People v. Miles CA2/7

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Filed 5/15/26 P. v. Miles CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B339031

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA017891-01)
v.

JEFFREY LEWIS MILES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed as
modified with directions.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

In 1994 Jeffrey Lewis Miles pleaded guilty to murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and robbery (§ 211) and admitted
allegations he committed the murder while engaged in a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), personally used a firearm in committing
the crimes (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), suffered a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and served a prior prison term
(§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). On his murder conviction the trial
court sentenced Miles to life in prison without the possibility of
parole, plus determinate terms on the various enhancements. On
his robbery conviction the court imposed and stayed execution of
the upper term of five years, plus four years for the firearm
enhancement.
Thirty years later the Legislature enacted section 1172.75,
which invalided most one-year enhancements for a prior prison
term. The superior court recalled Miles’s sentence under
section 1172.75 and resentenced him. On his murder conviction
the court sentenced Miles to life without the possibility of parole,
plus five years for the firearm enhancement. On his robbery
conviction the court imposed and stayed execution of the middle
term of three years, plus five years for the firearm enhancement.
Miles argues the court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to the (stayed) middle term, instead of the lower term, on his
robbery conviction and in declining to strike the firearm

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).2 Miles also
requests that, in light of legislation that became effective after
the superior court resentenced him, we strike the $300
restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The People
ask us to direct the superior court to correct the minute order of
the sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment to conform
to the oral pronouncement of judgment. We conclude that the
restitution fine should be stricken and that the abstract of
judgment corrected, but that otherwise the judgment should be
affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Miles Pleads Guilty to Murder and Robbery, and the
Trial Court Sentences Him
On November 28, 1993 a clerk at a convenience store called
the 911 emergency operator to report he had been robbed and
shot by “two black males in their early 20’s.” The clerk
subsequently died from a single gunshot wound to the chest.
Later that evening, police officers conducted a traffic stop and
arrested Miles and another individual for the crimes.
In June 1994 Miles pleaded guilty to murder and robbery
and admitted the allegations under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17), section 12022.5, subdivision (a), section 667,
subdivision (a), and section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The

2 Miles’s opening brief does not state whether he is
challenging the firearm enhancement on his murder conviction,
his robbery conviction, or both. We assume he is challenging the
firearm enhancement on both convictions.

3
probation officer reported that Miles stated his parents
committed him to a psychiatric ward in 1987 as a juvenile and
that, in 1992, while “he was just ‘standing there,’” he “suffered
five gunshot wounds” to his back, side, and stomach. The
probation officer also summarized the findings of the detective
who investigated the case: “Little insight was obtained during
the police investigation as to the reason the defendant shot the
victim at the [convenience store]. From all information obtained,
it appears that the clerk cooperated with the defendant and gave
him his demands.”
On his murder conviction the trial court sentenced Miles to
life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus five years for
the firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
five years for the serious felony enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a), and one year for the prior prison term
enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). On
Miles’s robbery conviction the court imposed and stayed
execution of a term of five years, plus four years for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).

B. The Legislature Enacts Ameliorative Legislation That
Affects Miles’s Sentence, and the Superior Court
Recalls His Sentence
“In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal
burdens of incarceration, the Legislature” enacted legislation
that amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), “to eliminate prior-
prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually
violent offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ [Citation.] In 2021, [the
Legislature] made this change retroactive. It enacted . . .

4
section 1171.1 [citation], later renumbered without substantive
change as . . . section 1172.75 . . . [citation], which declares: ‘Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, is legally invalid.’” (People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054; see § 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 directs the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation to provide the superior court information on
persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement now invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a),
and prescribes the procedure for the court to review the
information from the Department and, if appropriate, “recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75,
subds. (b) & (c).) In August 2023 the Department identified Miles
as a person serving a sentence that includes an enhancement
imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b).
The superior court set the matter for hearing and
appointed counsel to represent Miles. Counsel for Miles filed a
petition for resentencing and asserted that Miles “grew up in a
household fraught with physical abuse” and that his “experience
with violence at home contributed to his lack of impulse control
and tendency to act without proper reflection during his youth
and early adulthood.” Counsel cited studies on adolescent brain
development and argued that Miles, who was 22 years old when
he committed the crimes in this case, “was not only innately
immature due to the young age . . . but was also likely
exponentially more immature than his peers who had more
supportive upbringings devoid of violence.” On his robbery

5
conviction Miles asked the court to sentence him to the lower
term of two years, dismiss the prior prison term enhancement
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), and strike the serious
felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). Counsel
for Miles submitted three exhibits in support of the petition: (1) a
copy of the text of Assembly Bill No. 1540,3 (2) the abstract of
judgment from Miles’s original sentencing in 1994, and
(3) certificates stating Miles completed various classes and
passed the General Education Development examination while
incarcerated, along with employment reports stating he had a
“positive attitude and calm demeanor.”

C. The Superior Court Resentences Miles
At the resentencing hearing in April 2024 the prosecutor
objected to the court striking the five-year firearm enhancement
on the murder conviction because, the prosecutor explained, the
original sentence “was a negotiated disposition.” The court stated
it reviewed “the moving papers and all supporting documents
submitted by the defense” and acknowledged “its discretion as
under the statutes, as well as under the appropriate case law.”
On the murder conviction the court resentenced Miles to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, plus five years for the
firearm enhancement. The court dismissed the one-year prior
prison term enhancement under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), and struck the prior serious felony enhancement

3 Assembly Bill No. 1540 clarified that, “when recalling and
resentencing, the court ‘shall . . . apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.’” (People v.
McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040.)

6
under section 667, subdivision (a). The court stated it recognized
“the positive efforts made by Mr. Miles since he’s been
incarcerated.” On the robbery conviction the court stated: “There
are no factors in aggravation currently alleged or proven. The
court is limited to the [middle] term on count 2.” The court
imposed and stayed execution of a prison term of three years,
plus five years for the firearm enhancement. The court also
imposed a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), and $70 in costs.4 Miles timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing
Miles to the Middle Term on His Robbery Conviction
Miles argues the superior court abused its discretion in not
imposing the (stayed) lower term on his robbery conviction
because, according to Miles, “there was nothing in the record that
showed that the . . . court understood and applied section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) in making its sentencing choices” and his youth
at the time he committed the crimes and his childhood trauma

4 The minute order and abstract of judgment stated the court
also imposed a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 and
struck “all financial obligations, excluding any actual victim
restitution.” Because the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment
did not include these actions, we will direct the superior court to
correct the minute order and abstract of judgment by deleting
these terms.

7
“were contributing factors” to the commission of his offenses.
Miles’s argument lacks merit.5

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth detailed
instructions for resentencing once a sentence has been
recalled. . . . The trial court must ‘apply the sentencing rules of
the Judicial Council’ as well as ‘any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.’ [Citation.] In addition, the court may ‘consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant

5 Contrary to the People’s assertion, Miles did not forfeit his
argument. In his petition for resentencing Miles asked the court
to resentence him to the lower term; argued his stepfather beat
him and his mother, which, according to counsel, contributed to
Miles’s impulsiveness and tendency to act without thinking
“during his youth and early adulthood”; and cited neuroscience
research on adolescent brain development. Though counsel’s
argument appeared in a section titled “Factors Support Striking
the Enhancements,” Miles sufficiently preserved his argument.
(Cf. People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043
[defendant forfeited his argument under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), where he “could have asked the trial court at
the sentencing hearing . . . to apply the section 1170 amendments
retroactively to the . . . upper term sentence, but he did not do
so”]; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [defendant
forfeited his argument the court should have sentenced him to
the lower term where he “did not seek the lower term based on
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6); object to the imposition of the
middle term; or argue that [he] suffered any psychological
trauma as a result of mental illness”].)

8
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.’” (People v. Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b)(1),
“makes the middle term the presumptive sentence for a
determinate term of imprisonment.” (People v. Nielsen (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 816, 823 (Nielsen); see § 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), states, “Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The
person is a youth or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b)
of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the offense.”6
(See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419 [section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), “creates a presumption that the sentencing
court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence when, among other
things, a ‘psychological, physical, or childhood trauma’
contributed to the offense”]; Nielsen, at p. 823 [same]; People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991 (Fredrickson)

6 Section 1016.7, subdivision (b), defines a youth as “any
person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was
committed.”

9
[presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “applies only
if the defendant’s youth was ‘a contributing factor’ in his or her
commission of the offense”].)
“We review a court’s sentencing choices for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to a sentencing
decision made in the exercise of informed discretion, and a court
that is unaware of the scope of its discretion cannot exercise
informed discretion. [Citation.] We presume the court knows
and applies the applicable law, absent evidence to the contrary.
[Citations.] The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
show the court misunderstood its sentencing authority.”
(Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 823; see People v. Knowles
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764-765 (Knowles); Fredrickson,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)

2. Miles Has Not Shown the Superior Court Failed
To Consider Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6), or
Its Presumption
The record does not show the superior court failed to
consider Miles’s request the court sentence him to the lower term
on his robbery conviction. (See Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 765 [“‘Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates
otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all the
relevant sentencing factors set forth in the rules.’”].) Though the
court did not discuss section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), Miles has
not identified anything in the record suggesting the court
misunderstood the law or its discretion. The court’s failure to
mention any trauma in Miles’s childhood does not mean the court
did not consider it. (See Knowles, at pp. 768, 769 [trial court’s
failure to “mention all of the mitigating evidence,” including the

10
defendant’s childhood trauma, reflected the court “was not
convinced those additional claimed mitigating factors contributed
to the assault that ended in [the victim’s] death”].) As discussed,
the court stated that it had reviewed the documents Miles
submitted, that it understood the applicable laws and its
sentencing discretion, and that the petition and exhibits “were
very helpful and well-written.” Indeed, Miles states in his
opening brief (in the section explaining why he did not forfeit his
argument) that his trial counsel “explicitly requested the [lower]
term and set forth all the details of [his] childhood trauma” and
“presented evidence in support of her argument that [his] youth
contributed to him making ‘poor and impulsive decisions,’” all of
which “‘fairly apprised’” the court of the issue. Counsel’s
arguments and request the court impose the lower term on
Miles’s robbery conviction sufficiently alerted the court to
consider sentencing him to the lower term based on his youth and
childhood trauma. (See Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 827
[though the defendant did not expressly argue that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), applied, his “sentencing materials discussed
his childhood trauma and set forth how his childhood trauma led
to his crimes such that the trial court was ‘on notice’ [citation]
that [his] childhood trauma may have been a contributing factor
to the crimes in this case”].)
Miles also failed to show the presumption under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), applied to him. There is no
evidence in the record Miles’s youth or any childhood trauma
contributed to him committing the crimes in this case. The
probation report is the only document in the record that
contained any facts about Miles’s life before he committed his
crimes. As discussed, that report stated Miles’s parents

11
committed him to a psychiatric ward when he was 16 years old,
but it did not provide any details about the treatment he
received, the duration of his commitment, or the commitment’s
effect on Miles, including whether the experience contributed to
him committing the crimes. The probation report also recited
Miles’s statement that, approximately one year before he
committed the murder and robbery, he sustained five gunshot
wounds. Again, the report did not provide any further
information relevant to the inquiry under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), namely, whether this experience contributed to
Miles’s commission of the crimes.
As for the assertion in the petition for resentencing that
“Miles grew up in a household fraught with physical abuse,”
counsel for Miles did not provide a citation to the record or
indicate where she obtained that information. Miles did not
submit any evidence of childhood trauma, such as a declaration
or a report from a counselor or relative about his upbringing.
The only facts in the record relevant to the analysis under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), are that Miles was 22 years old
when he committed murder and robbery and that he experienced
two traumatic events (the psychiatric commitment and the
gunshot wounds).
But “the mere fact a defendant is young or has suffered
trauma is insufficient—either or both must be ‘a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense’ for the [lower] term
presumption to apply.” (Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 765; accord, People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1158; see People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039
[section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “does not require imposition of
the lower term in every case in which the defendant was under

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age 26 at the time the crime was committed”; it only “establishes
a presumption of the lower term if the defendant’s youth was ‘a
contributing factor’ in his or her commission of the crime”].) The
superior court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding the
presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), did not apply.
(See Knowles, at p. 769 [where the defendant’s psychological
assessments did not state he “was antisocial or impulsive” or
explain “how the impacts of [his] childhood trauma contributed to
his planning and execution of the assault on” the victim, “the
trial court could have reasonably inferred that [his] mental
illness did not contribute to his offense”]; Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 994 [record did not show a “clear indication
[the] defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in the . . .
offense”]; cf. Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 821-824
[defendant “made a sufficient initial showing to trigger
section 1170(b)(6)’s presumption,” where he testified about his
childhood trauma, a substance abuse specialist’s report “detailed
[the defendant’s] history of substance abuse and trauma,” and the
probation report “acknowledged that defendant’s drug addiction
could have contributed to the crime”].)
Citing sources ranging from the United States Department
of Justice to a website of the Kansas Judicial Branch, Miles
argues that “victims of childhood violence often grow up to be
aggressive and commit violence themselves” and that, “[g]iven
the amount of violence [he] suffered in childhood, there is
substantial evidence that his physical and childhood trauma are
a contributing factor to the offenses.” These studies, however,
were not before the superior court, and we cannot consider them
now. (See Hernandez v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th
1120, 1136, fn. 6 [“An appellate court must generally limit its

13
review to matters that are included in the record from the
proceedings below and may not consider other matters.”]; People
v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 508 [“Because [the
defendant] did not present these data in the superior court, we
cannot evaluate their untested validity and do not consider
them.”], review granted June 25, 2025, S290828.)
In his reply brief Miles argues he “specifically cited in his
petition studies and articles to show how [the] mitigating
circumstances are contributing factors to his underlying
offenses.” This argument, too, lacks merit. Miles does not cite
any authority that journal articles or empirical studies constitute
evidence that his youth or alleged childhood trauma contributed
to his decision to commit crime. Moreover, the findings cited in
Miles’s petition related to youths or victims of trauma in general,
not Miles. None of the studies showed Miles’s youth or alleged
childhood trauma played any role in the murder or robbery he
committed. (See Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 993,
fn. 7 [though “scientific studies regarding brain development”
may suggest it “would be reasonable to presume a defendant’s
youth is a contributing factor whenever a youth commits a
crime,” the “Legislature opted to require a finding of causation as
to all of the circumstances in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)”].)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining To Strike the Firearm Enhancement
Miles argues the superior court abused its discretion in not
exercising its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a). According to Miles, “two of the
enumerated mitigating circumstances in section 1385 were
present: the current offense is connected to prior victimization or

14
childhood trauma, and the enhancement is based on a prior
conviction that is over five years old.” Miles argues the court
failed to assign “‘significant value’” to the mitigating
circumstances or find dismissing the enhancement would
endanger public safety. The court, however, did not abuse its
discretion.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), “provides that
‘[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.’” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “provides that a sentencing court
‘[i]n exercising its discretion’ to dismiss a sentencing
enhancement ‘shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove’ certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances, and ‘[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’” (Walker, at
p. 1028.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E) and (H), describes
the two mitigating circumstances Miles argues apply to him: the
“current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma” and the “enhancement is based on a prior conviction that
is over five years old.” Section 1385, subdivision (c)(6)(A) and (B),
defines “‘[c]hildhood trauma’” and “‘[p]rior victimization,’” and
provides a court may conclude the defendant’s childhood trauma
or prior victimization “was connected to the offense if, after
reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, medical records, or records or reports by

15
qualified medical experts,” the court concludes that the
defendant’s childhood trauma or prior victimization
“substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the
commission of the offense.”
We review the superior court’s decision not to strike an
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c), for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
An “‘abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision
on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal standard.’”
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
The superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to strike the firearm enhancement. First, contrary to Miles’s
assertion, the record does not demonstrate the court failed to
conduct the proper analysis under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). The court stated it reviewed all the documents
and exhibits Miles submitted, which included the petition for
resentencing. Miles argued in his petition he experienced
childhood trauma, the prosecutor informed the court that Miles
was asking the court to dismiss the firearm enhancement, and
the court stated it was declining to strike the enhancement on
the murder conviction. Nothing in the record indicates the court
failed to consider Miles’s request to dismiss the firearm
enhancement or the arguments he made in his petition about his
childhood trauma. That the court did not discuss section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), or Miles’s alleged childhood trauma does not
mean the court failed to comply with section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). (See People v. Bravo, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1157 [“no particular language was required for the trial
court to decline to dismiss . . . enhancements”]; People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [“‘The trial court is not

16
required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion
under section 1385.’”]; see also People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725 [“Defendant’s citation to a silent record
is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion.”].)
Second, Miles did not present evidence section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), applied to him. As with his argument the court
should have sentenced him to the lower term on his robbery
conviction, there was no evidence any prior victimization or
childhood trauma contributed (much less substantially
contributed) to his committing the crimes. Miles did not
introduce evidence of childhood trauma (as discussed, counsel for
Miles did not state the factual basis of her assertion Miles had
been abused as a child, and there is no such evidence in the
record). The probation report stated Miles said he sustained five
gunshot wounds approximately one year before he committed his
crimes, but nothing in the report or anything else in the record
indicated the incident played a role in his criminal conduct, and
Miles did not mention the incident in the petition for
resentencing. (See People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087,
1095 [court did not err in determining the defendant’s illness did
not substantially contribute to his involvement in committing the
crime because “there was no evidence identifying potentially
relevant symptoms of schizophrenia or depression, nor any
evidence (or even reasoned argument) linking those symptoms to
[the defendant’s] commission of the current offense”].)
Finally, Miles mistakenly asserts the mitigating
circumstance in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) (the
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years
old) applies to him. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H), refers to

17
an enhancement on a “prior conviction.” (See People v. O’Bannon
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974, 982-983 [“the sentencing judge must
determine, at the moment of sentencing, whether a prior
conviction is five years old” (internal quotation marks omitted)].)
The superior court imposed the firearm enhancement on Miles’s
current convictions for murder and robbery.

C. The Superior Court Must Vacate the Restitution Fine
Under Section 1202.4, Subdivision (b)
Miles argues the superior court should have vacated his
$300 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b),
because ameliorative legislation enacted after the court
resentenced him has rendered his fine “unenforceable.” Miles is
correct.

1. Relevant Proceedings
The abstract of judgment from Miles’s original sentencing
in 1994 does not indicate whether the trial court imposed a
restitution fine.7 At the 2024 resentencing hearing under
section 1172.75, the superior court stated, after imposing the
terms of imprisonment on Miles’s convictions, “$300 restitution
fine.”

2. Applicable Law
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b), states: “In every case
where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a
separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds
compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states
those reasons on the record.” (See People v. Kopp (2025)

7 The transcript of that proceeding no longer exists.

18
19 Cal.5th 1, 13.) Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature
amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which states:
“Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a
restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including
any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
(See Kopp, at p. 17.)

3. The Restitution Fine Is Unenforceable and
Uncollectible
Though the abstract of judgment from 1994 does not reflect
whether the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum
restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), we
presume, as the People argue, the court did. (See People v.
Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [“we presume that the trial
court knew the law and followed it” in imposing a restitution fine
under section 1202.4]; People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107,
1114 [“‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law’”]; see also Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”].)
Thus, the superior court’s order imposing the restitution fine at
Miles’s resentencing in 2024 essentially reimposed the fine
imposed in 1994, which section 1465.9 has now made
unenforceable and uncollectible.
People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, review
granted, March 11, 2026, S295038, is instructive. In Salstrom
the trial court imposed a restitution fine under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), at the defendant’s original sentencing; at the
resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 many years later, the
superior court “‘reimpose[d] the fines and fees originally

19
imposed.’” (Salstrom, at pp. 598-599.) The defendant argued on
appeal section 1465.9 required the court to vacate the restitution
fine. (Salstrom, at p. 599.) The court in Salstrom agreed,
rejecting the People’s “implicit position” that, when the superior
court resentenced him and imposed the restitution fine, “this
reimposition restarted section 1465.9’s 10-year clock anew.” (Id.
at p. 600.) The court in Salstrom concluded that the superior
court did not impose a new restitution fine at the resentencing,
but rather reimposed “the original restitution fine,” and that,
under section 1465.9, the court’s “resentencing judgment
reimposing this fine more than 10 years after its original
imposition date must be vacated.” (Salstrom, at p. 600.)
Like the superior court in Salstrom, the superior court here
reimposed the original restitution fine mandated by
section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Indeed, the court stated before
pronouncing the judgment: “The court is first going to
incorporate all of the proceedings that occurred at the time of
sentencing” in June 1994. Because Miles’s restitution fine is
more than 10 years old, under section 1465.9, we will vacate it.
(See People v. Salstrom, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)

D. The Superior Court Must Correct the Minute Order
and the Abstract of Judgment
After imposing the $300 restitution fine, the superior court
stated: “$300 parole revocation fine, that is stayed pending
successful—Well, I am going to strike that. There is no parole
that’s going to be granted in this case.” As noted, the minute
order and abstract of judgment indicate the court (1) imposed and
stayed execution of a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45
and (2) imposed and struck “all financial obligations, excluding

20
any actual victim restitution.” The reporter’s transcript of the
resentencing hearing does not state the court made these rulings.
The superior court must correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of
judgment. “Ordinarily, where there is a discrepancy between the
oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment,
the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 237, 244; see People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381,
384, fn. 2 [“The record of the oral pronouncement of the court
controls over the clerk’s minute order.”]; People v. Portillo (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 577, 603 [“‘the oral pronouncement of sentence
controls over a subsequently entered minute order’”].) “Courts
may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . .
have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not
accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.”
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; accord, People v.
Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89; People v. Garcia (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 848, 859; see People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
676, 689 [“we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial
court to modify the minute order”].) Therefore, we direct the
superior court to delete from the minute order and abstract of
judgment the orders the court did not make at Miles’s
resentencing.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to vacate the $300 restitution
fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). As modified, the
judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to correct
the minute order of the resentencing hearing and the abstract of
judgment to accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of

21
judgment and this court’s decision vacating the $300 restitution
fine under section 1465.9, subdivision (d). In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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