CourtListener 10861329•People v. Abate CA2/6
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Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Abate CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342494
(Super. Ct. No.23F-00265)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
NATHAN DANIEL ABATE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Nathan Daniel Abate challenges his convictions
of forcible rape (Pen. Code1, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), rape of an
intoxicated person (id., subd. (a)(3)), and oral copulation with a
person under age 18 (former § 288a, subd. (b)(1) renumbered to
§ 287, subd. (b)(1) (stats 2018 ch. 423 § 49 (SB 1494) effective
January 1, 2019)). He contends we must reverse his convictions
because the trial court erroneously excluded relevant evidence,
improperly answered the deliberating jury’s question, and the
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We disagree and will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After one woman posted on social media accusing appellant
of sexual assault, additional women came forward with similar
accusations. They alleged that on multiple occasions between
2008 and 2013 appellant and his friend invited young women and
underage girls to their house, gave them alcohol, and raped them.
Appellant was charged by information with two counts of
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 1 (victim A.) & 2 (victim
L.), rape of an intoxicated person (id., subd. (a)(3); count 3), and
oral copulation with a person under age 18 (former § 288a, subd.
(b)(1) now § 287, subd. (b)(1); count 4). Appellant was convicted
by jury in counts 2, 3, and 4. The trial court declared a mistrial
for count 1 after the jury failed to reach a verdict. The court
sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term of eight years,
eight months.
DISCUSSION
Exclusion of Defense Expert Testimony
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion by
excluding expert witness testimony regarding motivations for
false accusations of sexual assault. He asserts the evidence was
relevant “to help the jury evaluate the complaining witnesses’
credibility” and testimony regarding motivations for making false
allegations is “logically no different than having an expert testify
about the common behaviors” of child sexual abuse victims.
Appellant is wrong.
“A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
162, 170.) Its “‘findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its
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application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’” (Ibid.) We will not “substitute our discretion for
that of the trial court.” (Id. at p. 174.)
Defense counsel sought to introduce expert testimony
regarding motivations for making false allegations of sexual
assault. At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the expert testified
that based on research women may be motivated to make false
allegations of sexual assault for sympathy, attention, to win a
child custody case, because of personality disorders, or to escape
the consequences of poor choices.
The trial court ruled the testimony inadmissible because it
was not sufficiently beyond common experience to be helpful to
the jury (Evid. Code § 801, subd. (a)) and because admitting the
testimony would “undermine the duty of the jury to determine
the truthfulness of the evidence.”
The excluded testimony “was neither technical nor
complex, and the trial court could reasonably have found that it
would not assist the trier of fact because it addressed a matter
readily understood by lay jurors.” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54
Cal.4th 395, 427.) Additionally, there is no authority to support
his position that the excluded evidence is logically the same as
expert testimony regarding Child Sexual Assault Accommodation
Syndrome. The court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
capricious and there was no abuse of discretion. (People v.
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.)
Trial Court’s Answer to Deliberating Jury’s Question
Appellant asserts the court’s response to a handwritten
note from the deliberating jury was erroneous. The note
requested “[t]he Penal Code regarding sex or rape of a minor (by
an adult). If that can be brought to us and/or if that is or should
be considered in this case. – Specific to Count 2 [¶] Penal Code =
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Law [¶] Main Question – Can consent be given by a minor for
sex with an adult?”
Before responding, the trial court reconvened with the
prosecutor and defense counsel. The court and both parties
agreed the response to the jury would be, “You may consider only
charges that have been filed against the defendant.” The court
asked the parties, “[T]hat’s suitable?” and the parties responded
affirmatively. The court then said, “I think it’s a very unclear set
of questions, and I want to be sure to answer the question they
are actually asking.” Defense counsel replied, “Understood.” The
court asked if there was anything further and defense counsel
said, “Just, for the record, I did speak to [appellant]. He does
know about the questions, and he’s authorized me to appear for
him for the questions.”
Appellant now contends the “correct answer” to the jury’s
question should have been, “in the context of the charges . . . a
minor can consent.” He argues informing the jury that a minor
can consent to sex with an adult “was necessary for jurors to
understand that lack of consent and belief in consent still had to
be proven even though the alleged victim was a minor.”
We review a court’s decision “to instruct, or not to instruct,
in its exercise of its supervision over a deliberating jury” for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-
746.) However, we conclude this claim is forfeited because
“defense counsel did not take the opportunity to suggest an
alternative [response to the jury]. His endorsement of the court’s
proposal effectively foreclosed further exploration of possible
responses to the jury’s question. Therefore, his claim on this
point has not been preserved.” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63
Cal.4th 214, 248-249.)
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Even if not forfeited, appellant’s claim lacks merit. As the
trial court noted, the jury’s questions/comments were “very
unclear.” The jury requested additional law regarding “sex or
rape of a minor (by an adult)” and whether a minor can consent
to sex with an adult, related to count 2. But the question did not
suggest the jury was confused by an instruction. The count 2 jury
instructions did not mention the victim’s age. Instructing the
jury as appellant suggests that “in the context of the charges . . .
a minor can consent” could create confusion where L.’s status as a
minor was not an element of the charged crime. As our Supreme
Court has noted, it is often risky for a trial court to offer
comments that diverge from the standard instructions. (People v.
Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.
A court has a general obligation to attempt to clear up any
instructional confusion expressed by the jury. But the court is
not required to elaborate on the instructions given when they are
full and complete. (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454,
465; § 1138.) “The court is required to instruct . . . ‘on any point
of law arising in the case’ ([§] 1138) [b]ut . . . not required so to
instruct on any ‘point of law’ merely associated therewith.”
(People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.746.)
By not providing additional instructions and directing the
jury to focus only on the charges filed, the court did not abuse its
discretion.
Moreover, any error was harmless under the Watson test.2
Appellant has not shown it is reasonably probable he would have
been acquitted of the charge of forcible rape of L. had the jury
2 The trial court’s violation of section 1138 does not require
reversal unless prejudice is shown under the standard set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Ainsworth
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020.)
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been instructed that a minor victim of forcible rape can consent.
There was no evidence and appellant did not contend L.
consented to sexual intercourse with him. Defense counsel
argued L. had “contaminated memories” and “faulty memor[ies]”
when she identified appellant as her assailant. The jury rejected
this argument.
Since we conclude each of appellant’s contentions lack
merit, we likewise conclude his claim of cumulative prejudice
lacks merit.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Michael Frye, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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