CourtListener 10865082•Evaristo v. Dumlao CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/27/26 Evaristo v. Dumlao CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JOSEPH EVARISTO et al., as B345651
Trustees, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 24STCV10207)
v.
AINA DUMLAO et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kerry Bensigner, Judge. Affirmed.
Aina Dumlao and Bru Miller, in pro. per., for Defendants
and Appellants.
SNS Law Group and Edrin Shamtob for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
_________________________
Aina Dumlao and Bru Miller (collectively, tenants) appeal
from a judgment against them in an unlawful detainer case.
Tenants contend the superior court erred in proceeding with a
bench trial after they filed a second attempt to remove the case to
federal court on the eve of that trial. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2014, tenants leased a housing unit owned by the
Evaristo Family Trust. In 2024, Joseph and Catherine Evaristo,
as trustees of the trust (collectively, landlord), brought an
unlawful detainer action against tenants seeking among other
things possession of the unit, $57,000 in unpaid rent, and any
holdover damages that might accrue while the case was pending.
After tenants’ initial attempts at derailing the case failed,
the superior court held a trial setting conference on October 3,
2024. Counsel representing Dumlao was present; Miller failed to
appear. Dumlao requested a jury trial, and the court ordered
jury fees posted by October 9, 2024. The court set a final status
conference for October 10 and set trial for October 14, 2024.
Tenants then sought to delay the trial through various
procedural machinations. On October 7, 2024, Miller filed a
bankruptcy petition. On November 21, 2024, the bankruptcy
court lifted the automatic stay. On December 3, 2024, Dumlao
sought to remove the unlawful detainer case to federal court,
claiming the case presented a federal question. On January 6,
2025, the district court remanded the matter to the superior court
for lack of federal jurisdiction. The district court’s order, which
was served upon tenants, stated “[t]he law is clear that
‘[u]nlawful detainer actions are strictly within the province of
state court.’ ”
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On January 23, 2025, the court held a status conference at
which counsel for both tenants were present. The day before that
status conference, Dumlao posted jury fees. The court set both
the final status conference and the trial for February 3, 2025.
The court ordered a bench trial, ruling that tenants had waived
their jury right by untimely posting jury fees after the court-
ordered date to do so.
Faced again with an impending trial date, tenants filed a
second notice of removal to federal court on January 31, 2025 (the
Friday before trial was to begin on the following Monday).
Tenants again claimed there was federal jurisdiction because the
unlawful detainer case presented a federal question.
On February 3, 2025, tenants failed to appear for the final
status conference and trial. Nor did any counsel appear on their
behalf. The superior court determined that it had jurisdiction to
proceed under the “narrow exception to the general rule that
state courts lose jurisdiction when a case is removed to federal
court” where there is a second attempt at removal that is
“frivolous” and “doomed from the outset.” (ClipperJet Inc. v.
Tyson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 521, 526, 529.) The court found
tenants had waived their right to a jury trial both by Dumlao
posting jury fees late and by failing to appear for trial. The court
then conducted a bench trial at which it heard from witnesses
and admitted exhibits into evidence. Based on the evidence
presented, the court awarded landlord possession of the unit and
ordered tenants to pay various amounts in past due rent and
holdover damages. The court entered judgment in landlord’s
favor on February 14, 2025.
On February 19, 2025, the district court issued an order
stating again that there was no basis to remove the case to
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federal court and that it was “clear that this court does not have
jurisdiction over the instant matter.”
Tenants thereafter timely appealed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Tenants argue we should reverse because the superior
court lacked jurisdiction to proceed after they filed their second
notice of removal to federal court. To the extent the superior
court did have jurisdiction to proceed, tenants argue the court
denied them due process because they had no notice the court
intended to proceed with trial on February 3, 2025 despite the
notice of removal, and because the court denied them a jury trial.
Landlord initially contends that tenants have forfeited
their challenges because the appellate record supplied by tenants
is incomplete as there is no reporter’s transcript or settled
statement for any of the court proceedings. We disagree.
Tenants’ challenges are procedural, not evidentiary, and the
record is adequate for us to address them.
Tenants’ second attempt to remove the case to federal court
on the eve of trial did not deprive the superior court of
jurisdiction to proceed. “[P]roceedings in the state court
subsequent to the petition for removal are valid if the suit was
not in fact removable.” (Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens
(1941) 312 U.S. 563, 566 [61 S.Ct. 715, 85 L.Ed. 1044].) Although
Metropolitan Casualty was decided before the removal statute
was amended into its current form, courts have concluded its
holding remains good law and that there continues to be “a
narrow exception providing that a state court retains jurisdiction
where the removal notice is frivolous or duplicative.” (ClipperJet
Inc. v. Tyson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 527-528 [citing cases
from Colorado, New York, North Dakota, and Oklahoma].)
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Concluding Congress did not intend “ ‘to allow a defendant to
repeatedly file notices of removal and endlessly delay state court
proceedings’ ” (id. at p. 529), ClipperJet agreed with these other
courts and “recognize[d] a narrow exception to the general rule
that state courts cannot proceed further when a defendant
removes the case” “where there is a frivolous or duplicative notice
of removal.” (Id. at p. 528.)
Tenants claim their second notice of removal was not
duplicative because the arguable federal questions identified in
their two removal notices differed. Even if we assume for the
sake of argument this somehow distinguishes the two notices, the
second notice was itself frivolous. What’s more, tenants knew or
should have known that it was frivolous. The district court had
already stated no federal jurisdiction existed to hear the case and
had told tenants (through its first remand order) that unlawful
detainer matters “ ‘are strictly within the province of state
court.’ ” Tenants nevertheless filed a second notice of removal.
As tenants have never made a colorable argument that federal
jurisdiction existed, and the second removal attempt was
frivolous, the superior court did not err in finding the exception
set forth in ClipperJet applied.
Because the superior court had jurisdiction to proceed with
the trial, we may quickly dispense with tenants’ two other
contentions. The superior court indisputably provided notice to
tenants on January 23, 2025 that trial would commence on
February 3, 2025. As the superior court never lost jurisdiction of
the case as a result of the frivolous second attempt at removal,
that trial date remained. Tenants’ failure to appear at trial was
based on their own strategic choice, not a lack of notice, and the
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superior court was not required to provide additional and
cumulative notice that trial was still set for February 3rd.
Tenants’ failure to appear also means the court did not err
in holding a bench trial. Regardless of whether the court erred
by striking the jury request for failure to comply with the order
about when Dumlao was to post fees, “[a] party waives trial by
jury . . . [¶] . . . [b]y failing to appear at the trial.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 631, subd. (f)(1).) As the court correctly held, tenants’
failure to appear at the trial independently justified the court
proceeding without a jury.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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