Fund Recovery Services v. Keesal, Young & Logan CA2/7

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Filed 5/27/26 Fund Recovery Services v. Keesal, Young & Logan CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

FUND RECOVERY SERVICES, B339325
LLC,
(Los Angeles County Super.
Plaintiff and Appellant, Ct. No. 20STCV43704)

v.

KEESAL, YOUNG & LOGAN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Dempsey Law, Michael D. Dempsey and Rebecca A. Asuan-
O’Brien, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Keesal, Young & Logan and Michael M. Gless, for
Defendants and Respondents.

__________________________
Fund Recovery Services LLC (Fund Recovery) appeals from
a judgment following a grant of summary judgment in favor of
law firm Keesal, Young & Logan (KYL) and KYL partner Sandor
X. Mayuga (collectively, Defendants), after the trial court
determined Fund Recovery’s fraud claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. The fraud claim is based on Defendants’
representation of Shoreside SPV Funding I, LLC (Shoreside I)
and Shoreside Loans, LLC (Shoreside Loans, collectively, the
Shoreside Entities) in several transactions. In the first
transaction, Fund Recovery’s assignor, lender Princeton
Alternative Income Fund LP (Princeton), loaned money to
Shoreside I.1 Fund Recovery contends that Defendants then
helped craft a second transaction to divert all of Shoreside I’s
assets to a new entity created with an unwitting third party.
Fund Recovery alleged the new entity was created to allow the
Shoreside Entities to discontinue their operations and evade
their obligations to Fund Recovery, while continuing their
operations under a new name.
In 2016 Fund Recovery sued the Shoreside Entities and
others (but not Defendants) in federal court. (See Fund Recovery
Services LLC et al. v. Shoreside SPV Funding I, LLC et al.
(C.D.Cal., 2:16-cv-06954-SJO-JC.) In November 2020 Fund
Recovery sued Defendants in this action, claiming Defendants
actively participated in the fraud rather than acted as “mere
scriveners.” Fund Recovery contends the two transactions were

1 Princeton assigned its rights and interests in the loans to
Fund Recovery in September 2016. Although Princeton was a co-
plaintiff along with Fund Recovery in the instant suit, the trial
court dismissed Princeton for lack of standing, and Princeton is
not a party to the appeal.

2
used in tandem to defraud Fund Recovery as well as the third
party. Fund Recovery alleged it did not discover the extent of
Defendants’ involvement in the fraudulent scheme until a
November 16, 2017 meeting with the principal of the third party,
three days before the statute of limitations would have expired.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the
action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for
fraud. They introduced evidence that, in June 2017 during the
federal action, Fund Recovery questioned Mayuga during his
deposition about an email to the third party that, according to
Fund Recovery’s complaint and admissions in discovery,
demonstrated Defendants’ active involvement in the allegedly
fraudulent transaction. Defendants argued the email placed
Fund Recovery on inquiry notice of its fraud claim before
November 2017. The trial court agreed and granted summary
judgment. Because there was no triable issue of material fact
regarding Fund Recovery’s inquiry notice, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Alleged Fraud and Fund Recovery’s Complaint
According to Fund Recovery’s operative amended
complaint, Defendants knowingly facilitated a scheme comprised
of two deals that, together, defrauded Princeton. Mayuga and
KYL represented the Shoreside Entities during the relevant
transactions. The first deal was between Princeton and the
Shoreside Entities, and the second deal was between the
Shoreside Entities and a third party, FPH Capital Partners LLC
(FPH), which was also a victim of the fraudulent scheme.
In the first deal, Princeton entered into a Loan and
Security Agreement (Loan Agreement) that provided a line of

3
credit to Shoreside I and granted Princeton a security interest in
Shoreside I’s assets (the Loan Deal). The Agreement included
provisions prohibiting the transfer of Shoreside I assets.
Shoreside Loans executed a separate agreement with Princeton
to guarantee Shoreside I’s obligations to Princeton. Defendants
and the Shoreside Entitles included terms and promises in the
agreements they knew to be false, including that Shoreside I was
“[s]olvent and will continue to be solvent” and that Shoreside
Loans would remain in business and would not transfer its
assets. Mayuga knew Shoreside Loans lacked sufficient assets to
remain solvent but nonetheless misrepresented the company’s
financial condition to induce Princeton to enter the Loan Deal.
Defendants also knew the Shoreside Entities would not comply
with the agreements, including the obligation to repay the credit
line, and later helped them evade those obligations through a
second deal.
In the second deal (the Asset Transfer Deal), Defendants
assisted in transferring the loan collateral from Shoreside I to a
newly formed entity, Shoreside Capital, LLC (the New Entity).
To carry out the transaction, the Shoreside Entities and
Defendants recruited third party FPH, which the complaint
alleged was also a victim of the scheme. The Shoreside Entities
and Defendants convinced FPH to co-found and provide capital
resources for the New Entity. The Shoreside Entities then
discontinued their operations and moved those operations and
the loan collateral to the New Entity in violation of the Loan
Agreement. By transferring the loan collateral, the Shoreside
Entities (as reconfigured) got an infusion of cash from FPH, but
could evade their contractual obligations to Princeton.
Defendants had a financial incentive to facilitate the Asset

4
Transfer Deal to generate funds to pay the Shoreline Entities’
outstanding legal fees, some of which FPH ultimately paid
directly to KYL. Defendants had orchestrated at least three
similar fraudulent schemes.
The complaint further alleged Princeton and Fund
Recovery knew Defendants participated in both transactions but
did not discover until November 16, 2017 that “Defendants were
not merely scriveners who prepared documents at the [o]riginal
Shoreside Entities’ behest,” but instead “played an active and
integral part” in both deals. On that date, Princeton’s and Fund
Recovery’s officers met with Navin Narang, the managing
member of FPH, at a dinner meeting. Narang described
Defendants’ role in initiating and structuring the Asset Transfer
Deal, including Mayuga’s efforts to direct negotiations and deflect
questions about the Loan Deal. At that meeting, Princeton and
Fund Recovery learned “the extent to which Defendants used and
misused their intimate and full knowledge of the [Loan Deal] in
using the [Asset Transfer Deal] to defraud [Princeton]. It was
only as a result of further, more lengthy discussions with Narang
regarding both deals that [Princeton and Fund Recovery] were
finally able to piece together how the two deals were used
together to defraud [them] and FPH and the critical component
driving both deals was Defendants’ involvement.”
Defendants “could not ethically participate in, direct, or
facilitate the transfer of those assets to another entity” because
Defendants would have known that transfer violated the Loan
Deal agreements. Defendants nevertheless “took numerous overt
acts in furtherance of the continued fraud upon [Princeton] by
drafting, reviewing, and revising documents for the [Asset

5
Transfer] Deal and were actively involved in every aspect of
negotiating the [Asset Transfer] Deal.”
To induce FPH to enter the Asset Transfer Deal,
Defendants falsely represented that the Asset Transfer Deal
would not violate the Loan Deal agreements. A June 8, 2016
email exchange between Mayuga and Narang “evidence[d]
[Mayuga’s] awareness of how the structuring of the
[Princeton]/Shoreside Loans Deal and the [Asset Transfer Deal]
was done to facilitate the fraud upon both [Princeton] and FPH.”
In that exchange, Narang asked Mayuga whether Shoreside
Loans had violated any agreement “with respect to” the Asset
Transfer Deal. Mayuga responded, “The short answer in my view
is ‘no,’ ” and stated he did not believe the “the structure of the
[Asset Transfer Deal] breached” the Loan Agreement. The
complaint alleged Princeton and Fund Recovery did not learn
until November 16, 2017 about Defendants’ active and integral
part in the fraudulent scheme, including their
misrepresentations that the Asset Transfer Deal was not
violating the Loan Deal.
Fund Recovery filed its complaint on November 13, 2020
and amended it in June 2021, asserting a single cause of action
for fraud. The complaint alleged Princeton was owed $4.14
million under the parties’ agreements.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Evidence
1. Summary judgment motion
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants argued
Fund Recovery’s sole cause of action for fraud was barred by the

6
three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure2
section 338, subdivision (d). Because the complaint was filed on
November 13, 2020, the claim was timely only if Fund Recovery
reasonably did not discover facts supporting a cause of action for
fraud until after November 13, 2017. Although the amended
complaint asserted Fund Recovery did not discover the alleged
fraud until November 16, 2017, Defendants contended the
undisputed evidence showed it was on inquiry notice of the
alleged fraud no later than June 29, 2017, nearly six months
earlier, when it learned of the June 2016 email exchange between
Mayuga and Narang. According to Defendants, “[t]he
information which [Fund Recovery] deem[s] so critical to [its]
‘belated’ discovery in a November 16, 2017 dinner meeting
actually appeared” in the June 2016 email that Fund Recovery’s
counsel received in a document production in May 2017 as part of
the lawsuit in federal court (District Court Action), “before the
statutory trigger date of November 13, 2017.” They contended
the statute of limitations had therefore run.
2. Defendants’ supporting evidence
a. 2015 and 2016 loan negotiations
Defendants relied in part on allegations in the amended
complaint, which admitted that Fund Recovery knew of
“Mayuga’s extensive participation in the negotiations, discussions
and detailed review and redlining of the documents” leading up
to the Loan Deal. The amended complaint also alleged
Defendants “took numerous overt acts in furtherance of the

2 Undesignated code references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

7
continued fraud upon [Fund Recovery] by drafting, reviewing,
and revising documents” for the Asset Transfer Deal.
b. June 2016 email from Mayuga
Defendants chiefly relied on the June 2016 email chain
between Narang and Mayuga referenced in the amended
complaint. On June 8, 2016, Narang emailed Mayuga, copying
Narang’s attorney and three other individuals, asking, “[D]id
shoreside loans violate anything in [the Loan Agreement] with
respect to [the Asset Transfer Deal]?” The next day, Mayuga
responded, “The short answer in my view is ‘no,’ ” and stated he
did not believe “the structure of the [Asset Transfer Deal]
breached” the Loan Agreement. According to the operative
complaint, this was a false representation. Further, the
complaint alleged the email “evidence[d] [Mayuga’s] awareness of
how the structuring of the [Princeton]/Shoreside Loans Deal and
the [Asset Transfer Deal] was done to facilitate the fraud upon
both [Princeton] and FPH.”
Philip Burgess, a consultant to Fund Recovery and
Princeton and a part owner of Princeton, testified as Fund
Recovery’s person most knowledgeable. At his deposition, when
asked to identify the “multiple false representations regarding
the [Asset Transfer Deal]” that Fund Recovery alleged
Defendants had made, Burgess pointed only to the “multiple
misrepresentations” in the June 9, 2016 email from Mayuga.
c. Discovery in the District Court Action regarding
the June 6, 2016 email
In October 2016 Fund Recovery sued the Shoreside
Entities, Narang, and FPH for fraud and conversion in the
District Court Action. (Fund Recovery Services LLC v. Shoreside
SPV Funding, I, LLC et al., supra, No. 2:16-cv-06954.) Mayuga

8
and KYL were not parties to that case. In April 2017 Narang and
Fund Recovery met to discuss the Shoreside Entities’ fraud. At
that meeting, Fund Recovery agreed to dismiss Narang and FPH
from the District Court Action.
The same month, Fund Recovery served a subpoena on
KYL. KYL responded in May 2017. The document production
included a copy of the June 2016 email chain between Mayuga
and Narang.
On June 29, 2017, Fund Recovery deposed Mayuga as a
witness in the District Court Action. During the deposition, Fund
Recovery’s counsel marked the June 2016 email chain as an
exhibit and questioned Mayuga about whether his email response
was true or whether it was a misrepresentation. Mayuga
testified he recalled receiving the email and responding to it.
d. November 16, 2017 dinner meeting
Defendants also introduced evidence concerning the
November 16, 2017 meeting attended by Narang along with three
Fund Recovery representatives, including Jack Cook and
Burgess. In a declaration, Narang recounted that during the
meeting, he “told [Fund Recovery] about Mayuga and KYL’s
involvement, including the assurances Mayuga provided
throughout the negotiations regarding the [Loan Agreement] and
his insistence that the [Asset Transfer Deal] with FPH was not in
violation of the [Loan Agreement].” He stated Fund Recovery
was “surprised to learn for the first time the extent of Mayuga
and KYL’s involvement in driving the scheme to not only defraud
Princeton and get KYL invoices paid, but the extent to which
Mayuga personally misled FPH.”

9
C. Fund Recovery’s Opposition and Supporting Evidence
1. Fund Recovery’s opposition to Defendants’ motion
Fund Recovery argued the actual date of discovery of
Defendants’ participation in the fraud is a material disputed fact,
with Fund Recovery maintaining it did not learn the “extent and
nature of Defendants’ fraudulent acts” until November 16, 2017.
Fund Recovery asserted Defendants “trie[d] to equate [its]
awareness of Defendants’ involvement as transactional attorneys
with awareness that Defendants were carrying out a fraudulent
scheme. These are two entirely different things.”
Fund Recovery argued it was aware of Defendants’
involvement in the Loan Deal “but unaware that they used their
unique knowledge of that deal to facilitate a subsequent
fraudulent deal as part of an ongoing fraudulent scheme. By
virtue of what was learned at the November 16, 2017 dinner,
[Fund Recovery] now knows that in addition to the [Loan Deal],
Defendants orchestrated at least three additional fraudulent
deals involving the transfer of assets posted as secured collateral
from one entity to another.”
Fund Recovery did “not dispute production of the [June
2016] email string, receipt of the email string, or awareness of its
contents.” However, Fund Recovery maintained its fraud claim
did not rest on a single email, stating “The June 8-9, 2016 email
string is simply evidence of one instance in which Mayuga
represented to FPH that its deal with the [Shoreside Entities] did
not violate the [Loan Deal].”
2. Fund Recovery’s supporting evidence
Fund Recovery’s evidence focused largely on the
November 16, 2017 meeting, which it claimed was when it first
learned of Defendants’ knowing participation in the fraud.

10
In a declaration, Cook (an executive affiliated with both
Princeton and Fund Recovery) stated, “I did not learn until a
November 16, 2017, dinner meeting in Princeton, New Jersey,
that was attended by Philip Burgess ... and Navin Narang … of
FPH, that [Defendants] participated in and aided and abetted the
… fraud, and that there was a growing list of victims of the
[Shoreside Entities’ owners’] fraud. That was the first I knew of
Mayuga’s active involvement.”3
Narang declared that Mayuga and the Shoreside Entities
prevented his team from communicating with Princeton and that
“Mayuga insisted he had the documents related to the [Loan
Deal] and was familiar with the deal terms.” Mayuga falsely
represented in his June 2016 email that the Asset Transfer Deal

3 Fund Recovery also submitted a declaration from Burgess,
in which he stated “Princeton, [Fund Recovery] and I” did not
learn of “the extensive fraud and aiding and abetting of
Defendants in the [Shoreside Entities’ owners’] wrongdoing …
until November 16, 2017.” The court sustained objections to
Burgess’s declaration.
Fund Recovery contends the court failed to comply with
section 437c, subdivision (g), because it did not explain its
evidentiary rulings. That statute requires the court to state the
reasons for granting summary judgment and to refer to the
evidence showing no triable issue exists. But Fund Recovery
cites no authority requiring the court to separately explain each
evidentiary ruling. More importantly, Fund Recovery does not
explain why any of the rulings were incorrect. Fund Recovery’s
arguments regarding the propriety of the court’s evidentiary
rulings are therefore forfeited. (See LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del
Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
1050, 1070 [“where, as here, the appellants’ opening brief makes
contentions unsupported by proper record citations or cogent
legal arguments, we may treat the contentions as forfeited”].)

11
did not violate the Loan Agreement. Narang stated that absent
Mayuga’s repeated assurances that the Asset Transfer Deal did
not violate the Loan Agreement, his company would have
withdrawn from the transaction.
Narang stated that at the November 16, 2017 dinner, “as
we were discussing the [Shoreside Entities’ owners’] fraudulent
conduct, the [Fund Recovery] team asked out loud how the
[owners] were able to pull off one fraudulent scheme after
another. I told them about Mayuga and KYL’s involvement,
including the assurances Mayuga provided throughout the
negotiations regarding the [Loan Agreement] and his insistence
that the [Asset Transfer Deal] deal with FPH was not in violation
of the [Loan Agreement]. They were surprised to learn for the
first time the extent of Mayuga and KYL’s involvement in driving
the scheme to not only defraud Princeton and get KYL invoices
paid, but the extent to which Mayuga personally misled FPH.”4

D. The Summary Judgment Ruling5
In April 2024 the court granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, concluding Fund Recovery’s sole cause of

4 Fund Recovery also relied on a declaration executed by
Christopher Leyva in February 2017 in the District Court Action.
Leyva was the chief executive officer of a company that provided
loan-management software to the Shoreside Entities. He
described transferring loan information from the Shoreside
Entities to a new account for the New Entity. The court
sustained Defendants’ objection to Leyva’s declaration on
relevance grounds.
5 Fund Recovery contends the trial court failed to comply
with section 437c, subdivision (g), which requires a court

12
action for fraud was barred by the three-year statute of
limitations. The court concluded Fund Recovery failed to raise a
triable issue of material fact regarding whether Fund Recovery
was on inquiry notice of any alleged fraud no later than June 29,
2017, the date its counsel deposed Mayuga in the District Court
Action. The court found the June 2016 email chain, which was
discussed during that deposition, contained “critical
representations” showing Mayuga’s involvement and thus put

granting summary judgment to “specify the reasons for its
determination” by written or oral order, and to have any oral
determination recorded by a court reporter. Although there was
no court reporter present to record the court’s oral ruling, the
parties later submitted a settled statement containing the trial
court’s reasoning. Thus, Fund Recovery has not shown prejudice
from the court’s failure to comply with section 437c, subdivision
(g). (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [an appellant has the burden
not only to show error but prejudice from that error]; Jackson v.
Lara (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 337, 342, fn. 2 [trial court’s failure
to state its reasons for granting summary judgment was
harmless error and did not require reversal where appellate
court’s independent review established validity of the judgment];
Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
1134, 1146 [“reversal for a failure to state reasons is not required
if the failure was harmless ‘since “ ‘[i]t is the validity of the ruling
which is reviewable and not the reasons therefore’ ” ’ ”].)
Fund Recovery also argues that during the process of
approving the Settled Statement, the trial court “forced” Fund
Recovery to “include verbatim language” from Defendants’
proposed amendments to Fund Recovery’s Proposed Settled
Statement which “does not accurately reflect the proceedings.”
But Fund Recovery identifies no specific inaccuracy and explains
no resulting prejudice.

13
Fund Recovery on notice before the November 16, 2017 meeting.
The court further ruled that the knowledge of Fund Recovery’s
attorneys was imputed to Fund Recovery. Because the action
was filed three years and six months after the June 29, 2017
deposition, and because the statue for limitations for fraud is
three years, the court held the claim was time-barred.
Fund Recovery timely appealed.6

6 The trial court initially issued a minute order and a signed
order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but
refused to sign a judgment, stating “The Court finds the
Plaintiff’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED
and the First Amended Complaint was DISMISSED with
prejudice on 4/18/24. Since the case was dismissed, there is no
need for a Judgment.” However, “[a]n order granting summary
judgment is not an appealable order.” (Champlin/GEI Wind
Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 223.) Instead,
“an appeal can only be taken from [the subsequent] entry of
judgment.” (Blauser v. Dubin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 918, 922.)
We ordered the trial court to sign an appealable judgment, which
it did while this appeal was pending. Accordingly, we construe
Fund Recovery’s notice of appeal as taken from the later entered
judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) [“The
reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the
superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it
has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of
judgment.”]; Rozanova v. Uribe (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392, 398,
fn. 3 [construing a notice of appeal from a nonappealable order to
apply to subsequent signed appealable order].)

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DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
1. Summary judgment and the statute of limitations
We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. (Gonzalez
v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.) In so doing, we “ ‘liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of
that party.’ ” (Ibid.) “Summary judgment is appropriate only
‘where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618; see § 437c, subds. (c) & (f).)
“The statute of limitations operates in an action as an
affirmative defense.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
383, 396; see Gutierrez v. Tostado (2025) 18 Cal.5th 222, 231.) In
moving for summary judgment on the statute of limitations
affirmative defense, once a defendant establishes all the elements
of the defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show one or
more triable issues of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Casarez
v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 873, 881; Jessen v.
Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484-1485.) “ ‘The
plaintiff ... shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but,
instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.’ ” (Casarez, at p. 881; see § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
2. Delayed discovery
Section 338, subdivision (d), provides that “the cause of
action [on the ground of fraud or mistake] is not deemed to have
accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts

15
constituting the fraud or mistake.” “A plaintiff has reason to
discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to
suspect a factual basis for its elements.’ [Citations.] Under the
discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause
of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will
generally trigger the statute of limitations period.”7 (Fox v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox); see
MGA Entertainment, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
554, 561 (MGA).) Under this test, “we look to whether the
plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of
wrongdoing has injured them.” (Fox, at p. 807.) In ascertaining
when a plaintiff has reason to suspect a factual basis for the
“elements of a cause of action, courts ‘do not take a
hypertechnical approach. ... Rather than examining whether the
plaintiffs suspect facts supporting each specific legal element of a
particular cause of action, we look to whether the plaintiffs have
reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured
them.’ ” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
308, 323.)
“[I]n order to employ the discovery rule to delay accrual of a
cause of action, a potential plaintiff who suspects that an injury
has been wrongfully caused must conduct a reasonable

7 “ ‘ “The elements of fraud ... are: (a) misrepresentation
(false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure);
(b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to
induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.” ’ ” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024)
17 Cal.5th 1, 32; accord, Alves v. Weber (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
99, 112; see also Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 1710 [statutory definition of
deceit].)

16
investigation of all potential causes of that injury. If such an
investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause of
action, the statute of limitations begins to run on that cause of
action when the investigation would have brought such
information to light. In order to adequately allege facts
supporting a theory of delayed discovery, the plaintiff must plead
that, despite diligent investigation of the circumstances of the
injury, he or she could not have reasonably discovered facts
supporting the cause of action within the applicable statute of
limitations period.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 808-809.)
“ ‘[I]f an action is brought more than three years after
commission of the fraud, plaintiff has the burden of pleading and
proving that he did not make the discovery until within three
years prior to the filing of his complaint.” (Cansino v. Bank of
America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472; see also Fox, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 809.) Specifically, the plaintiff “ ‘must
specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of
discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery
despite reasonable diligence.’ ” (Fox, at p. 808.)
The issue of “[w]hen a plaintiff reasonably should have
discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a cause of action or
application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of
fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence ...
can support only one reasonable conclusion.” (Stella v. Asset
Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 193;
accord, Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112;
People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians,
P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 552; Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 57, 64.)

17
B. Defendants Met Their Initial Burden To Show Fund
Recovery’s Claim Was Time-barred
The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (§ 338,
subd. (d).) Fund Recovery’s amended complaint alleged the claim
did not accrue until the November 2017 dinner meeting with
Narang. Although it previously knew Defendants were involved
in the Loan Deal and the Asset Transfer Deal, Fund Recovery
claimed it did not discover until November 16, 2017 that
Defendants “played an active and integral part” in the fraud. If
the undisputed evidence showed that before November 13, 2017
Fund Recovery “ha[d] reason to at least suspect” it had been
injured by some kind of wrongdoing by the Defendants, summary
judgment was proper. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
Defendants established that Fund Recovery was on inquiry
notice of Defendants’ purported fraudulent scheme by June 2017
at the latest. Fund Recovery’s amended complaint alleged
Mayuga’s June 2016 email to FPH “evidence[d] his awareness of
how the structuring of the [Princeton]/Shoreside Loans Deal and
the [Asset Transfer Deal] was done to facilitate the fraud upon
both [Princeton] and FPH.” Its person most knowledgeable,
Burgess, testified this email contained the misrepresentations by
Defendants that were central to Fund Recovery’s fraud claim.
Specifically, in the June 2016 email thread, Mayuga
represented that the Asset Transfer Deal would not violate the
Loan Deal agreements to induce FPH to enter the deal.
However, according to Fund Recovery, Mayuga knew that was
false, because he represented the Shoreside Entities in the Loan
Deal. He therefore knew the Loan Deal agreements required the
entities to remain solvent and not transfer their assets. If the
Shoreside Entities’ assets were moved to the New Entity, those

18
promises could not be performed. Accordingly, based on Fund
Recovery’s theory of the alleged fraud, Defendants “could not
ethically participate in, direct, or facilitate the transfer of those
assets to another entity” because Defendants would have known
that transfer violated the Loan Deal agreements. But the
amended complaint contended Defendants did just that. The
complaint alleged Defendants had “intimate and full knowledge”
of the details of the Loan Deal, which prohibited the transfer of
assets, but told FPH that such a transfer would not violate the
Loan Agreement. Therefore, Mayuga had to have known his
representation was false. According to Fund Recovery’s pleading,
the email reflected Mayuga’s active participation in the
fraudulent scheme, beyond mere ministerial document drafting.
Defendants also proffered evidence that Fund Recovery
possessed that email before November 2017. KYL produced the
June 2016 email chain in response to a subpoena in May 2017
during the District Court Action. The following month, Fund
Recovery deposed Mayuga, marked the email as an exhibit, and
questioned him about it, including questions about whether his
representations in the email were accurate. At that point, Fund
Recovery was at least on inquiry notice (even if it lacked actual
notice) of the facts revealed in the email. (J&A Mash & Barrel,
LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1, 31 [“ ‘Under
general agency principles, “an attorney is his client’s agent, and
... the agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal even where
... the agent does not actually communicate with the principal,
who thus lacks actual knowledge of the imputed fact.” ’ ”]; E-Fab,
Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308,
1319 [in the context of the delayed discovery rule, “it has long

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been the rule in California that ‘notice to an agent is notice to the
principal’ ”].)
Defendants therefore offered evidence that by June 2017 at
the latest, Fund Recovery knew or had reason to suspect
Defendants’ knowledge of and active involvement in the alleged
fraud. (See Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 270, 282 [“[a]n action for fraud ... accrues when a
plaintiff first learns that a fraud may have occurred, so long as he
or she could have confirmed the fraud through further
investigation.”].)

C. Fund Recovery Failed To Establish a Triable Issue that It
Discovered Defendants’ Fraud After November 13, 2017
The trial court correctly concluded Fund Recovery failed to
proffer evidence to raise a triable issue whether it had inquiry
notice of Defendants’ fraud prior to the normal expiration of the
statute of limitations.
Fund Recovery concedes that before the November 16, 2017
dinner, it was aware of Defendants’ involvement, but contends it
was “unaware that they used their unique knowledge of the deal
to orchestrate a subsequent deal as part of an ongoing fraudulent
scheme.” Fund Recovery relies on declarations from Cook and
Narang to argue it did not discover the extent of Defendants’ role
in the fraud until the November 16, 2017 meeting when Narang
provided this information to Cook and others. Narang’s
declaration recounted that at the November 2017 dinner, those
present discussed “Mayuga and KYL’s involvement, including the
assurances Mayuga provided throughout the negotiations
regarding the [Loan Agreement] and his insistence that the
[Asset Transfer Deal] deal with FPH was not in violation of the
[Loan Agreement].” In substance, Narang relayed what the June

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2016 email showed: Defendants were involved in the Asset
Transfer Deal and, to induce Mayuga to enter the deal,
represented to Narang that it did not violate the Loan
Agreement. Fund Recovery identifies no new fact learned in
November 2017 that was not apparent from the June 2016 email.
As explained, by June 2017, Fund Recovery was on inquiry notice
when it deposed Mayuga and examined the June 2016 email.
That is so even if specific individuals affiliated with Fund
Recovery, such as Cook, did not personally understand the
significance of the information in the June 2016 email at the
time.
Arguably, Mayuga’s June 2016 email does nothing more
than deny that the Asset Transfer Deal violated the Loan Deal—
a representation to a third party (Narang), not to Fund Recovery.
Considered on its own, we agree with Fund Recovery that the
email does not appear to be a “smoking gun” demonstrating
Defendants perpetrated fraud on Fund Recovery. However, as
discussed, Fund Recovery’s complaint alleged the email
“evidence[d] [Mayuga’s] awareness of how the structuring of the
[Princeton]/Shoreside Loans Deal and the [Asset Transfer Deal]
was done to facilitate the fraud upon both [Princeton] and FPH.”
As Fund Recovery argued in its opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, its fraud claim in large part relies on the
theory that Defendants’ misrepresentations to Narang and FPH
were part of the “ongoing fraudulent scheme” targeting both FPH
and Fund Recovery as victims. Thus. under Fund Recovery’s
theory, Mayuga’s misrepresentations to Narang about the Loan
Deal were integral to Defendants’ fraudulent scheme. Having
alleged the email demonstrated Defendants’ awareness and
participation—the crux of the claimed fraud—Fund Recovery

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cannot now contend the same email did not reveal misconduct.
(See Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437,
456 [“A defendant may rely on judicial admissions in moving for
summary judgment.”]; Castillo v. Barrera (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
1317, 1324 [“ ‘A defendant moving for summary judgment may
rely on the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint,
which constitute judicial admissions. As such they are conclusive
concessions of the truth of a matter and have the effect of
removing it from the issues.’ ”].)
Fund Recovery also argues that the June 2016 email did
not “capture or disclose the complexity of KYL’s fraudulent
scheme.” It asserts the amended complaint alleged several
misrepresentations beyond those in that email. But it identifies
none. Moreover, even if Fund Recovery did not understand the
full “complexity” of the alleged scheme until the November 2017
dinner, that did not delay accrual of the cause of action. The
question is not whether Fund Recovery understood the entire
scheme when it became aware of the email string, but when it
had reason to suspect wrongdoing.8 (See MGA, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 564 [“the question is not when [the plaintiff]

8 For the same reason, Fund Recovery did not raise a triable
issue that the cause of action was delayed until Fund Recovery
learned at the November 2017 dinner that “ ‘there have been at
least three (3) additional fraudulent schemes involving the
knowing and intentional transfer of assets posted as secured
collateral from one entity to another for the purpose of avoiding
obligations owed to unsuspecting victims such as [Princeton] and
[Fund Recovery].’ ” Discovering there were other alleged schemes
may have strengthened Fund Recovery’s suspicions or provided
additional context, but it did not restart or delay the statute of
limitations.

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actually discovered [the] misappropriations; it is when [the
plaintiff] by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered [the defendants] engaged in misappropriation”].)
Undisputed facts demonstrate that by June 2017 at the latest,
Fund Recovery was on notice of Defendants’ role in the Asset
Transfer Deal—conduct the amended complaint describes as a
“continu[ation]” of the original fraud. (See id. at p. 563 [a party
may not “compartmentaliz[e] its suspicion of wrongdoing”];
Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166,
179 [“because a party “was always aware of the general role of
Respondents,” he “could not wait for any admission by them of
fault, to form at least ‘a suspicion of wrongdoing’ when it all went
bad”].)
Finally, Fund Recovery argues it did not discover the fraud
earlier because Defendants actively concealed their conduct.
Fraudulent concealment can toll a limitations period while a
claim remains undiscovered, but only until the plaintiff, through
reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. (Bernson v.
Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931; see MGA,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 561.) The doctrine does not apply
once the plaintiff is on notice of a potential claim. (MGA, at
p. 561.) Thus, the doctrine does not apply here.
Because the undisputed evidence showed Fund Recovery
was on inquiry notice of Defendants’ role in the alleged fraud no
later than June 2017, the trial court properly found Fund
Recovery’s claim was time-barred and granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendants.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to
recover their costs on appeal.9

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

GIZA, J.*

9 Defendants claim their costs on appeal “include all time
spent drafting and finalizing the Settled Statement.” They are
incorrect, in part because the fees incurred in preparing a settled
statement are incurred in the trial court, not on appeal. (See
Muller v. Reagh (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 151, 153 [“A proposed
settled statement is not the record on appeal or any part thereof.
There is no provision in the rules for allowance of this type of
item” as a recoverable cost on appeal].)

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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