CourtListener 10863037•People v. Ruiz CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Ruiz CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335973
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA483209)
v.
ARMANDO GARCIA RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
A jury convicted defendant Armando Garcia Ruiz of one
count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and
one count of false imprisonment (§ 236) after Garcia Ruiz fatally
shot Skye Gutierrez during a confrontation over stolen
marijuana. Garcia Ruiz argues we should reverse because the
trial court failed to instruct the jury that his youth was a
relevant factor in determining whether he acted with conscious
disregard to human life in killing Gutierrez. He also argues the
court applied the wrong standard in denying his motion to strike
a firearm enhancement for purposes of sentencing, that the court
should have stayed his sentence for false imprisonment under
section 654, and that we must correct an error in the abstract of
judgment. Finally, he requests that we review the record to
determine whether the trial court erred in denying his request for
a copy of the video recording of Perkins2 operations in which an
undercover agent spoke with him and with a codefendant in jail.
We agree with Garcia Ruiz as to the abstract of judgment.
Otherwise, we find no prejudicial error by the trial court,
including in its denial of the motion to turn over the recording of
the Perkins operations. We therefore affirm the judgment subject
to the change in the abstract of judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Garcia Ruiz supplied marijuana, pills, and other products
to subordinates including Matthew Reyes and Elizabeth Zuniga,
1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 [110 S.Ct. 2394,
110 L.Ed.2d 243] (Perkins).
2
who in turn sold the drugs to customers. Reyes was Garcia Ruiz’s
codefendant but reached a plea agreement prior to trial. Zuniga
testified against Garcia Ruiz.
The chain of events that led to Gutierrez’s killing began on
the morning of November 17, 2019, when Reyes was robbed of a
backpack full of marijuana and some electronics. Zuniga testified
as to what Reyes told her about the robbery, which was that
Reyes had met with Gutierrez to sell her drugs. While Gutierrez
sat in the front seat of Reyes’s car and distracted him, Gutierrez’s
companion Fernando Jackson entered the back seat of the car,
put a knife to Reyes’s neck, and took his backpack. Surveillance
video footage and cellular phone data generally corroborated this
account.
Garcia Ruiz became angry when he learned about the
robbery. According to Zuniga, Garcia Ruiz was upset at the loss
of the marijuana but was more concerned that Gutierrez and
Jackson had disrespected him. He enlisted Zuniga to message
Gutierrez asking to buy drugs from her, hoping to set up a
meeting where they could recover the backpack. Garcia Ruiz
believed Gutierrez was more likely to respond to Zuniga because
she was a woman.
In the end, Zuniga primarily spoke with Jackson rather
than Gutierrez. Over the course of the day, she made or received
about 32 phone calls with him. Gutierrez’s friend Jasmine
Melendez testified she was with Gutierrez and Jackson that
afternoon and overheard some of the calls. She characterized the
conversations as “very aggressive,” and she heard some talk
regarding the possibility of a fight or gun violence.
Initially, Zuniga tried to arrange to meet with Jackson and
Gutierrez in a local park, but Jackson left the area before the
3
meeting took place. Garcia Ruiz and Reyes then went to stake
out the area around Jackson’s apartment, near where the robbery
took place. In the evening, Zuniga texted Garcia Ruiz that
Gutierrez “already knows y’all lookin for them.” Garcia Ruiz
replied, “It’s all good tho. They can run but can’t hide.” Garcia
Ruiz and Reyes returned home later that night after failing to
find Jackson and Gutierrez. Zuniga later told police she was
fairly certain that neither Garcia Ruiz nor Reyes intended for
anyone to die, but she saw a handgun on Garcia Ruiz’s lap as she
rode in his car that afternoon.
The next day, Garcia Ruiz continued searching for Jackson
and Gutierrez. Cell phone location data showed that the three
were all located near the same shopping mall at about 9:39 p.m.,
and that they all left shortly afterward.
Surveillance videos from cameras at nearby homes
recorded the scene a few minutes later outside Jackson’s
apartment. First, Garcia Ruiz and Reyes arrived in a white
minivan at about 10:10 p.m. and parked on the street. Jackson
and Gutierrez followed about 30 seconds later in a black BMW,
which they parked on the opposite side of the street.
Gutierrez got out of the BMW and walked around the front
of the vehicle, at which point Garcia Ruiz and Reyes got out of
the minivan. Garcia Ruiz ran toward Gutierrez, and Reyes ran
toward the passenger seat of the BMW, where Jackson was
seated. Reyes was carrying a baseball bat, which he swung at
the windshield of the BMW. Jackson got out of the BMW, and
Reyes swung the baseball bat at him. The bat clanged to the
ground, and Reyes and Jackson wrestled on the grassy area next
to the passenger side of the car.
4
As Reyes ran toward Jackson, Garcia Ruiz approached
Gutierrez. The resolution of the surveillance video is too low to
depict clearly what was in Garcia Ruiz’s hand, but he held his
arm out in front of his body as if pointing a gun. When Garcia
Ruiz reached Gutierrez, he grabbed her from behind and pulled
her toward the trunk of the car near where Reyes and Jackson
were fighting. One of the surveillance cameras recorded audio of
the encounter. It recorded Garcia Ruiz saying, “Hey, hey, hey,
don’t even move,” and “You move, I’m a [sic] do her.” Reyes and
Jackson continued wrestling, and Garcia Ruiz pulled Gutierrez
backwards with him away from the fighting. A few seconds later,
a gunshot rang out,3 and Gutierrez slumped to the ground.
Garcia Ruiz ran back to the front passenger’s seat of the minivan.
A few seconds later, Reyes separated himself from Jackson and
followed. Reyes got into the driver’s seat and drove away.
Gutierrez was pronounced dead at a local hospital. A
medical examiner testified that the cause of death was a gunshot
wound to the back of the neck. The presence of soot around the
entrance wound indicated that Gutierrez was shot at close range,
though the medical examiner did not see a muzzle imprint that
might have been present if the gun had been pressed up against
her neck. Gutierrez did not have defensive injuries to her hands
or fingernails.
Police arrested Garcia Ruiz about three weeks later, and
two detectives interviewed him about the crime. At first, Garcia
3 A row of trees separated the home where the closest
surveillance camera was located from the street. As a result, the
video footage shows only the lower part of Garcia Ruiz and
Gutierrez’s bodies, and it does not show the fatal shot.
5
Ruiz denied involvement and gave no substantive answers, but
eventually, he acknowledged being involved. He denied that he
intended to shoot Gutierrez, claiming the gun went off
accidentally because she was “pulling” away from him and
getting “aggressive,” and “with her hand kind of elbowed me.”
Later, he said that Gutierrez was grabbing at his hand that was
holding the gun, and as they were wrestling, he heard the gun go
off.
Garcia Ruiz did not testify in his own defense, but he called
a firearms expert, who testified that the trigger pull of a revolver
required between 12 and 15 pounds of force. The expert could not
determine the type of gun used in the shooting, but he testified
that a gun can discharge accidentally either because of a
mechanical malfunction or negligent handling.
The prosecution charged Garcia Ruiz with one count of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of kidnapping for
ransom (§ 209, subd. (a)). The prosecution also alleged that
Garcia Ruiz personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury and death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
The jury convicted Garcia Ruiz of lesser versions of both counts,
finding him guilty of second degree murder and false
imprisonment by violence (§ 236). In addition, the jury found
true a lesser firearm allegation, finding that he personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) in the commission of the murder.
The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison for
murder, plus an additional 10 years for the firearm enhancement.
The court imposed a two-year sentence for false imprisonment by
violence but ordered that it be served concurrently.
6
DISCUSSION
A. Any Error in the Trial Court’s Failure to Instruct the
Jury Regarding Garcia Ruiz’s Youth as a Factor in
the Mental State for Second Degree Murder Was
Harmless
Garcia Ruiz argues the trial court erred by failing to
include, in its jury instructions on implied-malice second degree
murder, a statement that the jury could consider his youth as a
relevant factor in determining whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. He acknowledges he did not request
such an instruction before the trial court, but he argues we
should either excuse the forfeiture or find his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an
instruction. We need not decide whether the court was required
to instruct the jury on his youth because any error in failing to do
so was harmless. Garcia Ruiz’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel also fails because he has not shown prejudice.
Because no case has held that a trial court must instruct
the jury on the defendant’s youth as a relevant factor in implied
malice murder, Garcia Ruiz relies primarily on a case addressing
this issue in a different context. In People v. Pittman (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 400 (Pittman), the court held that in deciding a
resentencing petition under section 1172.6, the trial court must
“consider how, if at all, [the defendant’s] youth impacted his
ability to form the requisite mental state for second degree
murder.” (Pittman, supra, at p. 418.)
To be guilty of implied-malice second degree murder, a
defendant must “ ‘ “ ‘ “know[] that his conduct endangers the life
of another,” ’ ” ’ ” and must “ ‘ “ ‘ “act[] with conscious disregard
for life.” ’ ” ’ ” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.) In a
7
case like Pittman, where the defendant was convicted as an aider
and abettor, the defendant must “act with intent to aid the life-
endangering act of the direct perpetrator that proximately causes
the death” (id. at p. 415) while “ ‘ “know[ing] that the act is
dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life” ’ ” (ibid., italics omitted, quoting People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991). The court in Pittman concluded that
the defendant’s youth was relevant to such a determination
because of “youthful offenders’ ‘relative impulsivity’ and ‘their
vulnerability to peer pressure.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[T]ransient
rashness,” ’ ‘ “ ‘impetuosity,’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘failure to appreciate risks
and consequences’ ” ’ are hallmarks of an immature brain.”
(Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)
We have serious doubts as to whether the Pittman court’s
reasoning translates to the context of this case. By definition,
defendants eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 did not
personally kill their victims. Instead, they were convicted of
murder for participating in criminal activity during which a
cohort killed a victim and had malice imputed to them. (See
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842; § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
The law at the time of their convictions allowed for murder
liability on the basis of vicarious liability without regard to a
defendant’s personal culpability for the killing. (Gentile, supra,
at pp. 843-844.) That is no longer the case, and in proceedings
under section 1172.6, a defendant is entitled to resentencing
unless “the prosecution can prove the defendant acted with the
accompanying mental state of mind of malice aforethought.”
(Gentile, supra, at p. 846.) In such cases, it is natural to take a
defendant’s youth into consideration when deciding whether he
understood the risks and consequences of his actions. That logic
8
has less force in cases like this one where the defendant literally
pulled the trigger and fired the fatal gunshot. It is not at all
obvious that a blanket rule requiring the trial court to instruct on
the relevance of youth is warranted in all cases in which a young
defendant is accused of personally committing implied-malice
murder.
We need not decide whether and in what circumstances a
trial court must instruct the jury on the defendant’s youth,
however, because in this case, any error in failing to give such an
instruction was harmless.4 The circumstances of this case differ
dramatically from those of Pittman. Pittman, who was 21 at the
time, noticed the victim using drugs with a prostitute in a truck
in front of his house and said to two friends, “ ‘Let’s go whip his
ass.’ ” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) He saw some
sharp chisels in a bucket nearby and handed them out to his
friends. One of the friends raced ahead, opened the door to the
truck, and used his chisel to stab the victim. (Id. at p. 405.)
There was conflicting testimony regarding Pittman’s role in the
attack, but at most he kicked or stomped on the victim after the
killer pulled him out of the truck. (Id. at p. 415.)
The court noted several indications suggesting youthful
immaturity may have played a role in these events: “Pittman,
21, participated in the attack on [the victim] with two peers who
were 16 and 17 years old. Inferences of immaturity and peer
4 Garcia Ruiz concedes that any error would be a matter of
state law, and that we apply the People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818 standard in reviewing for harmless error. We assume
this is correct, as Garcia Ruiz does not allege the jury
instructions omitted or misstated an element of the offense. (See
People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942-943.)
9
pressure may be drawn from those facts. In addition,
notwithstanding Pittman’s characterization of the attack as
‘planned,’ the trial evidence indicates that Pittman and his peers
acted impulsively and under the influence of ‘transient rashness.’
The selection of chisels as weapons appears to have been
spontaneous. The acknowledged motivation for the crime was
the happenstance that, while walking by his house, Pittman
noticed [the victim] ‘shooting up dope with a prostitute in his
truck.’ ” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)
The only common factor between this case and Pittman is
the defendant’s age. The killing of Gutierrez resulted from a
business dispute. Garcia Ruiz did not act spontaneously, but
instead devised a plan to find Gutierrez and Jackson, whom he
tracked methodically over two days. Garcia Ruiz brought a gun
with him during both days of his search, rather than simply
grabbing whatever improvised weapons lay at hand. Most
importantly, Garcia Ruiz was not an aider and abettor, but
personally killed Gutierrez. We recognize the jury here found
that shooting Gutierrez at close range after tracking her was not
sufficient to convict Garcia Ruiz of first degree premeditated
murder, but even so, “[p]ulling the hammer back on a loaded gun
and pointing it at another is certainly evidence of an intentional
act performed with conscious disregard for human life.” (People
v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1273-1274.) At
minimum, Garcia Ruiz grabbed Gutierrez, pointed a loaded gun
at her in the midst of a fight with his finger on the trigger, and
threatened to shoot her if Jackson did not stop fighting with
Reyes before he did in fact shoot her.
In sum, an instruction on the relevance of Garcia Ruiz’s
youth would have made no appreciable difference in the case as
10
there was no dispute Garcia Ruiz was the actual killer and the
evidence of implied malice was overwhelming. Because it is not
“reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
[defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error”
(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836), any error in the
failure to instruct the jury was harmless. (See Pittman, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at pp. 417-418.)
Garcia Ruiz’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails
for the same reason. To succeed on such a claim, a defendant
must show not only that his attorney was negligent, but also
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
694 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) Garcia Ruiz has not met
that standard here as there is no reasonable probability the
result would have been different had defense counsel requested
the instruction at issue.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Imposing the Firearm Enhancement
Prior to his sentencing hearing, Garcia Ruiz filed a
sentencing memorandum requesting the trial court stay or strike
the 10-year enhancement for using a firearm in the murder
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). He argued that two mitigating
circumstances specified in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
applied: “[t]he application of [the] enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years” (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)), and “[t]he current
offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma”
(id., subd. (c)(2)(E)). In support of the latter claim, Garcia Ruiz
submitted a report from a social worker detailing his history of
trauma, including the presence of an alcoholic father who
11
physically abused his mother, as well as an experience as a
teenager in which he was kidnapped for eight hours and robbed.
The trial court must “consider and afford great weight to
evidence” of these mitigating circumstances, the presence of
which “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); accord, People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029-1030.) Garcia Ruiz argued
that the dismissal of his firearm enhancement would not
endanger public safety because he had no prior criminal history
and because even without the enhancement, he would need to
serve 15 years in prison before even being considered for parole.
The trial court rejected Garcia Ruiz’s request to strike the
enhancement, finding that “in the totality of all of the
circumstances and in considering the information that was
provided to this court regarding your background, it doesn’t
outweigh or would it serve in the interest of justice to strike that
enhancement because you do pose a serious danger to the
community.” Garcia Ruiz’s disproportionate reaction to the theft
of the backpack suggested that “a very minor situation” could
“trigger [him] to act in a way that poses a danger to the
community.”
We review a trial court’s decision to impose a sentence
enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.) “ ‘[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the
trial court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an
incorrect legal standard.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) The issue of a defendant’s
dangerousness “is necessarily a forward-looking inquiry. When
determining whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of
12
danger, the trial court must look to when a defendant would be
released.” (People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063.)
In Gonzalez, the court held that the trial court applied an
incorrect standard by focusing only on whether the defendant
currently posed a danger to the public, without taking into
account whether he would continue to do so on the date of his
release. (Gonzalez, supra, at pp. 230-231.)
Garcia Ruiz argues the trial court in this case made the
same error as in Gonzalez, and that we must remand the case for
a new sentencing hearing. We disagree. The record in Gonzalez
showed that the court expressly declined to consider the
defendant’s dangerousness as of the date of release and focused
exclusively on dangerousness at the time of sentencing. (People
v. Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 223-224.) In contrast,
the record in this case does not show the trial court focused solely
on Garcia Ruiz’s current dangerousness.
The trial court mentioned the issue of dangerousness only
briefly during the sentencing hearing, stating it would not “serve
in the interest of justice to strike [the firearm] enhancement
because you do pose a serious danger to the community.”
Gonzalez affirmed that “the current dangerousness of the
defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have
some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would
endanger the public.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) The court’s failure to explicitly state that
it was considering Garcia Ruiz’s potential dangerousness at the
time of his release does not show the court ignored that part of
the law. In the absence of any evidence that the court
misunderstood its obligations or the scope of its discretion, we
13
presume the court knew the applicable law and followed it.
(People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
Decision not to Apply Section 654
Garcia Ruiz contends the trial court erred by failing to stay
the sentence for false imprisonment under section 654 instead of
imposing a concurrent sentence on that count. Section 654 bars
multiple punishment for a single “act or omission” (ibid.), but
courts have interpreted that term broadly to refer to “not only a
discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing
several acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v.
Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) Garcia Ruiz argues the
murder and false imprisonment both arose from the same intent
and objective.
“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. [Citations.] We review the trial court’s determination in
the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the
existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1143.) “In the absence of any reference to . . . section 654 during
sentencing, the fact that the court did not stay the sentence on
any count is generally deemed to reflect an implicit
determination that each crime had a separate objective.” (People
v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.)
The record contains almost no discussion of the application
of section 654 to Garcia Ruiz’s convictions. Garcia Ruiz filed a
sentencing memorandum requesting that the court stay his
14
sentence for false imprisonment pursuant to section 654, but he
offered no reasoned argument in support of any claim that his
offenses arose from the same objective or course of conduct. The
People’s sentencing memorandum likewise addressed the issue in
a conclusory manner. The People stated only that they did “not
agree” with Garcia Ruiz’s position, but that they “would not
object to [his] sentence being stayed for this count.” At the
sentencing hearing, neither the court nor the parties discussed
the issue. The court stated that it would “impose a concurrent
principal term of two years” for false imprisonment, and did not
refer explicitly to section 654.
Based on this record, we must infer the trial court found
Garcia Ruiz had a separate objective for each offense, and we
review that implied finding for substantial evidence. (People v.
Tarris, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 626.) We see no basis for
reversing the trial court under that standard. Although the two
offenses occurred in quick succession and were part of the same
dispute, they were not encompassed in the same physical act
because no single action “complete[d] the actus reus for each of
the relevant criminal offenses.” (People v. Corpening, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 313.) Furthermore, the trial court could reasonably
find that Garcia Ruiz committed each offense for a separate
purpose. For example, the court could have found that Garcia
Ruiz initially grabbed Gutierrez as part of a plan to recover the
stolen backpack, but that he shot her for revenge—the
prosecution presented evidence that both of those purposes
motivated Garcia Ruiz. On this mostly silent record, where we
must “review the trial court’s determination in the light most
favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every
fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence”
15
(People v. Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143), we do not
find error.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying the Motion
to Disclose Videos of the Perkins Operations
In the course of their investigation, the police conducted
separate Perkins operations on Garcia Ruiz and Reyes, in which
they placed each defendant in a cell with an informant in the
hope of eliciting incriminating information. The prosecution
disclosed audio recordings and transcripts of the interviews but
withheld video recordings of the interviews.
The court initially denied Garcia Ruiz’s motion to disclose
the video recordings on the ground that to do so would risk
revealing the identity of the informant. “Evidence Code section
1040, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes the trial court to decline to
disclose confidential records maintained by a public entity when
it finds the ‘necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the
information . . . outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the
interest of justice.’ ” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 73.)
The court later modified its decision and allowed Garcia Ruiz’s
attorney to view the recordings in the presence of a police officer,
but not to make copies of the recordings.
Because the transcript of the hearing during which the
court interviewed a police officer regarding the Perkins
operations is sealed, Garcia Ruiz’s appellate attorney has asked
us to review the transcript to determine whether the court
abused its discretion by denying trial counsel’s request for a copy
of the recordings. In the context of a defendant’s motion for
disclosure of police personnel records—another context in which
trial courts conduct in-camera hearings outside the presence of
defense counsel—courts “routinely independently examine[ ] the
16
sealed records of such in-camera hearings to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s
motion.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285.) We see
no reason not to review the trial court’s decision on the Perkins
transcript in the same manner. We have therefore reviewed the
sealed transcript, and we find no prejudicial error by the trial
court in denying the motion.
E. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected
The abstract of judgment states, correctly, that Garcia Ruiz
was convicted of violating section 236, but it incorrectly describes
this crime as “[k]idnapping for [r]ansom [r]esulting in [b]odily
[h]arm or [d]eath.” Section 236 actually refers to the crime of
false imprisonment, and it was this offense for which Garcia Ruiz
was convicted in count 3.
“An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction,”
and it is important for courts to correct elements of an abstract of
judgment that differ from the court’s oral judgment.” (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Garcia Ruiz requests that
we order the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to list
the correct crime in count 3. The People agree this is
appropriate, as do we. (See id. at pp. 186-188.)
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. On remand,
the trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment as to count 3
to state that Garcia Ruiz was convicted of false imprisonment,
and forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
18
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