration that
RWF is a successor to, and alter ego of, L&M, and RWF is
therefore liable on Simon’s state court judgments against L&M.
Defendants demurred to the complaint. Among other
things, and even though Simon had not separately headed any
such causes of action, they argued “Simon does not, and cannot,
state a claim for successor or alter ego liability.” Simon responded
in opposition that “Defendants’ purported ‘demurrer’ to alter ego
and successor liability is improper [because] neither is a separate
cause of action and thus, not properly subject to demurrer.”
(Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50, subd. (a).) In overruling the
demurrer in June 2023, the trial court adopted this logic:
“Defendants have demurred, ‘to the extent it is considered a
separate cause of action[,] [Simon]’s claim for alter ego liability.’
. . . This is not a separate cause of action, and therefore may not
be the basis of a demurrer.” Defendants answered the complaint.
Several months later, Defendants moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted after a hearing. Although
Defendants tell us in their respondents’ brief that we have
“numerous alternative grounds for affirming,” they argue none of
them on appeal, instead incorporating by reference portions of
the summary judgment record in the trial court. We therefore
describe here only the facts relating to the ground relied upon by

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the court, which is the sole basis for affirmance Defendants
actually argue in their respondents’ brief.
The trial court granted summary judgment on Simon’s
two causes of action on a single ground: Defendants had made a
prima facie evidentiary showing, which Simon failed to rebut,
that the value of the assets L&M transferred was less than the
value of the debt secured by those assets. As such, the
Assignment did not amount to a transfer of “assets” within the
meaning of section 3439.01, subdivision (a). (See id., subd. (a)(1).)
This conclusion rested on a report prepared by B. Riley Advisory
Services (B. Riley) for ISG in July 2022. It is a valuation of
“certain personal property” of L&M as of May 23, 2022. We
discuss the B. Riley report in greater detail below. Though Simon
disputed the valuation methodologies B. Riley relied upon and
offered evidence and argument the report concerned only a subset
of L&M’s assets, Simon did not offer a competing valuation.
Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, Simon filed
a motion to amend its complaint. The purposes of its proposed
amendments were “to add one cause of action for enforcement of
judgments against an alter ego defendant or under a successor
liability theory, and to update facts concerning Simon’s state
court judgments against L&M, including in Texas, Arizona,
Florida, Nevada, and California.” A hearing on Simon’s motion to
amend was set for after the scheduled summary judgment
hearing.
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Simon’s unamended initial complaint. As part of the
court’s order, it advanced and vacated the hearing on Simon’s
motion to amend its complaint.

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The trial court later entered judgment against Defendants.
Simon timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
“A defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be
granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the
defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The burden of persuasion remains with
the party moving for summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 861 [(Aguilar)].)” (Kahn
v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990,
1002–1003 (Kahn).)
“When the defendant moves for summary judgment, in
those circumstances in which the plaintiff would have the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must
present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact
from finding that it was more likely than not that the material
fact was true [citation], or the defendant must establish that an
element of the claim cannot be established, by presenting
evidence that the plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.’ ” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
pp. 1002–1003.)
If a defendant fails to meet this initial burden, the motion
must be denied. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840 (Binder).) If the defendant meets this
initial burden, however, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
establish, by means of competent and admissible evidence, a
triable issue of material fact remains. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851.)

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“On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary
judgment, we examine the record de novo, liberally construing
the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment
and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th
446, 460.) This requires us to draw from the evidence all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. (Id. at
p. 470.)
II. Analysis
A. UVTA and Conspiracy Causes of Action
Under the UVTA, a transfer made by a debtor is voidable
as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer (1) with the intent
to defraud its creditors; or (2) without receiving reasonably
equivalent value in exchange at a time when the debtor was
unreasonably undercapitalized or equitably insolvent. (§ 3439.04,
subd. (a).) For these purposes, “[t]ransfer” means parting with
any interest in an asset. (§ 3439.01, subd. (m).) And while the
definition of “[a]sset” generally embraces anything a debtor may
own (id., subds. (a), (j)), it does not include property of the debtor
“to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien” (id., subd. (a)(1)).
Thus, the UVTA applies only to transfers of property in which the
debtor had some equity. (See Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v.
Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834, 841, 843.)
For the reasons that follow, we conclude Defendants failed
to show an absence of triable facts relating to L&M’s lack of
equity in the property it transferred. As such, the trial court
improperly granted summary adjudication on Simon’s UVTA
cause of action and related conspiracy cause of action. Summary
judgment was therefore improper.

8
1. Defendants Failed to Produce Evidence
L&M Lacked Equity in All Its Property
The trial court concluded L&M lacked equity in the
property it assigned to ISG—all of its property—because the
$3.373 million in debts secured by that property as of the
Assignment date exceeded any value B. Riley placed on it in its
July 2022 report. The report contained two different estimates of
value: $2,487,116 under a “fair market value” approach; and
$1,773,380 under a “forced liquidation” approach. B. Riley did not
value L&M’s assets as a going concern, even though L&M was
operating and even though the Assignment was specifically
intended “to preserve the value of the assets [as] an ongoing
business.”
Simon contends the trial court’s conclusion was wrong for
at least two reasons. First, B. Riley should have valued L&M’s
assets as a going concern as a matter of law because RWF
continued to operate them as a going concern after the
transaction. Second, B. Riley’s report failed to address all of
L&M’s assets.
We need not consider the question of valuation
methodology because, when construed in the light most favorable
to Simon, the B. Riley report did not address all L&M’s assets.
We therefore conclude the trial court erred in ruling the B. Riley
report satisfied Defendants’ burden to establish the value of all
the property L&M transferred.
First, the B. Riley report, on its face, did not purport to
address all L&M’s assets. Instead, it valued “certain personal
property . . . held by L&M.” Drawing inferences from the word
“certain” most favorable to Simon, the B. Riley report addressed
only some of, and not all, L&M’s property. (See Bumb v.

9
McIntyre (9th Cir. 1960) 277 F.2d 647, 650 [“It would appear that
the word ‘certain’ has a number of different meanings, and its
meaning in a particular case depends upon the context in which
the word is used. If the words used were ‘certain of the’ it might
mean ‘some of the.’ If the words used were ‘those certain’ or ‘all
that certain’ it might mean ‘precise,’ ‘definite,’ or ‘ascertained’
property.”].) The reasonableness of this inference is buttressed by
the statement in B. Riley’s engagement letter that “[a]ny assets
or liabilities not identified [therein] w[ould] be excluded from the
[v]aluation.” Moreover, even if the word “certain” is not
independently limiting, the report’s express limitation to
“personal property” means L&M’s real property leases, though
referenced in the report, were excluded from the valuation.
Second, the description of the personal property B. Riley
did value reinforces the inference that not all L&M’s valuable
personal property was included. The report valued “two vehicles,
two forklifts, several manual and electric pallet jacks, warehouse
and retail store racking, furniture & fixtures, leasehold
improvements, signage, and inventory.” Comparing this list of
categories to the APA’s 22 categories of assets RWF bought from
ISG, the inference favorable to Simon is that several categories of
assets were excluded. This is true even accounting for the
statement in the B. Riley report that L&M’s trade name, domain
names, and Amazon seller accounts (each of which RWF was
careful to include in its acquisition) had no material value under
B. Riley’s chosen valuation methodologies.
Third, and in any event, we need not rely on inference to
know B. Riley did not value all L&M’s valuable personal
property. Defendants do not dispute the appraisal excluded tax
credits. Indeed, one of Defendants’ summary judgment witnesses

10
declared in support of the motion that “a tax refund asset . . . was
not included in the scope of the B. Riley appraisal.” ISG’s notice
to creditors reflects that RWF purchased a federal Employee
Retention Tax Credit receivable assigned from L&M worth
$410,792.
On this basis, we conclude Defendants simply did not offer
evidence of the value of all the property L&M transferred to
ISG.3 Accordingly, they did not meet their initial burden of
presenting evidence that would preclude a reasonable factfinder
from finding that property was worth less than the debt it
secured.
In reaching this conclusion, we disagree with the trial
court’s assessment of Simon’s argument below that B. Riley’s
appraisal failed to address all L&M’s assets. First, the court said
Simon had not materially disputed B. Riley’s “calculat[ions],”
characterizing a response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed
facts as “not disputing that B. Riley conducted an appraisal of
L&M’s assets.” But what Simon actually said was that it
“[d]isputed that the appraisal valued ‘L&M’s assets,’ given its
limited coverage.” Simon repeatedly made clear its position the
B. Riley report was underinclusive on its face. “[A] plaintiff can
defeat a defense motion for summary judgment by showing . . .
the defense evidence itself permits conflicting inferences as to the
existence of the specified fact . . . .” (Cole v. Town of Los
Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 756–757.)

3 At oral argument, Defendants argued they submitted
declarations and other evidence reaching the same value
conclusion the B. Riley report did. All of this evidence refers back
to the B. Riley report and is therefore inadequate for the same
reasons the B. Riley report is.

11
Second, the trial court incorrectly addressed Simon’s
assertion that B. Riley omitted to value tax credits. The court
found Simon should have offered a declaration that B. Riley
should have, but did not, value them. However, Defendants could
not meet their burden of production on the issue of lack of equity
in L&M’s property without offering evidence of the gross value of
all its property. Again, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment
has no evidentiary burden if the defendant has failed to satisfy
its initial burden of production. (Binder, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at
p. 840.)
Third, the trial court said Simon’s citation in its opposition
just to the “appraisal summary” was not sufficient to show the
appraisal did not value contract rights. But Simon’s citation was
also to the full B. Riley report, and that report shows B. Riley did
not value contract rights that L&M had. As already noted, the
B. Riley report is expressly limited to personal property but it
recognizes L&M owned real property leases. These same leases
are among those “contracts” RWF assumed under the APA.
Simon also pointed to evidence extrinsic to the B. Riley
report to show it was underinclusive. It noted L&M’s financial
statements showed, as of December 31, 2021, L&M owned
leasehold improvements with a book value of $2,350,738. These
accounted for more than half the balance sheet value of L&M’s
assets. But the B. Riley report, which valued L&M’s assets as of
May 23, 2022, ascribes no value to leasehold improvements.
Though the report says leasehold improvements are among
several categories of personal property that were the subject of
the valuation, and though the report mentions leasehold
improvements as one of several “[m]ajor assets” B. Riley valued
under the indirect cost approach, B. Riley’s exhibits showing the

12
category-by-category valuations that sum to its ultimate value
conclusions make no mention of leasehold improvements.
Particularly in light of other evidence the B. Riley report
was incomplete, the reasonable inference favorable to Simon is
that B. Riley, despite claiming to have valued L&M’s leasehold
improvements, omitted their value from the report. Instead of
drawing this inference, the trial court construed the B. Riley
report as “appear[ing] to show B. Riley did receive, consider, and
analyze the leasehold improvement amount set forth in the 2021
financial statement, even if the exact amount of the leasehold
improvement amount is not included in the appraisal summary.”
As Simon noted below, the problem is not that the appraised
value of the leasehold improvements does not “exactly” match the
financial statement; it’s that leasehold improvements are not
valued in the B. Riley report at all.
Though it is enough that the B. Riley report did not even
attempt to address all L&M’s property, the record contains
evidence the omitted assets were, in fact, valuable. Again, the
federal Employee Tax Retention Credit was worth at least
$410,000. L&M’s real property leases, though not specifically
valued, also had value. This is apparent from the Assignment
documents. The real property leases were expressly excluded
from the initial assignment. However, they were ultimately sold
by ISG to RWF. By the terms of the Assignment document, the
only way this could have happened was that ISG first
“determine[d] that [the leases] [could] be assigned and also that
[they] ha[d] realizable value for [L&M’s] creditors . . . .”4 (Italics

4 ISG made this determination remarkably quickly given
that the APA was consummated the same day it was signed.

13
added.) And, while book value is not necessarily probative of
actual value, L&M held leasehold improvements with a recent
book value of $2,350,738 that were nowhere reflected in B. Riley’s
calculation of value as of a date less than five months later.
Defendants argue, in the alternative, they met their initial
burden by showing Simon cannot establish an essential element
of its cause of action. In support, they cite Simon’s discovery
responses on various topics, including Simon’s failure to dispute
the “[]accura[cy]” of the B. Riley report or provide any specifics
regarding the “wrongful[ness] of ISG’s conduct.” But Defendants
cite no discovery response establishing Simon cannot show L&M
had some equity in the property it transferred to ISG. The
B. Riley report can be both underinclusive and accurate as to the
assets it did value.
Because we conclude Defendants, in relying on a valuation
that did not address all L&M’s property, did not meet their
burden of production on the issue of lack of equity, we need not
address the issue of valuation methodology. If presented with
competing valuation methodologies at trial, the trial court will
have to determine in the first instance which methodology is
appropriate given the facts in this case. We need not express an
opinion as to the court’s analysis of that issue, other than to note
that authority from other courts interpreting similar statutes and
the United States Bankruptcy Code may be persuasive. (See
Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 664 (Mejia) [citing “decisions
of other states construing parallel provisions of the [UVTA]”];
Kirkland v. Risso (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 971, 977–978 [following
decisions of other states in fraudulent transfer case]; Hayes v.
Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp.,
Inc.) (9th Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 528, 534 [applying analogous

14
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to a Hawaii state law
fraudulent transfer claim].)
2. Defendants’ Alternative Grounds for
Affirmance Are Unpersuasive
Without identifying them, Defendants assert we have
“numerous alternative grounds for affirming the Trial Court
Order,” followed by a bare citation to the first 15 pages of their
summary judgment memorandum and the entirety of their
summary judgment reply (inclusive of its proof of service). We
will consider only those alternative arguments in the portion of
the memorandum to which Defendants direct our attention.
(See Schram Construction, Inc. v. Regents of University of
California (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1052, fn. 7 [issue raised
for first time in reply brief before trial court waived on appeal].)
Defendants first argued the transfer of L&M’s assets
cannot be fraudulent because “it was done pursuant to California
law.” A legal procedure for effecting a transfer is not a license to
make a fraudulent transfer. (See Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 664 [legislative authorization for transfers pursuant to marital
settlement agreements not “a one-time-only opportunity to
defraud creditors by including [a] fraudulent transfer [therein]”].)
The court in Tatung Co. v. Shu Tze Hsu (C.D.Cal. 2014)
43 F.Supp.3d 1036, 1069, confronted with the same argument
Defendants make, “f[ound] no . . . authority or basis in the
statutory text to hold that the [UVTA] is inapplicable to
assignments for the benefit of creditors.” Defendants offered no
new authority below.
Defendants next argued Simon suffered no damages
because L&M had no equity in its property. For the same reason
we concluded summary judgment was inappropriate on the

15
ground that L&M transferred no “assets” as defined in the
UVTA, summary judgment is also inappropriate on this ground.
Defendants next argued Simon’s fraudulent transfer cause
of action against Levin and Mintz fails because they neither
personally transferred nor received any property in connection
with the Assignment. As explained in Potter v. Alliance United
Insurance Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 894, 910, “[t]he UVTA
permits a creditor to recover against a transferee or a ‘person for
whose benefit the transfer was made.’ ” As such, the beneficiary
of a fraudulent transfer, even if not the transferee, is a proper
defendant. (Ibid.) Defendants’ argument simply ignores this, as
well as the fact that Levin and Mintz were the sole shareholders
of L&M, are the sole shareholders of RWF, were personal
guarantors of $2,029,406 in L&M debt that RWF assumed, and
were owners of the lender on another $1,103,000 of such debt.
Even if these facts are not conclusive to show Levin and Mintz
were beneficiaries of the transfer, nothing in the record precludes
a finding that they stood to benefit from it and the attendant
preservation of L&M’s former business reincarnated as RWF.
Finally, Defendants argued there can be no conspiracy
liability in the absence of an underlying tort. As we reject the
trial court’s summary judgment on the underlying UVTA cause of
action, we reject its judgment on the conspiracy cause of action as
well.
B. Alter Ego and Successor Liability “Claims”
Defendants contend “the trial court decided Simon’s alter
ego and successor liability claims.” We disagree. The only
mention of those “claims” is in the introduction to the discussion
section of the order: “Defendants . . . move the court for an order
granting summary judgment in their favor and against [Simon]

16
on [Simon’s] Complaint or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication in their favor and against [Simon] on the first and
second causes of action and the claims for alter ego and successor
liability.” (Italics added.) The order then proceeds, under
separate headings, to address Simon’s “first cause of action for
voidable transfer” and “second cause of action for aiding,
abetting, and/or conspiracy to commit fraudulent transfer.” At
the conclusion of each separately headed section, the order states
that the court “grants [the] motion for summary adjudication as
to [each] cause of action.” Immediately after discussing the
second cause of action, the order states “[t]he court has granted
summary adjudication on each cause of action alleged against
Defendants” and “therefore grants Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.”
We interpret the trial court’s distinction between the
“causes of action,” which it discussed, and the “claims,” which it
did not, as the court deeming resolution of the latter unnecessary
to the determination of the motion because each was only a
“claim for damages” on the other causes of action within the
meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (f)(1). This is consistent with the court’s
determination earlier in the proceedings that “ ‘alter ego liability’
. . . is not a separate cause of action.” It would also explain why
the court did not further discuss the “claims,” having resolved the
“causes of action” in Defendants’ favor.
We therefore have no occasion to address the validity of
those “claims.”
III. Simon’s Motion to Amend
As part of its summary judgment order, the trial court
advanced and vacated the hearing on Simon’s motion to amend

17
its complaint to add a cause of action for judgment enforcement
against an alter ego defendant or under a successor liability
theory. As a result, the court never heard or decided Simon’s
motion. The only apparent justification for this was the court’s
conclusion summary judgment was warranted. As this was error,
the court shall consider Simon’s motion to amend on remand in
the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Costs are awarded to Simon.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

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