County of Santa Clara v. PERB CA6

CourtListener 10865084Calctapp27 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/27/26 County of Santa Clara v. PERB CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, H051570
(PERB Case No. SF-CE-1796-M)
Petitioner,

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD,

Respondent;

REGISTERED NURSES
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

The Legislature has declared “all public employees” to be “disaster service
workers,” who “in conditions of disaster or … extreme peril to life, property, and
resources” may be deployed for “such disaster service activities as may be assigned to
them by their superiors or by law.” (Gov. Code, § 3100.)1 At the same time, the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; § 3500 et seq.) requires public employers to “meet
and confer in good faith” with representative employee unions about “terms and
conditions of employment” that are “within the scope of [union] representation.”
(§ 3505.) Exempt from this duty to bargain are “fundamental managerial or policy

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
decision[s]” (Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th
623, 628 (Claremont)), or “the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity
provided by law or executive order” (§ 3504). But when the duty to bargain applies, the
public agency must “consider fully” a union’s position on behalf of its members before
“arriving at a determination of policy or course of action.” (§ 3505.)
At issue here is the County of Santa Clara’s use of its employees in disaster
service work at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB) held that the county had engaged in unfair labor practices by not
affording the Registered Nurses Professional Association (Registered Nurses) and
Service Employees International Union, Local 521 (SEIU) “notice and an opportunity to
meet and confer in good faith over: (1) assignments to [private] nursing facilities … and
motels; (2) new and amended [disaster service] policies; and (3) the effects of scaling
back services at certain medical clinics.” PERB reasoned that the emergency
circumstances presented by the pandemic were not relevant to the threshold
determination whether the county’s decisions were subject to mandatory bargaining, but
only to the timing of mandatory bargaining. We granted the county’s petition for writ of
review, to clarify the scope of the county’s duty to bargain with union representatives, at
least as practicable (§ 3504.5), about the decision to deploy represented employees as
disaster service workers (DSW’s), the manner of deployment, and the effects of those
deployments on conditions of employment.
We reject the county’s contention that the disaster service assignments represented
no change to the employees’ status quo or were exempted by section 3100 from the duty
to bargain. Although the county concedes its obligation to bargain as practicable over
certain effects of the deployment, we also reject its challenges to PERB’s determination
of which effects are subject to bargaining and whether the county complied. But as to the
county’s threshold decision to deploy represented employees as DSW’s—as distinct from
the operational decisions implementing that decision—PERB erred as a matter of law in

2
refusing to consider the public health emergency in assessing whether this was a
fundamental managerial or policy decision that was outside the scope of representation.
And while substantial evidence supports PERB’s determination that the county’s revision
of its DSW policy guidance for employees changed the status quo, here too PERB’s
erroneous refusal to consider the public health emergency is apparent in its reasoning.
We will therefore annul PERB’s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Unfair Practice Charge and PERB Complaint

In May 2020, Registered Nurses and SEIU filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the county. As a result, PERB’s Office of General Counsel filed a complaint
against the county.
The General Counsel alleged that in April 2020, after temporarily closing at least
one of its medical clinics, the county (1) unilaterally adopted a policy of assigning
represented employees to privately owned nursing facilities, hotels, or shelters, changing
the terms and conditions of the employees’ work; (2) unilaterally modified its existing
DSW policy applicable to covered employees; and (3) bypassed the unions by dealing
directly with covered employees, while failing to provide the unions with requested
information that was relevant and necessary to represent their members.
B. The PERB Decision2

The county provides medical services through Santa Clara Valley Medical Center
(SCVMC) hospitals and clinics. Registered Nurses represents thousands of registered
nurses working for the county. SEIU likewise represents thousands of county workers,
including licensed vocational nurses and others.

2
There being no dispute about the evidentiary facts summarized in PERB’s
decision, we draw our summary of the evidence from the decision itself.

3
In February 2020, the county declared an emergency due to the COVID-19
pandemic. In March,3 the county issued a shelter-in-place order. Beginning in March
and April, the county issued three documents related to DSW assignments, scaled back
medical services at some county facilities, assigned its employees to work at privately
owned skilled nursing facilities, and began assigning its employees to privately owned
motels. The county did not bargain with the unions over these decisions. PERB ruled
that much of this conduct violated the MMBA.
1. County DSW Policies

Since 2008, the county has included in its policy manual a section titled “County
Employees serving as Disaster Service Workers.” It included answers to “ ‘frequently
asked questions’ ” (FAQ). The FAQ specified, “ ‘When the County Executive proclaims
a countywide emergency, employees need to take care of their families first and ensure
their safety; follow their department’s reporting instructions; be prepared to be assigned
to any type of disaster service activity. This assignment may be consistent with the
employee’s normal work duties and/or may require the employee to work at locations,
times and conditions, other than the employee’s normal assignment.’ ” (Italics omitted.)
In April 2020, the county issued three documents without affording the unions
notice or an opportunity to bargain. One was an update to “County Employees serving as
Disaster Service Workers,” omitting the prior statement about employees caring for their
families after an emergency declaration and adding that DSW assignments are a
condition of employment, refusal of which may lead to discipline, including termination.
The other documents were a new COVID-19 FAQ addressing when the county might
permit employees to refuse DSW assignments and a single-page document addressing
certain internal county procedures for DSW deployments.

3
Undesignated dates are in 2020.

4
2. Private Nursing Facility Assignments

Beginning in mid-March, the county implemented changes at its clinics that
reduced the need for on-site staff. The county e-mailed nurses announcing that it was
scaling back services at some SCVMC clinics and stating that it planned to divert nurses
to other facilities, asking nurses to rank their preferences. Around the end of the month,
the county scaled back services at some SCVMC clinics. The county did not give the
unions prior notice of those actions.
Without consulting the unions, the county asked nurses to volunteer for
assignment to county-run skilled nursing facilities. By the end of March, the county had
identified a pool of nurses who either volunteered for assignment or who worked at
clinics where the county had scaled back services. In early April, the county trained
several nurses for assignment to skilled nursing facilities.
Around the same time, privately owned skilled nursing and long-term care
facilities were experiencing staffing shortages and a rapid increase in COVID-19
infections. Two private nursing facilities—The Ridge and Canyon Springs—had
particularly acute needs and sought either staffing assistance from the county or transfer
of their patients to county hospitals.
The county was concerned that if the staffing shortages at The Ridge and Canyon
Springs caused these private care facilities to evacuate their patients to county hospitals,
this would both spread infection in county hospitals and decrease the number of hospital
beds available for patients needing acute care. So the county decided to send nurses to
Canyon Springs, announcing the decision to the unions that same day in a “ ‘Courtesy
Notice on DSW assignments.’ ”
Within hours, both unions asked to bargain over the county’s decision. It was only
in a meeting with the county the next day that Registered Nurses learned that nurses were
already on their way to their first shift at Canyon Springs. The county refused Registered
Nurses’ request to bargain the terms and conditions of DSW employment, including

5
safety protocols. Over the next few weeks, the county assigned 17 nurses to Canyon
Springs. While county nurses were assigned to Canyon Springs,4 the county met almost
daily with Registered Nurses about assignments to private nursing facilities, “listened to
their suggestions and ideas … and answered some of their questions,” but maintained that
it had “ ‘no obligation to meet and confer on DSW assignments.’ ” In the same period,
county representatives met with SEIU multiple times to discuss private nursing facility
assignments. The county “listened to SEIU’s concerns and proposals … and answered
some of SEIU’s questions, but denied that the meetings were bargaining sessions.” After
the Canyon Springs assignments were complete, the county rejected Registered Nurses’
request to bargain over the selection method and deployment list for any future DSW
assignments.
3. Motel Assignments

The county was concerned that people living in close physical proximity at
congregate shelters were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and of worse
outcomes if they contracted the virus. This ultimately led the county to contract with
privately owned motels to house people experiencing homelessness and with nonprofit
organizations to staff the motels. But because some of the nonprofit organizations lacked
sufficient staff, the county in April 2020 assigned SEIU-represented employees to work
as DSW’s at the motels, without prior notice to SEIU.5 The next month the county
assigned more SEIU-represented employees to privately owned motels. As of August, at

4
The assignments ended after the county helped Canyon Springs secure other
staffing.
5
As recently as March 2020, the county had assured SEIU that “the County would
give notice to SEIU before further deployment” of employees reassigned to prepare a
county-owned motel for occupants. The county ultimately did not use the county-owned
motel to house people experiencing homelessness.

6
least two employees were in DSW motel assignments that had been extended to
December 31, 2020.
Although SEIU attempted to bargain, the county again maintained that it had no
obligation to do so. In April, after SEIU learned its members had been assigned to
private motels, the county denied any obligation to meet and confer on DSW
assignments. In late April and early May, the county met with SEIU “almost daily to
discuss DSW assignments”—“the role of the assignments, [personal protective
equipment (PPE)], interactions with motel residents, trash removal, laundry, food
delivery, shift schedules, and other issues.” Although the county listened to SEIU’s
concerns and answered some questions, the county maintained that it had no duty to
bargain about the motel assignments.
4. PERB’s Conclusions and the County’s Writ Petition

PERB found that the county violated the MMBA when it failed and refused to
afford the unions “notice and an opportunity to meet and confer in good faith over:
(1) assignments to [private] nursing facilities … and motels; (2) new and amended
[DSW] policies; and (3) the effects of scaling back services at certain medical clinics.”
PERB found that the county also violated the MMBA by failing to provide information
the unions requested and by derivatively interfering with collective bargaining unit
employees’ rights to be represented and the unions’ right to represent collective
bargaining unit employees.
PERB reasoned that the unions established a prima facie case that the county
owed, and violated, a duty to bargain over DSW-related decisions and the effects of its
decision to scale back medical services at its medical clinics.6 First, the county changed
the status quo by (1) modifying its 2008 DSW policy; (2) making a new COVID-19

6
PERB held that the decision to scale back services was not subject to mandatory
bargaining.

7
policy;7 and (3) reassigning employees to private nursing facilities and motels. Second,
the changes were within the scope of representation because they were not mandated by
external law—section 3100—and were “critical to defining the employment relationship
rather than altering the overall direction of the County’s enterprise.” Alternatively, the
new assignments were within the scope of representation because they had a significant
and adverse effect on employment conditions that outweighed the county’s general,
nonemergency, interests. PERB considered the emergency presented by the pandemic
relevant only to the county’s emergency defense to the failure to bargain before acting
unilaterally, not to whether the actions were subject to mandatory bargaining within the
scope of representation.
PERB concluded that the county had established an emergency defense: The
actions being urgently needed to save lives, the county did not need to bargain to impasse
or agreement before acting. But this emergency defense did not, in PERB’s reasoning,
relieve the county of the duty to provide notice and an opportunity to bargain to the
extent practicable. The county violated its duty to bargain in good faith by maintaining
that it had no duty to bargain in good faith at all. Due to this “flat denial,” PERB did not
undertake a “more nuanced determination[]” of when it became practicable to give the
unions notice of the emergency measures at issue.
We granted the county’s timely petition for a writ of review.
II. DISCUSSION

The MMBA’s purpose “is to promote full communication between public
employers and their employees, as well as to improve personnel management and
employer-employee relations in public agencies.” (County of Sonoma v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 167, 178 (County of Sonoma).) To that

7
PERB ruled that the third policy was an internal policy beyond the scope of
representation, so it did not assess whether the third policy changed the status quo.

8
end, “[t]he MMBA requires a public employer and employee representatives ‘to meet and
confer in good faith about a matter within the “scope of representation,” concerning,
among other things, “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” ’ ”
(Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 982, 993 (Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs).)
This mandate to bargain in good faith “ ‘is premised on the belief that collective
discussions backed by the parties’ economic weapons will result in decisions that are
better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. [Citations.] This will
be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution
through the bargaining process.’ ” (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 637; see also Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) When an employer asserts
that the matter is a fundamental managerial or policy decision and therefore outside the
scope of representation, courts apply a three-part inquiry to decide whether
section 3505’s meet and confer requirement applies. (Claremont, at p. 638.)
Where it applies, the duty to bargain generally “ ‘ “requires the public agency to
refrain from making unilateral changes in employees’ wages and working conditions
until the employer and employee association have bargained to impasse.” ’ ” (Kern
County Hospital Authority v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
860, 877, italics omitted (Kern County).) An unlawful unilateral change consists of (1) a
change or deviation from the status quo that (2) concerns a matter within the scope of
representation and (3) has a generalized effect or continuing impact on represented
employees’ terms or conditions of employment (4) without adequate advance notice to
the union and bargaining in good faith until the parties reached an agreement or a lawful
impasse. (Id. at p. 878.)
PERB’s factual findings “shall be conclusive,” so long as they are “supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” (§ 3509.5, subd. (b); see also
Kern County, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 877.) “ ‘ “If there is a plausible basis for the

9
Board’s factual decisions, we are not concerned that contrary findings may seem to us
equally reasonable, or even more so.” ’ ” (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd.
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912 (Boling).) We also “ ‘generally defer to PERB’s construction
of labor law provisions within its jurisdiction,’ ” but not when its construction “ ‘is
clearly erroneous.’ ” (Id. at pp. 911–912.) “[C]ourts retain final authority to ‘ “state the
true meaning of the statute.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 912.)
Applying these standards of review, we will defer to PERB’s factual findings,
rejecting the county’s contention that they are unsupported by substantial evidence. We
will accordingly uphold PERB’s determination that the county failed to bargain in good
faith when practicable over the effects and implementation of DSW assignments. As for
the parties’ dispute on purely legal questions, we reject in our independent judgment the
county’s broad assertion that section 3100 means no DSW assignment can effect a
change to an employee’s status quo. But PERB’s narrowing of the Claremont inquiry in
determining whether county policy decisions are subject to mandatory bargaining is
clearly erroneous. On this sole ground, we will annul PERB’s decision and remand the
matter for PERB to reconsider its assessment of the county’s unilateral policy decisions
under a proper application of the Supreme Court’s Claremont balancing test.
A. The County’s DSW Policy Decisions

The county contends that it was entitled to unilaterally undertake DSW
assignments because the assignments (1) did not change the status quo and (2) were
beyond the scope of representation. PERB’s findings that both the DSW assignments and
revision of the DSW policy changed the status quo are supported by substantial evidence.
But PERB misapplied the Claremont analysis in assessing whether the scope of
representation included the foundational decision to assign DSW’s to private nursing
facilities and motels.

10
1. The DSW Assignment Decisions

a. The Scope of PERB’s Decision
For the first time at oral argument, PERB conceded that the county’s decision to
assign workers to private nursing facilities is not subject to mandatory bargaining. It
nonetheless defended the breadth of its decision and order on the theory that both merely
address the implementation and effects of those policy decisions. But like the county and
amici, and like PERB’s own response to amici, we read the plain text of PERB’s
decision, as well as its context, to sweep more broadly.
Our reading tracks the unions’ unfair practice charge and the complaint PERB
adjudicated. The unions based their unfair practice charge in part on the allegation that
their first notice of the county’s plans to designate represented employees as DSW’s was
an April 6, 2020 “ ‘[c]ourtesy [n]otice’ ” that “County staff will be assigned to the
privately owned [skilled nursing facilities] as DSW, and that the County staff would care
for the COVID-19 negative patients in the [skilled nursing facility], in order to relieve
pressure on the County’s acute care facilities.” Registered Nurses specifically
complained about the county’s failure to bargain over the county’s antecedent closure or
reduction in services of certain county clinics. Among other remedies, the unions sought
rescission of “all previously[ ]taken unilateral actions.” (Italics added.) In turn, PERB’s
General Counsel alleged in its complaint that the county violated its duty to meet and
confer in good faith by its unilateral adoption of a policy—assigning represented
employees to private nursing facilities, hotels, and shelters.
Nothing in PERB’s decision suggests the more modest reading it lately advances.
True, in its decision PERB initially differentiated between an employer’s policy-based
“assignment decision” and the effects and implementation of such a decision, including
that the implementation and effects may be bargainable even where the decision is not.
But, without limiting its order to implementation and effects, PERB ordered the county to

11
meet and confer in good faith over “assignments to [private] skilled nursing facilities …
and motels.” This contrasts with PERB’s order regarding the county decision to scale
back services at certain medical clinics. There, PERB held that the decision to scale back
services was not subject to mandatory bargaining and directed the county only to bargain
over “the effects” of the decision.8
And as recently as its answer in this court to the brief of amicus curiae, PERB
maintained that its decision “required [the county] to acknowledge its duty to bargain
regarding its decision to deploy workers and bargain as soon as practicable.” (Italics
added.) In PERB’s view, the county’s interest in emergency deployment of workers was
adequately protected by deferring compliance with the duty to bargain to “ ‘the earliest
practicable time.’ ”
Given PERB’s evolving interpretation of its precedential decision and order, we
will address the application of Claremont to the county’s threshold decision to assign
DSW’s to private nursing facilities and motels and explain why we will hold PERB to its
concession at oral argument.

b. The Status Quo
The county contends that because all public employees have a duty under
section 3100 to act as DSW’s in an emergency, no legitimate DSW assignment can
change the status quo. The county’s threshold premise is legally infirm, however, and its
refusal to engage with a meaningful comparison of the employees’ pre-emergency

8
PERB asserted at oral argument that because its order does not distinguish the
decision to use DSW assignments to deliver new services from the implementation of
that decision, the discussion of “DSW assignments” in PERB’s decision could be
understood as limited to the implementation and effects of those assignments. This is not
a reasonable construction of PERB’s order, which required the county to meet and confer
over “DSW assignments” without limitation but over only “the effects of scaling back
services.” We accept PERB’s representation about the intended scope of its precedential
decision and order; annulment and remand will permit PERB to clarify both.

12
assignments and the conditions of their employment as DSW’s forecloses the county’s
alternative suggestion that the specific assignments here were in fact reasonably
contemplated within the assigned employees’ normal role.
Besides section 3100’s designation of public employees as disaster service
workers, the county relies on its Emergency Management Ordinance and two
employment policies as evidence of the status quo. The ordinance empowers the county
executive, as director of emergency services, to “require emergency services of any
County … employee.” Policies adopted in 2008 and 2014 alerted employees that “they
may be assigned to assist in any disaster service activity” protecting public health and
safety and preserving lives and property, including in response to a “pandemic.” Both
policies explained that employees, as part of the county’s response to a disaster, could be
left to perform their normal job duties or could be assigned to alternative disaster service
duties. Both polices included examples of disaster service duties—ranging from “clerical
support,” “food preparation,” and “delivery driving” to “damage assessment” and
“security”—but were explicit that these examples were nonexhaustive. Both policies
explained that employees would be compensated “based upon” their normal positions.
But nothing in section 3100, county ordinance, or county policy establishes a
status quo; taken together, these merely alert employees that the county’s disaster
response may cause their status quo to change—with no apparent limitation on the extent
of that change beyond their superiors’ lawful discretion. How statute, ordinance, and
policy are operationalized in responding to a disaster and whether this response in fact
changes the status quo for affected employees depends on a comparison of baseline
conditions for those employees before and after the contemplated disaster service
assignments. The county, however, in its maximalist view of section 3100, has not
engaged in that comparison.

13
Substantial evidence supports PERB’s determination that specific DSW
assignments changed the status quo because they were not reasonably comprehended by
the general obligation to perform disaster service work when called on.
The county principally contends that it has no obligation to bargain over any
disaster service assignment because disaster service assignments of all types are
reasonably comprehended by the employee’s duty to serve as DSW’s if called on.
To be sure, PERB has long recognized that even if an employee has never
performed a particular duty, assigning the employee such a duty may not represent a
bargainable deviation from the status quo if that duty is “ ‘reasonably comprehended’
within their existing assignment or set of duties.” (Registered Nurses Professional
Association v. County of Santa Clara (2022) PERB Dec. No. 2820-M [46 PERC ¶ 169,
pp. 5–6] (RNPA); see also Rio Hondo Faculty Association v. Rio Hondo Community
College District (1982) PERB Dec. No. 0279 [7 PERC ¶ 14036, p. 17].) “ ‘[R]easonably
comprehended’ is an objective standard that refers to what a reasonable employee would
comprehend based on all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, past
practice, training, and job descriptions.” (RNPA, at p. 6.) But an employer deviates from
the status quo, and is obligated to bargain in good faith, when it creates a new policy or
enforces an existing policy in a new way. (Id. at p. 5; § 3505.)
It is one thing to know that as a matter of law or employer policy one may have to
perform disaster service work in a future emergency as a condition of employment; it is
another to know what kind of service the emergency will require. We decline to hold that
a failure to forecast the specific services to be required brings an unlimited range of
disaster service work within the unsuspecting employee’s status quo.9 As reflected by
PERB’s findings, the county in the pandemic made a novel decision to use its workforce

9
Although the county’s policies provided some exemplar disaster service
activities, the activities here do not fall within those examples.

14
to support new services. PERB’s determination that the DSW assignments changed the
status quo is supported by substantial evidence, and we reject the county’s contention that
this determination turned on a foundational error of law.
The county appears to suggest that the assignments at issue here were sufficiently
related to the prior assignments that there was no change in the status quo. But the
county declines to provide “a detailed comparison between an employee’s DSW duties
and their regular day-to-day duties” on the theory that such a comparison is irrelevant.
To the extent the county has mounted a substantial evidence challenge, it has done
so by reframing the findings PERB made in concluding that private nursing facility
assignments changed the status quo. PERB found that such work changed the status quo
because employees were supervised by private sector managers under unfamiliar
standards and procedures. These findings are supported by evidence that (1) county
nurses shadowed facility-employed nurses as training; (2) doctors at the facilities
expected nurses to follow verbal medication orders instead of written medication orders
as generally provided by county policy; and (3) nurses felt that the latter deviation from
county policy put patient health and their licenses at risk. What the county disputes,
however, is not the existence of this evidence but its relevance—disclaiming county
responsibility for any unfamiliar policies at the private nursing facilities and contesting
the distinct finding, announced elsewhere in the PERB decision, that nurses had to work
at the facilities without county supervision. But these arguments are at best tangential to
the sufficiency of evidence to support the relevant findings. While the county takes issue
with discrete factual statements—about the extent of county supervision of DSW
placements or certain differences in work policies as between the private nursing
facilities and county facilities—these contentions do not demonstrate error.
Nor did PERB fail to address section 3100, the county ordinance, or the county’s
DSW policies in addressing whether the private nursing facility assignments were
reasonably comprehended in the employees’ existing assignments or duties. PERB

15
discussed each of these matters, including the relevance of “job descriptions,” and
interpreted job descriptions in the context of the employees’ overall role.

c. The Scope of Representation and Claremont
“The scope of representation … include[s] all matters relating to employment
conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment,” but “shall not include consideration of
the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or
executive order.” (§ 3504.) To distinguish the “ ‘arguably vague’ and ‘overlapping’ ”
definition of the scope of representation and its exception, we apply a three-part inquiry:
(1) Does the management action have “ ‘a significant and adverse effect on the wages,
hours, or working conditions’ ” of represented employees? (2) If so, does “the significant
and adverse effect arise[] from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy
decision”? (3) Where these interests of both the employees and management are
implicated, “[t]he action ‘is within the scope of representation only if the employer’s
need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the
benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.’ ”
(Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 631, 638.)
The county contends that it was entitled to unilaterally decide to assign DSW’s to
private nursing facilities and motels, because this was a fundamental managerial or policy
decision beyond the scope of union representation. We agree that—as to the threshold
decision to deploy represented DSW’s to private nursing facilities and motels—PERB
erred in applying Claremont by refusing to consider the emergency circumstances in its
balancing. This error requires us to annul PERB’s decision to permit its correction. But
we reject county’s contention that section 3100 removes the implementation of these
DSW assignments from the scope of representation as a matter of law.10

10
Section 3100 grants the county discretion to assign its employees as DSW’s but
does not address how the county is to exercise that discretion with represented employees

16
In applying Claremont, PERB necessarily reached the third-step balancing.11 As
we have explained, the record and the law supported PERB’s conclusion that sending
county employees to privately owned nursing facilities and motels in these circumstances
had significant and adverse effects on employment conditions. And accepting PERB’s
factual findings as to the county’s emergency defense, those significant and adverse
effects flowed from a fundamental managerial and policy decision that failing to staff
private nursing facilities or motels repurposed for emergency housing risked spreading
infection and overburdening hospitals.12 But at the crucial balancing step, PERB erred by
expressly refusing to consider the “emergency characteristics of the situation.” This
failure is material to PERB’s analysis of the initial decision to assign DSW’s to private
nursing facilities and motels.

under the MMBA. Claremont supplies a framework by which to reconcile a public
entity’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations—including
disaster service assignment under section 3100—with its bargaining obligations under the
MMBA. The county’s January 8, 2026 request for judicial notice of dictionary
definitions and four lines of legislative history would add nothing to our interpretation of
either section 3100 or the MMBA, so we deny it.
11
In the alternative, PERB stated that it did not need to apply the Claremont
inquiry because its own precedent adequately established that “material changes to job
assignments and duties generally fall within the scope of representation.” Not so. The
decisions PERB invoked are distinguishable in that neither applied a Claremont analysis
to an analogous context. (See RNPA, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2820-M, p. 7; Cerritos
College Faculty Federation, American Federation of Teachers Local 6215 v. Cerritos
Community College Dist. (2022) PERB Dec. No. 2819 [46 PERC ¶ 168, pp. 30–31].)
That job duties and assignments are generally within the scope of representation does not
resolve whether the county’s emergency resort to section 3100 assignments at private
nursing facilities and motels was necessarily within the scope of representation under
Claremont’s balancing inquiry. Any balancing inquiry is necessarily specific to its
context, and if the Legislature or Supreme Court had intended to ensure that material
changes to job assignments and duties were categorically within the scope of
representation, either could have directed us accordingly.
12
There is no dispute that these actions were within the county’s authority under
section 3100.

17
PERB’s refusal to consider the emergency circumstances undermines its third-step
Claremont balancing because it undervalues the county’s need for unencumbered
decisionmaking in matters of emergency policy. The emergency circumstances at a
minimum bear on the third-step consideration of “whether the ‘transactional cost of the
bargaining process outweighs its value.’ ” (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638.)
PERB articulates no reason why the county’s interest in deciding unencumbered how best
to ameliorate the spread of infection in the community while preserving hospital capacity
is outweighed by any countervailing benefits of bargaining that fundamental policy
decision.
A county’s authority under section 3100 to assign public employees to perform
disaster service activities in a pandemic is no less fundamental than its authority to
institute layoffs to manage fiscal constraints. (See International Assn. of Fire Fighters,
Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 264–
265, 276 (Richmond Firefighters) [distinguishing the threshold decision to reduce the
workforce from the implementation and effects of that decision].) We draw a similar
distinction here.
But by expressly disregarding “the emergency characteristics of the situation” in
assessing whether the disaster service decision was within the scope of representation,
PERB failed to consider the county’s interest in organizing its services to protect public
health in a pandemic. It is not enough to say that the emergency defense allows the
bargaining obligation to be postponed until such time as bargaining is practicable: First,
this fallaciously assumes the conclusion that the decision was bargainable in the first
instance, and places PERB’s thumb dispositively on one side of the Claremont scale;
second, time-sensitivity is but one of the salient emergency characteristics of the
situation.13

13
No party has challenged PERB’s application of section 3504.5 to permit the
county to delay bargaining to agreement or impasse until it was practicable to do so.

18
PERB in its briefing asserted that we must defer to its decision to ignore the
“pandemic’s effects” in assessing the scope of representation. But our deference to
PERB’s construction of the MMBA, much like PERB’s construction, is limited by
Supreme Court precedent, as it is the judiciary that is ultimately responsible for
construing the statute. (See Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 911.) In this context, the
Supreme Court’s recognition in Claremont that the employer’s need for unencumbered
decisionmaking is to be weighed in the balance requires us and PERB alike to consider
that need and the circumstances that inform it, including the occurrence of a disaster
contemplated by section 3100.14 We will trust the Legislature to promptly address any
concerns about the scope of the Claremont balancing by clarifying amendment.
In its ruling, PERB identified no benefit to employer-employee relations from
bargaining the county’s initial decision to assign DSW’s. PERB addressed only benefits
from bargaining the implementation and effects of the threshold decision—training,
availability of personal protective equipment, and hazard pay. PERB having identified
no benefit from requiring bargaining over the initial decision, the Claremont balancing

Consistent with that analysis, the county accepts that it had to meet and confer about the
bargainable effects of its initial decision to assign DSW’s as soon as practicable. We
address the county’s arguments about the scope of bargainable effects and its compliance
with that obligation in a separate section, below.
14
PERB’s reliance on its earlier decision in Oxnard Federation of Teachers and
School Employees, Local 1273 v. Oxnard Union High School District (2022) PERB Dec.
No. 2803 [46 PERC ¶ 110] is misplaced. There, PERB ruled that bargaining over
changes to work-from-home policies would not unduly infringe on managerial freedom.
(Oxnard, at p. 43.) PERB reasoned that even if time was of the essence due to the
pandemic, “that consideration [went] to the limitations on bargaining obligations when an
emergency compels an employer to act rapidly …; it does not … turn the topic into a
non-mandatory subject.” (Ibid.) But time is only one element of the pandemic policy
decision at issue here, which implicated not merely the safety of county employees in the
workplace but protection of the public at large and the county’s capacity to provide
hospital care for those most in need and housing for those least equipped otherwise to
maintain protective practices.

19
necessarily tilts in favor of the county’s need to decide where and in what capacity to
assign DSW’s to preserve life in a pandemic. We recognize the unions’ “interest in
protecting and compensating the essential workers serving the public during a …
pandemic.” The unions can serve that interest by bargaining over the implementation and
effects of the DSW assignments, without bargaining over the fundamental decision to
deploy DSW’s in the first instance.15
PERB emphasizes that its application of an emergency defense means that
including the assignment decision within the scope of representation will have a muted
impact on the county’s decisionmaking because the county will be permitted to make the
decision without bargaining to agreement or impasse (or at all) if it is impracticable to do
so. But this logic overlooks the correspondingly muted benefit to employer-employee
relations when the emergency defense applies. PERB identified nothing to be gained
from bargaining over the county’s threshold decision to choose one model of DSW
deployments over some alternative deployment (or non-deployment), when the public
health emergency that compelled the county to choose has already pushed the county to
implement that choice.16 Even if the county had a practicable opportunity to meet and
confer with the unions about its decision, PERB has identified no benefit to
employer-employee relations that would outweigh the county’s need to decide how best
to manage public health in a pandemic.
2. The 2020 Policy

The county contends that it had no duty to bargain over the April 2020 policy
titled “County Employees Serving as Disaster Service Workers,” arguing that it did not

15
SEIU and Registered Nurses do not identify any benefit to bargaining as to this
threshold decision, as opposed to terms and conditions of employment.
16
The benefits of even delayed bargaining over the implementation and effects of
the initial decision are more apparent, particularly when the assignments continued for
weeks and even months.

20
change the status quo set by the county’s 2008 policy of the same name.17 Under our
deferential standard of review, PERB’s contrary finding is supported by substantial
evidence. (See Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912 [discussing judicial deference to PERB
factual findings].)
In its decision and on appeal, PERB relies on two features of the 2020 policy—the
removal of some language from the 2008 policy and the addition of new language. As
we have explained, the 2008 policy included that “employees need to take care of their
families first and ensure their safety” with its directive to “follow their department’s
reporting instructions; be prepared to be assigned to any type of disaster service activity.”
The 2020 policy omitted this prefatory encouragement and instead added that employees
cannot refuse a DSW assignment absent “a legitimate qualifying reason” approved by the
county and that the failure to accept or perform a DSW assignment “may lead to
discipline, including termination of employment.” It was not illegitimate for PERB to
infer from these changes that the 2020 policy subordinated what had been employees’
“first” responsibility to care for their families to their compliance with DSW assignment
on pain of termination.
The county’s contention that it did not prohibit employees from taking measures to
ensure the safety of their families is beside the point. The change PERB identified is not
a prohibition on ensuring family safety but the priority now given to DSW duties.
Although the county now characterizes its 2008 policy as only recommending that
“employees should ensure the safety of their families upon the declaration of a
countywide emergency,” the language of the policy (including the use of “need” rather
than “should”) lends itself to PERB’s construction, even if a reasonable trier of fact could
reach a different conclusion.
17
PERB also ordered the county to rescind and bargain in good faith over a second
April 2020 policy, entitled “Disaster Service Worker County Employees Frequently
Asked Questions Sheet COVID-19 Pandemic.” The county does not challenge that order.

21
Nor was PERB required to accept the county’s position that the 2020 FAQ was
merely guidance. On the face of both the 2008 and 2020 iterations, the FAQ’s are a
device for explaining the county’s policies, including here whether employees may focus
on their families’ safety over acceptance of a DSW assignment in lieu of their normal
duties.
Testimony that the policy was intended only as “additional guidance” does not
detract from the sufficiency of the evidence supporting PERB’s contrary ruling. If
anything, testimony that the new policy “create[d] a systemic procedure … to respond to
… emerging needs” and related to “how we would implement the disaster service worker
scheme relating to current events” supports PERB’s conclusion that this changed the
status quo.
We also defer to PERB’s determination that the addition of new language about
discipline and termination also changed the status quo. Considering this new language
alongside the removal of language emphasizing family care, PERB inferred that this
modification signaled a shift to a policy of more aggressively disciplining employees who
did not comply with DSW assignments. Because this inference is plausible, we will not
disturb it. (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912.)
We recognize that a statement that work “may” be required, as in the 2008 policy,
and that the failure to perform work “may” lead to discipline, as in the later policy, are
coextensively vague. Further, PERB acknowledged testimony that, independent of the
2020 DSW policy, county employees could be subject to discipline for refusing to carry
out tasks assigned to them. We agree that confronted with those facts, one could
reasonably infer that the county changed the framing of its policy, but not the policy
itself. Even so, recognizing that the county elected to change its policy language, we are
not persuaded to reject the factual inferences that PERB drew from this record.
Because the county’s challenge to PERB’s decision and order as to the 2020 DSW
policy is limited to PERB’s factual findings, we will not reach PERB’s conclusion that

22
this change in the status quo was subject to mandatory bargaining, and we express no
opinion on this point. Because we must annul PERB’s decision based on its Claremont
error in addressing the county’s threshold decision to assign DSW’s under section 3100,
we note for the parties’ guidance on remand that PERB’s determination that the 2020
DSW policy was subject to mandatory bargaining considered only “disciplinary issues as
they exist in general, not during an emergency.”
B. Implementation and Effects of the DSW Policy Decisions

Our ruling that PERB materially erred in assessing the scope of the representation
does not extend to the implementation and effects of the DSW policy decisions. In the
layoff context, our Supreme Court explained that while a decision to use layoffs to reduce
labor costs is not subject to mandatory bargaining, employees are entitled to bargain
“over the implementation of the decision, including the number of employees to be laid
off, and the timing of the layoffs, as well as the effects of the layoffs on the workload and
safety of the remaining employees.” (Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 277.) The implementation of the county’s DSW assignments is analogous to the
implementation of layoffs—the means of effectuating the policy decision touches on
issues, such as employee safety and compensation, that PERB found in this case will
benefit from the bargaining process. And unlike the county’s core policy decision
concerning the services to provide in a pandemic, the core implementation constraint
imposed by the pandemic was the need to act quickly. Where the need to act quickly is
the essence of the argument for unencumbered decisionmaking, we identify no error in
PERB’s determination that the concern is addressed by PERB’s application of the
emergency defense. Moreover, even delayed bargaining may provide a substantial
benefit to employer-employee relations because these assignments were implemented for
an extended period. So we do not disturb PERB’s conclusion as it relates to the county’s
implementation of DSW assignments.

23
Indeed, the county concedes that it had a duty to bargain over certain effects of the
DSW assignments at issue here when it was practicable to do so.18 But the county
disputes which effects are bargainable, contending that PERB erred in including hazard
pay and employee selection. Further, the county asserts that it satisfied as soon as
practicable its obligation to meet and confer over bargainable effects. We reject these
claims of error.
1. Hazard Pay

PERB viewed hazard pay as an “obvious point[]” for the parties to negotiate,
reasoning that existing [memorandum of understanding] provisions on hazard pay did not
contemplate assignments to private nursing facilities and motels during a pandemic. The
county contends that PERB erred by disregarding its 2008 DSW policy, which provided
that DSW pay will be “based upon [the employees’] normal County positions and may be
eligible to receive overtime depending on their classification and hours worked.”
Conceding that the 2008 policy forecloses the need for bargaining about
compensation only if it is clear and unambiguous as to what pay employees will receive
for their work, the county asserts that the “policy is clear on its face as to the
compensation employees assigned to DSW activities would receive.” (See Teamsters
Local 856 v. County of Merced (2020) PERB Dec. No. 2740-M [45 PERC ¶ 29, p. 10]
[employer can take unilateral action on matter within the scope of representation if the
right to negotiate has been waived through clear and unambiguous contract language].)
But the 2008 policy only rules out the possibility that employees will be paid under a
separate compensation scheme for disaster service activities; it does not establish what
employees will be paid, including whether hazard pay will be available. The 2008 policy
is thus ambiguous.

18
For example, the county concedes that it was required to bargain training,
staffing ratios, PPE, workload, and other safety measures as soon as practicable.

24
2. Employee Selection

The county contends that the process for selecting employees is outside the scope
of representation for the same reasons that the decision to issue DSW assignments is
outside the scope of representation. But even if the decision to deploy DSW’s to private
nursing facilities and motels is itself exempt from the duty to mandatory bargain, the
selection of employees to be deployed was integral to implementation of that policy
decision. We discern no error impacting PERB’s balancing of the county’s need for
unencumbered decisionmaking against the benefits of bargaining as it relates to this
effect of the county’s decision to assign DSW’s to support private skilled nursing
facilities and motels. As with fiscal layoffs, where “the number and identity of the
employees to be laid off” is a managerial decision subject to bargaining (Richmond
Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 265), we have no basis to disturb PERB’s conclusion
that the same applies here.
As in the layoff context, the MMBA’s core purpose of “improv[ing] personnel
management and employer-employee relations” (County of Sonoma, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 178) is served here by requiring bargaining over the county’s
employee selection process (together with other bargainable effects). As to the county’s
interest in making that selection unencumbered, the county’s own election to solicit
volunteers even at the height of the pandemic implicitly concedes the benefit of employee
participation in deciding who would be subject to these novel and potentially dangerous
assignments. Compared with the fundamental policy decision of resorting to DSW
assignments, the county’s interest in unencumbered decisionmaking over the
implementation of that policy decision is lesser, and the benefit to employer-employee
relations of bargaining over means of implementation is greater. This benefit remains
even where the county’s first practicable opportunity to bargain arose only after it
unilaterally selected and dispatched employees to private nursing facilities or motels.
And the record supplies no basis to infer that PERB’s Claremont error as to the threshold

25
decision to invoke the DSW policy taints in any way PERB’s conclusion that employee
selection was among the bargainable effects of that decision.
3. Timing

The county contends that it fulfilled its obligation to meet and confer as soon as
practicable because it met with the unions to discuss bargainable effects as early as April
2020. PERB, however, did not find that the county failed to meet with the unions; PERB
instead located the breach of the county’s duty to bargain in the county’s persistent
position that the meetings were merely a noncompulsory courtesy. The county does not
directly dispute PERB’s findings that the county refused to negotiate, believing that
negotiation was not required, and that its meetings were no more than a pro forma
courtesy. County e-mails from April 2020 denying any “obligation to meet and confer on
DSW assignments or enter into sideletters regarding such matters” adequately support
these findings. Moreover, the county maintains that the unions were “largely focused on
… hazard pay and selection process”—the very issues that the county continues to
maintain are “outside the scope” of representation. The county has supplied us with no
basis to reject PERB’s determination that it refused to bargain in good faith about any
aspect of the DSW assignments regardless of whether it had become practicable to do so.
C. Remedy

Although we have rejected most of the county’s challenges to PERB’s decision,
PERB’s clear error in its application of Claremont to county policy changes was material
to the decision, considering PERB’s factual findings, and to the order, considering the
breadth of relief PERB granted. Specifically, the finding that the county violated the
MMBA by failing to meet and confer in good faith over “assignments to skilled nursing
facilities … and motels”—without limitation to the implementation and effects of those
assignments—is infected by clear legal error in the application of Claremont. PERB
erred in finding that the county was required to meet and confer over whether to assign
DSW’s to skilled nursing facilities and motels, not in finding that the county was required

26
to meet and confer, when practicable, over which DSW’s were assigned and on what
terms.
Having identified a material legal error in PERB’s analysis, we will annul the
decision and return the matter to PERB to enter a new decision and order free from its
misapplication of Claremont. (See San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 867; § 3509.5, subd. (b) [authorizing appellate courts
entertaining petitions for a writ of extraordinary relief to set aside the decision or order of
the board].)
III. DISPOSITION
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) Decision Number 2876-M is
annulled. The matter is remanded to PERB for further proceedings consistent with the
views expressed in this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs in this original
proceeding.

27
_____________________________________
LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
GROVER, Acting P. J.

_____________________________________
WILSON, J.

County of Santa Clara v. Public Employment Relations Board
H051570

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