Jones v. Eaton CA2/5

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Filed 5/20/26 Jones v. Eaton CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DEREK JONES, B338670

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC710289)
v.

JOSEPH EATON,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Derek Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sinclair Braun Kargher, Kevin S. Sinclair, and Andrew H.
Steinberg for Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of an action under the
“five-year rule,” which requires a plaintiff to bring a case to trial
within five years of filing it. The trial court granted defendant
and respondent Joseph Eaton’s (Eaton’s) motion to dismiss the
case filed by plaintiff and appellant Derek Jones (Jones) for
violating the five-year rule. We consider whether this was
error—either because Jones’s action against Eaton was
automatically stayed by Jones’s appeal of a judgment against
other defendants in the action or because Jones demonstrated
bringing the matter to trial within the required timeframe was
impossible, impracticable, or futile.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Background Facts1
The facts of the dispute between Jones and Eaton are not
pertinent to resolving this appeal. It suffices to say that Jones
sued Eaton and a group of other defendants (Umbrella Capital
Group, Inc. dba The Plaza Group Realty (The Plaza Group),
IKON, LLC (IKON), Michael Alladawi (Alladawi), William Go
(Go), and Umbrella Group, Inc. (collectively, the Umbrella
Defendants)) and alleged they engaged in a fraudulent scheme.
As alleged, Eaton and the Umbrella Defendants loaned money to
Jones, secured the loan by using Jones’s residential property as
collateral, and, through a series of predatory and deceptive acts,
obtained the equity in the home by foreclosing on the loan and

1
Jones and Eaton both filed motions to augment the record
with documents that were filed in the trial court, including two
iterations of Jones’s complaint and status reports filed by both
parties in July 2023. The motions are granted.

2
subsequently selling the property to Industrial Strength
Investments M, LLC (Industrial Strength). Per the allegations in
the complaint, Eaton was a principal or partner in The Plaza
Group, the entity that brokered the loan, and a manager and
member of Industrial Strength, which ultimately purchased the
property.
Industrial Strength later initiated a quiet title action,
which resulted in a declaration that it held valid title to the
property.

B. Procedural History
1. Early proceedings
Jones filed the complaint in this action in June 2018.2
Insofar as the record—which is primarily comprised of the trial
court’s register of actions—reveals, Jones did not serve the
complaint on any defendants until a year later, in June 2019,
when he served some but not all defendants and did not serve
either Eaton or Industrial Strength.
Despite the apparent lack of service, Industrial Strength
appeared in the action in June 2019 and demurred. The trial
court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Jones then
filed a first amended complaint. Industrial Strength filed
another demurrer, which the trial court sustained without leave
to amend.
Jones filed proofs of service by mail on Eaton in January
2020 and August 2021, but there is no indication Eaton ever

2
The complaint initially identified other plaintiffs, but by
the third amended complaint, Jones was the only named plaintiff
and is the only party appealing the trial court’s order.

3
returned a notice of acknowledgement and receipt. In the
interim, the trial court issued numerous orders to show cause
regarding the absence of filed proofs of service on various
defendants.

2. The defendants demur
In September 2021, Eaton filed a demurrer to the first
amended complaint. The Umbrella Defendants filed their own
demurrer a month later. In December 2021, the trial court held a
joint hearing on the two demurrers. Both Eaton and the
Umbrella Defendants argued the claims in the complaint were
precluded by the quiet title judgment. Eaton also demurred
separately to eight of the causes of action on other grounds. The
trial court overruled the demurrers to the extent they argued
preclusion and sustained Eaton’s demurrer to the individual
causes of action with leave to amend. The order stated the
deadline to amend the complaint was Monday, December 13,
2021. Jones obtained two extensions of that deadline.
Jones filed his second amended complaint on January 11,
2022, alleging eleven causes of action. Six of them, the causes of
action for fraudulent inducement, intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL), and
cancellation of instruments, named Eaton as a defendant. All the
causes of action alleged against Eaton were also alleged against
some, if not all, of the Umbrella Defendants.
Eaton demurred again, arguing that some of the claims
against him were precluded by the prior quiet title action and
that the causes of action individually failed to state claims. The

4
Umbrella Defendants also filed a demurrer, but it is not included
in the appellate record.
In June 2022, the trial court ruled on the demurrers filed
by Eaton and the Umbrella Defendants. The court sustained the
Umbrella Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. It
sustained Eaton’s demurrer with leave to amend and gave Jones
20 days to amend the complaint.3 Jones subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration of both orders, which the trial court
denied. In late July, Eaton filed an ex parte application to
dismiss the action for failure to timely amend, which the trial
court also denied. The following month, Jones twice sought an
extension of his deadline to file an amended complaint, which the
trial court denied too. On August 30, 2022, Jones filed a third
amended complaint, but the complaint was not signed.
In December 2022, Jones appealed the trial court’s
judgment in favor of the Umbrella Defendants.
In March 2023, the trial court held an order to show cause
hearing regarding discovery and a trial setting conference. It
continued the latter to July 2023.

3. The July conference
Jones filed a status report in advance of the July 2023 trial
setting conference that represented he had not served his third
amended complaint because he intended to file a fourth amended
complaint. The status report also advised Jones had filed a

3
Around this time, Eaton filed a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court held a hearing on that motion in
November 2022 and denied it. Eaton also filed a series of
discovery motions.

5
notice of appeal in December 2022 regarding the court’s dismissal
of certain defendants and that appeal was still pending. Jones
asserted this meant the five-year rule “would appear to be
stayed” pending the disposition of his appeal. Jones also asserted
he was requesting leave to file his fourth amended complaint.
Eaton filed a status report shortly thereafter that
represented Jones told Eaton he wished to seek leave to file a
fourth amended complaint and, as a result, Jones contended it
would be premature to set a trial date. Eaton agreed setting a
trial date would be premature.
On July 26, 2023, the trial court issued a minute order
reflecting it held a trial setting conference.4 In its minute order,
the court stated Jones was currently incarcerated in federal
prison. The court’s minute order also states that after conferring
with counsel, the court ruled as follows: “The Court has not
issued any stay on the action as to any parties on the matter. [¶]
The Court sees no reason to set the matter for trial and will not
set any further hearing dates on the matter due to [Jones’s]
current incarceration.”

4. The first motion to dismiss
In October 2023, Jones filed a motion for leave to file a
fourth amended complaint, which the trial court ultimately
denied. In November, Eaton filed an ex parte application to
dismiss the case for failure to timely amend, which the court also
denied.

4
The record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the
conference.

6
The court set an order to show cause hearing regarding
trial readiness for November 16, 2023. The register of actions
indicates this hearing was held, but the record does not contain a
minute order or any other document memorializing the
proceedings.
The trial court held another hearing on November 30, 2023.
The day before the hearing, Jones filed a notice of errata to the
third amended complaint. During the hearing, the court brought
up the five-year rule and stated it thought they previously
discussed the deadline had passed. The court said it recognized
Jones had filed a third amended complaint, but it was not signed.
Jones contended he had filed a notice of errata with a signed
signature page, but the page was not in the court’s record. After
hearing argument, the trial court determined it would continue
the matter to read additional materials and opined Eaton should
be filing a motion to dismiss under the five-year statute. Toward
the end of the hearing, the court said, “You know I’m not seeking
to dismiss this case because it’s five years old, but if I’m going to
get a motion, I have to rule upon the motion. If we’re going to be
up on appeal on the matter with respect to the unsigned third
amended complaint, we may as well take it up on both issues.”
Shortly thereafter, Eaton filed a Code of Civil Procedure
section 583.360 motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the
five-year rule.5 The court denied the motion.6

5
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
6
Neither the briefing on the motion nor the court’s order
ruling on the motion is included in the appellate record.

7
5. The second motion to dismiss
In January 2024, Eaton demurred to the third amended
complaint. Later the same month, Eaton filed another motion to
dismiss the action pursuant to the five-year rule.
Eaton argued dismissal was appropriate because plaintiffs
filed their complaint on June 15, 2018, and their five-year
deadline, which was arguably extended by the emergency rule
related to the COVID-19 pandemic, passed on December 15,
2023. Eaton also contended the five-year rule could not be tolled
because of the pending appeal involving the Umbrella
Defendants or the trial court’s July minute order declining to set
a trial date.
Jones opposed the second motion to dismiss and argued it
was impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring the action to trial
within the five-year period (as extended by six months due to the
COVID-19 pandemic). Jones also contended his action against
Eaton was automatically stayed, pursuant to section 916, by his
appeal of the judgment as to the Umbrella Defendants.7 Jones
further asserted the trial court refused to bring the matter to
trial while he was incarcerated, and in that regard, Jones
referenced the trial court’s July 26, 2023, minute order. Jones
also maintained Eaton had not and could not credibly allege he

7
In December 2025, we partially affirmed and partially
reversed the judgment in favor of the Umbrella Defendants.
(Jones v. Umbrella Capital Group, Inc. (Dec. 5, 2025, No.
B325981) [nonpub. opn.].) We remanded with directions to let
some of Jones’s claims against the Umbrella Defendants proceed
until resolved by other process, including the two fraud causes of
action, the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, and the UCL
cause of action that were also alleged against Eaton.

8
was prejudiced by any loss of evidence via the diminished
memories of witnesses.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss in
February 2024. The court stated it denied the last motion to
dismiss because the five-year period plus the six-month COVID-
19 extension had not passed, but the current motion was filed
after the deadline. The trial court also confirmed it had read the
parties’ written briefs. After hearing argument from the parties,
the court said it was going to dismiss the action and instructed
Eaton to prepare a proposed order. The court thereafter
approved the order and entered a judgment of dismissal.

II. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in granting the motion to
dismiss, and all of Jones’s arguments to the contrary are
unavailing. Jones’s case against Eaton was not automatically
stayed by his appeal of the judgment in favor of the Umbrella
Defendants because the proceedings against Eaton would not
have jeopardized the effectiveness of the appeal and thus were
not “embraced” in or “affected” by the judgment. Jones also did
not demonstrate he was entitled to tolling for impossibility,
impracticability, or futility; we presume the trial court followed
the law in issuing that order, including the law requiring it to
consider relevant factors in deciding the motion. Further, even if
we assume Jones identified some circumstance of impossibility,
impracticability, or futility and a causal connection between that
circumstance and his inability to move the case to trial, Jones did
not demonstrate reasonable diligence in moving the case to trial
at all stages of the proceedings. The record reflects Jones did not
properly effect service of any complaint on Eaton for three years,

9
waited over a year to serve a different iteration of the complaint,
and made no prompt efforts to move the case forward (or seek a
discretionary stay) once on notice the trial court did not believe
the case was stayed by operation of law.

A. The Five-Year Rule
Section 583.310 requires that “[a]n action shall be brought
to trial within five years after the action is commenced against
the defendant.” “Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Judicial
Council of California enacted Rule 10, which provides in
subdivision (a): ‘Notwithstanding any other law,
including . . . section 583.310, for all civil actions filed on or
before April 6, 2020, the time in which to bring the action to trial
is extended by six months for a total of five years and six
months.’” (Oswald v. Landmark Builders, Inc. (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 240, 246.)
The five-year “requirement is mandatory and not subject to
extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by
statute. [Citation.]” (Rel v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 882, 888; see also Cole v. Hammond (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 912, 921 [once five years has elapsed, “‘a defendant
has an absolute right to obtain an order of dismissal’”].) The
three statutory exceptions that toll the five-year limit are periods
when: “(a) [t]he jurisdiction of the court to try the action was
suspended[;] [¶] (b) [p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed
or enjoined[;][and] [¶] (c) [b]ringing the action to trial, for any
other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.”
(§ 583.340, subds. (a)-(c).) “‘The purpose of the five-year
dismissal statute is to prevent the prosecution of stale claims
where defendants could be prejudiced by loss of evidence and

10
diminished memories of witnesses. [Citation.] The statute also
protects defendants from the annoyance of having unmeritorious
claims against them unresolved for unreasonable periods of time.’
[Citation.]” (Rel, supra, at 888-889.)
In the absence of any tolling, the five-year period within
which Jones was required to bring his action to trial, extended by
an additional six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ended
in December 2023.

B. Jones’s Action Against Eaton Was Not Stayed
The trial court did not affirmatively stay Jones’s action at
any point and Jones never moved for a discretionary stay.
Recognizing this, Jones argues the case was automatically stayed
by his appeal of the judgment in favor of the Umbrella
Defendants. We review de novo the legal question of whether his
appeal of that judgment automatically stayed his action against
Eaton. (See, e.g., Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1081, 1092.)
“[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial
court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the
matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including
enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may
proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not
affected by the judgment or order.” (§ 916, subd. (a).) “‘[W]hether
a matter is “embraced” in or “affected” by a judgment [or order]
within the meaning of [section 916] depends on
whether postjudgment [or postorder] proceedings on the matter
would have any effect on the “effectiveness” of the appeal.’
[Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35
Cal.4th 180, 189.)

11
A trial court’s proceeding affects the effectiveness of an
appeal: (1) where it seeks to enforce, vacate, or modify the ruling
at issue on appeal; (2) where it seeks to substantially interfere
with the appellate court’s ability to conduct the appeal; (3) if the
possible outcomes on appeal and the possible results of the
proceeding are irreconcilable; and (4) where the purpose of the
appeal is to avoid the need for that proceeding. (Id. at 189-190.)
An appeal does not, however, stay proceedings in ancillary or
collateral matters that do not affect the judgment on appeal. (Id.
at 191.) A proceeding is ancillary or collateral if the proceeding
“could or would have occurred regardless of the outcome of the
appeal,” even if the proceeding has a potential effect on the
appeal. (Ibid.)
Jones’s claims against Eaton were not automatically stayed
by section 916 when he appealed the judgment in favor of the
Umbrella Defendants. Proceedings against Eaton, including
through trial, could or would have occurred regardless of the
outcome of the appeal involving the Umbrella Defendants.
Though the claims Jones pled against Eaton were also alleged
against some or all of the Umbrella Defendants, continuing to
litigate the action against Eaton would have no effect on the
“effectiveness” of the appeal. It would not inherently involve any
effort to enforce, vacate, or modify the order as to the Umbrella
Defendants nor would it affect our ability to resolve the appeal.
The possible outcomes on appeal and the possible results of
proceeding with the claims against Eaton also were not
irreconcilable. At most, there would have been some risk of
inconsistent rulings, or of different determinations of liability.
But those possibilities did not implicate the effectiveness of the
appeal and thus did not stay the case against Eaton.

12
C. Reversal Is Not Warranted for Impossibility,
Impracticability, or Futility
1. The trial court was not required to state the
reasons for its decision, and we presume the
decision is correct
Jones asserts the trial court’s ruling was infirm for a
variety of reasons, many of which stem from the same
overarching contention—that because the trial court did not state
its reasons for granting the motion, it did not consider various
factors or issues germane to the motion to dismiss. Principles of
appellate review forestall this argument.
“‘A judgment . . . of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564.) We make all reasonable inferences favoring the
lower court’s order and affirm the judgment if any possible
grounds exist for the trial court to have reached its factual
conclusions. (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416; Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) Absent evidence to the contrary, we
also presume the trial court followed applicable law. (Save the
Capitol, Save the Trees v. Department of General Services (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 1237, 1248.) Any ambiguity in the record is
resolved in favor of the judgment. (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 749, 765-766; Winograd v. American Broadcasting
Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342 (rule 3.1342)
provides that a trial court ruling on a motion to dismiss under
the five-year rule must consider, among other factors, the nature

13
and complexity of the case, the pendency of other litigation under
a common set of facts, and the diligence of “the parties” in
pursing discovery or other pretrial proceedings. While an
explanation from the trial court would have facilitated appellate
review, the court was not required to provide one. (See Wilson v.
Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563; see also
rule 3.1342(e) [not mandating express findings or reasoning].)
Additionally, though the trial court did not explain its ruling, it
did state on the record that it had reviewed the parties’ briefing—
and Jones discussed the rule 3.1342 factors in his briefs. As a
result, and because we presume the trial court’s judgment is
correct in the absence of an affirmative showing of error, we
conclude the court followed the law and duly considered the
pertinent factors in making its ruling.8 (Wilson, supra, at 563.)

8
Jones’s reliance on Dowling v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685 and Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Wagner
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 545 to argue reversal is required because the trial
court failed to consider certain factors is misplaced. In Dowling,
the trial court expressly stated it would not consider whether
proceedings in a pending appeal rendered bringing the case to
trial impracticable or futile. (Dowling, supra, at 697.) Similarly,
in Brunzell, the trial court determined the question of whether
the complexity and probable expense of proceeding against some
defendants while the matter could not be brought to trial against
others due to appeals or injunctions was irrelevant to the
question of whether the impracticability exception applied.
(Brunzell, supra, at 551.) Here, in contrast, the trial court did
not expressly decline to consider any factors or indicate they were
irrelevant.

14
2. Jones was not reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the action
“In computing the time within which an action must be
brought to trial, courts must exclude the time during which
bringing the action to trial was impossible, impracticable, or
futile despite a plaintiff’s reasonable diligence.” (Oswald, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at 246.) “To avoid dismissal under the section
583.340, subdivision (c) exception, a plaintiff must prove (1) a
circumstance establishing impossibility, impracticability, or
futility, (2) a causal connection between the circumstance and the
failure to move the case to trial within the five-year period, and
(3) that [the plaintiff] was reasonably diligent in prosecuting [the]
case at all stages in the proceedings.” (Tanguilig v. Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313, 323.) “‘The
critical factor . . . is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable
diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’ [Citations.]” (Bruns v.
E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731.)
“The determination whether it was ‘impossible,
impracticable, or futile’ to bring a case to trial within a given
time period is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles
faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s
exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.”
(Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424,
438.) “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
circumstances warrant application of the . . . exception.
[Citation.]” (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 731.) We review the
trial court’s determination for abuse of discretion.9 (Oswald,

9
Jones asserts the issue should be reviewed de novo because
the trial court did not state its reasons for granting the motion.

15
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at 247; Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants,
Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 783, 794.)
Jones presents several reasons that he claims rendered
bringing his matter to trial within five years impossible,
impracticable, or futile. Some of those arguments, like his
contention that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the time
added by continuances on the court’s own motion, are forfeited
because he did not raise them below. (See, e.g., Baugh v. Garl
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 737, 746 [“[p]oints not raised in the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal”]; Tanguilig,
supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 330.) Others, like his contention that
Eaton filed numerous pre-trial motions, do not amount to
anything more than “ordinary pretrial delays,” which “do[] not
excuse failure to bring a case to trial within the five-year period.”
(Bank of America v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1000,
1016.) We accordingly discuss only those arguments that do not
suffer from these flaws.
Jones’s contention that it would have been impracticable to
bring the matter to trial against Eaton and then potentially have
to conduct a separate trial against the Umbrella Defendants is
unpersuasive because Jones bore the burden of demonstrating
further litigation would have resulted in “‘“‘excessive
and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’”’” (Bruns, supra, 51
Cal.4th at 731), and he proffered no evidence to that effect.
Jones’s separate claim that it was impossible or
impracticable to bring the case to trial after the trial court’s July

As already discussed, the trial court was not required to do so
and we presume it duly considered all required factors. Abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard of review.

16
2023 minute order has some surface appeal. In that minute
order, the court asserted it “s[aw]no reason to set the matter for
trial and [would] not set any further hearing dates on the matter
due to the plaintiff[‘s] current incarceration.” The language
suggests the court’s pronouncement might have rendered further
attempts to bring the matter to trial futile. But there is no
reporter’s transcript from that hearing in the record, so we
cannot ascertain whether there was further context relevant to
the court’s ruling, and without that context, the statement in the
minute order alone is not a proper basis for reversal. (See, e.g.,
Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 186-187.)
Moreover, even if we assume Jones established the trial
court’s July 2023 pronouncement did constitute a circumstance of
impossibility, impracticability, or futility, and that there was a
causal relationship between the circumstance and Jones’s failure
to bring the matter to trial within the five-year period, reversal
still would not be warranted. To avoid dismissal, Jones was also
required to prove he was “reasonably diligent in prosecuting [the]
case at all stages in the proceedings.” (Tanguilig, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at 323.) The record we have shows he was not.
Jones did not effectively serve the complaint and summons
on Eaton for approximately three years after he filed the original
complaint. And it is not entirely clear from the record before us
whether he actually managed to properly effect service of the
complaint or whether Eaton appeared voluntarily. Though Jones
contends that the register of actions reflects he served Eaton
twice, in 2020 and 2021, the notations on the register state Eaton
was served by mail. Service of a summons by mail is ineffective
unless the defendant returns a notice of acknowledgement and

17
receipt. (§ 415.30, subds. (c)-(d).) The record does not indicate
Eaton ever did so.
Turning to the latter portion of the extended five-and-a-
half-year period, Jones still was not reasonably diligent. He filed
the third amended complaint on August 30, 2022, but it appears
Jones still had not served the complaint on Eaton nearly a year
later, in July 2023. Jones asserts this was due to his earnestly
held belief that his appeal involving the Umbrella Defendants
stayed the entire case. We are unconvinced an honest but
mistaken belief would excuse the lengthy delay. But even
assuming we credited the argument, Jones did not appeal that
judgment until December 20, 2022. Jones has no explanation for
failing to serve Eaton in the four-month period before he filed the
notice of appeal.
Jones’s actions after the trial setting conference on July 26,
2023, are also inconsistent with reasonable diligence. The court’s
comments at that hearing alerted Jones that the court did not
believe the five-year rule had been stayed. Nevertheless, Jones
thereafter made no effort to seek a discretionary stay (so far as
the appellate record reveals) and there is no reason to believe
such an effort necessarily would have been futile. The trial
court’s minute order merely stated the court had not stayed the
case; it did not indicate the court foreclosed the possibility of
doing so if a proper motion were filed. Jones also waited until
October 2023 (just over two months before his deadline to bring
the case to trial) to file a motion for leave to file a fourth amended
complaint. This was not reasonably diligent, particularly
considering the temporal proximity to the end of the five-year
period. (Wilshire Bundy Corp. v. Auerbach (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d
1280, 1287 [“the diligence required of a litigant increases as the

18
five-year deadline approaches”].) The implied finding that Jones
was not diligent in pursuing his case and that the exception for
impossibility, impracticability, and futility did not apply was not
an abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Eaton is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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