People v. Harris CA2/3

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Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Harris CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B343664

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA284216)
v.

CHRISTOPHER HARRIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Charlaine Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Christopher
Harris of first degree murder and found true that he personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury and death. The trial court subsequently denied Harris’s
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the
prima facie stage.1 We conclude the record of conviction
conclusively establishes Harris was convicted of murder under a
still valid theory and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2004, Eric “Stoney” Alexander was shot and
killed on a street in Los Angeles.2 A witness heard the gunshots
and saw a black SUV leave the scene. At trial, witnesses testified
that Harris’s sister Kwana3 said that she contacted Alexander to
lure him to a location and then drove Harris to meet him, and
that Harris admitted that he shot Alexander.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We take the facts of the underlying crime from the
summary of the evidence contained in our prior opinion affirming
Harris’s and Kwana’s convictions. (People v. Harris (May 9,
2013, B222583) [nonpub. opn.].) We provide this factual
summary only to give context to Harris’s arguments. We do not
rely on these facts to determine whether Harris has made a
prima facie showing of resentencing eligibility under
section 1172.6.
3 Because both siblings share the same last name, we use
Kwana’s first name in this opinion for clarity.

2
In 2006, the People charged Harris and Kwana with
Alexander’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), in addition to other
crimes.4 The information alleged that Harris personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death to Alexander (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Harris and Kwana were jointly tried by a jury. As relevant
here, the trial court instructed the jury on principles of malice
aforethought and first degree murder (CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521),
the natural and probable consequences doctrine based on the
uncharged target offense of assault with a deadly weapon
(CALCRIM Nos. 403, 875), and the personal and intentional
discharge of a firearm causing death (CALCRIM No. 3150).
The jury convicted Harris and Kwana of the first degree
murder of Alexander. The jury found true that Harris personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing Alexander’s
death. The court sentenced Harris to life without the possibility
of parole for the first degree murder of Alexander and 25 years to
life on the personal and intentional use enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
In 2024, Harris filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel. The People
opposed the petition, arguing that the jury found Harris
personally shot Alexander and convicted him as the actual killer.
Harris argued in reply that the People’s position required the
trial court to engage in impermissible factfinding and that the

4 Harris was also charged with and convicted of second
degree murder in a shooting that occurred months after
Alexander’s murder. Harris’s appeal challenges the trial court’s
denial of his petition only with respect to his conviction for the
first degree murder of Alexander.

3
true finding on the firearm enhancement did not establish as a
matter of law that he personally harbored malice.
The trial court denied the petition. The court concluded
that the record of conviction established that the jury convicted
Harris of first degree murder as the actual shooter and therefore
did not rely on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as
a basis for his liability.
Harris timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill amended
section 188, requiring that to be convicted of murder, “a principal
in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created “a procedural mechanism
for those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended
in [Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for resentencing.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; see also Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959.) “The process begins with the filing of a
petition that declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes
to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the
effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see
id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)” (Emanuel, at p. 880.) “After the parties

4
have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “[A] trial court may properly, at the prima
facie stage, reference the record of conviction to ‘ “ ‘refut[e]’ ” ’
[citation] conclusory allegations in furtherance of its statutorily
required screening function at that juncture of a section 1172.6
proceeding.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569
(Patton).) “[P]etitioners confronting a record of conviction that
demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming
forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution
and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would
entail.” (Id. at p. 567.) However, a court may not reject the
petitioner’s allegations “ ‘on credibility grounds’ ” or engage in
“ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at pp. 971, 972.)
“ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Antonelli
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724.) “Otherwise, the court must issue an
order to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden ‘to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder
or attempted murder’ under the law as amended by Senate
Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)).” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14
Cal.5th 839, 869.)

5
“We independently review the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief.” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 465.)
II. The Record of Conviction Establishes Harris Is
Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Harris is ineligible for resentencing relief under
section 1172.6 because he was convicted under a theory of
liability that remained valid after Senate Bill No. 1437 amended
the Penal Code. The record of conviction conclusively establishes
that the jury convicted Harris of first degree murder as the direct
perpetrator of the shooting that killed Alexander, foreclosing the
possibility that the jury applied the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for his liability.
The information charged Harris with Alexander’s murder.
It also alleged that during the commission of the murder, Harris
“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun,
which proximately caused great bodily injury and death to Eric
Alexander” under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). During
closing argument, the prosecutor identified Harris as “the actual
shooter” and “the actual killer” in Alexander’s murder.5

5 We take judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts
reflecting the closing arguments and reporting the delivery of the
jury’s verdicts in the underlying trial, which were part of the
record on direct appeal. (People v. Harris, supra, B222583; see
Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) Although the trial
court did not rely on these materials, they are part of the record
of conviction. As we will affirm the trial court’s order on any
ground disclosed by the record, we consider these portions of the
record of conviction. (People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
924, 935.)

6
The court instructed the jury that to find Harris guilty of
first degree murder, it had to conclude that the People proved he
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, which
encompasses the specific intent to kill. (CALCRIM No. 521 [“The
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill.”]; see also People
v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [“aside from felony
murder, a specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient of first
degree murder”].) The court further instructed the jury that it
could only return a true finding on the firearm enhancement if
the People proved that Harris personally discharged a firearm
during the commission of the murder, he intended to discharge
the firearm, and his act caused Alexander’s death. (CALCRIM
No. 3150; see In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 603.) The jury
convicted Harris of first degree murder and found true that he
intentionally discharged a firearm causing Alexander’s death.6
Although there was a codefendant in this case, the only
theory presented to the jury was that Harris shot and killed
Alexander, and Kwana was an aider and abettor. The jury’s
finding on the personal use of a firearm enhancement as to
Harris demonstrates that the jury accepted that theory. While
the court instructed the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the jury could not have applied that
theory to Harris.

6 The jury also convicted Kwana of first degree murder.
Although the trial court and counsel in these proceedings
referred to an information charging Kwana with a principal use
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)
and (e)(1), it appears from the reporter’s transcript reflecting the
reading of the jury verdicts that no firearm enhancement was
presented to the jury as to Kwana.

7
The natural and probable consequences instruction
permitted the jury to convict a defendant of murder if the
defendant committed or aided and abetted assault with a deadly
weapon, a coparticipant in the assault with a deadly weapon
committed the crime of murder, and a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have known the commission of the
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the assault with a deadly weapon.7 (CALCRIM
No. 403.) In other words, the jury could impose natural and
probable consequences liability only on a defendant who did not
commit murder during the commission of the underlying assault.
To this end, the prosecutor expressly argued to the jury
that this instruction could apply to hold Kwana, not Harris, liable
for murder. Specifically, the prosecutor described Kwana as an
aider and abettor who set up Alexander’s murder and drove
Harris to the location where he killed Alexander. The prosecutor
stated that if the jury found that Kwana “only intended to aid
and abet as assault . . . and then [Christopher] Harris went
further and fired seven bullets into Stoney Alexander, then she
would be guilty of being an aider and abettor to assault with a
firearm, the natural result or within the normal range of
outcomes is murder[,] even if [Christopher] took it farther than
what she had originally intended.”
People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120 (Morales) is
instructive. Morales and his codefendant were charged in
connection with a robbery of an armored truck. (Id. at p. 1123.)
A jury found Morales guilty of robbery, assault with an assault

7 The instruction informed the jury that “[a] coparticipant in
a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the
perpetrator.”

8
weapon, and the attempted premeditated murder of an employee
of the truck company. (Id. at p. 1127.) The jury also found true
that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
caused great bodily injury in the commission of the robbery and
attempted murder. (Id. at pp. 1127–1128.)
Morales subsequently petitioned for resentencing on his
attempted murder conviction under section 1172.6. (Morales,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128.) The Court of Appeal affirmed
a trial court order denying the petition. (Id. at p. 1131.) The
court noted that the “only factual basis” the prosecution alleged
to prove a “direct but ineffectual act toward killing” the
employee—an element of attempted murder—was Morales
shooting him with a semiautomatic rifle. (Id. at p. 1132.) By
concluding Morales committed assault with an assault weapon
and personally discharged a firearm causing injury, “the jury
found Morales was the robber who shot [the employee] with the
AK-47 semiautomatic rifle and, therefore, he was the direct
perpetrator of the attempted premeditated murder.” (Ibid.)
The court rejected Morales’s argument that the jury could
have found Morales guilty as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Morales, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1132–1133.) The court reasoned: “[I]f
the jury had found Morales guilty of attempted premeditated
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory, it
would not have found true the allegation that he personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. We agree with
the trial court’s reasoning: ‘once the jury found that Morales was
the shooter, the natural and probable consequence theory of
liability for Morales became inapplicable. It would only have

9
been applicable if the jury had found that [the codefendant] (not
Morales) was the shooter.’ ” (Id. at p. 1133.)
The same rationale applies to Harris’s case. The People’s
sole theory of liability regarding the first degree murder count
was that Harris shot and killed Alexander as the direct
perpetrator. The jury found Harris was the shooter and, under
the circumstances of this case, the direct perpetrator of the
murder, foreclosing the applicability of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to his conviction. (People v. Muhammad
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 281–282 [defendant ineligible for
§ 1172.6 relief because undisputed facts in record of conviction
established prosecution only pursued theory that defendant was
direct perpetrator of attempted murder].)
Harris argues that the jury’s true finding on the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), did not
supply the requisite finding of malice that would preclude him
from prima facie eligibility for resentencing. However, the true
finding on the firearm enhancement is relevant here not because
it conclusively demonstrates a finding of malice, but because it
established Harris’s specific role as the shooter and therefore as
the direct perpetrator of first degree murder. (Morales, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1133–1134 [attempted murder conviction
established malice and § 12022.53, subd. (d) finding showed
defendant was direct perpetrator].) Since the jury found Harris
was the actual shooter, not an aider and abettor, the jury’s guilty
verdict for first degree murder established that Harris personally
“acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation,” and
therefore intended to kill. (CALCRIM No. 521.)
People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (Offley), which
Harris cites in support of his arguments, is readily

10
distinguishable. There, the defendant was one of five people
charged with participating in a gang-related shooting. At least
three of the defendants fired shots into a car. One victim was
killed and another was seriously wounded. (Id. at p. 592.) The
jury received a natural and probable consequences instruction as
to conspiracy, convicted the defendant of second degree murder,
and found a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) allegation true. (Id.
at p. 593.)
On appeal from the denial of Offley’s resentencing petition,
the Court of Appeal concluded the defendant was not ineligible
for section 1172.6 resentencing relief as a matter of law because
the jury’s verdict did not rule out the possibility that it relied on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to convict him.
(Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) The court held that the
jury’s true finding on the firearm enhancement established only
that the defendant had the general intent to discharge a firearm
and did not reflect a finding that he had the intent to kill or any
other form of malice aforethought. (Id. at pp. 597–598.) The
language of the natural and probable consequences instruction
for conspiracy, supported by the prosecutor’s express arguments
that the jury could convict Offley based on this instruction,
permitted the jury to convict Offley of second degree murder even
if he intended solely to take part in a conspiracy to commit
assault with a firearm, and neither harbored the intent to kill the
victim, nor acted in conscious disregard of the risk to life. (Id. at
p. 599.)
In contrast, here, the jury could not have concluded Harris
was the actual shooter and also applied the natural and probable
consequences instruction to convict him. The jury’s true finding
on the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) allegation established

11
that Harris shot and killed Alexander. Neither the People’s
theory of the case nor the jury’s findings permitted the conclusion
that someone else fired a weapon or shot and killed Alexander.
(See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567 [absent specific facts
identifying someone else as the direct perpetrator, no material
fact dispute arises “from mere latent, speculative possibilities . . .
a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured
from thin air or a legal conclusion”].) And, as explained above,
the jury instruction allowed the jury to apply the natural and
probable consequences theory when the defendant aided and
abetted an assault and a coparticipant committed murder during
the commission of the assault. The jury was not provided any
basis to apply the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
the “coparticipant” who actually shot and killed Alexander.
The jury’s verdict convicting Harris of first degree murder
as the actual killer could only be based on its finding that Harris
personally acted with malice aforethought. (See Offley, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 599 [“[i]n many instances, additional
information from the record will establish that a defendant’s
conviction was not based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and that the jury must have convicted the
defendant on the basis of his own malice aforethought”]; see, e.g.,
People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 450, 448, 449 [plea
could not reasonably be construed as imposing natural and
probable consequences liability where defendant admitted he
personally discharged firearm into occupied vehicle “in an
attempt to murder [victims]” because he did not act vicariously].)
Harris was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Harris’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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