Rafiee v. Dangoor CA2/7

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Filed 5/13/26 Rafiee v. Dangoor CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

RAFI RAFIEE, B346022

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 20STCV43794)
v.

DANIEL DANGOOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kevin C. Brazile, Judge. Reversed.
Sam Vahedi & Associates and Sam Vahedi for Defendant
and Appellant.
Ashour Yehoshua, Ashkan Ashour and Edward Y. Chau for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Daniel Dangoor, a licensed real estate salesperson working
for the sellers’ “real estate broker and listing agent,” Coldwell
Banker Realty, appeals from a judgment entered against him for
$18,500 in damages on a breach of contract claim brought by the
buyer, Rafi Rafiee. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded
Dangoor was personally liable on the contract notwithstanding
that Dangoor did not personally make promises to Rafiee, that he
was not a signatory to the contract, that he was not identified as
a party to the contract, and that the court found he was acting in
the scope of his agency to the sellers. We reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dangoor does not challenge the trial court’s factual
findings. We therefore accept the facts as established in the trial
court’s Statement of Decision.

A. The Transaction
In August 2020 Rafiee submitted an offer to purchase a
single-family residence at 948 Thayer from Morad and Nahid
Golcheh on a standard California Association of Realtors
Residential Purchase Agreement (RPA). At the time Rafiee
visited the residence for the initial showing, the residence was
furnished with items owned by the Nightfall Group, the sellers’
short-term-rental tenant. After some negotiation, the sellers
responded with Seller Counter Offer No. 2, which added the
operative provision at the center of this appeal: “Furniture at
showing or equivalent to be included by Listing Agents, not
Seller.”
Dangoor was one of three licensed real estate salespersons
working for the sellers’ “real estate broker and listing agent,”

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Coldwell Banker Realty. Dangoor and his co-salespersons, Iman
and Mina Eshaghyan, “came to an agreement with the sellers
that the cost of the furniture would be deducted from the
commission owed by the sellers to the listing agents” rather than
being an additional charge to the sellers. One of sellers’
salespersons informed Rafiee that the exact furniture present at
the initial showing might not be available, because it belonged to
the Nightfall Group, and that an “equivalent” set from another
Nightfall Group short-term-rental property would be provided.
Rafiee accepted Seller Counter Offer No. 2.
Rafiee visited the residence multiple times during the 17-
day inspection contingency period. On one such visit, Rafiee
observed that the showing furniture had already been removed.
The sellers’ salespersons explained that the sellers could not
obtain the same furniture set and that an equivalent set from the
Nightfall Group would be delivered. They further explained that
the piano and pool table still at the residence were not considered
“furniture” and had never been part of the deal. Rafiee
“knowingly waived his inspection contingency and proceeded with
the purchase of the home.”
In October 2020 Dangoor sent Rafiee photographs of the
replacement furniture via WhatsApp and advised that the pieces
were being prepped for delivery. Rafiee responded that he did
not “really like anything from [this batch]” and expressed hope
that a different set would be available. Dangoor explained the
replacement furniture had come from another Nightfall Group
property and invited Rafiee to inspect it in person before it was
disassembled for delivery. Rafiee declined the inspection and
stated, “This is not equivalent to the furniture that was in the
house.”

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B. The Litigation and the Trial
Rafiee filed his complaint in November 2020. After the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Golcheh
sellers and approved a $10,000 good-faith settlement with all the
other defendants, Dangoor proceeded as the sole remaining
defendant through a bench trial in September 2024. Dangoor
and Rafiee testified. In addition, expert Brett Baer testified that
“furniture” was a term of art in real estate and included chairs,
tables, beds, sofas, desks, and the like but did not include pianos,
pool tables, televisions, or similar items. Witness Michael
Brushin, who purchased and inventoried both sets of furniture,
provided the valuation evidence the trial court ultimately
adopted: the furniture at showing was worth $5,950, and the
replacement furniture Rafiee received was worth $7,800.
At the close of Rafiee’s case-in-chief, Dangoor moved for
judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The court
granted the motion on the intentional misrepresentation and
unjust enrichment causes of action and denied the motion on the
breach of contract cause of action. After the parties submitted
written closing briefs and the trial court issued a tentative ruling,
the trial court adopted Dangoor’s proposed statement of decision
in full.

C. The Statement of Decision and the Judgment
The trial court made the following express findings
pertinent to this appeal:
• “Dangoor was not a signatory to the RPA.”
• “[T]he RPA, including the Counteroffers incorporated
therein, constitute the contract at issue,” and “No other
contract between the parties, written or oral, is in
evidence.”

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• “[T]he RPA is an integrated contract.”
• “Dangoor did not personally make promises to Rafiee
regarding furniture in connection with the Transaction.”
On the furniture valuations, the trial court found the
furniture at showing had a reasonable value of $5,950, and the
replacement furniture Rafiee received had a reasonable value
of $7,800. Notwithstanding the higher dollar value, the court
further found that the replacement furniture was “not
‘equivalent’” to the furniture at showing.
Concerning liability for breach of contract, the trial court
stated: “The RPA provides that ‘brokers’ are excluded from the
contract. However, because Dangoor is a Real Estate
Salesperson acting as an agent for RE Broker Group and not a
‘Broker,’ the Court finds that Dangoor owed a contractual duty to
Rafiee to ensure that the promise made in the RPA regarding
furniture [was] fulfilled. The RPA specifically states that the
furniture is to be ‘Included by Listing Agents, not Seller.’
Therefore, it is implied that Dangoor and Rafiee were in
contractual privity. Accordingly, Dangoor had a duty to ensure
that Rafiee received equivalent furniture to that at showing. The
Court further finds that, while Dangoor was acting in the scope of
his agency for the sellers in the subject real estate transaction
when communicating promises regarding furniture, those
promises memorialized in the RPA are binding on Dangoor
personally for this reason.”
On damages, the trial court quoted Civil Code sections 3300
and 3301 and then stated the entirety of its damages ruling in
one sentence: “Based upon the evidence identified above, the
Court finds that Rafiee suffered damages for Dangoor’s breach of
contract totaling $18,500.”

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Judgment was entered on January 10, 2025, and
subsequently amended on April 30, 2025, to reflect the
$10,000 good-faith-settlement credit, producing a net award
of $8,500. Dangoor appealed.

DISCUSSION

Dangoor’s primary argument is that the trial court erred in
imposing contractual liability on him.

A. Applicable law and standard of review
Dangoor argues that he does not challenge any of the trial
court’s factual findings and the contract issue is a pure question
of law: whether the court’s legal conclusion of personal contract
liability can be reconciled with its own findings and with
controlling California law. Rafiee does not dispute that contract
interpretation is “solely a judicial function” if there are no facts in
dispute. Regarding the contract interpretation issue, we discern
no factual disputes and so address the question of law. Questions
of law are reviewed de novo. (Scheenstra v. California Dairies,
Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 391 [contract interpretation on
undisputed facts reviewed independently].)

B. Dangoor Is Not Liable for Breach of Contract
Dangoor argues that the court’s factual findings “eliminate,
as a matter of law, any possibility that Dangoor owed contractual
obligations to Rafiee under the RPA.” We agree.
First, the court found that “the RPA, including the
Counteroffers incorporated therein, constitute the contract at
issue.” The court noted that “Rafiee testified that the only
agreement between him and any of the defendants concerning
furniture is embodied in Trial Exhibit 40 – Seller Counter

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Offer 2, which is a part of the RPA between the buyer (Rafiee)
and the sellers. . . . No other contract between the parties,
written or oral, is in evidence.” In addition, “the RPA is an
integrated contract because it provides that ‘All understandings
between the Parties are incorporated in this Agreement. Its
terms are intended by the Parties as a final, complete, and
exclusive expression of their Agreement with respect to its
subject matter, and may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement.’” There is
no dispute that the RPA is the sole source of contractual liability
in this case. If there is contract liability in this case, it must be
through the RPA.
The primary term at issue is “Furniture at showing or
equivalent to be included by Listing Agents, not Seller.” The
language “Listing Agents, not Seller” makes a clear distinction
between the listing agents and seller. The sellers are Morad and
Nahid Golcheh. The term “Listing Agents” does not indicate any
specific person or entity.1
Dangoor focuses on the RPA’s standard language of ‘“Real
Estate Brokers are not parties to the Agreement between Buyer
and Seller.”’ He initially argues that this precludes liability for
both the broker and him but later narrows the argument to
acknowledge that it allocates responsibility to the seller’s side
(but not the sellers) and still precludes liability for a salesperson.

1 Business & Professions Code section 10018.03 defines
“listing agent” but it does not assist the analysis in this case.
“‘Listing agent’ means a licensee who provides services requiring
a real estate license for or on behalf of a seller pursuant to a
listing agreement. Listing agent includes a seller’s agent.” (Bus.
& Prof. Code § 10018.03)

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Rafiee responds that the language “refers to the main purchase
transaction between buyer and seller”: “It does not immunize
agents from liability for specific obligations they assume within
the contract. If Appellant’s interpretation were correct, listing
agents could make any promise in a real estate contract, no
matter how explicit, and escape all accountability by pointing to
the boilerplate ‘not Parties’ language.” The problem is that the
promise is not explicit concerning who the “Listing Agents” are.
“[W]hen a general and [a] particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a
particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent
with it.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; see Maryland Casualty Co. v.
State Industrial Accident Commission (1930) 209 Cal. 394, 398
[“when general and particular provisions of a contract deal with
the same subject matter, the specific provisions are of controlling
force”]; Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1225, 1235 [“under well established principles of contract
interpretation, when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the particular and specific provision is paramount to
the general provision”].) The general boilerplate that the broker
is not a party is inconsistent with the specific provision that
furniture will be provided by listing agents, not seller. So the
more specific provision controls.
But that still does not answer the question of who is liable.
Dangoor argues he is a real estate salesperson and an employee
of Coldwell Banker Realty. He acts as an agent for Coldwell
Banker Realty, and Coldwell Banker Realty is an agent for the
sellers. As a real estate salesperson under California law, he
cannot contract in his own name, nor accept compensation from
any person other than the broker under whom he is licensed.

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Thus, according to Dangoor, he cannot be liable for breach of
contract.
California’s Real Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000
et seq.) creates a mandatory agency relationship between the
licensed broker and the licensed salesperson. “[T]he Legislature
has, by virtue of statutory enactment, made such a salesman an
agent of the broker as a matter of law,” and a salesperson “can
act only for, on behalf of, and in place of the broker under whom
he is licensed, and . . . his acts are limited to those which he does
and performs as an agent for such broker.” (Gipson v. Davis
Realty Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 190, 206-207.) “‘[A]ny contract
which purports to change that relationship from that of agent to
independent contractor is invalid as being contrary to the
provisions of the Real Estate Law.’” (Grubb & Ellis Co. v.
Spengler (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 890, 895-896, quoting Gipson, at
pp. 206-207; see also Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential
Brokerage Co. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1024, 1037-1040 [discussing the
broker-salesperson agency structure].) “A real estate salesperson
is strictly the agent of the broker. The salesperson cannot
contract in his or her own name and cannot accept money from
any person other than the broker under whom he or she is
licensed.” (Venturi & Co. LLC v. Pacific Malibu Development
Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1424, fn. 8; see Deane v.
Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 292, 296 [salesperson
lacked legal capacity to contract in individual name]; Grand v.
Griesinger (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 397, 406 [salesperson “cannot
contract in his own name [citations], nor accept compensation
from any person other than the broker under whom he is
licensed,” deriving the rule from the “entire statutory scheme” of
the Real Estate Law].)

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Rafiee argues that “California law recognizes that an agent
who expressly assumes a contractual obligation may be held
personally liable, notwithstanding his agency status,” citing
Filippo Industries, Inc. v. Sun Ins. Co. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
1429, 1442 (Filippo). Here, however, Dangoor never expressly
assumed a contractual obligation. The court found that “Dangoor
did not personally make promises to Rafiee regarding furniture
in connection with the Transaction.” Had the term been
“Furniture at showing or equivalent to be included by Dangoor,
not Seller” the outcome might be different. But the term here
does not specifically identify Dangoor.
In addition, Filippo–the only case Rafiee cites in support of
his argument on the contract issue2–does not support Rafiee, nor
does it even include the language quoted in the Respondent’s
Brief. On the relevant issue of whether an agent for a disclosed
principal can be liable, the court found “no substantial evidence
to support a verdict against the agent McGee” and reversed the
order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict for McGee.

2 The only case we find in which a real estate salesperson is
held personally liable for breach of contract relating to a real
estate transaction involves a side contract between
two salespersons to share commissions. (Sanowicz v. Bacal
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1037.) The court discussed the
statutory prohibitions on real estate salespersons contracting in
their own names, citing Business & Professions Code
section 10137 and Grand v. Griesinger, supra, 160 Cal.App.2d
397, and held “that two licensed real estate agents may agree to
share commissions earned under the circumstances we describe
in this opinion.” (Sanowicz, at p. 1030.) This is not the situation
here.

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(Filippo, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.) “‘“Where an agent is
duly constituted and names his principal and contracts in his
name and does not exceed his authority, the principal is
responsible and not the agent.” [¶] This view has been adopted
in California. Where the signature as agent and not as a
principal appears on the face of the contract, the principal is
liable and not the agent.’” (Id. at p. 1442.)
Furthermore, in this case, the court described “Defendant
Coldwell Banker Realty” as “the real estate broker and listing
agent that represented the sellers in the subject transaction” and
“Defendant Re eBroker Group Inc.” as “the referring real estate
broker and co-listing agent representing the sellers in the subject
transaction.” Dangoor is described as “the real estate
Salesperson under the employ of Coldwell Banker Realty.” The
court refers to Coldwell Banker Realty and Re eBroker Group
Inc.—not Dangoor or the other salespersons—as listing agents.
The court found and the parties do not dispute that the
RPA is the only contract at issue; that Dangoor is a “Real Estate
Salesperson acting as an agent for [a broker] and not a ‘Broker’”;
that the RPA is integrated; that Dangoor did not sign the RPA;
that Dangoor was acting “in the scope of his agency for the
sellers”; and that Coldwell Banker Realty and Re eBroker Group
Inc. could be described as “listing agents.” Given these findings,
Dangoor cannot be liable for breaching the contract term
“Furniture at showing or equivalent to be included by Listing
Agents, not Seller.”3

3 Dangoor also argues that the court erred in overruling his
demurrer to the First Amended Complaint and that the court’s
damages award was an abuse of discretion. Because we conclude

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Dangoor.
Dangoor is to recover his costs on appeal.

GIZA, J.*
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

Dangoor cannot be liable under the contract as a matter of law,
we do not reach these issues.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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