CourtListener 10863042•People v. Lovett CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Lovett CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339468
(Super. Ct. No. 17CR10694)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
BRETT EDWARD LOVETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Brett Edward Lovett appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of grand theft (Pen. Code,1 § 487, subd. (a);
counts 1, 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 16), securities fraud (Corp. Code,
§ 25541; counts 2, 4), burglary (§ 459; count 6), elder theft (§ 368,
subd. (d)(1); counts 10, 15, 17), forgery (§ 470, subd. (a); counts
11, 18, 20, 21), and money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)(1);
counts 24, 26-36). The jury found true that four of the victims
were particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
1 All unmarked statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4.421(a)(3); counts 12-18, 20, 21), the manner in which he carried
out the crimes indicated planning, sophistication, or
professionalism (id., rule 4.421(a)(8); counts 1-6, 10, 12-18), the
crimes involved great monetary value (id., rule 4.421(a)(9);
counts 1-6, 10, 12-14), and that he took in excess of $100,000
(§ 186.11; counts 1-5, 7-9, 12-14, 16, 18-21). The court sentenced
appellant to an aggregate determinate term of 16 years, eight
months in state prison. It ordered him to pay restitution to five
victims totaling $699,841.85, doubled to $1,399,683.70 pursuant
to section 186.11, subdivision (c).2
We will affirm the judgment but order the clerk to correct a
clerical error in the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecutors charged appellant in 2017 for various financial
crimes involving five victims. The crimes occurred between 2011
and 2015. This appeal concerns convictions relating to two of the
five—Richard Bush and Ruby Revell—as well as money
laundering convictions that were not tied to a particular victim.
Our factual and procedural background focuses on these
convictions.
Richard Bush
Bush met appellant at church in 2009. He loaned appellant
$25,000 in 2011 to start a business called State DPS Legal Aid
2 Section 186.11, subdivision (c) states that defendants
convicted of two or more specified felonies and subject to the
aggravated white collar crime enhancement described in
subdivision (a) resulting in a taking of more than $500,000 “shall
also be liable for a fine not to exceed five hundred thousand
dollars ($500,000) or double the value of the taking, whichever is
greater.”
2
Information, Inc. (State DPS) that provided callers with advice
and referrals in landlord-tenant matters. Bush had recently
retired and saw the loan as an opportunity to invest the proceeds
of his employer-sponsored 401(k). He wrote appellant a check
with the word “investment” in the subject line. They
memorialized the transaction in a document entitled “Unsecured
Promissory Note” dated May 1, 2011 that provided for Bush to
receive annual interest at eight percent. They executed an
addendum in January of 2012 that raised interest to ten percent
and provided for Bush to receive a ten percent equity stake “if the
company turned out to be a profitable thing and they could turn
around and sell it to someone else . . . .”
In 2012, Bush transferred the balance of his 401(k) to an
individual retirement account (IRA) controlled by appellant.
Appellant then transferred $105,000 from the IRA to a bank
account entitled “Brett Lovett DBA Trust Capital Holding,”
ostensibly to invest in a motel construction project in Texas.
They signed a promissory note dated March 26, 2012 in which
appellant agreed to make a single balloon payment of $120,000 in
April of 2014.
The loans went unpaid. Appellant confessed to Bush in
2015 that he owed money to other members of their church. He
asked to use Bush’s good credit to obtain corporate credit cards
for a new company he was starting. Appellant would then
transfer the cards into his own name within a month and use
them to pay off his debts. Bush agreed. Appellant incurred over
$21,000 in additional debt on three cards in Bush’s name. He
never repaid the loans or credit card charges. Bush and his wife
lost their life savings.
3
Ruby Revell
Revell first spoke to appellant in mid-2011 when she called
an organization called “Legal Aid Information” for help getting
survivor benefits from her late grandmother’s pension plan. A
2010 car accident had left her paralyzed and confined to a
wheelchair. They met in person on July 27, 2011. Revell signed
a general power of attorney allowing appellant to “[o]pen,
maintain or close bank accounts” on her behalf. The document
was then notarized and signed by two of Revell’s friends as
witnesses.
Revell purportedly signed a second document entitled
“Agreement” on the same day. This one was not witnessed or
notarized. It stated: “I, Ruby R. Revell enter into this written
agreement and General Power of Attorney for services on this
date with Brett Lovett. It is my understanding that my mother
Yvonne Ryan has deceased with no last will and testament and
as such I, as her only surviving heir need assistance in
ascertaining if I have any claim to assets or valuables left behind
in her name. [¶] I have no available monetary means to pay for
services needed and due to my current financial situation so
agree to the terms set forth here, namely: a) If any account(s),
life insurance proceeds, pension plans, or death benefits are
located and attainable, I request that the full sum of these
benefits be received by Ruby R. Revell, and I will not pay a
percentage or fee for the assistance needed to acquire such funds.
[¶] b) If any interest in real property is found, and that real
property is found to have equitable value, I agree for services
rendered on my behalf that I ask for the first 15% of any value, if
any value is found, come to me Ruby R. Revell as beneficiary, and
I relinquish any right to any percentage of value up and above
4
15% in any real property found to have any equitable value for
services rendered on my behalf.” (Italics added.)
Appellant had already “found” an interest in real property
by this time—a house owned by Revell’s late mother through a
family trust. Two weeks earlier appellant had sent a letter to
Gary Ryan, Revell’s uncle and the trust’s successor trustee, on
the letterhead of Legal Aid Information. It said, “our office has
been retained by Ms. Ruby Revell in relation to her legal right to
file for ‘LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION’ as next of kin and the
only child of the above mentioned deceased with the Superior
Court of Orange County Probate Dept.” The letter asserted
Revell was “entitled to her mothers [sic] 50% share” of a single-
family house owned by the trust in Buena Park.
Appellant eventually persuaded Ryan to sell the house.
Ryan received a letter signed by attorney Robert C. Burlison, cc’d
to “bl,” in December of 2011. The letter demanded he deposit
Revell’s share of the sale proceeds—$114,646—into “the State
DPS account” within 24 hours. He did so. Ryan communicated
only with appellant during this time because he assumed
appellant was her attorney. Appellant admonished Ryan that
Revell “was not entitled to any information other that what you
have provided our office as Trustee” and that “she will receive
what the State allows here to receive, until then she has to wait.”
Revell grew suspicious when appellant would not pay her
after the house sold. The law firm of Hess-Verdon & Associates
agreed to represent her on a contingency basis. They demanded
an accounting and served a “Revocation of Power of Attorney for
Finance” on September 21, 2012. Appellant sent them an
“Escrow Account Statement” that reflected only about $53,000 of
the proceeds remained. Revell petitioned for an accounting in
5
Los Angeles Superior Court when her attorney’s attempts to
collect the funds failed.3 She died in 2013 without receiving
payment. Her daughter pursued civil claims against appellant on
behalf of the estate. After trial, the probate court found appellant
defrauded Revell and awarded her estate the entire $114,646
sent to appellant from the house sale, doubled for bad faith
breach of duty, plus punitive damages.
Charges and Trial
Prosecutors filed a 29-count felony complaint against
appellant in October of 2017. At the time of trial in January of
2024, a 36-count amended information charged him with
securities fraud and burglary relating to Bush, grand theft
relating to Revell, and money laundering arising from his
transfer of funds between various bank accounts he controlled.
Bank records showed appellant deposited most victims’ money
into checking accounts he used to pay personal expenses. These
expenses included dining out, vacations, car rentals, groceries,
hair loss supplies, cosmetic procedures, private school tuition for
his children, utilities, and hundreds of ATM cash withdrawals.
A forensic accountant described appellant as running a
classic Ponzi scheme. He testified, “[W]hat happens in a Ponzi
scheme is money from newer investors is being used to pay off
older investors. And oftentimes a promoter of a scheme will tell
investors that they are going to make money with their
investment and that he’s going to invest their money and return
their original principal plus profit. In this case there wasn’t any
3 In re Matter of Ruby Revell (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2013,
No. BP140980). The court takes judicial notice of the filing date
of the petition (April 29, 2013) on its own motion. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subds. (b) & (d).)
6
type of investment that was made. I looked through those
transactions. I didn’t see purchases of any kind of stocks or
anything like that or investing in some kind of business venture.
So the money that’s being returned to the investors is money
from subsequent investors because as I mentioned earlier the
defendant was spending most of the money on living his lifestyle
and so in order to repay earlier investors he need[ed] to have new
money coming in from subsequent investors.”
Prosecutors also introduced a 2007 consent order entered in
federal court between appellant and the U.S. Commodities
Futures Trading Commission. Appellant agreed to pay over
$315,000 in restitution to two members of his former church who
agreed to let him trade commodities on their behalf. The
commission found appellant never registered with the
commission as a commodities broker and used the money he
received for personal expenses, family transfers, and repayments
to other customers of his self-described financial advisory
business, Northwest Asset Fund. It concluded appellant
“willfully violated [section] 4b(a)(2)(i) and (iii) of the [Commodity
Exchange] Act” by misappropriating customer funds and
misrepresenting the risk of commodities trading.
The jury found appellant guilty on 29 of 36 counts. It found
true allegations that Revell was particularly vulnerable. The
court ordered appellant to pay restitution of $141,061.79 to Bush
and $114,646.01 to Revell’s estate.
DISCUSSION
Securities Fraud Convictions
(Victim Bush)
Appellant contends insufficient evidence supports his
convictions for securities fraud (counts 2 and 4). He argues the
7
two promissory notes given to Bush do not meet the statutory
definition of a security. Our review is limited to whether the
record contains substantial evidence, contradicted or not,
supporting the jury’s verdicts. (People v. Martinez (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 686, 706.) We conclude it does.
“Corporation Code section 25019 defines a ‘security’
expansively, and includes ‘participation in any profit-sharing
agreement’ or an ‘investment contract,’ whether or not a written
document evidences the investment.” (People v. Frederick (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 400, 413.) “An ‘investment contract’ is ‘“a
contract or a transaction in which a person entrusts money or
other capital to another, with the expectation of deriving a profit,
income or some financial benefit from a business enterprise, the
failure or success of which is dependent upon the managerial
efforts of other persons.”’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Smith (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 230, 235.) “Whether an investment constitutes a
security is a question for the finder of fact.” (People v. Butler
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 404, 414.) The record shows both notes
fall within this definition.
The Unsecured Promissory Note dated May 1, 2011 (the
basis of count 2) specifies loan terms but does not expressly refer
to an investment or business enterprise. Bush testified, however,
that appellant sought the $25,000 loan as a “way to financing
them starting this company and having a profitable business that
they could make money on, and that I could get eight percent on.”
He gave appellant the money several months before they
executed the note. The subject line of the check described its
purpose as an investment. The note identifies the purported
business, i.e., “State DPS Legal Aid Information, Inc.,” as the
borrower instead of appellant. The January 2012 amendment
8
stated Bush would be entitled to ten percent of the sale proceeds
if the principal remained unpaid after five years and appellant
sold the business. Bush testified “the idea [was] that once they
had a real good profitable business going they could turn around
and sell it.”
The promissory note dated March 26, 2012 (the basis of
count 4) also does not refer to an investment or business
enterprise, but Bush’s testimony again completes the story. He
described appellant approaching him about investing in a motel
construction project in Texas adjacent to oil production sites. “I
believe the whole idea of it,” he testified, “was this investment to
the company in Texas that was building the motel. It was for
that purpose that this – they were borrowing $100,000 from me
to finance their project as an investor.” When asked what
appellant told him about the company, Bush responded, “You
know, a term that comes to my mind – he mentioned that he was
an ombudsman. And I don't know – somehow he was – had a
position within the people in Texas who were building this motel.
He was now working with them. And I guess – well, you know, it
was a way of investing with them. And he was using the
[$]100,000 that I was supplying to be a part of the operation of
what they were creating.”
Appellant next contends the trial court instructed the jury
incorrectly on counts 2 and 4 because it did not define “common
enterprise” in the context of an alleged violation of Corporations
Code section 25019. If the instruction was potentially misleading
or incomplete, appellant had a duty to object or request a
clarifying advisement. (People v. Thomas (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d
134, 145.) He did not. The issue is forfeited. (People v. Lee
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)
9
Appellant asserts the issue is not forfeited, however,
because the term was sufficiently vague to trigger the court’s sua
sponte instructional duties and because the error affected his
substantial rights. We review this contention de novo,
considering the challenged instructions in the context of the
instructions and the record as a whole “‘to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in
an impermissible manner.’” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th
306, 326; People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
The jury instructions defined “security” as follows: “‘[A]ny
note, stock, evidence of indebtedness, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, or investment contract. [¶] A
financial transaction or relationship is an investment contract,
and therefore a security, if all of the following elements are
present: [¶] 1. A person entrusted money or other capital to
another; [¶] 2. The person who entrusted the money or capital to
another did so with the expectation of receiving a profit, income,
or some financial benefit from a common enterprise; AND, [¶] 3.
The failure or success of the common enterprise was dependent
on the managerial efforts of persons other than the person who
entrusted the money or other capital.”
Appellant argues that failing to further define “common
enterprise” as a separate business endeavor allowed the jury to
equate the loan itself—i.e., the agreement to pay back the two
loans with interest—as the “enterprise[s]” prosecutors needed to
prove existed. He asserts this effectively eliminated the “common
enterprise” element of securities fraud on both counts.
The trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct extended to
defining those terms “having a technical meaning peculiar to the
law. [Citations.]” (People v. Elam (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298,
10
306.) Nothing in the record suggests the jury required additional
technical instruction, or that it might have interpreted or applied
the instruction in a way that lightened the burden of prosecutors
by equating the notes themselves to the “common enterprises”
they needed to prove. Bush testified forthrightly that he loaned
appellant money on both occasions to invest in business
opportunities. The prosecutor argued in closing that “[t]he
outcome of those notes, assuming that these actually were real
businesses, it wasn’t dependent on Mr. Bush at all. It was
dependent on [appellant] to put in the work, to go out there and
find investments, run a business.” The trial court properly
instructed the jury on these counts.
Burglary Conviction
(Victim Bush)
Appellant contends his conviction for burglary (count 6) is
not supported by sufficient evidence. The People alleged that
“[o]n or between October 1, 2015 and October 31, 2015” appellant
“did enter an inhabited dwelling house . . . occupied by [Bush],
with the intent to commit larceny and any felony.” Appellant
argues this “invited the jury to conflate all of [the] appellant’s
conduct during the month of October 2015 as support for a single
claim of burglary,” allowing prosecutors to secure his conviction
without proving he entered Bush’s house on a specific day with
the required mental state. We disagree.
Bush testified that appellant approached him in late 2015
about his debts to other members of their church. Appellant
asked to use Bush’s credit “as a reference or as a backup for
himself” to apply for corporate credits cards. Appellant stated he
would use his credit “for about a month” and then Bush would be
“completely out of the arrangement.”
11
Prosecutors introduced emails between appellant and
Curtis Browne, a credit consultant, from around this time.
Appellant sent him Bush’s credit report on Thursday, October 15,
2015. Browne responded that “[Bush’s] scores are great” and
that he would seek preapproval for credit in his name. Appellant
emailed Browne as follows the next day: “Question – When does
[Bush] withdraw from the cards and the corporation? After we
have received the cards? Then we notify card issuers he is no
longer with company and everything and all liability is switched
into my name solely? With no liability to [Bush] correct?”
Browne responded, “It’s a good idea can take over everything
formerly once we have fixed your credit. That will be in short
order though.” Appellant said he would get Bush’s “signature
and the card information” by that night or Saturday morning.
Appellant still did not have the signature or information on
Monday morning, October 19. He emailed Browne at 7:47 a.m.
saying that he intended to visit Bush’s house that day. He wrote:
“Didn’t forget about getting you [Bush’s] card info and agreement
over the weekend. [¶] I just wanted to clarify something before
[Bush] and I proceeded. This is not a question he brought up but
that I am bringing up . . . . [¶] Once we proceed through funding I
was hoping, and I kinda of packaged it this way to him that he
could withdraw from the corporation and that I would take over
as director and assume the credit cards and all liability . . . .
Before I wrote any checks, the reason I bring this up is it might
be somewhat unnerving if he is the primary card holder and I'm
writing a check for $75,000 you know what I mean . . . . This is
not a deal breaker with him, we have such a relationship that he
would likely still do that for me until as you mentioned my credit
is in a better place, but i will have to work a little harder to make
12
him not worry that he ultimately is not responsible . . . . [¶]
Anyway just throwing out there if it is at all possible to transfer
ownership of this Corp sometime soon at least after we receive
funding that would be best case scenario. [¶] Ok let me know, I
will be heading over to [Bush’s] this morning between 11:00 -
12:00 will scan and forward you agreement and card info . . . .”
Browne responded as follows about two hours later: “You can
take over as President and CEO of the corporation at any time
and have sole power of the corporation. However, to be clear -
until your credit is better and you formally take over the credit
cards and [Bush] removes himself from that liability - he could
still potentially be liable in the case of default on those cards.
Just make real sure your plan allows for paying back the cards
and you’ll be fine.” (Italics added.)
Appellant and Browne emailed on Tuesday, October 20 and
Wednesday, October 21 about charging $4,600 and $4,400 on two
of Bush’s cards to buy “aged” shell corporations that could more
easily obtain corporate credit. Bush testified appellant did not
warn him about these charges and discovered them only when he
received statements in the mail that December. He also found
appellant had charged personal expenses, eventually incurring
over $21,000 on three cards. He never removed Bush or his wife
from the accounts or paid them back.
Appellant argues these emails show he did not intend to
commit theft when he visited Bush’s house to get the information
needed to receive the cards. We decline to interpret and
reassemble the evidence to fit appellant’s alternative factual
narrative. Reversing for a lack of sufficient substantial evidence
is not warranted “unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
13
conviction].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting
People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
The jury heard evidence that appellant solicited Bush’s
personal information for the purpose of opening credit accounts to
pay debts owed to others. He secured Bush’s approval by
representing he would promptly remove Bush from the accounts
once opened. The credit consultant confirmed on the morning of
October 19, 2015, that Bush would remain liable until appellant
could improve his credit and pay off any charges incurred.
Appellant—already deeply in debt to Bush and others—
confirmed he would visit Bush later that morning to get the
information needed to open the accounts. He began charging
thousands of dollars to the accounts the next day, in Bush’s name,
without his permission. This quickly grew to over $21,000.
Jurors could infer from this evidence that appellant entered
Bush’s house on October 19 “with the intent to commit larceny
and any felony,” i.e., to access credit he could not and would not
pay back to Bush.
Forgery and Grand Theft Convictions
(Victim Revell)
Appellant contends the prosecutors failed to charge him
with forgery (count 11) and grand theft (count 12) within the
four-year statute of limitations. (§§ 801.5, 803, subd. (c)(1).) He
raised the issue below. The jury was instructed on the applicable
limitations periods but still convicted him on both counts. “When
an issue involving the statute of limitations has been tried, we
review the record to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the findings of the trier of fact.” (People v. Castillo
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 364, 369.) We conclude both counts were
timely filed.
14
Count 11 is based on the allegation appellant forged the
name of attorney Robert Burlison on the December 2011 letter to
Gary Ryan demanding Revell’s 50 percent share of the house sale
proceeds. Appellant argues Revell had discovered or should have
discovered the forgery no later than when she revoked his power
of attorney on September 21, 2012. We disagree. “The
limitations period is triggered when either the victim or a
responsible law enforcement official learns of facts which, if
investigated with reasonable diligence, would make that person
aware a crime had occurred.” (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 921, 930 (Rodriguez).) Here, Revell sought counsel
after appellant refused to disperse the proceeds of her share of
the house sale—not because she suspected appellant forged an
attorney’s name on a document. Appellant’s conduct may have
notified Revell of potential financial impropriety but nothing in
the record shows she received the letter, and, assuming she did,
why she would have initially doubted the signature’s
authenticity.
Count 12 is based on allegations that appellant committed
theft when he took the $114,646.01 in house sale proceeds from
Revell. Appellant contends similarly that Revell’s “act of
revoking appellant’s power of attorney [on September 12, 2012]
unequivocally proved she had become aware of facts that should
have alerted her to the facts underlying the charge of grand
theft” by that date. He argues the limitations period thus expired
more than a year before prosecutors charged him. Here the
People concede, stating the revocation “indicated [Revell] no
longer believed appellant was acting in her best interests.” They
agree we should reverse count 12 and remand the case for
resentencing. We do not accept the concession.
15
“[D]iscovery of a loss by the victim alone is insufficient to
trigger the limitations period. [Citation.] ‘The question is
whether there is sufficient knowledge that a crime has been
committed.’” (Rodriguez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 930, italics
added.) “The issue of when [a crime] was discovered or could
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence
presents questions for the trier of fact to decide.” (Ibid.) The jury
here did not have the benefit of Revell’s testimony because she
died a decade before trial. It was left to infer her knowledge and
state of mind through extensive documentary evidence and the
testimony of others. The relevant question, however, is not
whether she discovered appellant was not acting in her best
interests during the limitations period—it is whether she
discovered appellant had committed a crime against her during
this period.
The revocation itself states nothing about the basis of
Revell’s decision to revoke appellant’s powers. Revell’s attorney
testified his office served the revocation in September of 2012
“because there was still money outstanding that he had collected
purportedly under this Power of Attorney. And we wanted to
make sure that that money wasn’t distributed or we could
somehow try to secure it.” The firm petitioned for an accounting
in probate court in April of 2013 but the original petition was not
admitted into evidence at trial.4 Revell’s attorney testified his
office received an “Escrow Account Statement” signed in
February of 2012 that showed appellant received $60,458.96 “per
POA” and that $53,040.59 remained in an escrow account at
4 The court admitted Revell’s first amended petition (her
estate’s operative pleading) as an exhibit but instructed jurors
not to take its allegations for their truth.
16
Burlison Law Group. Appellant did not serve an accounting of
the proceeds in the probate litigation until April of 2014. Revell’s
attorneys did not depose him until they were approaching trial in
2015.
The jury heard this evidence and more—we count 17
witnesses and more than 150 numbered exhibits—over the course
of ten days. The court instructed it properly on the statute of
limitations. The jury convicted appellant on count 12
nonetheless. The record amply supports the finding that his
deceits obfuscated the full nature and scope of his illicit activities
well into the limitations period. We assume the jury understood
its instructions and decline to substitute our judgment of the
evidence it considered.
Money Laundering Convictions
The jury convicted appellant on twelve counts of money
laundering under section 186.10, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant
contends two of these convictions, i.e., counts 28 and 32, are
based on insufficient evidence because the trial court recited the
incorrect mental state for those crimes when it instructed the
jury. Again, he raised no objection to the instruction below. The
issue is likewise forfeited. Anticipating this, appellant argues
that defense counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. We disagree.
The money laundering statute (section 186.10) allows
prosecutors to prove the defendant’s mental state in one of two
ways, i.e., by showing the defendant conducted or attempted to
conduct specified financial transactions “(1) with the specific
intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any
criminal activity, or (2) knowing that the monetary instrument
17
represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly
from the proceeds of, criminal activity, is guilty of the crime of
money laundering.” (§ 186.10, subd. (a).) Here, prosecutors
charged appellant under subdivision (a)(1), alleging that he
conducted the relevant transactions “with the intent to promote,
manage, establish, carry on,” etc. The instructions submitted to
the court by the parties and thereafter read to the jury, however,
cited the mental state set forth in subdivision (a)(2), stating “the
People must prove that the Defendant . . . knew that the
monetary instruments represented the proceeds of criminal
activity or were derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of
criminal activity.” Prosecutors quoted the latter in closing
argument without drawing an objection from the defense.
Establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires appellant to demonstrate counsel’s performance was
deficient and he suffered prejudice as a result. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674]
(Strickland); People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) To
demonstrate deficient performance, appellant must show
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. (Mickel, at p. 198.) To demonstrate prejudice,
he must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
deficient performance the outcome of trial would have been
different. (Ibid.) An ineffective assistance claim fails upon a
defective showing of either component. (People v. Holt (1997) 15
Cal.4th 619, 703.) Appellant shows neither.
Defense counsel’s performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness considering the number and
complexity of the charges against his client. The information
included 36 felony counts involving seven victims. The parties
18
submitted 75 pages of jury instructions to the trial court.
Defense counsel’s neglecting to flag an inconsistency that had
also evaded the detection of the court and prosecutors was hardly
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.)
Even if counsel performed deficiently, the record confirms
no prejudice resulted. The jury still found appellant harbored
one of the two mental states required to establish money
laundering under section 186.10. Appellant does not propose how
he would have altered his theory of the case—i.e., that he
obtained the alleged victims’ money by permission rather than by
theft or embezzlement—had prosecutors proved their case using
subdivision (a)(1) instead of (a)(2) or the court instructed the jury
on the former. Substantial evidence supports the convictions.
Appellant scrutinizes the testimony of the prosecution’s
forensic accounting expert and the exhibits supporting that
testimony. This goes to the weight of the evidence and witness
credibility. Here we defer again to the trier of fact. (See Rufo v.
Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 614 [“In reviewing a claim of
insufficiency of evidence, the appellate court must consider the
whole record, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, presume every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence, and defer to the trier of fact’s
determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”].)
Penal Code Section 654
As recommended in the probation sentencing report, the
court stayed four of appellant’s convictions at sentencing
pursuant to section 654. It stated: “So Counts 1 and 2 were 654
and 2 had the greater punishment, so we’re sentencing on 2.
Counts 3 and 4 were 654, and 4 had the greater punishment. 14
19
and 15 were 654 and therefore 15 carries a greater punishment
and 14 will be stayed. 16 and 17 are 654 and 17 carries greater
punishment, so 16 is stayed.”
Appellant contends this shows the trial court applied the
prior version of section 654, which required imposing the “longest
potential term of imprisonment” when sentencing a defendant
convicted of two or more crimes for the same act. The People
argue it is unclear whether the court applied current law and
request we remand for clarification. The current version of
section 654 went into effect two and a half years before
appellant’s sentencing. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.)
Appellant did not object or raise any issue regarding the court’s
application of section 654. Although failure to stay execution of a
sentence under section 654 is not subject to forfeiture because it
results in an unauthorized sentence (People v. Hester (2000) 22
Cal.4th 290, 295), here the court did stay execution of the related
counts. We therefore conclude appellant has forfeited his claim.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-353 [“the waiver
doctrine should apply to claims involving the trial court’s failure
to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
choices”].)
Corrections to Abstract of Judgment
The parties agree the trial court imposed one-third the
middle term (i.e., one year) on count 4 for securities fraud but did
not mark the appropriate box on the abstract of judgment with
an “X.” Here we agree and will direct the clerk to correct the
error. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts
may correct clerical errors at any time].)
20
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The superior court clerk is
directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect appellant’s
one-year sentence on count 4 is one-third the middle term. The
corrected abstract of judgment shall be forwarded to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P.J.
BALTODANO, J.
21
Pauline Maxwell, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.