People v. Reyes CA2/5

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Filed 5/14/26 P. v. Reyes CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B340970

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA067579)
v.

JOAQUIN SERRANO REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Shezad H. Thakor and Stephanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Joaquin Serrano Reyes appeals the sentence
imposed at his 2024 resentencing, arguing that the trial court
erred by not striking a Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)1
five-year enhancement pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c).
We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In January 2005, a jury found defendant guilty of nine
counts of lewd and lascivious conduct against a child within the
meaning of section 288, subdivision (a). The jury also found true
the allegations that defendant suffered prior convictions for
attempted murder in violation of sections 664 and 187,
subdivision (a); infliction of corporal injury on a spouse in
violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a); and sexual intercourse
with a minor in violation of section 261.5, subdivision (c).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
55 years, comprised of: an upper term of 16 years on count 1;
consecutive four-year terms on each of the remaining eight counts
(2 through 9), for a total of an 32 years; a five-year term for the
prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a);
and two terms of one-year each for the two prior prison terms
under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On August 17, 2023, the trial court received notice from the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that defendant
was eligible for resentencing pursuant to sections 1172.7 and

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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1172.75. The court appointed counsel for defendant and set the
matter for a further hearing on resentencing.
On July 2, 2024, defendant filed a brief requesting a full
resentencing, including, among others, requests to strike his two
section 667.5, subdivision (b) one-year enhancements and his
section 667, subdivision (a) five-year enhancement.2
The trial court held the resentencing hearing on
September 5, 2024, during which it struck the two section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements and resentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of 53 years. But the court declined the request to
strike the section 667, subdivision (a) five-year enhancement. It
expressly found that the interests of justice did not support
striking the enhancement, reasoning that defendant’s “succession
of violent crimes,” his failure to participate in classes or other
services while incarcerated, and his numerous rules violations
while incarcerated, including those involving sexually
inappropriate behavior, demonstrated that he “continue[s] to be
clearly a danger to everyone.”
Defendant appealed from the resentencing.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the trial court was required, as a
matter of law, to dismiss the section 667, subdivision (b)
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), because

2 The minute order and reporter’s transcript for the
resentencing hearing show that the prosecution filed an
opposition to the resentencing request which the trial court
considered at the hearing in making its ruling, but that brief is
not in our record.

3
the imposition of the enhancement resulted in a sentence greater
than 20 years.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) added subdivision (c) to
section 1385, providing in relevant part that ‘the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) further
provides: ‘In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances
in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
“Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.’” (People v. Torres (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 88, 92 (Torres).)
The mitigating circumstance in section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) upon which defendant relies is described in subparagraph
(C), which provides: “The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) We
independently review questions of statutory interpretation.
(Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.)

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B. Analysis

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the trial
court’s findings that dismissal of the section 667, subdivision (a)
enhancement would endanger public safety or be against the
interest of justice. Instead, he contends that the court was
required to dismiss the enhancement because its application
resulted in a sentence of over 20 years.3 We disagree.
The application of the enhancement would not “result in a
sentence of over 20 years” because defendant’s 48-year sentence,
prior to the application of the enhancement, already exceeded 20
years. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 93–94.) Moreover,
even assuming for purposes of argument that the application of
the enhancement did “result in a sentence of over 20 years,” we
would reject defendant’s contention that section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(C), which states that such enhancements “shall be
dismissed,” mandated a dismissal of the enhancement. As
defendant acknowledges, many courts have rejected defendant’s
construction of the statute, finding that dismissal under section

3 Defendant contends that the “base offense” in count 1 was
only 16 years and the five-year enhancement was imposed on
that count, resulting in a sentence greater than 20 years. But the
five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) was
predicated on the jury’s true finding that defendant had
previously been convicted of a prior serious felony; it was not
based on any conduct by defendant in the commission of any of
the nine charged lewd conduct offenses. Based on defendant’s
conduct underlying those counts, he received an aggregate
sentence of 48 years before the application of the enhancement
for the commission of the prior offense. Thus, defendant’s
sentence was greater than 20 years without the application of the
five-year enhancement.

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1385, subdivision (C)(2)(C) is discretionary, not mandatory,
notwithstanding the use of the term “shall” in subdivision
(c)(2)(C). (People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444–446;
People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290–291; People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238–241.) We reach the
same conclusion as those decisions.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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