CourtListener 10863462•Asi v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn. CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 5/22/26 Asi v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
HUSAM ASI, B349640
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV15728)
v.
HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN PRESS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
Husam Asi, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sinclair Braun Kargher and Alexander M. Kargher; Latham &
Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Robert J. Ellison and Chandler S. Howell for
Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Here we decide the trial court correctly granted the second anti-SLAPP
special motion to strike brought by defendant Hollywood Foreign Press
Association (HFPA) in this action filed by Husam Asi (Asi). (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16.) 1 In 2022, an entertainment news outlet accused Asi of sexual
misconduct. In a previous appeal, we determined the trial court should have
granted HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike certain causes of action arising
from its public statements to the press regarding the allegations against Asi.
Upon remand, Asi amended his complaint. In response, HFPA filed a
second anti-SLAPP motion to strike, arguing that Asi improperly reasserted
claims based on the same public statements at issue in the previous appeal.
HFPA’s motion also targeted newly asserted claims arising from its
preservation and review of certain emails stored on an email account HFPA
provided to Asi to conduct HFPA business.
The trial court granted HFPA’s motion to strike in its entirety, and Asi
now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the challenged
claims were properly stricken under our anti-SLAPP statute and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background
The facts of this case are well known to this court and the parties. We
take judicial notice of our prior unpublished opinion in Asi v. Hollywood
Foreign Press Association (Oct. 13, 2023, No. B327002) (Asi I), and decline to
repeat the summary of the parties’ dispute set forth therein. Instead, we
1 The term “SLAPP” stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise specified.
2
provide a brief sketch of the background proceedings necessary to provide
context for the arguments raised in this appeal.
In 2022, the entertainment news outlet TheWrap published an article
detailing allegations made by three women accusing Asi of sexual
misconduct. When approached for comment by TheWrap and other press
outlets, HFPA stated that it took the allegations against Asi seriously and
had suspended Asi from HFPA pending an investigation by outside counsel.
Shortly thereafter, Asi filed suit against HFPA, alleging tort and
contract causes of action based, in part, on HFPA’s statements to TheWrap
and The Los Angeles Times regarding the accusations against Asi. In
response, HFPA filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Asi’s claims stemming
from its statements to the press. In Asi I, a different panel of this Court
determined that HFPA’s statements to the press—which the parties both
characterized as “press releases”—were protected activity and that Asi could
not establish a probability of success on certain causes of action arising from
those statements.
II. Asi’s HFPA Email Account
As HFPA’s first anti-SLAPP motion was pending in the trial court, a
dispute arose between the parties regarding an email account HFPA provided
to Asi: asi@hfpa.org. In August 2022, HFPA became aware that Asi
attempted to remove over 30,000 emails from his HFPA account. HFPA was
able to recover many of the emails, which it subsequently made available to
its counsel at Latham & Watkins LLP (Latham). Latham performed an
analysis of the metadata from the emails recovered by HFPA and determined
that some of the emails were between Asi and his former legal counsel.
Latham sequestered those emails from review.
3
Latham contacted Asi’s then-current counsel at Locke Lord LLP (Locke
Lord), arguing that Asi’s attempt to delete the emails from his HFPA account
was “intentional and extensive spoliation of highly relevant evidence.”
Latham also provided a copy of the metadata report documenting the emails
between Asi and his former counsel. In response, Locke Lord argued that Asi
“did not intentionally delete any potentially discoverable documents” and
instead had created a “full backup of the data from that email account.”
Locke Lord offered to provide Latham with a full copy of the email backup
made by Asi on the condition that HFPA and Latham agreed not to review
any of the emails between Asi and his former counsel.
Latham accepted Locke Lord’s offer, and in October 2022, Locke Lord
produced a full backup of Asi’s HFPA email account to Latham. Latham
sequestered the emails identified on its metadata report but reviewed other
emails from Asi’s HFPA account in the course of discovery and motion
practice in this litigation.
III. Pleading Amendments Following Remand
Following remand after Asi I, Asi made repeated efforts to amend his
complaint. In April 2024, Asi filed a first amended complaint. After filing his
first amended complaint, Asi wanted to again amend his complaint. The
parties agreed to extend HFPA’s time to respond to the first amended
complaint until the trial court ruled on Asi’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. At this time, Asi was acting in propria persona and he
encountered technical and procedural difficulties in filing his motion for leave
to amend. As a result, his motion was not granted until November 2024. Asi
then experienced further technical difficulties in filing his second amended
complaint. On January 3, 2025, Asi was able to successfully file his amended
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pleading, now captioned as the third amended complaint (TAC). The TAC is
Asi’s operative pleading.
The TAC removed all references to HFPA’s “press releases” but added
new allegations regarding unidentified statements made by HFPA. For
example, the TAC alleges HFPA improperly announced its investigation into
TheWrap’s allegations, and publicly shamed Asi by disseminating “harmful
statements” regarding the allegations against him. These allegations are
incorporated by reference in all causes of action asserted in the TAC.
The TAC also added allegations and causes of action arising from
HFPA’s preservation and review of the emails from Asi’s HFPA email
account. Specifically, the TAC alleged that when Asi received notice of his
expulsion from HFPA in August 2022, he took measures to “preserve” his
emails on HFPA’s system “to ensure that no potentially relevant evidence
was lost in connection with the ongoing litigation with the HFPA.” According
to the TAC, HFPA “intervened to stop the deletion process of [Asi’s] data on
their system, thus gaining access to” the emails in his HFPA email account.
HFPA reviewed some of those emails, “ultimately serving them as part of
discovery material” in this litigation. The TAC claimed that “HFPA’s
unauthorized access to these emails gave them an unfair advantage in their
litigation against [Asi], as they were able to pass this sensitive information to
their lawyers.”
Asi’s causes of action for intrusion upon seclusion and violation of the
Stored Communications Act are based entirely on the allegation that HFPA
improperly accessed and reviewed certain emails on Asi’s HFPA email
account during this lawsuit. Asi’s cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress incorporates all the other allegations of the TAC and
5
therefore arises in part from HFPA’s public statements and use of the emails
from Asi’s HFPA account.
A. Second Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike
HFPA filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike certain portions of the
TAC. HFPA’s motion challenged two categories of claims raised in the TAC:
(1) claims based on HFPA’s public statements regarding the allegations of
sexual misconduct published by TheWrap, and (2) claims based on HFPA’s
preservation and review of emails from Asi’s HFPA email account.
Specifically, HFPA sought to strike portions of Asi’s causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, interference with contract, interference with prospective economic
relations, retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, to the extent they arose from HFPA’s public
statements regarding the allegations of sexual misconduct against Asi. 2
HFPA argued these causes of action were all “based, in part, on the
materially identical allegation that Asi was injured by the HFPA’s press
releases.” HFPA claimed Asi disregarded the holding of Asi I and improperly
re-inserted claims that this court previously determined were barred under
section 425.16.
Additionally, HFPA argued that Asi’s email claims arose from protected
litigation-related activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). HFPA also
argued that Asi’s email claims were based on allegations that HFPA used the
emails from his HFPA account to obtain an unfair advantage in the litigation.
HFPA asserted that Asi could not establish a probability of success on his
2 The relevant allegations appear at paragraphs 54, 58, 65, 66, 67, 75, 88, 96,
115, 180, 181, 182, 183 of the TAC.
6
email claims because they were barred by the litigation privilege under Civil
Code section 47.
B. Asi’s Opposition
Asi opposed the motion to strike. Asi claimed the challenged portions
of the TAC relating to HFPA’s public statements were not based on HFPA’s
press releases but instead based on “communications wholly separate and
apart from the press releases.” In a declaration submitted with his
opposition, Asi identified only two such communications. The first was a
February 9, 2022, email from HFPA’s president to its members which
acknowledged TheWrap’s story about Asi, stated that he had been placed on
probation pending an investigation by outside counsel, and quoted, verbatim,
the text of one of the press releases at issue in Asi I. The second
communication identified by Asi was a statement made by “HFPA crisis
manager James Lee” to a reporter from The Los Angeles Times
acknowledging that HFPA “automatically placed [Asi] on probation once a
sexual assault claim arose.” Asi argued that because the challenged claims
were not based on the press releases, he did not need to establish a
probability of success on his claims arising from HFPA’s public statements.
Asi also argued his email claims did not arise from any speech or
petitioning undertaken by HFPA on a “public issue” under section 425.16,
subdivision (e). Alternatively, he asserted that HFPA was judicially estopped
from arguing that its investigation into the accusations against Asi was a
matter of public interest, because in obtaining a protective order from the
court, HFPA previously argued that certain documents related to that
investigation were confidential. Asi also argued his email claims were not
barred by California’s litigation privilege.
7
Finally, Asi argued HFPA’s motion to strike was untimely because
some of the allegations it sought to strike were first alleged in Asi’s first
amended complaint, filed in April 2024. Asi argued HFPA’s motion to strike
was filed in February 2025, well past the 60-day time limit to file an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike claims asserted in his first amended complaint.
In response to Asi’s opposition, HFPA filed a set of 24 evidentiary
objections to certain portions of Asi’s declaration, as well as one of the
exhibits attached thereto.
C. Trial Court Ruling
The trial court sustained HFPA’s objections to Asi’s declaration and
granted the anti-SLAPP motion to strike in its entirety. The court began by
determining that HFPA’s motion was timely. The court noted that the
parties agreed that HFPA’s “responsive pleading deadline was extended
through the time that the TAC was filed.” The court noted that because of
the repeated technical difficulties Asi experienced in filing his motions for
leave to amend and relevant amended complaints, his operative TAC was not
filed until January 3, 2025. The court concluded that HFPA’s anti-SLAPP
motion to strike was timely filed within 60 days of the filing of the TAC.
Turning to the merits of HFPA’s motion, the trial court agreed that
Asi’s claims arising from HFPA’s public statements were materially identical
to the press release claims at issue in Asi I. The court determined that for
the reasons outlined in Asi I, the challenged claims arose from HFPA’s
protected activity and Asi failed to present “any evidence” establishing a
probability of prevailing on the claims arising from HFPA’s public
statements. The trial court also determined that HFPA’s access and use of
Asi’s emails on its email server constituted protected activity under section
8
425.16, subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4). The court concluded that Asi failed to
provide any evidence in support of his email claims.
Asi timely appealed the trial court’s order.
DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a two-
step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its
“burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).)
Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court
decides if the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
We review the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion de
novo, applying the same two-step analysis. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) We independently review whether a
moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action arises from protected activity. (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 977, 988.)
II. Claims Arising from HFPA’s Public Statements
With the exception of Asi’s sixth cause of action for retaliation under
Labor Code section 1102.5, all the challenged causes of action stemming, in
part, from HFPA’s public statements were both asserted in Asi’s original
complaint and challenged by HFPA’s first anti-SLAPP motion in Asi I.
9
A. Causes of Action Asserted in Both Pleadings
The trial court correctly determined that, to the extent they arise from
HFPA’s public statements, Asi’s causes of action for breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference
with contract, interference with prospective economic relations, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred under our holding in
Asi I.
“There is no such thing as granting an anti-SLAPP motion with leave
to amend.” (Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 676 (Dickinson).)
“Once the trial court has determined the speech at issue is constitutionally
protected, it may not grant leave to amend to omit facts to take the claim out
of the protection of section 425.16.” (Mobile Medical Services, etc. v. Rajaram
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 164, 171.) An appellate court’s decision on an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike becomes the law of the case that is binding on the
parties upon remand. (Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 136, 149 (Finato).) Under the law of the case doctrine, “‘“the
decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision
of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of
the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same
case.”’ [Citation.]” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 (Sargon).) Accordingly, “to the
extent the allegations in [the TAC] are analogous to those struck in [Asi I],
they are precluded by that earlier opinion.” (Finato, at p. 148.)
Asi argues the TAC does not assert any claims barred by Asi I because
the TAC removed any reference to press releases. This argument misses the
mark. The question is not whether the TAC repeats the “specific language”
struck in Asi I, rather, we review the substance of the allegations of the TAC
10
to determine if they are “analogous” to those raised in Asi’s original
complaint. (Finato, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 145, 148.) We conclude that
they are.
In opposing HFPA’s motion, Asi identified only two statements that
form the basis of this category of challenged claims. A review of these
statements establishes that the challenged portions of the TAC are based on
the same public statements at issue in Asi I. 3 The first statement was an
email sent to HFPA’s members which simply quotes one of the press releases
at issue in Asi I. The second was a statement made to a reporter from The
Los Angeles Times, which similarly mirrored the “press release” to The Los
Angeles Times at issue in Asi I. It is therefore clear that the challenged
portions of the TAC are directly analogous to the “press release” claims in
Asi’s original complaint. Asi cannot plead his way around the holding of Asi I
by simply recharacterizing HFPA’s “press releases” as a “leak” or “public
statement.” (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 676 [“a plaintiff whose
complaint is stricken by a successful anti-SLAPP motion cannot try again
with an amended complaint”].)
As Asi’s claims regarding HFPA’s public statements are materially
identical to the press release claims at issue in Asi I, we conclude the trial
court correctly determined these duplicative claims in the TAC are barred
3 Asi argues the trial court erred in sustaining HFPA’s objections to his
declaration “in a blanket, unexplained ruling” that was made “en masse
without analysis.” Asi has forfeited this claim of error by failing to raise this
objection in the trial court. (Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co. (1989) 216
Cal.App.3d 547, 584.) Even if we were to assume the trial court erred in this
regard, we can only conclude that any such error was harmless as we have
reviewed the challenged portions of Asi’s declaration and determined they do
not alter the outcome of our decision in this case.
11
under the law of the case doctrine. (Finato, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 148–
149.)
B. Retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5
We also affirm the trial court’s ruling with respect to Asi’s newly
asserted cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5.
1. Prong One
Asi’s original complaint did not assert a claim under Labor Code
section 1102.5. As pled in the TAC, Asi’s retaliation claim expressly seeks to
hold HFPA liable based on HFPA’s “disseminating . . . allegations [of sexual
assault], prompting the BBC to suspend [Asi]’s show and resulting in severe
damage to [Asi]’s reputation and loss of access to press interviews.” As we
noted above, the only examples Asi has provided of this wrongful
dissemination by HFPA are two statements which mirror the press releases
at issue in Asi I. The newly asserted retaliation cause of action is therefore
based, in part, on conduct that Asi I determined was protected activity under
prong one. 4 Our prior determination on this point is binding on the parties
4 HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion did not seek to strike Asi’s cause of action for
retaliation in its entirety, but rather only sought to strike the claim within
that cause of action that HFPA’s public statements regarding TheWrap’s
allegations constituted improper retaliation against Asi under the Labor
Code. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010
[“Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating whether an
entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from protected
activity” and instead courts “should analyze each claim for relief” asserted
within a cause of action to determine if the challenged acts are protected].)
“[T]o the extent any acts are unprotected, the claims based on those acts will
survive.” (Id. at p. 1012.) Therefore, to the extent the challenged causes of
action are also partially based on other allegations of non-protected conduct
12
under the law of the case doctrine. (Sargon, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p.
1505; Finato, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)
As HFPA has shown Asi’s retaliation claim arises in part from
protected activity, the question becomes whether Asi can establish a
probability of success on the merits of such a cause of action under prong two.
We conclude he cannot.
2. Prong Two
Under the second anti-SLAPP prong, a plaintiff “need only establish
that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert
Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must
demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “The prima facie
showing of merit must be made with evidence that is admissible at trial.”
(Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1289.)
Asi has not carried his burden to establish a probability that he will
prevail on his retaliation claim under the Labor Code. Asi’s opposition to
HFPA’s motion did not identify the elements of his retaliation claim or
provide the court with any evidence or argument showing a probability of
establishing those elements. Instead, he merely argued that he did not have
to make a showing under prong two because HFPA was factually incorrect in
asserting that his retaliation claim was based in any part on the press
releases at issue in Asi I. As Asi did not endeavor to establish a probability of
success on his cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5, we find no
by HFPA, those other allegations were not encompassed by HFPA’s anti-
SLAPP motion to strike and remain in the case.
13
error in the trial court’s determination that Asi failed to make such a
showing.
In an attempt to avoid this result, Asi argues for the first time on
appeal that he can establish such a probability of success under prong two.
His argument is unconvincing for several reasons.
First, as Asi failed to raise this factual argument in the trial court, he
is generally prohibited from raising it for the first time on appeal. (In re
Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [“‘“theories not raised in
the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal”’”]; Bocanegra v.
Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 857 [“‘“a party is not permitted to
change its position on appeal and raise new issues not presented in the trial
court”’”].)
Second, Asi’s argument is premised on broad assertions of law and fact
that are unsupported by any citation to the record or pertinent authority.
For example, Asi claims in generalized fashion that he was “subjected . . . to a
series of escalating adverse employment actions” without offering any legal
authority or analysis suggesting that HFPA’s public statements
acknowledging the investigation and suspension constitute an “adverse
employment action” under California law. He also asserts that he engaged in
“protected activity” by “reporting what he believed to be violations of law and
HFPA policies,” and that HFPA levied “false allegations of sexual misconduct
and assault” against him. These factual claims are not supported by any
citation to the record showing Asi presented evidence on these points in
opposing HFPA’s motion.
Asi’s failure to support his new argument with adequate citation to the
record and legal authority is fatal on appeal. “It is the parties’ responsibility
to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to
14
authority. [Citations.] When they do not furnish legal argument with
citation to authority on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited
and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]” (Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754 (Shaw).) “We are not required to
examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
For these reasons, we conclude Asi has failed to establish a probability
of success on his retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling striking Asi’s cause of action for
retaliation under the Labor Code to the extent it is based on HFPA’s public
statements regarding the allegations against him.
III. Claims Arising from Asi’s Emails
Asi argues the trial court erred in granting HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion
to strike the claims arising from HFPA’s access to and review of emails from
Asi’s HFPA email account. We find no error by the trial court and affirm.
A. Prong One
The protections of section 425.16 extend to “any act” taken in
furtherance of the right to petition. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) At the first step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving party must establish both (1) that
its act constituted protected activity and (2) the opposing party’s cause of
action arose from that protected activity.” (Colyear v. Rolling Hills
Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 130;
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887.)
A “claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is
the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to
15
some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1060.) To determine whether a challenged allegation or claim “arises
from” protected activity we must determine whether protected activity was
the alleged injury-producing act forming the basis for the claim. (Id. at pp.
1062–1063.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context,
without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-
SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)
Protected activity has been statutorily defined to include four
categories of statements or conduct. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) HFPA argues Asi’s
email claims fall within three of the statutory definitions of protected conduct
enumerated at section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1), (e)(2), and (e)(4).
Subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) protect “any written or oral statement or
writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” or “in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1),
(e)(2).) Subdivision (e)(4) protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
In conducting the anti-SLAPP analysis, Asi is bound by the allegations
of the TAC. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672
[“As is true with summary judgment motions, the issues in an anti-SLAPP
motion are framed by the pleadings”]; accord Medical Marijuana, Inc. v.
ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 893.) The TAC alleges that Asi
decided to back up his HFPA email account “to ensure that no potentially
relevant evidence was lost in connection with the ongoing litigation with the
HFPA.” The TAC therefore expressly acknowledges that the emails on Asi’s
HFPA account were potential evidence in this litigation. The TAC also
16
alleges that HFPA accessed Asi’s emails during this litigation in order “to
stop the deletion process of [Asi’s] data on their system.” The TAC claims
HFPA wrongfully gave his emails to its attorneys in this action and
improperly produced his emails during discovery in this litigation. The TAC
asserts Asi faced an “unfair disadvantage” in this litigation because his
emails were “exploited by [HFPA] and [its] legal counsel.”
Taken together, the allegations of the TAC make it clear that the
gravamen of Asi’s email claims is based on actions taken by HFPA in
connection with Asi’s lawsuit. HFPA’s conduct in accessing, preserving, and
utilizing Asi’s emails for litigation-related purposes is the injury-producing
conduct alleged in Asi’s email claims. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)
1. Anti-SLAPP Protections Extend to Non-Communicative
Conduct
Asi argues HFPA’s conduct in accessing and reviewing his emails is not
entitled to anti-SLAPP protection because it was not communicative in
nature. We agree that Asi’s email claims arise, in part, from non-
communicative conduct by HFPA. However, the protections afforded by the
anti-SLAPP statute extend to both “litigation-related speech and activity.”
(Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 154;
Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532,
1537 [anti-SLAPP statute “applies not only to the filing of lawsuits, but
extends to conduct that relates to such litigation”].)
Courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes
litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908.) Non-communicative acts have
been held to constitute protected activity under the statute. (See, e.g.,
17
Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062–1065 (Rusheen) [concluding
that attorneys’ non-communicative actions to enforce a judgment and levy on
property were within the scope of section 425.16]; Peregrine Funding, Inc. v.
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672
[holding that non-communicative litigation tactics employed to benefit a
party in pending litigation, such as withholding of responsive documents in
discovery, were protected activity under § 425.16, subd. (e)(4)].)
Asi’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Asi claims that
HFPA’s conduct cannot constitute litigation-related activity because at the
time HFPA accessed his emails in August 2022, discovery in this case was
stayed “due to HFPA’s own anti-SLAPP motion.” It is true that under section
425.16, subdivision (g), “All discovery proceedings in the action shall be
stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (g).) However, the stay is temporary and only “remain[s] in
effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion.” (Ibid.) HFPA’s
first anti-SLAPP motion to strike was not directed at the entirety of Asi’s
complaint and instead was directed only at claims related to HFPA’s press
releases. Any stay of discovery was only temporary and HFPA’s actions to
preserve and review potentially relevant evidence were still necessarily
related to this litigation even though discovery was temporarily stayed.
Asi’s argument is supported by a single citation to Paul v. Friedman
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853 (Paul). Paul is of no help to Asi. Paul concerned
claims related to previous arbitration proceedings. As relevant to Asi’s
appeal, Paul merely noted that, to constitute protected conduct under section
425.16, subdivision (e)(2), the defendant must show “the suit arose from oral
statements or writings ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration
or review’ in the arbitration.” (Id. at p. 865, quoting § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
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Nothing in Paul supports Asi’s claim that litigation activities fall beyond the
ambit of our anti-SLAPP statute when they are undertaken while discovery
is temporarily stayed. Cases do not stand for propositions not considered.
(People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071; B.B. v. County of Los Angeles
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11.)
2. Asi Has Not Established HFPA’s Conduct was Illegal as a
Matter of Law
Asi argues HFPA’s conduct in accessing and reviewing his emails was
illegal as a matter of law and therefore cannot be protected activity under the
exception stated by our Supreme Court in Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th
299 (Flatley). We conclude the Flatley exception is inapplicable here.
Flatley “is a very narrow exception. It applies only ‘where either the
defendant concedes the illegality of its conduct or the illegality is conclusively
shown by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna &
Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210.) Since Flatley, courts have
interpreted this exception to apply to conduct that is not merely illegal, but is
criminal. (E.g., Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
1153, 1169 [“[W]e hold that the rule from [Flatley], is limited to criminal
conduct”]; Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 [the Flatley court’s “use of the phrase ‘illegal’ was
intended to mean criminal, and not merely violative of a statute”].) The only
purported criminal violation asserted by Asi is a violation of the Stored
Communications Act.
Asi’s reliance on Flatley is based on the false assertion that HFPA “did
not provide any evidence” that it was authorized to preserve or access the
emails on his HFPA account. Asi claims it is therefore undisputed that
19
HFPA committed “a federal criminal violation under the Stored
Communications Act.” Asi is incorrect. HFPA has repeatedly asserted that it
was authorized to review Asi’s emails. In briefing this issue in the trial court,
HFPA argued that Asi’s former counsel at Locke Lord authorized HFPA’s
access to and review of Asi’s emails by producing a full copy of the emails on
Asi’s HFPA account subject only to the limitation that HFPA agree to not
review the emails identified on Latham’s metadata report. 5 HFPA also
presented evidence of this authorization in the form of the declaration of its
counsel and copies of counsels’ correspondence on the subject. Asi did not
object to this evidence below and does not claim on appeal that the trial court
erred in considering this evidence in ruling on HFPA’s motion.
Simply put, HFPA has not conceded the illegality of its conduct. Nor
has Asi conclusively established any criminal conduct by HFPA as a matter
of law. Asi has therefore failed to establish the Flatley exception applies.
B. Prong Two
On appeal, HFPA argues Asi cannot establish a probability of
prevailing on his email claims because they are barred by the litigation
privilege under Civil Code section 47. We agree.
The litigation privilege extends to any communication: (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that has
5 HFPA has also argued that it was authorized by Title 18 United States
Code section 2701(c)(1), which provides the Stored Communications Act does
not apply to conduct which is authorized “by the person or entity providing a
wire or electronic communications service.” (18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).) HFPA
contends that, as it was the entity which provided the email address to Asi, it
did not need his authorization to review the emails on his account.
20
some connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990)
50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) The privilege does not stop at protecting
communications, and also extends to non-communicative acts that are
“necessarily related to the allegedly wrongful communicative act.” (Rusheen,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) Courts have recognized the privilege extends to
the production of documents in discovery. (See Foothill Federal Credit Union
v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 632, 635–636 [defendant’s
disclosure of documents in response to a valid discovery request was
protected by the litigation privilege]; Nelson v. Tucker Ellis, LLP (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 827, 846–847 [litigation privilege barred tort claims stemming
from disclosure of attorney’s work product in response to a valid subpoena].)
Asi’s appellate briefing does not address the litigation privilege. Asi
does not mention Civil Code section 47 or respond to the authority cited in
the trial court’s ruling or HFPA’s appellate briefing. In the absence of any
argument or authority on this point, we can only conclude that Asi has
conceded that his email claims are barred by the litigation privilege.
(Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
507, 529 [a party “effectively concedes” an issue by failing to address it in
briefing]; Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 754 [an argument is deemed
forfeited in the absence of meaningful argument and citation to authority].)
“A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation
privilege precludes the defendant’s liability on the claim.” (Digerati
Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
873, 888.) As Asi cannot carry his burden under prong two with respect to
his email claims, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant HFPA’s special
21
motion to strike. We therefore need not reach Asi’s other arguments under
prong two and decline to do so. 6
IV. Timeliness
We reject Asi’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that
HFPA’s motion to strike was timely. Section 425.16, subdivision (f), provides
that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike “may be filed within 60 days of the
service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon
terms it deems proper.” (§ 425.16, subd. (f).)
Asi contends that HFPA’s 60-day time limit to bring an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike began to run with the filing of his first amended complaint.
In finding HFPA’s motion timely, the trial court concluded that the parties’
agreement to extend HFPA’s time to respond to the first amended complaint
also applied to the 60-day deadline imposed by statute. The appellate
appendix prepared by Asi contains a register of actions from the trial court
proceedings, which indicates a joint stipulation and order extending HFPA’s
time to respond to Asi’s first amended complaint was filed on May 30, 2024.
But this stipulation is not included in the appendix prepared by Asi. As a
result, the only record we have of the parties’ stipulation is the trial court’s
June 6, 2024, minute order noting that Asi agreed to extend HFPA’s time to
respond to the first amended complaint.
Asi cannot establish any error in the trial court’s interpretation of the
parties’ stipulation as he has failed to preserve that stipulation in the record
on appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
6 HFPA’s request for judicial notice is denied.
22
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609
(Jameson); Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Without the
stipulation in the record, we have no way to review the propriety of the trial
court’s interpretation of that document. “‘“[I]f the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.”’” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
The record shows the parties mutually agreed to extend HFPA’s time to
respond to the first amended complaint. Other courts have recognized that
such stipulations will serve to restart the 60-day clock under section 425.16,
subdivision (f). (See South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 634, 654 [by stipulating to extend defendant’s “time to respond to
the complaint, the parties effectively agreed the 60-day time period to file an
anti-SLAPP motion would start anew”].) On the record before us, we find no
error in the trial court’s determination that HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion was
timely under section 425.16, subdivision (f).
V. Judicial Estoppel
Asi argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars HFPA from
arguing that its actions concerned an issue of “public interest” because it
sought a protective order limiting the public disclosure of certain internal
documents relating to its investigation into the allegations against Asi.
Judicial estoppel “precludes a party from taking inconsistent positions in
separate judicial proceedings.” (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 831, 841.) We find nothing inherently inconsistent in HFPA’s
positions that: (1) there was public interest in how HFPA would respond to
public allegations of sexual misconduct by one of its members, and (2) some of
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HFPA’s internal records regarding its investigation are confidential and
should not be made available to the public. In protecting a party’s right to
speak on an issue of public interest, our anti-SLAPP statute does not require
that a party forever forfeit the ability to speak privately on that issue.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike is
affirmed. HFPA is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J.*
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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