CourtListener 10862354•People v. Smith CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Smith CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086949
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF189455B)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
JOSHUA SMITH, DENYING REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 24, 2026, be modified in the
following particulars:
1. On page 15, after the second full paragraph beginning “The
prosecution introduced into evidence” and before the paragraph beginning
“The trial evidence amply demonstrated,” the following paragraph inserted:
The jury learned that illegal firearm possession was one of the
gang’s primary activities, along with burglaries and other crimes. The gang
expert made it clear that firearm possession provided the gang with benefits
that went beyond mere reputation—such as protection, entering rival
territory, and facilitating additional crimes. These were immediate and
concrete operational benefits. The predicate offenses involved multiple
gang members acting together while armed, including conduct directed at
rivals and the detention of armed gang members after a shooting in rival
gang territory. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that the predicate
offenses were linked to the gang’s collective criminal activities, rather than
representing isolated criminal conduct by individual gang members. (See
Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 762 [organizational nexus may be shown by
linking predicate offenses to a gang’s primary activities].)
2. On page 16, the sentence “Appellant’s reliance on Clark and Farley
is unavailing” is deleted from the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 15
with “The trial evidence amply demonstrated …”
3. On page 16, in the last sentence of the last full paragraph, the phrase
“facilitating other criminal opportunities” is changed to “financial gain” so the
sentence reads:
Examples of qualifying benefits include retaliation against rivals,
intimidation of witnesses, or financial gain.
Except for the modifications set forth herein, the opinion previously filed remains
unchanged. These modifications do not alter the judgment. Appellant’s petition for
rehearing is denied.
LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
DESANTOS, J.
2.
Filed 4/24/26 P. v. Smith CA5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086949
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF189455B)
v.
JOSHUA SMITH, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
Pulskamp, Judge.
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Kelly E. LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2022, appellant Joshua Smith was with his codefendant Ronald Goosby1 when
appellant fired multiple shots that struck two victims, both of whom survived. In 2023, a
jury convicted appellant of premeditated attempted murder (Pen Code, §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a);2 count 2) and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b); counts 3 & 4). In all three counts, the jury found true gang enhancement
allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true that appellant personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and he
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Appellant received a determinate
sentence of 19 years and a consecutive aggregate term of 40 years to life.
Appellant raises six claims in this appeal, including alleged instructional and
sentencing errors, insufficiency of the evidence, a contention that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion for mistrial, and cumulative error. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The charges in this case arise from a shooting captured on surveillance video. The
incident occurred in the parking lot of a gas station and convenience store. It was
undisputed at trial that appellant was the only shooter during this incident, and he was the
one who shot the victims.
I. The Shooting.
The confrontation began when Goosby and one of the victims, Dymon Ford,
began throwing gang signs at each other.3 A short time later, appellant appeared on the
1 In the nonpublished opinion in the companion case, People v. Goosby (Nov. 4,
2025, F086856), we resolved Goosby’s claims and affirmed the judgment. In January
2026, the California Supreme Court denied review. (People v. Goosby, Jan. 22, 2026,
S294322.)
2 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3 During closing argument, Goosby’s trial counsel admitted that Goosby has gang
tattoos, he was “throwing signs that night,” and he was “wearing gang paraphernalia.”
2.
scene, and he walked towards Goosby. They stood near each other in the parking lot for
one or two seconds.4 Appellant told the jury that, during this brief encounter with
Goosby, they greeted each other.5
Appellant proceeded toward the store, walking past Ford and positioning himself
just outside the store. Goosby approached Ford directly and engaged him in
conversation. After engaging with Ford, Goosby began walking towards appellant with
Ford following closely behind. Goosby and Ford walked within a few feet of appellant.
Just before appellant opened fire, Goosby reached over and patted at one of Ford’s
pockets in which Ford had his hand. Goosby’s movement was consistent with a quick
“pat search” to check for a weapon. Goosby later admitted to law enforcement that he
touched Ford’s pocket because he did not know what Ford might have.
Appellant was looking in the direction of Goosby and Ford while Goosby searched
Ford’s pocket. After Goosby stopped patting Ford’s pocket, appellant drew a firearm and
fired multiple shots at close range. Goosby was standing immediately next to Ford at the
moment the shots were fired, and he made no attempt to intervene or to flee.
As the shots were being fired, Ford turned and fled into the parking lot. He was
clearly injured and unable to run at any speed. At trial, appellant admitted that he
continued to fire at Ford even while Ford was running away. Ford was struck with
approximately four shots, but he managed to stay on his feet and flee.
Goosby’s trial attorney told the jury that the defense would not deny that Goosby “has
gang ties written all over him”
4 Appellant arrived at the parking lot separately from Goosby. It appears that
someone dropped off appellant.
5 Appellant told the jury that he previously knew Goosby “a little” through the
mother of some of his children. At trial, appellant agreed that Goosby was a family
friend.
3.
Once he stopped firing, appellant briefly reached out and touched Goosby’s arm.
Both Goosby and appellant then jogged after Ford, who continued to flee across the
parking lot.
II. Law Enforcement Takes Appellant and Goosby into Custody.
A police officer driving in the area happened to witness part of the shooting and he
immediately pursued Goosby and appellant. The officer quickly took appellant into
custody. Appellant erroneously claimed to the officer that Ford had fired at him.
The firearm that appellant used in this shooting was recovered. Law enforcement
determined that appellant fired seven times during this attack. In addition to shooting
Ford, one of appellant’s shots struck a bystander in her foot.
Goosby initially eluded law enforcement, hiding in a nearby location. Other
officers found him a short time later and took him into custody.
III. The Gang Evidence.
During the main trial, the prosecution’s gang expert testified that, when this
shooting occurred, Goosby and appellant were affiliated with the East Side Crips, a
criminal street gang. The victim, Ford, was an affiliate of the West Side Crips. These
gangs are rivals of each other in this area.
After the jury convicted appellant and Goosby, a bifurcated trial occurred
regarding the gang allegations. During that phase, the gang expert opined that Goosby
was a member of the East Side Crips, while appellant was an associate of that gang.
According to the expert, Ford was an associate of the West Side Crips on the night he
was shot. Based on a hypothetical that matched the facts of this case, the expert opined
that this shooting was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with the East Side Crips criminal street gang.
4.
IV. The Relevant Defense Evidence.
Goosby did not testify at trial, and he offered no evidence on his own behalf.
Appellant testified at trial, admitting that he shot Ford. According to appellant, he
fired because he was afraid for his life. Through his own testimony and that from an
expert witness, he offered evidence showing he suffered from posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) stemming from prior incidents where he had been assaulted and shot.
However, appellant’s expert could not opine that appellant’s behavior on the night in
question was actually caused by his PTSD.
At trial, appellant denied having an agreement with Goosby to shoot at Ford.
According to appellant, it was a coincidence that he and Goosby were both at that parking
lot at the same time. Appellant testified that he became fearful of both Goosby and Ford
because they were exchanging aggressive words with each other and he felt he needed to
fire to protect himself.
Appellant told the jury that he had consumed alcohol and ingested cocaine during
the day of this shooting. His mother had died on his birthday, less than a month earlier,
and he was still “venting from that” and just trying to get over that.” He admitted that he
ingested more cocaine just before this shooting took place. He claimed that he went to
the convenience store a little after 2:00 a.m. to purchase more alcohol. He took a loaded
gun with him because he knew that area was dangerous and frequented by gang
members. He admitted to the jury that, as a convicted felon, it was illegal for him to
possess a firearm.
Appellant testified that, as appellant and Ford interacted outside the convenience
store, he became fearful of both of them. Appellant claimed he had heard Ford say words
to the effect that he (Ford) was going to kill both of them if they did not leave. Appellant
testified that he did not aim when he fired and he did not care whether he hit appellant or
Ford, he just wanted them both to get away from him.
5.
Appellant claimed to the jury that he fired to protect his own life. He believed
Ford might have been armed with a firearm. He thought he saw Ford’s hand coming out
of his pocket. According to appellant, he shot Ford before Ford could shoot him.
At trial, appellant admitted he had subsequently learned that Ford had been
unarmed when this incident occurred. However, he claimed that, in the moment, he had
believed Ford was armed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying a Motion for
Mistrial and Any Presumed Error is Harmless.
At trial, the prosecution’s gang expert identified multiple gang-related tattoos on
Goosby’s body. According to the expert, most of these tattoos showed Goosby’s
affiliation with the East Side Crips.
One of Goosby’s tattoos depicted a basketball player. The gang expert told the
jury that “gang members will refer to themselves as basketball players” to express that
they are “shooters” who are “violent” and they “like shooting people for fun.” Goosby’s
counsel objected to this testimony. After an unreported sidebar, the trial court sustained
the objection, struck the expert’s testimony about the meaning of the basketball tattoo,
and admonished the jury to disregard it entirely.
At the next break, Goosby’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which appellant’s
counsel joined. Goosby’s counsel argued that this testimony had violated an in limine
ruling, it was highly prejudicial, and it could not be cured by admonition. After hearing
arguments from the parties, the court denied the motion for mistrial. The court concluded
that this testimony had not violated any prior orders and was the product of
miscommunication rather than misconduct. The court believed its admonition was
sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
mistrial. According to appellant, the gang expert’s remarks about Goosby’s basketball
6.
tattoo violated an in limine ruling, it injected inflammatory and highly prejudicial
character evidence into this trial, and it irreparably tainted the jury. He maintains that
reversal is required because the error was not harmless under either the federal standard
of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) or the state standard of People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).
We reject appellant’s arguments. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and
any presumed error is harmless.6
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
A ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198.) A trial court should grant a mistrial only when a
party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. (Id. at pp. 198–
199.) The court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. (Id.
at p. 198.)
Here, the expert’s comments about the basketball tattoo were isolated remarks
amid otherwise proper testimony regarding Goosby’s gang-related tattoos. These
disputed statements were brief and never repeated. The trial court promptly struck this
testimony. Such fleeting, stricken comments do not create the sort of incurable prejudice
that compels a mistrial. (See, e.g., People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 199 [brief,
improper testimony cured by prompt admonition]; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916,
953 [timely admonition cured any prejudice], overruled on another ground in People v
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823,
831 [no prejudice following admonition to disregard brief testimony which was
stricken].)
6 Respondent asserts that appellant forfeited this claim in failing to preserve it
below. To overcome any forfeiture, appellant raises ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because this claim fails on its merits, we decline to address forfeiture, thus rendering
moot the assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel.
7.
The trial court was in the best position to gauge the likely effect of this event on
the jury. (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 323.) The court immediately
sustained the objection, struck the testimony, and admonished the jury. Jurors are
presumed to follow such instructions. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574.)
Nothing in this record reasonably demonstrates that appellant’s chances of receiving a
fair trial were irreparably damaged from this brief testimony. Under these circumstances,
it is apparent that the court did not abuse its considerable discretion in denying the
motion for mistrial.7
B. Any presumed error is harmless.
Appellant argues prejudice spilled over to him from the remark about Goosby’s
basketball tattoo. He contends that the jurors would have been unable to ignore the
remark that Goosby liked to shoot people, which would have impacted how the jurors
viewed this shooting and appellant’s criminal intent. We are not persuaded. Even if we
assume the trial court abused its discretion, reversal is not warranted because the record
does not show prejudice under either Watson or Chapman.
It was undisputed at trial that appellant was the sole shooter during this incident.
The expert’s inappropriate remark concerned Goosby, not appellant, and nothing in the
record reasonably suggests the jury attributed it to appellant. The admissible evidence
overwhelmingly established appellant’s express malice and his guilt for premeditated
attempted murder. Video evidence showed appellant and Goosby working together both
before and immediately after appellant fired seven shots at Ford. The evidence was
undisputed that Goosby was affiliated with the East Side Crips and Ford with the rival
West Side Crips. Goosby and Ford exchanged gang signs before appellant attacked Ford.
7 Although he expressly states that prosecutorial misconduct is not at issue in this
appeal, appellant nevertheless asserts that the trial court should have recognized that the
disputed testimony violated an in limine order, which raised the possibility of
prosecutorial misconduct. Since appellant explicitly disclaims prosecutorial misconduct
as an issue on appeal, we have no cause to address that potential claim.
8.
Appellant and Goosby both chased Ford after he was shot. From all of this, a reasonable
inference exists that appellant acted in concert with Goosby as part of a gang-related
attack. The totality of the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s
true findings that appellant committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. The
video evidence conclusively supports the jury’s rejection of self-defense.
Given this record, it is implausible that the verdicts were impacted from the
isolated remarks that Goosby’s basketball tattoo indicated he liked to shoot people. The
video evidence overwhelmingly established appellant’s guilt. Under the state standard,
there is no reasonable probability appellant would have obtained a more favorable result
had a mistrial been granted. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Under the federal
standard, we can declare that any presumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Consequently, prejudice is not present
under either standard of review, and this claim fails.
II. Any Alleged Instructional Error with CALCRIM No. 3428 Was Harmless.
Based on CALCRIM No. 3428, the trial court instructed the jury regarding how to
consider appellant’s mental disorders, including the evidence of his PTSD. For the
attempted murder charged in count 2, the jury was told it could consider such evidence in
deciding whether appellant acted “with an intent to kill” or if he acted with deliberation
and premeditation. The court further instructed that jurors could not consider mental
health evidence in deciding whether appellant acted in complete self-defense or in
evaluating the assaults charged in counts 3 and 4.
The parties dispute whether this instruction was legally correct. Appellant relies
on People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393 (Ocegueda), which holds it is error
to substitute “intent to kill” for “express malice” in CALCRIM No. 3428 because doing
so impermissibly limits the jury’s consideration of mental disorder evidence. (Ocegueda,
at p. 1407.) Based on Ocegueda, the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3428 now caution
9.
against a trial court from doing what occurred here—instructing with “ ‘intent to kill’ ”
language in an attempted murder case instead of using “ ‘express malice.’ ”
Respondent argues that Ocegueda is distinguishable. Attempted murder requires
proof of a specific intent to kill. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) From
respondent’s perspective, the trial court’s instruction tracked the actual elements of the
charged offense and did not preclude jurors from considering appellant’s mental health
evidence for other aspects of his conduct.
The parties’ competing arguments illustrate the density and complexity of
delineating the proper role of mental disorder evidence. Rather than shift through the
parties’ complex disagreements, we conclude this claim can be resolved more efficiently
if we focus on prejudice. We conclude that, even if we assume instructional error
occurred with CALCRIM No. 3428, any potential error is harmless.
According to appellant, the alleged instructional error relieved the jury of its duty
to consider his PTSD to explain all facets of his conduct. He asserts at least one juror
could have been persuaded to acquit him of attempted murder after deciding he acted
reasonably to defend himself, resulting in lawful self-defense. He maintains the court’s
inclusion of “intent to kill” in CALCRIM No. 3428 prevented the jury from considering
his PTSD evidence to support imperfect self-defense, to negate consciousness of guilt, or
to undermine the prosecution’s gang theory. Appellant contends a properly instructed
jury could have used the PTSD evidence to draw an inference that he fled from police
immediately after this shooting—not from consciousness of guilt—but because he was
frightened beyond reason. Likewise, instead of finding a false statement made to law
enforcement, appellant contends that the jury could have reasonably concluded he
genuinely believed Ford had fired one or more shots at him. Appellant also argues that
jurors could have believed he only reflexively made that false statement to officers who,
with their guns drawn and pointed at him, activated a fear response derived from his
earlier interactions with police in his neighborhood.
10.
Appellant asserts that the alleged instructional error requires reversal under
Chapman because it deprived him of a complete defense. In the alternative, he argues
that reversal is required even under the state standard of Watson.
Appellant’s arguments regarding prejudice are unpersuasive. This record amply
demonstrates that any potential error was harmless under either Watson or Chapman.
Consequently, we need not resolve the parties’ disputed points regarding which standard
of review we should employ. This claim fails under either standard.8
Express malice and an intent to unlawfully kill are legally identical. (People v.
Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739.) Attempted murder requires proof of express malice,
meaning a deliberate intent to unlawfully take a life. (Ibid.; see also § 188, subd. (a)(1).)
Thus, where the evidence shows a purposeful attempt to kill, express malice is
necessarily demonstrated.
Here, the evidence of express malice was overwhelming. Surveillance footage
showed appellant firing repeated shots at Ford and then pursuing him. The attack
stopped only because a police officer intervened. Nothing in this sequence suggests
reflexive, accidental, or fear-driven conduct. Instead, the video evidence overwhelmingly
and conclusively demonstrates a sustained, goal-directed effort to kill.
Appellant’s theory depends on the premise that, had jurors been instructed using
the phrase “express malice,” they might have accepted his claim of self-defense based on
PTSD. But the jury’s actual findings foreclose that premise. The jury found that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and also found true a lying-
in-wait allegation.9 Those findings necessarily reflect that jurors concluded appellant
acted with planning, reflection, and calculated purpose—conclusions that are
8 Because this claim fails on its merits due to a lack of prejudice, we need not
address forfeiture or ineffective assistance of counsel.
9 Appellant notes that a theory of lying in wait for attempted murder was likely
error, but since the jury returned true findings on both lying in wait and
premeditation/deliberation, he does not raise this issue on appeal.
11.
fundamentally incompatible with a claim that his conduct was driven by panic, confusion,
or an uncontrollable response to trauma. Because the jury rejected the factual foundation
of appellant’s theory, the wording of CALCRIM No. 3428 could not have altered the
outcome.
Other jury instructions further negate any risk of prejudice. The jury was
instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 600 (attempted murder), 601 (premeditation and
deliberation), 505 (self-defense), and 604 (attempted voluntary manslaughter based on
imperfect self-defense). None of these instructions required the jury to engage with the
concept of “express malice” or “malice aforethought.” As such, any potential
instructional error with CALCRIM No. 3428 did not mislead the jurors or impact their
deliberations on the charges and defenses.
With CALCRIM No. 604 (attempted voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect
self-defense), the jury was told to consider “all the circumstances as they were known
and appeared” to appellant when evaluating appellant’s belief in the need to defend
himself. This instruction ensured that the jury could fully consider appellant’s claimed
PTSD, and how it influenced his belief that he was in imminent danger or believed that
the immediate use of deadly force was necessary.
With CALCRIM Nos. 362 and 372, the jurors were informed that appellant’s false
or misleading statement, and his flight from the scene, could show a consciousness of
guilt. Nothing in these instructions barred the jury from considering alternative
explanations for appellant’s behavior, such as his PTSD, fear, confusion, or panic.
Finally, we reject appellant’s contention that he was unable to present a full
defense. Through his own testimony and that from an expert witness, he offered
evidence showing he suffered from PTSD stemming from prior incidents where he had
been assaulted and shot. However, appellant’s expert could not opine at trial that
appellant’s behavior on the night in question was actually caused by his PTSD. The jury
was instructed on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The jury was free to consider
12.
appellant’s PTSD in evaluating his perception of danger and use of force. The jury
nevertheless rejected those theories.
Given the overwhelming video evidence, the jury’s express findings of
premeditation and lying in wait, and the instructions allowing full consideration of
appellant’s mental health evidence, any potential instructional error was harmless. It is
beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to the verdicts.
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable appellant
would have achieved a more favorable outcome had CALCRIM No. 3428 used the term
“express malice.” (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) This claim fails due to a
clear lack of prejudice.
III. Cumulative Error Did Not Occur.
Appellant argues that his claims above are closely related because everything at
trial revolved around the crucial question of whether he acted out of self-defense or
carried out a planned gang shooting. He contends that, if any claimed error is found to
fall short of justifying reversal, their combined effect rendered the possibility of a fair
trial unreachable. We disagree.
“Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may
nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th
694, 772, fn. 32.) Cumulative error is essentially a due process claim. (People v. Rivas
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.) The test is whether the defendant received a fair
trial. (Ibid.)
We reject appellant’s claim of cumulative error because his individual claims
above are meritless. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057 [cumulative
prejudice argument rejected because each individual contention lacked merit or did not
result in prejudice].) Taking these combined claims into account, we are satisfied that
appellant received a fair adjudication.
13.
IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the Gang Allegations.
Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that the East Side Crips
qualify as a “criminal street gang” under section 186.22. He contends the prosecution
failed to show an organized association or group. He also asserts the prosecution failed
to prove that the predicate offenses provided a nonreputational benefit to the gang. We
are not persuaded.
A. The prosecutor established the existence of a qualifying criminal street
gang.
Section 186.22, subdivision (f), defines a “criminal street gang” as an “ongoing
organized association or group” of three or more persons, having a common name or
identifying sign or symbol, whose members collectively engage in a pattern of criminal
gang activity. The gang’s organizational structure may be formal or informal. (People v.
Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 315, 333 (Farley).)
Appellant argues that the gang expert failed to identify any relationship between
the gang subsets, beyond a notion that they “pay respect” to the larger gang identity.
Appellant relies on (1) People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 (Clark); (2) Farley, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th 315; and (3) People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59 (Prunty). These
opinions do not assist him.
In Clark, our high court reiterated that the prosecution must show a nexus between
a gang organization and an offense committed by one or more gang members. (Clark,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 762.) An organizational nexus may be shown “by evidence
linking the predicate offenses to the gang’s organizational structure, meaning its manner
of governance; its primary activities; or its common goals and principles.” (Ibid.)
In Farley, the appellate court held that “a ‘criminal street gang’ under
section 186.22(f) may be formal or informal.” (Farley, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 330.) An informal organization can be shown through “collaboration, long-term
relationships, use of the same turf, and behavior demonstrating a shared identity.” (Ibid.)
14.
The Farley court noted that “there is no single way to demonstrate the organizational
structure section 186.22(f) requires.” (Farley, supra, at p. 333.)
Here, the prosecution’s gang expert testified that the East Side Crips consist of
more than three members who all identify under that common name. These gang
members use common signs, symbols and colors. The expert explained the traditional
boundaries of this gang. Subsets exist within the traditional boundaries, and the subsets
“pay respect to the same gang, and they are all the same gang.” The expert analogized
the East Side Crips as a tree with the subsets as branches. The expert explained the
gang’s primary activities, which included the illegal possession of firearms.
The prosecution introduced into evidence three predicate offenses committed by
East Side Crips members. The predicate offenses involved separate incidents in which
multiple gang members illegally possessed firearms. In the first predicate offense,
multiple East Side Crip gang members were live streaming on social media when one
member pointed a firearm at the camera while another made derogatory hand signs
toward a rival gang. In the second predicate offense, two armed members of the East
Side Crips were apprehended shortly after a shooting that had occurred in rival gang
territory. The third predicate offense involved three gang members who were detained
during a traffic stop. A loaded firearm was in the center console of the vehicle.
According to the gang expert, firearm possession benefited the gang by enabling its
members to enter rival territory, protect each other, and commit other crimes of
opportunity, such as burglaries and carjackings.
The trial evidence amply demonstrated an ongoing association of three or more
people with a common name, symbols, and territory. The evidence showed that members
of the East Side Crips have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. Thus, the
statutory elements were met. (See § 186.22, subd. (f).) The jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 1401, which required it to find these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings. Taken together, the expert’s
15.
testimony and the predicate offenses provided the jury with ample evidence to conclude
that the East Side Crips were a qualifying criminal street gang. The prosecution showed
a “nexus between the individual predicate offenses and the gang as an organized,
collective enterprise.” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 749.) Appellant’s reliance on Clark
and Farley is unavailing.
Nor does Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th 59 alter the result. Prunty held that, when a
prosecution’s case turns on the existence and conduct of one or more gang subsets, then
the prosecution must show some associational or organizational connection uniting those
subsets. (Id. at p. 71.) In Prunty, the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence
showing “an associational or organizational connection” between the defendant’s gang
and the two subsets that committed the requisite predicate offenses. (Id. at p. 81.)
The concern in Prunty does not exist here. The predicate offenses in this trial
were all committed by members of appellant’s gang, the East Side Crips. No subsets
were identified. Consequently, Prunty is distinguishable.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding that the East Side Crips constitute a “criminal street
gang” within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (f). The prosecution established
not just shared symbols, but an ongoing, coordinated association whose collective
criminal activity supported the statutory definition.
B. The prosecutor established a benefit to the gang that was more than
reputational.
Appellant next contends the prosecution failed to prove that the predicate offenses
provided a benefit to the East Side Crips that was more than reputational. We disagree.
Predicate offenses must commonly benefit a gang, and the benefit must extend
beyond mere reputation. Examples of qualifying benefits include retaliation against
rivals, intimidation of witnesses, or facilitating other criminal opportunities. (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).)
16.
Appellant contends that the gang expert merely speculated when explaining how
the predicate offenses provided a benefit to the gang that was more than reputational. He
relies on People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843 (Ramon), In re Frank S. (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1192 (Frank S.), and People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278
(Soriano). These three opinions do not assist him.
In Ramon, the defendant and another gang member were stopped in a stolen truck.
A handgun was recovered. (Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 847.) The
prosecution’s gang expert merely opined that gangs use such tools to commit crimes, but
no evidence was introduced to show this particular truck or gun were connected to gang
activity. (Id. at p. 848.) The appellate court reversed, finding that the gang expert’s
opinion was speculative. (Id. at p. 851.) The appellate court also concluded that the gang
expert had lacked sufficient facts to opine about the defendant’s specific intent. (Id. at
pp. 852–853.)
In Frank S., the prosecution’s gang expert asserted that a minor’s possession of a
knife benefitted the minor’s gang. (Frank S., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) A
panel from this court reversed the gang enhancement. The panel noted that the
prosecution had not presented any evidence that the minor was in gang territory, had
gang members with him, or had any reason to expect to use the knife in a gang-related
offense. (Ibid.) In fact, the minor had told an arresting officer “that he had been jumped
two days prior and needed the knife for protection.” (Ibid.) This court held it was
improper to allow the expert to state the minor’s specific intent for the knife without any
other substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
In Soriano, two gang members were walking together in their gang’s territory
where they both lived, and police detained them. A knife was found in the defendant’s
pocket. (Soriano, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 281.) A gang expert opined that the
defendant carried the knife for the benefit of, in association with, and with the intent to
promote his gang. A jury found true a gang enhancement allegation. (Ibid.) The
17.
appellate court reversed the enhancement based on insufficient evidence. There were no
facts showing that the defendant was acting on his own behalf, or whether he was acting
on behalf of his gang. Nothing showed an intent to use the knife. (Id. at p. 289.)
Although he was with another gang member, nothing showed that the crime of carrying a
concealed knife was gang related. (Id. at p. 290.) In short, the expert’s opinion was
based on speculation. (Ibid.)
In contrast to Ramon, Frank S., and Soriano, the prosecution here did not rely on
speculation to establish the gang enhancement allegations. Goosby was a member of the
East Side Crips10 and Ford was associated with the rival West Side Crips. Appellant
admitted to the jury that he knew or at least suspected that Goosby and Ford were
involved in a gang when this incident occurred. Goosby and Ford exchanged gang signs
with each other before appellant tried to kill Ford. After firing at Ford, appellant tapped
or touched Goosby, who then joined appellant in pursuing Ford across the parking lot.
From the totality of the evidence, the jury had ample grounds to draw a reasonable
inference that appellant committed this crime for the benefit of, in association with, and
with the intent to promote the East Side Crips. Ramon, Frank S., and Soriano are
distinguishable.
Moreover, the prosecution introduced certified conviction records establishing that
members of appellant’s gang were convicted of firearm-related offenses in three separate
predicate cases. The officers who investigated those cases testified about the
circumstances of the crimes. The gang expert explained that firearm possession is a
primary activity of the East Side Crips. The expert testified that firearm possession
allows gang members to travel into rival gang territory by enabling members to protect
one another. It also facilitates crimes of opportunity, such as carjackings and burglaries.
10 During closing argument, Goosby’s trial counsel admitted that Goosby has gang
tattoos on his body, he was “throwing signs that night,” and he was “wearing gang
paraphernalia.” Goosby’s trial attorney told the jury that the defense would not deny that
Goosby “has gang ties written all over him”
18.
The expert opined that the three predicate offenses provided a common, nonreputational
benefit to appellant’s gang.
This record contains substantial evidence from which a rational jury could
conclude that the predicate offenses established a common, nonreputational benefit to the
East Side Crips. The certified conviction records, corroborated by officer testimony,
demonstrated that multiple members of appellant’s gang engaged in coordinated firearm
possession across three separate incidents. The gang expert explained why such conduct
advanced the gang’s objectives of protection and opportunity for additional criminal
activity. This testimony did not rest on speculation but on concrete, admissible evidence
of coordinated gang behavior.
The jurors were instructed with CALCRIM No. 1401, requiring them to find a
benefit to the East Side Crips that was more than reputational. Viewing the record in the
most favorable light to the judgment, a rational jury could conclude that the predicate
offenses introduced in this trial met the requirements of section 186.22, subdivision (g).
This evidence was reasonable, credible and of solid value. Thus, a reasonable jury could
find the gang allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Albillar (2010)
51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60 [articulating this standard for gang enhancements].) This claim
fails.
V. Substantial Evidence Supports the Imposition of Upper Terms.
In relevant part, the trial court found true certain factors in aggravation, including
that (1) appellant’s violent conduct indicated he posed a serious danger to society; and
(2) his prior convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b).)11 For the two assaults with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3 &
4), appellant received upper terms, but the sentence in count 4 was stayed.
11 All future references to a rule refer to the California Rules of Court.
19.
In the present claim, appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support
these two factors in aggravation. We disagree.
A court may impose an upper term only if aggravating circumstances are found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. (§ 1170, subd. (b).) On appeal, we
review those findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Mendez-Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.) Only a single factor in aggravation is needed to justify an
upper term sentence. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728.) “The essence of
‘aggravation’ relates to the effect of a particular fact in making the offense distinctively
worse than the ordinary.” (People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110.)
A. Appellant’s conduct shows he poses a serious danger to society.
Appellant argues that his prior criminal record is too sparse to support the
imposition of upper term sentences. He is mistaken. The record amply supports the trial
court’s finding that appellant’s violent conduct indicates he poses a serious danger to
society. (Rule 4.421(b)(1).)
Through certified records, the prosecution established appellant’s criminal history,
including both juvenile and adult offenses.
In 2011, the juvenile court sustained an allegation of infliction of corporal injury
to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)).
In 2012, the juvenile court sustained an allegation of infliction of corporal injury
to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and the juvenile court sustained an allegation of
making criminal threats (§ 422).
In 2014, as an adult, appellant had separate convictions for felony false
imprisonment (§ 236) and two misdemeanor convictions for public intoxication (§ 647,
subd. (f)).
In 2015, appellant had a felony conviction for failure to appear (§ 1320, subd. (b)).
In 2019, appellant had a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).)
20.
The current crimes occurred in 2022. These convictions for attempted murder and
two assaults with a semiautomatic firearm, though serious, do not themselves count as
“prior convictions” for purposes of rule 4.421(b). Juvenile adjudications, like adult
convictions, may be considered in assessing aggravating factors. (Rule 4.421(b)(2).)
As a juvenile, appellant twice inflicted corporal injury to a cohabitant. As an
adult, he was convicted of false imprisonment. Thus, this record amply reflects an
ongoing pattern of violent conduct.
Moreover, appellant’s conduct in the present matter justifies the trial court’s
aggravated sentence. Appellant fired his gun seven times in a public parking lot, striking
both the intended victim and an innocent bystander. Other bystanders were present, and
they could have been easily struck. Appellant’s egregious conduct made this incident
distinctively worse than an ordinary assault with a firearm. The trial court, therefore,
could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “has engaged in violent
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.” (Rule 4.421(b)(1).) The court
properly relied on the way appellant committed the present crimes and on his
demonstrated pattern of escalating criminal conduct. Substantial evidence supports this
factor in aggravation.
B. Appellant has suffered numerous prior convictions that are becoming
more serious.
Substantial evidence also supports the finding that appellant’s prior convictions
were numerous or increasingly serious. (Rule 4.421(b)(2).) Between 2011 and 2019,
appellant accumulated at least eight adjudications and convictions, including two
adjudications of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and a felony false
imprisonment. The trajectory of appellant’s behavior—from violent juvenile
adjudications in 2011 and 2012, to adult misdemeanors in 2014, to an adult felony in
2014, to another felony in 2015, and then to further criminal conduct in 2019—reflects
both numerical sufficiency and escalation in seriousness. The trial court could
21.
reasonably determine this record was more than sufficient to satisfy this factor in
aggravation.
C. Conclusion.
The record overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s findings that appellant has
engaged in violent conduct indicating he poses a serious danger to society, and that his
convictions were numerous or increasingly serious. (Rule 4.421(b)(1) & (2).) Moreover,
the court also found true other factors in aggravation, such as the crime involved great
violence (rule 4.421(a)(1)) and the manner in which the crime was carried out indicated
planning and sophistication (rule 4.421(a)(8)). Appellant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence for these factors, and only a single valid aggravating factor is
necessary to justify the imposition of an upper term sentence. (People v. Osband, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 728.) Accordingly, a remand for resentencing is unwarranted and this
claim fails.
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Upper Term
Sentences in Counts 3 and 4.
In counts 3 and 4, appellant received upper-term sentences for his two convictions
of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The sentence for the assault of Ford was stayed.
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the
presumption in favor of a low term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). He argues
that—because of his youth,12 traumatic background, and mental health disorders—the
court was prohibited from imposing anything but the low term unless it expressly found
that the factors in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. He contends that the court
failed to articulate its sentencing choices on the record as required by statute.
12 Appellant was approximately 27 years old when the present crimes occurred in
2022.
22.
A. The governing law.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), provides that, where the defendant’s youth,
trauma, or mental illness (among other considerations) was a “contributing factor” in the
commission of the offense, the trial court shall impose the low term unless it finds that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigation and justify a sentence exceeding the low
term, or that imposition of the low term would be contrary to the interests of justice.
(§ 1170, subds. (b)(6)(A)–(C).) The sentencing court must state its reasons for its
sentencing choice on the record at the time of sentencing. (Id., subd. (c).)
A sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, relies
on improper considerations, or fails to exercise informed discretion. (People v. Panozo
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.) Absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, we
presume the trial court understood and applied the law correctly. (People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361; see also rule 4.409 [all relevant sentencing factors “will be
deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].)
B. Factual background.
Prior to sentencing in this matter, appellant filed a memorandum emphasizing his
difficult upbringing, including being shot in the head with a pellet gun at the age of 13,
and then later being shot in the neck and stabbed as an adult. His memorandum also
detailed his mother’s recent death, and his mental health diagnoses of antisocial
personality disorder, PTSD, and major depressive disorder. Counsel urged the court to
impose only a single life term with concurrent sentences, and to strike additional
enhancements.
In contrast, the probation department recommended upper terms for the assault
counts, citing multiple factors in aggravation, including the violent nature of this crime,
appellant’s criminal history, and his danger to society. Probation also recommended
consecutive sentences.
23.
At sentencing, appellant’s counsel reiterated appellant’s mitigating history and
asked the court to impose a sentence of 15 years to life and to strike additional
enhancements where possible. Defense counsel mentioned Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), asking the court to strike enhancements.13 Finally,
counsel argued that count 3 (assault with a semiautomatic firearm) should run
concurrently.
The trial court expressly stated it had reviewed the recommendations from the
probation department. The court declined to adopt probation’s finding that the victim
was “particularly vulnerable” but agreed with the remaining aggravating factors. The
court observed that, while appellant’s prior criminal record was “relatively minor,” the
seriousness of the present offenses—including his decision to fire multiple shots in
public—outweighed any suggestion that mitigation “would be appropriate.”
C. Analysis.
1. We decline to find forfeiture.
Respondent contends that appellant has forfeited this claim by failing to
specifically invoke at sentencing the low-term presumption found in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). In response, appellant asserts that the court had an obligation to
comply with the requirements of section 1170 so that forfeiture should not apply. In the
alternative, appellant contends that any forfeiture should be excused due to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Courts are currently split on whether a defendant can forfeit a claim on appeal that
the trial court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). (See People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994, fn. 8
[claim that trial court should have applied lower-term presumption is not subject to
13 Senate Bill 81 expanded juridical discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements
in the interest of justice by identifying circumstances that weigh strongly in favor of
dismissal. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; see § 1385, subds. (c)(1), (2)(A)–(I).)
24.
forfeiture]; but see People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043–1047 [claim
under section 1170, subdivision (b), forfeited by failing to raise issue below].)
We need not decide whether appellant forfeited this claim because, assuming the
claim is properly before us, this record does not reflect that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing upper-term sentences. Thus, because the claim fails on its merits,
we need not address whether it was forfeited or whether defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance.
2. This claim fails on its merits.
To trigger the presumption of a low term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
the defendant’s youth, trauma, or mental illness must have been a “contributing factor” in
the commission of the offense—that is, it must have played a causal role in bringing
about the criminal conduct. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); People v. Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992–993.)
Here, the record affirmatively refutes any causal connection. Appellant’s mental
health expert could not opine that appellant’s conduct was caused by PTSD or any other
mental illness. The video evidence established that appellant deliberately positioned
himself and fired multiple rounds at close range. Based on the verdicts, the jury rejected
appellant’s claim that PTSD or mental health issues explained his criminal conduct. The
jury found that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. Thus, contrary to
appellant’s assertion, the presumption for a low term was never triggered under section
1170, subdivision (b)(6).
In any event, even assuming the low-term presumption applied, the trial court
acted well within its discretion in concluding that factors in aggravation outweighed the
factors in mitigation. The record established multiple valid aggravating factors, including
the extreme violence of the offense, the grave risk posed to multiple victims and
bystanders, and appellant’s criminal history reflecting a pattern of increasingly serious
conduct. These factors independently justified the imposition of upper-term sentences.
25.
Only a single valid aggravating circumstance is required to support an upper term.
(People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 728.)
We reject appellant’s contention that, because firearm enhancements were
imposed, the trial court improperly relied on appellant’s use of a firearm to aggravate his
sentence. The rule against dual use of facts prohibits a court from imposing an upper
term based on a fact that represents an element of the underlying crime or an
enhancement. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350; see also rule 4.420(h).)
However, a sentencing court may consider such aggravating facts if they extend beyond
the elements necessary to establish the crime. (People v. Castorena (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 558, 562 [dual use rule not violated where facts used to aggravate
sentence were not required for the underlying crime].)
Here, the trial court found that appellant engaged in an “egregious act of violence”
in public that was “reckless” when he fired “multiple rounds” that endangered
bystanders. These circumstances extended well beyond the statutory elements of the
firearm enhancements that the jury found true under section 12022.53, subdivision (d)—
that appellant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury—and section
12022.5, subdivision (a)—that he personally used a firearm. The circumstances of
appellant’s criminal conduct properly supported the imposition of upper terms without
violating the rule against the dual use of facts.
Finally, the record shows that the trial court articulated its reasoning and weighed
both aggravating and mitigating factors. The court expressly acknowledged appellant’s
mental health history and his “relatively minor” prior record, but concluded those factors
were outweighed by the gravity of the crimes and the threat appellant posed. Appellant’s
trial counsel raised Senate Bill 81 and urged leniency. The court nonetheless exercised
its discretion to impose the upper terms. Absent an affirmative showing otherwise, which
does not appear in this record, we presume the court understood and applied the law
correctly. (People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
26.
Based on this record, the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.14 The
evidence did not establish that appellant’s youth, trauma, or mental illnesses were
contributing factors to these offenses, and even if the statutory presumption applied,
substantial aggravation amply justified upper terms. The court did not improperly engage
in the dual use of facts but reasonably relied on appellant’s broader criminal conduct to
conclude that the aggravated sentences were appropriate. The court reviewed probation’s
recommendations, weighed mitigation, and explained its choices on the record.
Accordingly, appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive, and this claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
DESANTOS, J.
14 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we do not address appellant’s
arguments that a remand is required for a new sentencing hearing.
27.
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