CourtListener 10860190•Montez v. Perez CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 5/15/26 Montez v. Perez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
VICTOR MONTEZ et al., B333369
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MC027758)
v.
DENNIS PEREZ,
Defendant;
FARMERS DIRECT PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.,
Intervener and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, J. Stephen Czuleger, Judge. Reversed in
part, affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Melissa B. Whalen;
Wesierski & Zurek, Christopher P. Wesierski and Michelle R.
Prescott for Intervener and Appellant.
Parris Law Firm, R. Rex Parris, Khail A. Parris, Bruce L.
Schechter and Misak Chanchikyan, for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
__________________________
Farmers Direct Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
(Farmers) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Victor
Montez and his wife Lisa Montez1 after a jury trial. After Victor
sustained significant injuries in a car crash with a drunk driver,
he and Lisa sued the driver for negligence and loss of consortium.
Farmers intervened after the driver stopped participating in the
case and went to prison for felony drunk driving. A jury awarded
the Montezes a total of $8,862,730 in damages, including
$1,002,730 for Victor’s past medical costs and $5,360,000 for
future medical expenses. The award of economic damages for the
medical costs totaling $6,362,730 is the only part of the judgment
at issue here.
Farmers contends the trial court erred by allowing the
Montezes’ life care planning expert to testify at trial about the
costs of Victor’s past and future medical care because the subject
was outside the scope of his expert disclosure and deposition
testimony. Farmers further asserts the verdict on the medical
costs lacked substantial evidence because the expert improperly
relayed another expert’s opinions regarding the medical costs,
and therefore the testimony was hearsay and lacked foundation.
We agree the court should not have admitted the challenged
expert testimony on costs, the only evidence at trial regarding the
1 We refer to Victor Montez and Lisa Montez by their first
name for clarity’s sake.
2
medical expenses, because it exceeded the scope of the expert’s
disclosed subjects. We therefore reverse and remand for a new
trial limited to economic damages.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Car Accident, the Complaint, and Farmers’
Intervention
In 2017 Perez was driving under the influence of alcohol
and at a high rate of speed when he lost control of his car and
collided head-on with Victor’s car. Victor suffered significant
injuries. He was hospitalized for 40 days, transferred to a
rehabilitation center for an additional three weeks, and then
continued to need significant medical care and treatments once
he returned home. Victor returned to work six months after the
collision but continued to experience complications and pain from
his injuries and retired three years later.
In May 2018 Victor and Lisa sued Perez for negligence and
loss of consortium. Perez answered the complaint, denying
liability and asserting comparative fault and other affirmative
defenses.
Perez stopped participating in the case, and in June 2021
the trial court granted Farmers’ motion to intervene. The court
then struck Perez’s answer and entered his default. In a criminal
case, Perez pleaded no contest to a violation of Vehicle Code
section 23153 for felony drunk driving, and he was sentenced to
state prison.
B. Discovery
Both parties designated numerous experts. The Montezes
designated Thomas Zweber as a “Physiatrist Life Care Planning
3
Specialist” who would testify about “the nature, extent and cause
of [Victor’s] injuries and the medical needs,” and “any life care
planning needs of [Victor] as well the reasonableness of past
medical care, and the cost of future health care expenses,
including, but not limited to, assessment of [Victor’s] future care
needs and associated costs.” They also designated Andrew
Morris as a “Life Care Planner/Medical Biller” and stated Morris
would testify about “the reasonableness of past medical care and
treatment for [Victor and] the assessment of the costs of [Victor’s]
future care.”
Zweber issued a draft report on September 6, 2021. His
report identified categories of medical care Victor would need,
including medications, procedures, professional services “for
independen[ce] and quality of life,” home modification, and
therapy. There were no dollar amounts associated with the costs
categories, other than for plastic surgery.
Several days later, Farmers deposed Zweber. Zweber
stated his testimony would address, in relevant part, “any life
care planning needs of the plaintiff,” “the reasonableness of past
medical care,” “the cost of future healthcare expenses,” and
“plaintiff’s future care needs associated with the cost.” He
testified the “care outlined” in his life care plan was complete, but
the cost summary was not. The cost summary would be
completed “[s]ometime soon and certainly before trial.” Zweber
acknowledged the “costing of care” is an important component of
a life care plan.
When discussing the addition of cost figures, Zweber
explained the law firm representing the Montezes had retained
an economist to calculate the costs and add them to the life care
plan, and “the draft report will become a final report when I go
4
over that and go item by item to make sure that it is reasonable.”
Zweber explained, “In many of the life care plans that I put
together, I collaborate with somebody to actually use the
resources that [are] acceptable in the industry [and] apply the
costs. This is a draft report. I review the final report and go line-
by-line and look at the resources and ... at times I do some
modification to the costs if ... it needs to be adjusted one way or
another.” Zweber ultimately would confirm that the numbers
supplied by the economist were correct and reasonable.
When Farmers’ counsel asked questions suggesting one
needs to know the actual cost estimate to evaluate the
reasonableness of the care plan, the Montezes’ counsel
interrupted and stated, “Counsel, let me put a stop to this. We
have other experts for the line of questioning that you have. It is
on your designation. You can’t sit here and harass one of our
experts as to the topic that he has not been retained for. He’s a
life—he was retained to provide a life care plan, future treatment
that Mr. Montez will need. There are other experts that will give
opinions as to how much that future treatment costs.” At another
point he stated, “We have one expert who is going to be giving
opinions as to future treatment [i.e., Zweber], another expert who
is going to be giving opinions as to the costs of each specific
future treatment.” In response to further questioning of Zweber
regarding the costs, the Montezes’ counsel again interjected that
“[t]here is a difference between the experts that we have. You
are asking one expert to give opinions as to multiple different
things. ... There is a difference between a life care planner and a
medical biller. There is a big difference.” Farmers’ counsel then
asked Zweber about the methodology for calculating future costs,
and the Montezes’ counsel objected before Zweber could respond,
5
stating, “Lacks foundation and outside the scope. He’s not a
medical biller at this time.”
At the end of Zweber’s deposition, Farmers’ counsel asked,
“Does this report contain all of the opinions you intend to offer at
trial as of today?” Zweber confirmed it did, and stated there were
no other opinions he intended to offer to the jury that counsel had
not asked him about.
After Zweber’s deposition, Farmers requested a final report
from Zweber that included the cost figures at least five times and
asked to meet and confer with the Montezes’ counsel about
Zweber’s opinions. Farmers repeatedly attempted to set up a
second deposition session for Zweber based on his representations
in his original deposition that he had additional work to do.
Farmers served a deposition notice that noticed Zweber’s
deposition again and demanded Montez produce any further
reports by Zweber. In January 2022, Montez’s counsel
responded, “We are not producing Dr. Zweber because he does not
have new opinions. If he generates new opinions we will let you
know.”
C. Evidence at Trial
A 10-day trial began in June 2023. The evidence at trial
largely focused on the extent of Victor’s injuries and his past and
anticipated future medical care, as well as his noneconomic
damages. The Montezes called numerous treating physicians and
experts, including a radiologist, a trauma surgeon, two expert
orthopedic surgeons, a treating general surgeon, a treating
orthopedic trauma surgeon, three treating orthopedic surgeons, a
treating trauma surgeon, a treating neuroradiologist, a treating
neuropsychologist, an expert neurosurgeon, an expert plastic
surgeon, an expert psychologist, an expert psychiatrist, and
6
two treating psychiatrists, to testify about the extent of Victor’s
injuries and the care he would need in the future. Victor would
need additional surgeries, injections, therapies, and medications.
Other than testimony about ketamine therapy, which was not
included in the life care plan, none of the treating doctors or
experts testified about the cost of Victor’s past or future medical
care.
When Zweber testified on behalf of the Montezes, the
Montezes’ counsel asked for his determination as to the “total
amount of medical expenses incurred as a result of the crash.”
Farmers objected under Kennemur v. State of California (1982)
133 Cal.App.3d 907 (Kennemur) (a seminal case regarding the
requirement that experts’ trial testimony stay within the scope of
their pretrial disclosures), and the court overruled the objection.
After having his recollection refreshed with Morris’s report,
Zweber testified Victor’s total past medical expenses were
$1,002,730, although he did not know what portion of that Victor
had actually paid. The court overruled Farmers’ motion to strike
based on Kennemur, hearsay, and People v. Sanchez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).
Zweber also testified regarding his life care plan for Victor.
A life care plan is a comprehensive assessment of a patient’s
current and future medical needs. He explained that developing
a life plan involves identifying the patient’s medical conditions
and determining which conditions are attributable to the
accident. Zweber testified he had organized Victor’s anticipated
care into 11 categories, such as physician and professional costs
(“doctors, psychologists, neuropsychologists, at times
chiropractic”), medications, and “surgical and interventional”
(“things like knee surgeries, hip surgeries, shoulder surgeries,
7
pain injection therapies, biologic injections, [and] steroid
injection[s]”).
As Zweber described each category in the life care plan, the
Montezes’ counsel added each to a posterboard. Counsel also
created a separate chart with dollar amounts for each category.
Over Farmers’ renewed Kennemur objection, Zweber estimated
the cost for future care at $5.36 million.
On cross-examination, Zweber confirmed the life care plan
produced in discovery had contained no cost figures. He explained
the plan included the information necessary for a cost analyst “to
take it the next step and do the actual dollar costing process.”
Zweber’s hourly rate was higher, so Morris, who was “expert at
costing out care, did the full costing of this life care plan.”
Zweber stated, “before I sign off on the final report, I will review
line-by-line and resources used for the final costs.” He “had a
lengthy conversation with” Morris when “the numbers essentially
came out” and the two “went over the numbers and the sourcing
and so forth.” Zweber confirmed he did not prepare a final report
that contained the cost figures.
In closing, the Montezes relied on Zweber’s estimates and
asked the jury to award $1,002,730 in past medical expenses and
$5,360,000 in future medical costs. Farmers asked the jury to
award $475,000 in past medical expenses for Victor and no
damages for his future medical expenses because of insufficient
proof.
D. The Directed Verdict, the Jury Award, and Farmers’ New
Trial Motion
After the close of evidence, the Montezes moved for a
partial directed verdict on liability. The trial court granted the
motion, finding Perez liable for the crash and concluding there
8
was no evidence Victor contributed to the collision. The only
issues left for the jury were damages.
During deliberations, the jury requested Zweber’s “future
cost breakdown.” Over Farmers’ renewed objections under
Kennemur and Sanchez, the court admitted the demonstrative
posterboards from Zweber’s testimony into evidence and sent
them to the jury room.
The jury returned its verdict the same day. It awarded the
amounts reflected on the posterboards: $1,002,730 for past
medical expenses and $5,360,000 for future expenses. The jury
also awarded Victor $1,500,000 in past noneconomic damages
and $1,000,000 in future noneconomic damages, for a total
of $8,862,730, and it awarded Lisa $25,000 for loss of consortium.
Farmers moved for a new trial on economic damages for
past and future medical expenses. It argued the trial court
should have excluded Zweber’s testimony on costs under
Kennemur and Sanchez, and that substantial evidence did not
support the jury’s economic damages award. Counsel for
Farmers declared in support of Farmers’ motion for new trial
that “[o]ur office was never informed by Plaintiffs’ counsel that
Dr. Zweber had updated his opinions to include future costs, nor
that he intended to offer opinions as to the past medical costs.
Plaintiffs’ counsel represented to our office that the opinions
regarding future medical costs were to be provided by their
expert Dr. Morris.”
The trial court denied the motion. It reasoned Zweber’s
opinions were “fully explored” in his deposition and “all opinions
he expressed at trial were within those general subject matter
areas.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court ruled there
9
was adequate foundation for the testimony and “more than
sufficient evidence to support the medical damages award.”
Farmers timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Farmers contends the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing Zweber to offer “surprise testimony at trial about the
total cost of [Victor’s] past and future medical care.” Farmers
argues the error was prejudicial. We agree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
For every expert witnesses a party intends to call at trial
the party must provide to the other side an “expert witness
declaration” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210, subd. (b))2 that includes
“[a] brief narrative statement of the general substance of the
testimony that the expert is expected to give” and “[a]
representation that the expert will be sufficiently familiar with
the pending action to submit to a meaningful oral deposition
concerning the specific testimony, including an opinion and its
basis, that the expert is expected to give at trial” (id., § 2034.260,
subd. (c)(2), (4)). After serving an expert witness declaration, the
litigant must make its designated expert available for a
deposition. (Kennemur, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 918-919.)
The purpose of the expert witness discovery scheme “is to
give fair notice of what an expert will say at trial. This allows
the parties to assess whether to take the expert’s deposition, to
fully explore the relevant subject area at any such deposition,
2 Undesignated code references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
10
and to select an expert who can respond with a competing opinion
on that subject area. ... [T]he need for pretrial discovery is
greater with respect to expert witnesses than it is for ordinary
fact witnesses [because] ... . [¶] ... the other parties must prepare
to cope with witnesses possessed of specialized knowledge in
some scientific or technical field. They must gear up to cross-
examine them effectively, and they must marshal the evidence to
rebut their opinions.’ ” (Bonds v. Roy (1999) 20 Cal.4th 140, 146-
147; accord, Easterby v. Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 772, 780.)
“After a witness has denied at his or her deposition having
reached opinions on a particular subject, the defendant is entitled
to rely on that disclaimer ‘until such time as appellant disclosed
that [the expert witness] had conducted a further investigation
and had reached additional opinions in a new area of inquiry.’ ”
(Dozier v. Shapiro (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1519.)
If the narrative statement or the expert’s deposition
testimony “ ‘fails to disclose the general substance of the
testimony the party later wishes to elicit from the expert at
trial,’ ” a trial court must exclude the expert testimony.
(Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 885, review filed
Apr. 6, 2026 (Jogani), quoting Bonds v. Roy, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 149; see Jones v. Moore (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 557, 564-565
[expert’s trial testimony that went beyond deposition testimony
was properly excluded; although plaintiff’s expert witness
declaration arguably was broad enough to encompass later
testimony at trial, “in his deposition he testified as to certain
specific opinions, said those were his only opinions, and if he had
others he would notify defense counsel”]; Kennemur, supra,
133 Cal.App.3d at p. 919; § 2034.300, subd. (b).) “A trial court
should exclude an expert opinion based ‘on a party’s right to rely
11
on the other party’s expert’s express representation that the
opinions expressed during an expert deposition are the only ones
that need be met at trial,’ because in such circumstances ‘it would
be grossly unfair and prejudicial to permit the expert to offer
additional opinions at trial.’ ” (Jogani, at p. 885; accord, Jones, at
p. 565.)
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
(Adoption of X.D. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 812, 831.) We will not
disturb a trial court’s admissibility ruling “ ‘except on a showing
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186,
222; Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1151.) “An ‘ “erroneous evidentiary
ruling requires reversal only if ‘there is a reasonable probability
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” ’ ” (K.M. v. Grossmont
Union High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717, 760.)
B. The Court Abused Its Discretion by Allowing the Montezes’
Expert To Testify About the Subject of Medical Costs that
Exceeded the Scope of His Disclosure and Deposition
Testimony
Zweber’s expert witness declaration provided pursuant to
section 2034.210 stated he would opine on the “reasonableness of
past medical care,” but not on the past medical costs. While the
expert declaration stated he would testify about “the cost of
future health care expenses,” the draft report produced prior to
his deposition identified categories of anticipated life care needs,
such as medications and procedures, but it assigned no dollar
amounts to those categories except for plastic surgery.
12
At his deposition, counsel for the Montezes attempted to
question Zweber about the actual costs tied to the life care
categories, but Zweber said the cost figures did not yet exist.
Zweber and the Montezes’ counsel represented that another
expert (Morris) would supply those cost opinions missing from
the draft report and stymied questioning on the subject. For
example, when Farmers’ counsel asked Zweber about the
methodology for calculating future costs, Montezes’ counsel
objected before Zweber could respond, stating, “Lacks foundation
and outside the scope. He’s not a medical biller at this time.”
Multiple times the Montezes’ counsel represented a different
expert would be testifying about the cost figures and Zweber was
retained only to provide a life care plan.
At the end of Zweber’s deposition, Farmers’ counsel asked
whether the report contained all opinions Zweber intended to
offer at trial. Zweber confirmed it did and stated he had no
additional opinions that had not been covered.
Although Zweber testified his report was “a draft report,”
and he would need to review a later “final report” (with costs
added) line by line to assess the reasonableness of those
estimated costs, counsel for the Montezes never provided an
updated final report with the cost numbers and denied Farmers
an opportunity to examine Zweber on an updated life plan with
costs added. After the original deposition of Zweber, Farmers
sent counsel for the Montezes at least five demands for a final
report containing the missing cost figures. Farmers also
repeatedly sought to take a second deposition of Zweber on the
subject of costs. The formal deposition notice it served also
demanded the production of any further reports by Zweber.
13
In January 2022, the Montezes’ counsel responded, “We are
not producing Dr. Zweber because he does not have new opinions.
If he generates new opinions we will let you know.” No
supplemental disclosure followed, and Farmers’ counsel declared
in support of Farmers’ motion for new trial that the Montezes’
counsel never informed Farmers that Zweber had updated his
opinions to include future costs or that he intended to testify
about past medical costs, and instead represented that those
opinions would come from Morris.
Farmers had a right to rely on the representations of the
opposing party that the opinions Zweber expressed during his
deposition were the only ones that needed to be met at trial.
(Jones v. Moore, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 565-566.) Because
Zweber confirmed he had no additional opinions beyond those
disclosed at his deposition, and because those disclosed opinions
did not include the cost of medical care, the trial court should not
have allowed him to testify on that subject at trial. (See Jogani,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 886 [trial court erred in allowing
expert to testify about damages for lost investments when
expert’s “answers at deposition did not fairly disclose” his opinion
and at deposition he “expressly restricted his opinion”];
Valencia v. Mendoza (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 427, 450 [expert
testimony properly excluded at trial where party’s expert did not
disclose subject of his testimony and party refused to make
expert available to be deposed on additional opinions he intended
to provide]); McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56, 98
[expert properly precluded from opining about costs where the
disclosure did not identify that area of testimony and expert
stated in deposition that he was not asked to offer an opinion on
that subject]; Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008)
14
158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1599 [trial court “properly prohibited any
opinions relating to the fraud causes of action since [plaintiff’s
expert] had testified at his deposition that he had formed no
opinions on those causes of action”]; cf. Cooper v. Takeda
Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 595
[trial court erred in excluding testimony where an expert “had
previously disclosed the general substance of his opinion and “did
not disavow that opinion at any time,” and the opposing party
“had the opportunity to examine his opinion on those matters
before trial”].) Farmers was deprived of “ ‘ “fair notice of what an
expert will say at trial” ’ ” and “ ‘ “a fair opportunity to prepare
for cross-examination or rebuttal.” ’ ” (Dozier v. Shapiro, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1519.) The trial court thus abused its
discretion by allowing Zweber to testify at trial about the costs of
Victor’s past and future medical care.
The court’s error was prejudicial. Zweber’s testimony
supplied the only evidence of the costs of Victor’s past and future
medical care. In closing, the Montezes relied on Zweber’s figures
in requesting the jury award past and future medical costs as
economic damages. The jury undeniably relied on that
testimony; it awarded the exact amounts reflected on the
posterboards used during Zweber’s testimony—$1,002,730 for
past medical expenses and $5,360,000 for future medical
expenses. (See Jogani, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 887 [error in
admitting undisclosed expert testimony was prejudicial where
testimony provided the only evidence of component of damages
and jury awarded the exact amount from expert’s opinion].) And,
as discussed, Farmers lacked a reasonable opportunity to test
those opinions. There is thus a “ ‘ “ ‘reasonable probability that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
15
reached in the absence of the error.’ ” ’ ” (K.M. v. Grossmont
Union High School Dist., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.)
C. A Limited Retrial on the Issue of Economic Damages Is the
Appropriate Remedy
Farmers contends that with Zweber’s inadmissible
testimony excised, the award of economic damages was not
supported by substantial evidence, and the proper remedy is to
“reverse the judgment with directions to eliminate the award of
economic damages” rather than remand for a retrial.
Even assuming the economic damages verdict lacked substantial
evidence, however, a retrial on the issue is the proper remedy in
these circumstances.
We recognize that “[i]f the plaintiff had a ‘full and fair
opportunity’ to present the supporting evidence, and the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to support a damages award, a
reviewing court may strike the award without ordering a retrial.”
(Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 116, 153; see Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys
APC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 788, 803 [“ ‘no new trial is ordinarily
allowed’ ” when plaintiffs had full opportunity but failed to
present sufficient evidence to support their case].) However, the
circumstances here are somewhat unique. Victor introduced
significant, admissible evidence on the medical care he received
in the past and will need in the future. The parties agreed Victor
incurred past medical expenses—Farmers asked the jury to
award roughly half of the past medical costs requested by the
Montezes. (See Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
696, 742 [where future economic damages award was based on
expert’s speculation, limited retrial on such damages was
16
appropriate because defendant did “not genuinely dispute that
the plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable, non-speculative award
of future economic damages”].) And, although Farmers asked the
jury to award nothing for Victor’s future medical expenses, it
made that request solely based on its contention the proof of the
actual costs lacked foundation, not because Farmers disputed
Victor would have future expenses.
There is no hard and fast rule that requires judgment be
entered in Farmers’ favor in these circumstances, and we
conclude the most suitable remedy is a limited retrial on
economic damages. (See generally Weisgram v. Marley Co. (2000)
528 U.S. 440, 444, 456 [when, “[s]horn of the erroneously
admitted expert testimony, the record evidence is insufficient to
justify a plaintiff’s verdict,” appellate courts should exercise their
informed discretion in deciding whether to direct entry of
judgment for defendant or to remand for further trial
proceedings]); see also Jogani, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 887
[remanding for new trial on economic damages after concluding
no admissible evidence supported award]; Yaffee v. Skeen (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1311 [“We have concluded the total award
for future medical expenses is not supported by substantial
evidence. However, this does not mean we have concluded none
of the award is supported by substantial evidence. ... [Thus] we
reverse the jury’s award of damages for future medical costs and
remand for a new trial on this issue.”].)
The Montezes contend that if we remand for a retrial on
economic damages, we should also order retrial of the
noneconomic damages. However, contrary to the Montezes’
argument, the economic damages (based on the past and future
medical costs) are not “inextricably intertwined” with the
17
noneconomic damages (based on Victor’s pain, suffering, and
other noneconomic harm). (See Yaffee v. Skeen, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1322 [rejecting defendant’s argument “that
reversal of noneconomic damages is required when other
damages awards are reversed”]; Burchell v. Faculty Physicians &
Surgeons etc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 515, 529-530 [disagreeing
with the proposition that the noneconomic damages award must
have a “ ‘reasonable relationship’ to the amount of economic
damages” because “[i]t has long been the rule that ‘[t]he ratio
between special and general damages is not controlling’ due to
differences in how those types of damages are calculated”].) We
therefore reverse and remand for a new trial limited to economic
damages.3 Because the judgment is reversed, we also reverse the
associated award of prejudgment interest and the award of costs.
3 Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on Victor’s
economic damages, we need not address Farmers’ remaining
arguments on evidentiary issues, i.e., that Zweber’s testimony
was inadmissible because it relied on hearsay and lacked
foundation.
18
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The award for economic
damages and award of prejudgment interest and costs are
reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial limited to
those issues. The awards for noneconomic damages, loss of
consortium, and attorney fees pursuant to section 2033.420 are
affirmed. Farmers is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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