CourtListener 10865080•In re B.A. CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 5/27/26 In re B.A. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B347533
In re B.A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01098A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Cheryl Spano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
eight-month-old B.A. and removed her from mother’s custody.
The dependency petition was based on mother’s substance abuse.
On appeal, mother contends the evidence was insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s disposition order removing B.A. from
mother’s physical custody. Mother further argues that the
juvenile court failed to independently determine whether the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) made reasonable efforts to prevent B.A.’s removal. She
additionally contends that DCFS and the court failed to
sufficiently describe the basis for the removal order and the
reasonable efforts made to prevent removal. We affirm the
juvenile court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2025, mother was hospitalized for abdominal
pain.1 Drug tests completed at the hospital were positive for
marijuana and fentanyl. B.A. was four months old. A referral
was submitted to DCFS.
During an initial investigation, the maternal grandmother
told a social worker that mother and B.A. lived with her.
Maternal grandmother helped mother care for B.A. She had not
known that mother was using fentanyl. The home appeared safe.
Mother admitted to a social worker that she had used
fentanyl for about two or three years and that she regularly
1 All dates are in 2025 unless otherwise noted.
2
smoked marijuana. Mother snorted crushed fentanyl pills up to
three times a week and used them whenever she felt withdrawal
symptoms. Mother also took Percocet during the first two
months of her pregnancy with B.A., when she was still unaware
she was pregnant. She stopped during her pregnancy but
“slipped up” once during the middle of the pregnancy.2 Mother
said she had no more pills and had last used fentanyl the prior
weekend. She still smoked marijuana every night while
maternal grandmother watched B.A. She said the marijuana
helped her with anxiety. At the hospital, she was prescribed
several medications, including “buprenorphine-Suboxone.” She
had agreed to enter an outpatient substance abuse program and
to attend narcotics anonymous meetings.
B.A. attended a daycare operated by mother’s maternal
aunt. The aunt had no concerns about B.A. and said she
“appears to be well cared for.” Over the course of two DCFS
visits, social workers noted B.A. appeared healthy and had no
marks or bruises indicative of abuse. She seemed comfortable
with mother.
The maternal great grandmother told a social worker
“there was a scare a few years ago when mother was at school in
Northridge prior to the baby where, ‘I don’t think it’s considered
an overdose, but there was a scare.’ ” The maternal great
grandmother believed everything changed for mother once she
got pregnant and she was now “completely different.”
2 It is unclear if mother was using Percocet during this time,
or fentanyl, as she later told a social worker the fentanyl she
used came in the form of “fake Percocet” pills. It is also unclear if
mother’s statement that she “stopped” during her pregnancy
meant she also stopped using marijuana.
3
Mother agreed to a voluntary safety plan in advance of the
detention hearing. She agreed she would remain sober and
would not use any substances. She also agreed to enroll and
participate in a substance abuse program. She would not
breastfeed B.A. and would use maternal grandmother for
support. On March 24, mother tested positive for marijuana. In
early April, she reported that she was enrolled in an intensive
outpatient program that would start on April 10. Mother’s case
manager from the outpatient program confirmed that she had
enrolled in services and random drug testing and was scheduled
to attend classes.
DCFS filed a petition alleging B.A. was a person described
by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),
based on the parents’ substance abuse.3 As to mother, the
petition alleged she had a history of substance abuse and was
currently abusing marijuana, fentanyl, and prescription
medication, which rendered her incapable of providing regular
care of B.A.
Although DCFS asked the juvenile court to detain B.A.
from mother, the court denied the request at the initial hearing.
The court conditioned the release to mother on her and B.A.
continuing to live with the maternal grandmother or in other
3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. Father was noncustodial and had only
minimal contact with B.A. It was undisputed that father had a
significant, unresolved substance abuse problem. He admitted
fentanyl use and tested positive for methamphetamine. The
court detained B.A. from father, sustained the petition’s
allegations as to him, removed B.A. from his custody, and ordered
reunification services. Father is not a party to this appeal. We
discuss only the facts relevant to mother.
4
DCFS-approved housing, and on mother submitting to weekly
random drug testing. The court warned that if mother tested
positive, or had any missed or unexcused tests, DCFS was
authorized to detain B.A. The court further ordered that mother
was to stop using marijuana and the levels of the drug in her test
results were to decrease to zero. The court ordered DCFS to
provide in-home family preservation services to mother.
In late May, DCFS interviewed mother for the jurisdiction
and disposition report. Mother reported that she was now using
medication for anxiety but she did not like how it made her feel.
She preferred using marijuana to “take the anxiety edge off” and
did not believe there was any problem with her using it. She said
the drug also helped her to have an appetite and to stay calm.
She continued to smoke marijuana nightly before bed, while B.A.
was asleep and maternal grandmother was watching her.
Mother informed the social worker that “marijuana is legal, and
she and her family have a plan to ensure she is using and
keeping the baby safe.” Because mother was only 20 years old,
she obtained marijuana from “ ‘whoever will sell it to me and
some dispensaries who don’t card me.’ ”
As to fentanyl, mother reported she was two months sober.
She had started using the drug when she was 17 years old,
around three years earlier. She obtained the drug in the form of
“fake Percocet” pills, which she crushed and snorted daily.4 She
4 Father reported that he overdosed on “pills” several times
in 2023. On the first occasion, after mother sent him money to
buy pills and he was waiting for her, he snorted what he believed
must have been “concentrated fentanyl,” causing him to overdose.
The second time, father was in mother’s dorm room when mother
spent $300 to buy a large bag of pills. Father “ ‘hit a big line’ ”
and lost consciousness while mother was out of the room.
5
used the drug to “feel mellow,” and it “ ‘never crossed [her]
mind’ ” that the drug was dangerous and people had died using it.
She admitted struggling to stop using, explaining: “ ‘obviously[,]
because I was addicted, I used for three years.’ ” However, she
told the social worker she had quit and was ready to stay sober as
to fentanyl. She denied that she had ever been around B.A. while
under the influence of marijuana or fentanyl.
The maternal great aunt had B.A. at her daycare every
weekday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The great aunt had no
concerns about abuse, neglect, B.A.’s behavior, or B.A.’s sleep.
B.A. was reaching developmental milestones like rolling over and
lifting her head. B.A. had never smelled like marijuana and the
great aunt had not noticed mother smelling of marijuana.
However, the great aunt did not see mother regularly because
maternal grandmother dropped B.A. off at daycare.
In June, a program coordinator from mother’s outpatient
program informed DCFS that mother was required to submit to
drug testing once a week, but she had been sporadic in
complying. In mid-April, mother had tested positive for alcohol.
She missed drug tests three times in May.5 The jurisdiction and
disposition report indicated mother was confused about weekly
testing, but DCFS clarified the requirement with her at the end
of May.
5 DCFS submitted test results showing mother was a “no
show” for tests on May 8, 13, 21, and 30. Mother submitted
results showing she tested with the outpatient program on May
21. The test results were positive for marijuana only. Mother
submitted to further drug tests on June 2, 6, 13, 18, and 25. The
June 2, June 6, June 18, and June 25 tests were positive for
marijuana. The June 13 test was negative for all substances.
6
Mother initially participated consistently in group and
individual counseling. But in late June, mother’s therapist
reported that she was inconsistent with therapy. Mother had
attended only three sessions and, as a result, she was discharged
from individual therapy in mid-June. The therapist observed
that “mother was not receptive to receiving services and had no
insight to the reason for her being in the [outpatient] program.”
The therapist further reported that mother did not want to quit
using marijuana and disliked the Suboxone prescribed to her to
help treat her fentanyl addiction. Mother said she did not like
the therapist and the program was going to connect her with a
different one.
Mother told a social worker she was working with her
substance abuse counselor to slowly stop using marijuana. When
asked how she intended to address her lack of appetite and
anxiety without using drugs, mother did not have a plan. She
denied any current fentanyl use.
DCFS had initiated family preservation services for
mother. Mother canceled or missed several intake appointments,
preventing the service provider from assessing B.A.’s safety in
the home. Although a social worker reminded mother on May 30
about a scheduled intake appointment for the services on June 3,
mother did not show up for the appointment. Mother had
similarly missed an initial appointment with the social worker
and a medical hub clinic appointment. Mother gave DCFS a
written statement asserting, among other things, that she had
eventually completed an intake for family preservation services
and was now in the assessment process.
At the July jurisdiction and disposition hearing, DCFS
asked the court to sustain the petition and remove B.A. from
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mother. DCFS’s counsel argued that mother continued to use
marijuana, despite the court’s admonition that her levels of the
drug decrease to zero. Minor’s counsel agreed the court should
sustain the petition and declare B.A. a dependent of the court but
argued against removal. Counsel noted mother had not tested
positive for fentanyl during the pendency of the case and she had
family support to keep B.A. safe. Mother’s counsel argued only
about the proposed disposition, contending that the court should
not remove B.A. from mother. According to mother’s counsel,
mother had completed an intake interview with family
preservation services and only used marijuana at night when
maternal grandmother was taking care of B.A.
The juvenile court noted mother’s ongoing marijuana use
created risk because “obviously, marijuana[,] for you led to
fentanyl so you need to stop.” The court sustained the petition as
pled. As to disposition, the court ruled: “I am going to detain the
child, as the court does find by clear and convincing evidence
there is a substantial danger to the minor’s physical and mental
well-being. There is no reasonable means to protect without
removal. [¶] And reasonable efforts have been made to prevent
the removal.” The court ordered DCFS to provide mother
reunification services. B.A. was placed with maternal
grandmother. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Dispositional Order
A. Legal principles and standard of review
To remove a child from a custodial parent, the juvenile
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is
or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
8
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . .
physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Section 361,
subdivision (e), requires the court to “make a determination as to
whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate
the need for removal of the minor from their home . . . . The court
shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is
based.”
“[T]he juvenile court must determine whether a child will
be in substantial danger if permitted to remain in the parent’s
physical custody, considering not only the parent’s past conduct,
but also current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the
conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re
I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520 (I.R.).) A child need not be
harmed before removal is warranted to avoid such harm. (In re
D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328; In re N.M. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 159, 169–170.)
When reviewing a juvenile court’s dispositional orders, we
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found removal
necessary by clear and convincing evidence. (I.R., supra, 61
Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) We consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the respondent, giving the respondent the
benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in
support of the juvenile court’s order. “ ‘We uphold judgments if
they are correct for any reason, “regardless of the correctness of
the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion.”
[Citation.] “It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which
9
is the subject of review . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Jonathan B.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876.)
B. Discussion
While the parties disputed the extent to which mother’s
ongoing use of marijuana posed a danger to B.A., it was
undisputed that mother had a severe addiction to fentanyl, a
highly dangerous drug that she obtained illegally. Mother did
not dispute that fentanyl use rendered her incapable of providing
adequate care and supervision of B.A. Mother also admitted that
prior to DCFS involvement, she was using fentanyl daily. She
also admitted struggling to stop using fentanyl. Mother started
using drugs when she was 14 years old. A social worker reported
that mother said she had never before sought treatment because
she “never saw her substance use as an issue.” Mother later
denied making this statement, informing the court that she knew
her fentanyl use was severe and a problem, but she had been
unable to stop using the drug previously because the withdrawal
symptoms were too bad.
DCFS implemented a safety plan that was designed to
allow mother to retain custody of B.A. But although mother
initially followed the plan, by the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, her compliance had faltered. Mother attended only a
few sessions of individual counseling, which presumably was
intended to help her address the causes or triggers of her
addiction. She had been discharged from individual therapy.
A report from the substance abuse program coordinator
suggested mother’s attendance in other aspects of the program
had become inconsistent. The coordinator told a social worker:
“Prior to our services being held on Zoom and our relocation[,
mother] was consistent with her attendance. I will be addressing
10
her participation and treatment plan goals at our next individual
counseling session.”
Although DCFS had initiated family preservation services,
which would enable service providers to monitor B.A.’s safety and
care while in mother’s home, mother did not show up for a
scheduled intake despite a social worker reminder. The service
provider reported that it had difficulty reaching mother; “child
safety was unable to be established due to [family’s] inability to
meet . . . in the month of May”; and “challenges included mother
cancelling set appointments.” Although mother represented that
the intake appointment occurred before the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, mother’s earlier conduct, at a minimum,
significantly delayed the services.
Mother was receiving medication-assisted drug treatment
to address her fentanyl addiction, but drug test results showed
she was not taking it regularly. Mother instead relied on illegally
procured marijuana. Although mother described having anxiety,
which she had previously self-treated, in part, with fentanyl, she
did not show up for an appointment with a psychiatrist arranged
through the substance abuse program. When a DCFS social
worker asked about the missed appointment, “mother reported
that no one reminded her of the appointment, and she does not
know the psychiatrist’s name.”
The record as a whole thus contains substantial evidence
from which the juvenile court reasonably could have found it
highly probable that B.A. would be in substantial danger if
allowed to remain in mother’s custody and that there were no
reasonable means to protect her without removal.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) There was
evidence of mother’s severe fentanyl addiction and even a prior
11
overdose “scare.” Mother continued using marijuana and tested
positive for alcohol. The juvenile court had already ordered, and
DCFS had facilitated and monitored, several measures to protect
B.A. while she remained in mother’s custody. Mother complied
with some of the measures but disregarded others.
Further, while mother had the support of family members,
they told DCFS they were completely unaware of her prior
fentanyl addiction. The family members’ statements did not
suggest they were likely to know if mother relapsed on the drug.
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that this lack of
awareness prevented the family members from being able to
ensure that B.A. would not be in mother’s care if mother is under
the influence of fentanyl.
Similarly, the juvenile court could find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that there were no reasonable means to
protect B.A. without removing her from mother’s custody. DCFS
had implemented a safety plan ordered, in part, by the juvenile
court, but mother’s compliance with that plan had grown worse
as time passed. Critically, mother had not participated in the in-
home services that would allow social workers to regularly assess
B.A.’s safety while in mother’s care. She canceled appointments,
including on July 1, only days before the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing.6 Mother further had only partially engaged
in the substance abuse program, including by having a period of
only sporadic drug testing, being discharged from individual
therapy, failing to follow through with psychiatric treatment, and
not using medication-assisted drug treatment.
6 Mother said the interview conflicted with her classes at the
substance abuse program, yet she had previously confirmed the
appointment.
12
Mother relies on evidence that the substance abuse
program coordinator described her as consistently participating
in group counseling and individual counseling, and mother had
gained insight into her substance use. Yet, this assessment was
provided in early June. By early July, mother had been
discharged from individual counseling, her individual therapist
opined that mother was not receptive to receiving services, and
the same program coordinator intended to “address” mother’s
participation with her at their next session.
Mother also argues that there is “absolutely no correlation
to mother’s parenting and ability to keep [B.A.] safe and her
engagement in therapy.” She contends missing appointments
was irrelevant. We disagree. Mother ignores that a critical
service she had not received due to multiple missed appointments
was in-home services, described above. Further, mother told a
social worker early in the case that she suffered from anxiety.
While she described using marijuana to treat that condition, she
also told a social worker that she used fentanyl because it made
her “feel mellow” and she used both substances to “[take] the
edge off.” She also said she did not know why she had used
fentanyl, but admitted she had struggled and used the drug for
three years. The juvenile court could reasonably infer from this
evidence that therapy was included in the substance abuse
program as an important part of a plan to assist mother in
understanding her addiction and enabling her to stay sober.
Mother relies on cases such as I.R., In re M.V. (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 944, and Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 856, as examples of the proper application of
section 361, subdivision (c). These cases, however, do not suggest
reversal is required in this case. All three involved domestic
13
violence. In each case, the parent challenging the juvenile court
orders had demonstrated an ability to avoid further violent
encounters, and, aside from the violence with another adult, the
children were not at risk in the parent’s custody. This case is
different. The risk posed to B.A. arises directly from mother’s
individual conduct. Unlike the parents in M.V. and Georgeanne
G., mother was decreasing her participation in services designed
to address the problems leading to jurisdiction. While these cases
on which mother relies explain the relevant law, they are not
analogous to this case.
In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, is also
distinguishable. In L.G., the appellate court concluded the child
welfare agency did not show there were no reasonable means by
which the child’s physical health could have been protected
without removal. The agency did not present evidence showing
“it had explored interventions to mitigate remaining sources of
risk and determined they were infeasible.” (Id. at p. 1232.) It did
not “[explore] a family maintenance plan under which mother
would receive regular counseling, in-home services, parenting
supports, or regular check-ins from a social worker.” (Ibid.) The
opposite is true here. DCFS created a plan designed to mitigate
sources of risk that involved mother’s participation in a
substance abuse program that included counseling and in-home
services. Mother prevented the in-home services from getting
fully underway by missing or canceling appointments, and she
ceased consistent participation in several aspects of the
substance abuse program. Social workers reported mother
canceling check-in appointments. She declined treatments for
her addiction and anxiety other than marijuana. Here, the
14
juvenile court could reasonably conclude DCFS met its burden of
proof.
We also reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court
failed to independently determine whether DCFS made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal. As we understand
mother’s argument, the contention is based on the asserted lack
of substantial evidence to support the findings and the court’s
statements regarding mother’s marijuana use. As discussed
above, we conclude substantial evidence supported the finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there were no reasonable
means to protect B.A. without removal. DCFS implemented a
detailed safety plan before the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing to allow B.A. to remain in mother’s care. The DCFS
reports detailed the agency’s efforts to facilitate that plan, yet
mother failed to comply with several important protective
measures. The juvenile court admitted the reports into evidence
and considered them. Although the court focused its oral
statements on mother’s marijuana use, the evidence amply
supported the court’s finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts
to prevent removal. We have no basis to conclude that the
finding was not based on the court’s independent assessment of
the evidence.
Finally, mother contends the jurisdiction and disposition
report failed to comply with California Rules of Court,
rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), and the juvenile court failed to comply with
the section 361, subdivision (e) requirement that the court “state
the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.”
We disagree that DCFS failed to comply with California
Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), which requires that a social
study recommending removal include a discussion of the
15
reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate removal. While a
section of the DCFS report titled “reasonable efforts” may have
been conclusory, much of the rest of the report was devoted to
describing the efforts DCFS had made to prevent removal. The
reports described the safety plan, the social workers’
communications with service providers, and efforts to encourage
and help mother to comply with the plan. This satisfied
California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).
To the extent the juvenile court failed to state facts on
which the removal decision was based, we find any error
harmless. After considering the entire record, we conclude it is
not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to mother
would have been reached had the court made the required
findings under section 361, subdivision (e). (In re L.O. (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 227, 246–247; In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058,
1068.)
16
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
17
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