CourtListener 10857592•Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 5/12/26 Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
MELINA CAMERON, 2d Civ. No. B341877
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 2024CUOE026155)
(Ventura County)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
BALFOUR BEATTY OPINION AND DENYING
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al., PETITION FOR REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN
Defendants and Appellants. JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 15, 2026,
be modified as follows:
On page 14, first full paragraph, after the first sentence,
“We find Casey, Doe, Liu, and Quilala persuasive and adopt their
reasoning,” insert footnote 1 stating:
1. We reject appellants’ claim that statements by “Senator
Gillibrand (D-NY) – the [EFAA’s] lead sponsor –” and two other
senators show that “[t]he EFAA is solely meant to exempt sexual
harassment and sexual assault claims from arbitration, not
entire lawsuits.” “ ‘The best evidence of [legislative] purpose is
the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and
submitted to the President. Where that contains a phrase that is
unambiguous—that has a clearly accepted meaning in both
legislative and judicial practice—we do not permit it to be
expanded or contracted by the statements of individual
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment
process.’ ” (Huff v. DeKalb County, Ga. (11th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d
1273, 1280, quoting from West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.
v. Casey (1991) 499 U.S. 83, 98-99, superseded on other grounds
by statute as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994)
511 U.S. 244, 251.)
Appellants’ petition for rehearing is denied.
There is no change in judgment.
YEGAN, A.P.J. BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
2
Filed 4/15/26 Cameron v. Balfour Beatty Construction CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
MELINA CAMERON, 2d Civ. No. B341877
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 2024CUOE026155)
(Ventura County)
v.
BALFOUR BEATTY
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour), and two of its
employees appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to
compel arbitration of respondent Melina Cameron’s complaint
alleging one cause of action for sexual harassment and nine other
causes of action. Respondent was Balfour’s former employee.
Before she began work, she signed an agreement requiring the
arbitration of disputes relating to her employment.
The trial court concluded that none of the complaint’s 10
causes of action was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and
Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). (9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402.) “In
general terms, the EFAA renders arbitration agreements
unenforceable at the plaintiff's election in sexual assault and
sexual harassment cases that arise or accrue on or after March 3,
2022, the EFAA's effective date.” (Doe v. Second Street Corp.
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 559 (Doe).)
Appellants contend the EFAA is inapplicable because
respondent failed to adequately state a claim for sexual
harassment. If the EFAA applies to the cause of action for sexual
harassment, appellants argue that the trial court erroneously
denied their motion to compel arbitration as to the other nine
causes of action. We affirm.
Respondent’s Complaint
Respondent’s complaint alleged: respondent is an African-
American woman. In January 2022 she was hired by Balfour “as
an assistant superintendent of a large construction project.”
“During her employment . . . , [she] was subjected to horrific
racial, gender, and sexual harassment[,] . . . racial and gender
discrimination[,] . . . and apparent workplace violence . . . . She
engaged in protected activity by making protected complaints
and was ultimately terminated in retaliation for the same.”
The complaint consisted of 10 causes of action: (1) hostile
work environment sexual harassment under the state Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.); (2) hostile work environment gender harassment under the
FEHA; (3) hostile work environment race harassment under the
FEHA; (4) gender discrimination under the FEHA; (5) race
discrimination under the FEHA; (6) retaliation for engaging in
protected activity under the FEHA; (7) failure to prevent
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under the FEHA; (8)
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whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section
1102.5, subdivision (b); (9) violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act
of 1976 (Civ. Code, § 51.7); and (10) violation of the Tom Bane
Civil Rights Act (id., § 52.1).
The first cause of action for sexual harassment was against
Balfour and its Assistant Senior Superintendent, Joe
Wandolowski, who was respondent’s direct supervisor. The first
cause of action alleged: on May 1, 2023, a safety supervisor
advised Wandolowski “that there was ‘extremely offensive
graffiti’ in the temporary toilets on the site known as porta-
potties.” Wandolowski told the safety supervisor that the graffiti
“‘had been there for months’ and . . . that he would have it
painted over. [The safety supervisor] responded in words to the
effect of ‘you don’t understand . . . it’s a big deal . . . if it’s reported
to the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission],
there could be huge repercussions.’ ” Respondent “immediately
learned about this conversation and went into the porta-potties to
see for herself. . . . [S]he discovered . . . : (1) Racist tropes and
diatribes against African-American people and Hispanics; (2)
Sexual drawings of women and derogatory references to women;
and (3) Sexual and racist drawings and references to [respondent]
along with threats to do her physical harm.”
Photographs of the obscene graffiti were attached to the
complaint as Exhibit A. Some of the graffiti specifically referred
to respondent. For example, the graffiti included the following
abusive language: (1) “fuck Mel” (respondent’s first name is
Melina); (2) “Mel can swallow my kids,” followed by illegible,
scratched-out writing and then “fuck you bitch ass cunt fuck
pussy shit fuck”; (3) “I need Mel’s pussy,” followed by “me too”;
and (4) “Mel fuck ya u dumb lame ass bitch.”
3
The graffiti also included drawings of (1) “Mel” naked with
a penis instead of a female sex organ, (2) “Mel’s” face with a penis
instead of a nose, and (3) a naked man whom someone had
labeled as “Mel.”
The complaint continued: “[O]n or about January 5, 2023,
Balfour management . . . had been notified of some of the graffiti
images. . . . Wandolowski had himself used some of those
temporary toilets with the graffiti images and had done nothing
about it. [Respondent] herself had viewed some of the graffiti on
occasions prior to May 1, 2023, but she had not seen those graffiti
images that were racial, sexual, and threatening violence to her
until she became aware of the Safety Supervisor's notification
to . . . Wandolowski.”
A staff meeting of Balfour employees, including respondent,
occurred about two days after the safety supervisor had
discovered the graffiti. “The issue of the graffiti on the temporary
toilets came up in the meeting. . . . Wandolowski, in a laughing
manner, asked what was going to be done with the graffiti in the
temporary toilets, calling the graffiti ‘artistic’ and ‘poetry’ all of
which elicited a few laughs. [Respondent] was mortified,
humiliated, and terrified since she was the only African-
American working in the field and several of the graffiti images
targeted her personally.”
During the staff meeting, “it was mentioned that ‘high
profile’ people, including, but not limited to the Mayor of the City
of Oxnard were going to attend [a] special event [at the project].
Rather than remove the graffiti, it was decided to lock up the
porta-potties for the event.”
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Respondent’s Declaration
In their motion to compel arbitration, appellants argued
that respondent “voluntarily ‘went into the porta-potties to see
for herself,’ proving that her exposure to the graffiti was not
unwelcome.” In reply to this argument, respondent declared
under penalty of perjury: “Balfour claims my sexual harassment
and gender harassment causes of action have no merit because I
purportedly voluntarily exposed myself to the graffiti in the
porta-potty toilets. This claim . . . is ridiculous. As the Assistant
Superintendent of the entire project, I was required as part of
my job duties to check the porta-potty toilets for damage and
graffiti and was required to report violations of the law and the
company's HR [Human Resources] policies to management. Also,
I had to use the porta-potty toilets that were utilized by all
workers on the project, as there were no other restrooms
available.”
Trial Court’s Ruling
Based solely on the EFAA, the trial court denied the motion
to compel arbitration. It explained: “The Court cannot compel
arbitration of [respondent’s] claims because they are all related to
the adequately pled sexual harassment dispute. . . . And the
allegations of the complaint and [respondent’s] declaration . . .
state facts sufficient to support the sexual harassment cause of
action.” In support of its ruling, the court cited Liu v. Miniso
Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791 (Liu).
The EFAA
“In 2022, Congress amended the [Federal Arbitration Act]
by adopting the EFAA. In relevant part, the EFAA provides:
‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election
of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment
5
dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute arbitration
agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case
which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to
the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.’ (9
U.S.C. § 402(a).) A ‘ “sexual harassment dispute” ’ is ‘a dispute
relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual
harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.’ (Id.,
§ 401(4).)” (Doe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 564-565.) “An
issue as to whether [the EFAA] applies with respect to a dispute
shall be determined under Federal law.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(b).)
Standard of Review
“In general, we review a ruling on a petition to compel
arbitration for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] But when, as
here, the ruling presents a pure question of law (whether the
EFAA applies and preempts [appellants’] motion to compel), we
review the trial court's order de novo.” (Casey v. Superior Court
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 583 (Casey).)
Respondent Adequately Stated
a Claim for Sexual Harassment
Appellants contend the EFAA is inapplicable because
respondent failed to adequately state a claim for sexual
harassment in the first cause of action. There is a split of
authority as to the standard for determining whether a claim for
sexual harassment has been adequately pleaded under the
EFAA. Some cases conclude that the claim must be merely
“nonfrivolous.” Other cases require that the claim be “plausible.”
(See Thomas v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc. (N.D. Ill., July 24,
2025, No. 25-CV-77) 2025 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 141753, at *8-12, [2025
WL 2084159, at *3-4].) “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
6
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. [Citation.] The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
(Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 678; see also Sonoiki v.
Harvard University (1st Cir. 2022) 37 F.4th 691, 703
[“ ‘Plausible . . . means something more than merely possible, and
gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job
that compels us to draw on our judicial experience and common
sense’ ”].)
We need not determine which standard applies.
Irrespective of whether the claim must be plausible or merely
nonfrivolous, the first cause of action adequately stated a claim
for sexual harassment.
The first cause of action alleged sexual harassment under
state law, i.e., the FEHA. “[T]o establish liability in a FEHA
hostile work environment sexual harassment case, a plaintiff
employee must show she was subjected to sexual advances,
conduct, or comments that were severe enough or sufficiently
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create a
hostile or abusive work environment. [Citations.] Although
annoying or ‘merely offensive’ comments in the workplace are not
actionable, conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment is unlawful,
even if it does not cause psychological injury to the plaintiff.”
(Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th
264, 283 (Lyle).)
“[T]he existence of a hostile work environment depends
upon ‘the totality of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘ “[A]
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and
7
subjectively offensive. . . .” ’ Therefore, ‘a plaintiff who
subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or abusive will not
prevail . . . if a reasonable person . . . , considering all the
circumstances, would not share the same perception.’ ” (Hughes
v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1044 (Hughes).)
“ ‘ “[T]he prohibition against sexual harassment includes
protection from a broad range of conduct” ’ . . . . Besides
unwanted sexual advances, ‘prohibited harassment includes
“verbal, physical, and visual harassment. . . .” [V]erbal
harassment may include epithets, derogatory comments, or slurs
on the basis of sex; . . . visual harassment may include derogatory
posters, cartoons, or drawings on the basis of sex.’ ” (Carranza v.
City of Los Angeles (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 388, 400-401.) “On
the other hand, a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim is not established where a supervisor or coworker simply
uses crude or inappropriate language in front of employees or
draws a vulgar picture, without directing sexual innuendos or
gender-related language toward a plaintiff or toward women in
general.” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 282.) “Generally, . . .
sexual conduct that involves or is aimed at persons other than
the plaintiff is considered less offensive and severe than conduct
that is directed at the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 284.)
Here, some of the obscene graffiti was specifically directed
at respondent, referring to her as “Mel.” In Bennett v. Corroon &
Black Corp. (1988) 845 F.2d 104, similar graffiti was posted in
the public men’s room of an office building where the plaintiff
was employed. She was informed of the “obscene cartoons
bearing her name.” (Id. at p. 105.) The court concluded, “Any
reasonable person would have to regard these cartoons as highly
offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her fellow employees
8
and clients with professional dignity and without the barrier of
sexual differentiation and abuse. This is a perfect matrix to grow
the hostile environment subjecting a woman to the
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult which Title VII
[of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.)]
protects against.” (Id. at p. 106.) “Title VII prohibits certain
forms of employment discrimination, including sexual
discrimination.” (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1036.) In “ ‘ “interpreting California's
FEHA, California courts often look for guidance to decisions
construing federal antidiscrimination laws, including title VII of
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.” ’ ” (Raines v. U.S.
Healthworks Medical Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268, 282.)
Appellants argue: “[Respondent] asserted one cause of
action for harassment based on sex. However, the allegations
supporting this claim are virtually nonexistent. She merely
claims that she witnessed offensive graffiti in the portable toilets
on a single occasion. She even admits to voluntarily entering the
portable toilets – on purpose – to see for herself. In other words,
the ‘conduct’ [respondent] alleges was isolated, and was neither a
‘concerted pattern’ nor ‘unwelcome.’ [Respondent] has therefore
not alleged conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute.”
Appellants characterize respondent’s sexual harassment cause of
action as “a single allegation of self-inflicted exposure to offensive
graffiti.”
“There is no recovery ‘for harassment that is occasional,
isolated, sporadic, or trivial.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p.
1043.) If the graffiti had been recently discovered by
management, appellants would have had a stronger case that the
sexually harassing conduct was “isolated.” But according to the
9
complaint, respondent’s supervisor, Wandolowski, told the safety
supervisor that the graffiti “‘had been there for months.’”
Wandolowski knew about the offensive graffiti but failed to take
any action to remove it. By allowing the graffiti to remain in
place for months, he arguably condoned it and contributed to
respondent’s sexual harassment. “[U]nder the FEHA, an
employer is strictly liable for all acts of sexual harassment by a
supervisor.” (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1042.) Moreover, at a staff meeting
attended by respondent, Wandolowski made light of the graffiti
by referring to it “in a laughing manner” as “ ‘artistic’ and
‘poetry.’ ”
Thus, the sexual harassment may reasonably be viewed not
as an isolated incident, but as conduct that continued during the
months that management did nothing about the graffiti. Because
respondent was aware of management’s failure to act, she
pleaded a plausible claim of sexual harassment “severe enough or
sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment
and create a hostile or abusive work environment.” (Lyle, supra,
38 Cal.4th at p. 283.)
That respondent voluntarily entered the porta-potties to
view the graffiti does not mean, as appellants claim, that her
exposure to the graffiti was “self-inflicted” and not “‘unwelcome.’”
Respondent declared under penalty of perjury, “As the Assistant
Superintendent of the entire project, I was required as part of
my job duties to check the porta-potty toilets for damage and
graffiti . . . .”
Appellants argue that “Herberg v. California Institute of the
Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142 [(Herberg)] is instructive, if not
controlling.” But Herberg is clearly distinguishable. There, the
10
plaintiff was an employee of the California Institute of the Arts
(CalArts). Two students “were permitted to exhibit their own
creative work as part of an end-of-the-year show at CalArts’s
main gallery.” (Id. at p. 146.) The work “depicted [plaintiff] in a
vulgar and sexually oriented drawing . . . .” (Id. at pp. 144-145.)
The drawing was exhibited for approximately 24 hours. Plaintiff
sued CalArts for sexual harassment under the FEHA.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting
CalArts’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court
concluded that the display of the offensive drawing “for 24 hours
did not constitute severe or pervasive harassment because of sex
as a matter of law.” (Herberg, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 150.)
The court explained that the plaintiff was not “subjected to any
sort of verbal abuse,” she “did not see the drawing until long after
it had been taken down,” and “the drawing was not intended to
harass plaintiff[], but rather to make a point about
representational art. Moreover, CalArts’s administrative
personnel were uniformly mindful of plaintiff[’s] feelings, and
made efforts to ameliorate the impact of the drawing during the
time it was on display.” (Id. at p. 153.)
In contrast to Herberg, the graffiti here subjected
respondent to verbal abuse, management knowingly allowed it to
remain in place for months, not just 24 hours, and respondent
saw the graffiti before it was removed. The graffiti had nothing
to do with “representational art.” (Herberg, supra, 101
Cal.App.4th at p. 153.) Furthermore, management was not
“mindful of [respondent’s] feelings.” (Ibid.) In respondent’s
presence, Wandolowski referred to the graffiti as “‘artistic’ and
‘poetry.’ ”
11
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion
to Compel Arbitration as to all 10 Causes of Action
The EFAA provides, “[N]o predispute arbitration
agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case
which is filed under . . . State law and relates to the . . . sexual
harassment dispute.” (Italics added.) (9 U.S.C. § 402(a) (section
402(a).) Appellants assert that, even if the first cause of action
adequately pleaded a claim of sexual harassment, the trial court
erroneously refused to compel arbitration as to the remaining
nine causes of action “that are unrelated to sexual harassment.”
But the EFAA does not say that each cause of action must relate
to the sexual harassment dispute. It says that the “case” must so
relate.
Appellants are asking us to rule contrary to a line of
California cases holding “that where a plaintiff's lawsuit contains
at least one claim that fits within the scope of the EFAA, ‘the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all claims asserted
in the lawsuit.’ ” (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 588;
accord, Doe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) The rationale for
this holding was considered at length in Liu, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at pp. 802-807. Liu explained: “[T]he key word in
section 402(a) is ‘case.’ The common meaning of the word, in the
context of litigation, is an action or suit.” (Id. at p. 802.) “[O]ne
cannot reasonably interpret section 402(a) as invalidating an
arbitration agreement only with respect to certain claims within
a case. The term Congress chose – ‘case’ – is different from the
term ‘claim.’ ” (Id. at p. 803.) “If Congress had intended the
result [defendants] seek[], it would have used the term ‘claim’
instead of ‘case’ (saying something like no arbitration agreement
‘shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a . . . claim which is
12
filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the . . .
sexual harassment dispute’), or alternatively stated that the
arbitration provision would be unenforceable ‘only to that portion
of the case related to the sexual harassment dispute.’ Congress
did not use such language, and we ‘lack the power to rewrite a
statute to make it conform to a “ ‘ “ ‘presumed intention’ ” ’ ”
which is not expressed in the statute itself. . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
Liu observed that its interpretation of section 402(a) will
promote the efficient administration of the EFAA: “Allowing a
plaintiff ‘alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment
dispute’ [citation] to opt out of arbitration for their entire case
avoids the potential for inefficiency in having separate
proceedings in court and an arbitration forum, and the related
additional burden placed on the parties of having to litigate
claims in both a court proceeding and an arbitration. In addition,
having a clear-cut rule that can be easily applied allows courts to
avoid making the sometimes-difficult determination, particularly
at the pleading stage, whether a given claim sufficiently overlaps
with allegations of sexual harassment.” (Liu, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
The most recent California case interpreting section 402(a)
is in accord with Casey, Doe, and Liu: “[I]t is no surprise that
every published California decision to address this issue has
concluded that, once properly invoked, the EFAA renders an
arbitration agreement unenforceable as to the entire case, not
merely the sexual harassment claim.” (Quilala v. Securitas
Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, 88
(Quilala).) Quilala concluded, “As all of Quilala’s claims stem
from the same employment relationship and his treatment by
13
defendants, his case ‘relates to’ his sexual harassment allegations
within the meaning of section 402(a) of the EFAA.” (Id. at 90.)
We find Casey, Doe, Liu, and Quilala persuasive and adopt
their reasoning. “As all of [respondent’s] claims stem from the
same employment relationship and [her] treatment by
[appellants], [her] case ‘relates to’ [her] sexual harassment
allegations within the meaning of section 402(a) of the EFAA.”
(Quilala, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 90.)
Disposition
The order denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration
is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
14
Henry J. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart and Spencer C.
Skeen, Nikolas T. Djordjevski, Maryam Rastegar, Danielle J.
Kaufman, for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Joel W. Baruch and Joel W. Baruch, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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