CourtListener 10857586•People v. Reed CA1/3
Testo completo
Filed 5/12/26 P. v. Reed CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, A170827
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
WILLIAM J. REED. Super. Ct. No. 051819838)
Defendant and Respondent.
William J. Reed, an attorney, appeals from a judgment entered after a
jury found him guilty of embezzling $400,000 in settlement funds from two
sets of clients—John Stone and Kristine Turner (the “Stone-Turners”) and
Marlene and Herb Schuler (the “Schulers”) (sometimes referred to collectively
as “plaintiffs”). Reed contends that the trial court committed instructional
and other errors during the trial and that insufficient evidence established
plaintiffs’ ownership of the settlement funds.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In October 2023, the Contra Costa County District Attorney charged
Reed with two counts of grand theft by embezzlement (Pen. Code, § 487,
1 We summarize only the facts and proceedings relevant to the issues
raised on appeal.
1
subd. (a); all unlabeled statutory references are to this code). The first
amended information also alleged the offenses constituted a white-collar
crime scheme that resulted in a taking of over $100,000 in property (§ 186.11,
subd. (a)).
At trial, there was no dispute that Reed represented plaintiffs in a
lawsuit against PG&E and that he received a $200,000 settlement on behalf
of the Stone-Turners and a $200,000 settlement on behalf of the Schulers.
There is also no dispute Reed kept all of the funds for himself, claiming he
believed in good faith that the entirety of the settlement proceeds was
rightfully his.
A. Prosecution Case
In 2006, a major wildfire (known to some as the Zamora wildfire)
occurred in the Woodland area. One of the wildfire victims, David Hatanaka,
consulted with Reed about suing PG&E for damages. During these
discussions, Reed informed Hatanaka that Reed’s attorney fees “wouldn’t
come out of [the] settlement but would be paid by PG&E.”
Reed asked Hatanaka to help gather other wildfire victims for a
lawsuit and provided Hatanaka with drafts of letters inviting victims to come
together to seek recovery from PG&E. Though Hatanaka did not write the
letters, he reviewed and sent them out on his own letterhead. One version of
this letter (the “Hatanaka Letter”) stated: “ ‘And on top of this, PG&E must
pay all of our attorney’s fees, expert fees, and court costs necessary to get this
fair payment, not the usual attorney fee charge of a third or 40 percent taken
out of the settlement amount.’ ” The Hatanaka Letter also informed
community members of a town hall meeting that would take place on June
28, 2007.
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On June 28, 2007, Reed attended the town hall meeting along with two
local attorneys. During the meeting, Reed represented that any settlement
with PG&E would not be reduced by attorney fees, which would be paid
separately by PG&E.
Around September 2008, Reed sent Hatanaka a representation
agreement. Section 4 of the agreement, titled “Legal Fees and Costs,” stated:
“You agree that the reasonable value of my services will [sic] at the hourly
rate of $625.00.” Hatanaka did not sign this agreement. Instead, Hatanaka
and his wife signed another agreement that had no fees and costs section, but
stated in a “Client’s Duties” section that client duties “include expenses
incurred in the ordinary course of [Reed’s] business, such as photocopying
and other reproduction costs (@.10 per page), parking and other travel
expenses, charges for legal research computer time and other similar items.”
Hatanaka and his wife added a handwritten note below this section which
stated: “Our financial responsibilities will be $0 for all costs and fees.” This
note was initialed by both Hatanaka and his wife, and also by Reed.
Hatanaka testified he and his wife added this note because they found this
section of the representation agreement to be “ ‘unclear.’ ”
In September 2008, Reed sent the Stone-Turners a representation
agreement accompanied by a cover letter. Section 4 of the representation
agreement was titled “Legal Fees and Costs” and stated: “You agree that the
reasonable value of my services will [sic] at the hourly rate of $625.00.” This
section also stated there would be certain costs the Stone-Turners would not
have to pay, but Reed “d[id] charge for other costs, and [the Stone-Turners]
agree[d] to pay for those costs and expenses in addition to [Reed’s] hourly
fees.” Notwithstanding this provision, Reed’s accompanying cover letter
stated the following: “Section (4) deals with Attorney Fees and Costs. It is
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part of our agreement that all fees and costs incurred in this case will be paid
by PG&E under the Inverse Condemnation claim as the law requires.
[¶] Phrased another way – and different from the usual 33 1/3% to 40% of
recovery fee arrangement – there will be no reduction from your recovery
from PG&E for my services. To the extent we are successful, you will be paid
for your damages without reduction for attorney fees and costs, and I will be
paid separately for the fees and costs.”
Stone understood the cover letter and representation agreement to
mean that section 4 of the representation agreement, relating to “Legal Fees
and Costs,” was “irrelevant” because PG&E would be responsible for the
attorney fees and costs and plaintiffs would receive “100 percent of whatever
[PG&E] gave [them] because [Reed] was getting paid by PG&E.” Stone
testified he discussed all of this with Reed before signing the agreement, and
Reed confirmed that PG&E would pay attorney fees to Reed directly and
plaintiffs would be “paid whatever we got.” Stone stated he would never have
signed the agreement if he were required to pay Reed $625 an hour.
The Hatanakas, Stone-Turners, Schulers, Tom Diaz, and a few other
individuals retained Reed to represent them in a lawsuit against PG&E
(“Schuler v. PG&E”). These individuals decided to retain Reed based on their
understanding that they would not have to pay Reed’s attorney fees. Stone
testified his main concern about suing PG&E was “[h]ow much [he] would
have to pay the lawyer,” while Turner indicated the language in the
Hatanaka Letter stating that PG&E would have to pay all of the attorney
fees was “very important” to her as she knew that litigation “could last a long
time” and be “very costly.”
Reed filed a lawsuit against PG&E on behalf of plaintiffs, the
Hatanakas, and Diaz in September 2008. From 2008 to 2012, plaintiffs did
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not receive invoices from Reed for his fees and costs. During this time period,
Reed confirmed with them several times that they would not have to pay any
fees or costs.
As time passed, Hatanaka found it harder to contact Reed about the
case, so he and his wife eventually terminated Reed and retained a new
attorney in the lawsuit. This new attorney settled their case and Diaz’s case
within a few months, but Reed asserted a lien against their settlements
based on the work he did for them. When the parties were unable to resolve
this dispute, PG&E, the Hatanakas, and Diaz filed a lawsuit against Reed
(the “PG&E Fee Lawsuit”) to have a court determine the amount of fees to
which Reed was entitled.
The PG&E Fee Lawsuit settled in August 2013, with PG&E agreeing to
pay Reed $255,000. $204,000 of the $255,000 amount was deemed to
represent payment for Reed’s work in representing all the plaintiffs in the
Schuler v. PG&E action. In acquiescing to this settlement, Reed “agree[d]
that PG&E shall be entitled to a credit of $204,000 against any award of
attorney’s fees or costs made in favor of any or all of the remaining plaintiffs
[e.g., the Stone-Turners and the Schulers] in Schuler v. PG&E.” The
agreement further stated that “Reed should not receive a double recovery of
fees or costs in connection with his work in Schuler v. PG&E.”
In August 2013, Reed told plaintiffs that PG&E had made them each a
settlement offer of $120,000. At Reed’s urging, plaintiffs rejected the
settlement offer and attended a judicial settlement conference with PG&E on
August 30. At the August 30 settlement conference, PG&E offered $200,000
to the Stone-Turners, $200,000 to the Schulers, and $75,000 to Reed. The
Schulers wanted to accept this offer but watched Reed refuse it; the Schulers
did not say anything because Reed had told them not to speak during the
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proceedings. As for the Stone-Turners, Reed informed them they could “do
much better” as the Hatanakas received $700,000 and Diaz received
$500,000. But in counseling the Stone-Turners to reject the settlement offer,
Reed did not tell them they would have to pay his attorney fees and costs if
they went to trial. As such, the Stone-Turners decided to reject the
settlement offer.
A few days later, Reed met with plaintiffs and told them he would not
go to trial, which was scheduled for the following month, unless they paid
him $75,000 so he could retain an expert witness for the matter. Reed also
began expressing doubts about whether PG&E actually started the fire.
When plaintiffs indicated they were unwilling to pay this money and asked
Reed to take the $200,000 PG&E had previously offered them, Reed “shoved
a piece of paper” at them and indicated they owed him approximately
$600,000.
In September 2013, PG&E sent offers under Code of Civil Procedure
section 998 (the “998 offers”) for both the Stone-Turners and the Schulers,
offering them each $200,000 “in satisfaction of all of their claims for damages,
costs and expenses, attorney’s fees, and interest in th[e] action.” Neither of
the 998 offers included a separate offer to pay attorney fees to Reed, but
PG&E had previously paid Reed $204,000 for his work on behalf of all of the
original plaintiffs in the Schuler v. PG&E lawsuit, including the Stone-
Turners and the Schulers.
After receiving the 998 offers, Reed met with plaintiffs again and
demanded they either provide him with $30,000 to take the case to trial or
give him half of each of their $200,000 settlements. Reed then pushed a
stack of billings towards plaintiffs and claimed he had done $900,000 worth
of work on the case which someone had to pay. When Reed said this,
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plaintiffs were “flabbergasted,” “speechless,” and “just sat there,” while Stone
responded “[t]hat’s not what we agreed to.” Turner said she could not really
remember if she informed Reed they would accept the 998 offer at this time
because they were all “in shock,” but she stated it was possible they may have
signaled acceptance of the offer because they did not know what other choice
they had. Reed then abruptly left and said he would speak to PG&E.
Reed proceeded to accept the 998 offers on behalf of plaintiffs and, at
Reed’s suggestion, PG&E’s attorney Mark Hancock delivered the settlement
checks, which were made out to plaintiffs and Reed, to Reed’s house on
October 17, 2013. Plaintiffs, however, were unaware they had received
settlement funds from PG&E until Hancock mentioned the checks had been
delivered during a November 2013 hearing related to Reed’s failure to
properly dismiss the lawsuit.
After learning of the settlement checks, plaintiffs immediately
attempted to contact Reed but did not hear from him until he showed up at
the Stone-Turners’ house in December 2013 to have them “sign off on the
lawsuit” and “sign over the checks” so he could cash or put them in an
account. Reed brought copies of the settlement checks but not the checks
themselves. He also presented a “Final Accounting & Dispersal Agreement”
which indicated the families would each only receive $97,948.83 after Reed
deducted $100,000 in attorney fees and $2051.17 in costs. When Stone saw
this, he brought out the cover letter and representation agreement and told
Reed those documents indicated that PG&E would directly pay Reed for his
fees and costs and plaintiffs for the settlement. Turner stated Reed was “not
happy” with this and quickly left.
This series of events led to civil lawsuits between plaintiffs and Reed,
at least one of which was pending when the criminal trial occurred. On
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January 20, 2016, plaintiffs and Reed also participated in a California State
Bar fee arbitration proceeding.
Plaintiffs never received “one penny” of the PG&E settlement funds,
nor did they ever authorize Reed to move these settlement funds to any
particular bank account or to use the funds for his own personal expenses.
At trial, Kenneth Tam—an expert in forensic accounting and taxes—
testified he determined that both families’ $200,000 checks were deposited in
Reed’s Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (“IOLTA trust account”) in
November 2013. In April 2014, however, Reed transferred $200,000 of that
amount to one of his personal accounts, $100,000 to another personal
account, and $100,000 to a third personal account. At various points, Reed
renamed some of the accounts to state the funds were being held in trust for
himself and the Stone-Turners or the Schulers but, eventually, Reed
transferred all of the money to his own personal accounts and spent it all on
his personal expenses.
State Bar Supervising Attorney Manuel Jiménez testified as an expert
on the Rules of Professional Conduct as they pertain to attorney handling of
funds and client trust accounts. Jiménez testified that attorneys have a
fiduciary duty to put their clients’ interests above their own and are ethically
obligated to place funds received on behalf of a client into a client trust
account. Jiménez also testified that an attorney may not withdraw any funds
from the client trust account so long as there is a dispute over the division of
funds that has not been resolved by the parties’ agreement or a final judicial
adjudication. Jiménez explained, however, that funds consisting solely of
attorney funds cannot be placed in a client trust account. During Jiménez’s
testimony, the trial court repeatedly clarified to the jury that violating State
Bar rules is not itself a crime.
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B. Defense Case
The first defense witness was attorney Michael Meadows, who
indicated he had previously testified as an expert in billing dispute cases.
Meadows testified that Reed’s $625 hourly rate was reasonable. He also
stated it would be a common practice for a settling defendant in an inverse
condemnation case to ask to see a representation agreement to determine an
attorney’s billing rate. Based on his review of Reed’s billing records in the
matter, Meadows believed the amount of time Reed put into the case was
reasonable.
Reed then took the stand. On direct examination, Reed testified that at
the June 2007 town hall meeting, he told the wildfire victims that they could
“never afford” the attorney fees needed to bring a case against PG&E but
indicated that by statute PG&E “would pay [the attorneys] at the other end.”
Reed also testified that when he met with the Schulers, he told them that
“PG&E would pay all of the attorney’s fees,” that they would only have to pay
“minimal” costs of between $500 and $1,000, and that PG&E would repay
these costs at the conclusion of the case. Reed also acknowledged he had
written the cover letter accompanying the representation agreements which
stated that “ ‘all the fees and costs incurred in th[e] case w[ould] be paid by
PG&E.’ ” Reed, however, testified he made a drafting error in this letter and
had intended to instead say all fees and costs would be “ ‘repaid’ ”—not
“ ‘paid’ ”—by PG&E under the inverse condemnation claim. (Italics added.)
As for the $255,000 Reed received through the settlement of the PG&E
Fee Lawsuit, Reed contended that sum covered only his fees for services
rendered to the Hatanakas and Diaz and not fees for work done for the other
plaintiffs. When the trial court inquired about the language in the
settlement agreement which stated that $204,000 of the $255,000 amount
9
would be “ ‘deemed to represent payment to Reed for fees for legal services in
Schuler vs. PG&E up to December 2012,’ ” Reed responded the designated
amount merely “reduce[d]” the approximately $900,000 he believed he was
owed for the work he had done on plaintiffs’ case.
With regard to the 998 offers of $200,000 for the Stone-Turners and
$200,000 for the Schulers, Reed testified he told them he owned and was
entitled to fees and costs under Civil Code section 1021.9 (“Section 1021.9”).
Reed therefore urged them to go to trial and at one point offered to loan them
$30,000 to do so. Plaintiffs, however, disagreed, pointing to Reed’s cover
letter and maintaining that Reed had “already been paid.” Reed told
plaintiffs to consult with another attorney while insisting the attorney would
confirm that Section 1021.9 granted Reed priority of interest in their
settlement funds. In the alternative, Reed said plaintiffs could split the
settlements such that each family would receive $100,000, and Reed would
“reduce [his] claim” for attorney fees to $100,000 and be paid from the
settlement funds.
Reed stated plaintiffs agreed to “take the split” the following week, and
Reed communicated this acceptance to PG&E. Reed confirmed he received
PG&E’s settlement checks for plaintiffs and stated he transferred the
$400,000 into an IOLTA trust account. He also claimed that the day after he
received the checks, he faxed copies of them to the Stone-Turners’ new
attorney, Wareham Seaman, who indicated he would transmit copies to the
Stone-Turners and to Marlene Schuler.
Reed testified that at some point, plaintiffs complained to the State Bar
that they did not have a retainer agreement with Reed, that Reed settled the
matter without their authorization, and that Reed had forged their names on
the settlement checks (“Settlement Authorization Dispute”). In 2015,
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however, Reed claimed plaintiffs conceded or were no longer contesting their
authorization of the settlement. Reed then believed the “confusion about the
ownership [of the settlement funds] had been resolved.” Reed also stated the
issue of ownership over the funds was “resolved both by the State Bar and by
the statements of Mr. Seaman and his clients on January the 26th of 2016,”
and there was a “consensus” among “six different entities” that the dispute
had been resolved. Reed did not specify which entities these were but
claimed he believed at that point that “all of the impediments to moving the
money were gone” and “[they had] answered the question of entitlement.” As
such, Reed transferred the money into his personal account, declared
$200,000 of this money as profits on his 2015 incomes taxes, and declared the
other $200,000 as profits on his 2016 income taxes.
Defense counsel asked Reed to explain the reasons Reed believed in
good faith that he owned the entirety of the $400,000 in settlement funds. In
response, Reed asserted that Section 1021.9 and an unidentified California
Supreme Court decision interpreting this statute purportedly granted him
“first priority” to plaintiffs’ settlement funds. At some point in the
questioning, the trial court interjected and pointed out that based on its
reading of the statute, Section 1021.9 did not give an attorney first priority
over client settlement funds. Instead, the court noted, Section 1021.9 merely
authorized a prevailing party in a nuisance action to collect attorney fees.
The court then remarked that Reed was trying to “wrap” himself in a statute
that did not say what he was claiming it said. Reed, however, continued to
insist that Section 1021.9 established his entitlement to the entirety of
plaintiffs’ settlement funds.
Following this line of questioning, the trial court made the following
announcement to the jury: “I want to clear up something that we got into a
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little earlier. [¶] We are not here to decide whether Mr. Reed is right or
wrong about his being entitled to the money. We are here to decide whether
he has a good faith belief that he was entitled to the money. [¶] We will be
instructing you on that. [¶] He had been referring in what I now take to have
been shorthand to the statute number that I said doesn’t say what he said it
said. However, he says there is case law interpreting it that does say what
he is saying. [¶] If he believes that, it doesn’t matter whether he is right or
wrong, and, frankly, I haven’t read this case law so I don’t know if he is right
or wrong. It is his state of mind and not the underlying law that matters.
[¶] The reason I bring that up is because I realized it might have given you
the impression that I was somehow lecturing Mr. Reed on how he was wrong
on the law. That wasn’t my intention at all. I don’t know what this case law
he is talking about says. He had referred to a statute. I looked up the
statute. Doesn’t look to me like the statute says what he said it is going to
say. [¶] But if other law says that or if he reasonably believed that other law
says that, then he does, okay.”
On cross-examination, Reed conceded his cover letter to plaintiffs was
part of his representation agreement with them, and he further
acknowledged this agreement would dictate how much money he would
receive from their acceptance of a 998 offer. However, Reed resisted the
prosecutor’s suggestion that the cover letter and representation agreement
should be read together, noting the trial court had “to make that decision.”
In response, the court interjected that the criminal trial was not the forum
for that issue and that the court had been “telling the jury for the last week
that [they] [we]re not dealing with the merits of any civil dispute.” The court
indicated the dispositive issue was Reed’s “state of mind,” “what actually was
understood and discussed among the parties at the time,” and Reed’s “belief
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about what his obligations were.” The court concluded: “If it turns out he’s
wrong about what the contract was, you don’t care and I don’t care.”
Later on in the cross-examination, Reed reversed himself on the issue
of whether plaintiffs had agreed to split the settlement money with him.
Instead, he testified plaintiffs “turned down the offer of the split, and as a
consequence . . . got none [of the money].” Reed asserted plaintiffs never
claimed the settlement money was theirs or provided any basis for their
belief they owned these funds.
At several points, Reed claimed he believed the settlement funds were
entirely his “after the State Bar made that decision.” Reed did not specify
which State Bar decision he was referring to, but this statement prompted
the prosecutor to move to admit the award from the January 2016 State Bar
fee arbitration.2 This nonbinding arbitration proceeding had taken place
before a three-arbitrator panel that considered evidence and testimony
regarding the fee dispute. The award reflected the panel’s determination
that Reed owed plaintiffs $400,000.
On this score, the trial court had initially stated during pretrial
proceedings that the parties were not allowed to discuss the State Bar fee
arbitration apart from noting it had occurred. The court also informed the
jury earlier in the trial it would not be told the results of that proceeding
because it was the jury’s factual determinations and not those of the
arbitration panel that would govern this case.
After Reed gave testimony implying the State Bar had determined he
was entitled to plaintiffs’ settlement funds, the trial court granted the
prosecution’s request, over the defense’s objection, to admit the fee award for
2 Reed was required to attend the arbitration proceeding after plaintiffs
complained to the State Bar about his conduct.
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impeachment purposes. While discussing this issue outside the presence of
the jury, the court noted that Reed had “done his best to give the impression
that he won the arbitration,” and further stated that if Reed was “going to
tell the jury” that the State Bar said he was entitled to the settlement funds,
then the prosecutor would be “100 percent entitled to bring out the fact that
it was a lie.” When the award was admitted into evidence, however, the court
cautioned the jury that the award was not evidence of the truth of its
contents but was admissible because it could bear on whether Reed had a
good faith belief he was entitled to the money or knew there was a dispute
with plaintiffs over ownership of the funds.
Upon further cross-examination on this issue, which included a review
of the findings in the State Bar fee arbitration award, Reed acknowledged the
State Bar did not actually tell him he was entitled to the settlement funds.
Instead, Reed admitted the State Bar had merely indicated it would not file
charges against him in the separate complaint filed by plaintiffs relative to
the Settlement Authorization Dispute where plaintiffs claimed they had no
retainer agreement with Reed, did not authorize him to settle their matter,
and forged their signatures on the settlement checks. Upon additional
questioning, Reed also admitted that after the State Bar fee arbitration was
initiated but before the panel issued a decision, he moved the settlement
funds into his own personal account despite knowing plaintiffs were claiming
ownership of those funds.
During this portion of the questioning, the trial court reiterated to the
jury that “[a]n arbitration award does not determine, for your purposes,
whether or not the clients or Mr. Reed was entitled to that money.” It also
reminded the jury the award was non-binding and relevant only insofar as it
related to the prosecution’s assertion that the award cast doubt on Reed’s
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good faith belief in his ownership of the money and put him on notice of the
fact there was a dispute over the funds.
On redirect examination, Reed outlined five bases for his purported
good faith belief he owned the entirety of the settlement funds: (1) Reed
believed that inverse condemnation cases statutorily allow for the recovery of
attorney fees; (2) Section 1021.9 and a California Supreme Court decision
interpreting that statute provided that any fees incurred belonged directly to
the attorney; (3) the Commercial Code granted Reed a security interest in
any settlement and provided that plaintiffs consented to having their award
reduced by attorney fees and costs when they signed the retainer agreement;
(4) Reed had a possessory lien over any recovery by plaintiffs that entitled
him to take first from the recovery before passing the rest onto plaintiffs; and
(5) Reed had an implied contractual lien that granted him a “greater” interest
in the settlement funds and gave him a “right to possess[] and dispos[e] [of
the funds] until there [w]as a determination made by the court.”
C. Jury Instruction Discussions and Reopened Redirect
Examination of Reed
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court and the parties
discussed whether jury instructions should be given regarding Reed’s legal
theories of ownership of settlement funds. During these discussions, the
court indicated it believed Reed’s theories were “baloney,” as they addressed
only the issue of an attorney’s entitlement to attorney fees from either a
defendant or a client, and not the issue of how to divide settlement funds
between a client and attorney. Nor, in the court’s view, did these theories
entitle an attorney to “take his last dollar out before the client sees a penny.”
The court stated it would be willing to instruct on these theories if requested
to do so by Reed but also warned that if the court did not agree with the
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theories, it would also “give the opposite instruction.” In response, defense
counsel declined jury instructions regarding Reed’s theories of ownership.
When these discussions resumed outside the presence of the jury the
following day, the court highlighted it had been “making a point in front of
the jury of talking about how the only thing that really counts is not the truth
of the law, but whether Mr. Reed had a good faith understanding of the law.”
The court then expressed concerns about how the jury was to determine if
Reed believed in good faith that he owned the settlement funds if the jury did
not understand anything about the law in this area. The court reiterated its
willingness to instruct on Reed’s theories of ownership with the caveat that if
it disagreed with Reed’s theories, it would “shoot them down.” The defense
again declined such instructions.
In response, the trial court continued to express concern about how the
jury was going to understand the legal issues involved in Reed’s good faith
defense. The court then invited the parties to consider whether they wanted
to have a legal expert testify as to whether or not Reed’s contentions were in
good faith because the court was concerned that, apart from Reed’s
testimony, no one was “attempting to tell [the jury] whether [Reed] [w]as
right or wrong.” However, the court stated that “[i]f neither side wants me to
instruct and neither side wants to put on any more witnesses, that’s okay
with me; I will leave it to you to argue to the jury about what they should or
should not think about whether Mr. Reed’s articulated theories are in good
faith or not.”
Defense counsel then stated his position was to “leave it be” with no
further instructions and the jury could decide whether Reed acted in good
faith belief. Nonetheless, the trial court invited both sides to consider over
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the upcoming weekend whether they wanted to present further evidence or
have the court provide jury instructions on this issue.
The following Monday, Reed asked if he could retake the stand, and the
trial court permitted him to do so subject to cross-examination. Before Reed
took the stand, the court informed the jury it had extensive discussions with
the parties around the issue of Reed’s testimony that he had a good faith
belief he was entitled to keep the entire $400,000. The court then reminded
the jury of what the court had been saying all along: “We are not here to try
whether Mr. Reed’s opinion was right or wrong, we are here to try, among
other things, whether Mr. Reed, in good faith, held such an opinion, and if so,
whether holding such an opinion was reasonable.”
On the reopened redirect examination, Reed touted his experience as a
lawyer and his familiarity with statutes that establish whether a lawyer or
client gets paid first from settlements such as the one obtained in plaintiffs’
matter. Reed also claimed to have done legal research around this issue,
stating he relied on Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, along with the
other theories of ownership he previously testified about, in concluding an
attorney had the right to be paid first in trespass cases such as these.
D. Jury Instructions and Closing Arguments
As relevant here, the trial court’s jury instructions included the
following instructions regarding the crime of grand theft by embezzlement:
“Count 1 relates to the Schulers; Count 2 relates to the Stones and Turners.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that, one, an owner entrusted his or her property to the defendant; two, the
owner did so because he or she trusted the defendant; three, the defendant
fraudulently took or used that property for his own benefit; and, four, when
the defendant took or used the property, he intended to deprive the owner of
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it.” “It is not necessary that the defendant received the property directly
from the owner. If the property was received from a third party under
circumstances whereby it was received by the defendant on behalf of or in
trust for the owner, and the defendant took the property for his own use
without authorization, that may be grand theft by embezzlement. [¶] It is
sufficient that the defendant and the owners were in a relationship of trust
and that the relationship is the reason why the third party transferred the
property to the defendant. [¶] It is not necessary that the owners continued
to trust the defendant by the time the property was taken. [¶] A person acts
fraudulently when he or she takes undue advantage of another person or
causes a loss to that person by breaching a duty, trust, or confidence.”
The trial court also gave the following jury instruction regarding Reed’s
good faith defense: “A good faith belief in acting with authorization to use
the property is a defense. In deciding whether the defendant believed that he
had a right to the property and whether he held that belief in good faith,
consider all the facts known to him at the time he obtained the property,
along with all the other evidence in the case. [¶] The defendant may hold the
belief in good faith, even if the belief is mistaken or unreasonable. But if the
defendant was aware of facts that made that belief completely unreasonable,
you may conclude that the belief was not held in good faith.”
In its closing argument, the prosecution argued the entirety of the
$400,000 in settlement proceeds belonged to plaintiffs. The prosecutor began
by highlighting Reed’s repeated representations to the wildfire victims that
they would not have to pay his attorney fees and costs because PG&E would
pay them, and that their recovery would not be reduced by the costs of his
services. The prosecutor then noted that Reed entered into a representation
agreement with plaintiffs that incorporated a cover letter with the same
18
term—namely, that any recovery obtained from PG&E would not be reduced
by Reed’s attorney fees and costs because he would be paid separately. The
prosecution argued Reed’s statements and the representation agreement
were “incredibly clear” that any recovery from PG&E, which would include
the 998 offers of $200,000 for each of the families, would not be reduced by
Reed’s attorney fees and costs. Reed, however, acted to appropriate all of
these funds. Additionally, Reed had earlier obtained payment for his work on
plaintiffs’ case through the settlement of the PG&E Fee Lawsuit.
Relative to Reed’s good faith defense, the prosecutor argued the
February 2016 State Bar fee arbitration award demonstrated a lack of good
faith on Reed’s part because he moved the settlement funds into and out of
his personal accounts and ultimately spent them even though the arbitrators
determined plaintiffs were owed the entire $400,000.
The defense argued in closing: “At that time when PG&E wrote a
check [for the 998 offers], whose money was that? Part of it was Turner,
Schuler, Stone’s. Part of it, if they had read what was sent to them, was
Reed’s, which would have been divided up. They were at odds with that
about how to divide that money up.” Without further explanation or
reference to the representation agreements or Reed’s theories of ownership,
the defense also asserted the settlement funds received from PG&E “included
Reed’s attorney’s fees.”
Defense counsel then pointedly argued that “what’s at issue here is the
intent,” and whether Reed believed in good faith that he had a right to the
property he took. Counsel contended that Reed could hold a belief in good
faith even if that belief was mistaken or unreasonable. He also asserted that
Reed researched the issue and consulted with attorneys when forming his
opinions on the issue of ownership. Counsel then stated that even if the jury
19
did not convict him, Reed would still be held accountable for his actions
because the matter would return to civil court, which is “where it should be
decided.” At the end, counsel reiterated that the matter should be sent back
to civil court because lawyers there “can look at the law and interpret it
differently.”
The jury ultimately convicted Reed of both counts of grand theft by
embezzlement and found true the special allegation that the offenses
constituted an aggravated white-collar crime involving the taking of over
$100,000 in property.
DISCUSSION
Reed challenges his convictions on the bases of: jury instructional
error; insufficiency of evidence to demonstrate plaintiffs owned the
settlement proceeds; improper admission of the State Bar fee arbitration
award; improper comments by the trial court during the trial; and cumulative
error that prejudiced Reed. We address these contentions in turn.
A. Purported Instructional Error
Reed contends the trial court removed the ownership element of the
embezzlement charges from the jury’s consideration and neglected its sua
sponte duty to instruct the jury on the contract interpretation principles
needed to determine the issue of ownership over the settlement funds.
1. Embezzlement Instructions
Reed acknowledges on appeal that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury on the elements of embezzlement, which include an owner’s
entrustment of his or her property to the defendant (§ 503; People v.
Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 764).3 However, Reed also points out the
court repeatedly stated during trial that the jury was “ ‘not [t]here to decide
3 See pages 17–18, ante, for the court’s embezzlement instructions.
20
whether [Reed] [wa]s right or wrong about his being entitled to the
[settlement funds]’ ” but to determine if Reed held a good faith belief that he
owned such funds.4 (Italics omitted.) In Reed’s view, such midtrial
comments conflicted with the court’s embezzlement instructions and
essentially removed the element of ownership from the jury’s consideration.
“When instructions are claimed to be conflicting or ambiguous, ‘we
inquire whether the jury was “reasonably likely” to have construed them in a
manner that violates the defendant’s rights.’ [Citation.] We look to the
instructions as a whole and the entire record of trial, including the
arguments of counsel.” (People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720.) If
we determine there was a failure of instruction, such as the effective removal
of an element of a crime from the jury’s consideration, we must conduct a
“thorough examination of the record” to determine if we can “conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the
error.” (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 (Neder); see also People
v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 (Mil).) For example, if a defendant
contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a
contrary finding, the error is not harmless. (Neder, at p. 19.) Conversely, an
instructional error is harmless where the reviewing court “concludes beyond
a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported
by overwhelming evidence.” (Id. at p. 17.) “Our task, then, is to determine
4 Additionally, when Reed stated on cross-examination that a judge had
to decide whether the cover letters and representation agreements with
plaintiffs should be construed together, the court interjected that the criminal
trial was not the forum for this issue and reminded the jurors they were not
dealing with the merits of a civil dispute. The court then refocused the
jurors’ attention on Reed’s state of mind and his belief about what his
obligations were, concluding with the statement that “[i]f it turns out [Reed’s]
wrong about what the contract was, you don’t care and I don’t care.”
21
‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary
finding with respect to the omitted element.’ ” (Mil, at p. 417)
As indicated, the trial court repeatedly commented during trial that the
jury need not consider whether Reed was right or wrong in believing he
owned or was entitled to the settlement funds. We will assume, for purposes
of argument, that such comments amounted to a failure of instruction to the
extent they could be understood as removing the ownership element of
embezzlement from the jury’s consideration, i.e., that “an owner entrusted his
or her property to the defendant.” But the question then arises whether such
error was prejudicial. We conclude it was not because there was no evidence
in the record that could rationally lead to a finding that Reed—as opposed to
plaintiffs—owned the settlement funds. (See Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 417.)
As a preliminary matter, we note Reed’s closing argument never
contended there was insufficient evidence of the ownership element of
embezzlement; instead, he argued strenuously that he lacked the intent to
commit the crime because he had a claim of right to the settlement funds and
a good faith belief in his ownership thereof.
More importantly, the record contained no evidence rationally
supporting a conclusion that the ownership element was not established.
Indeed, it was undisputed at trial that Reed was plaintiffs’ lawyer (and thus
a fiduciary) in the lawsuit against PG&E; that PG&E’s 998 offers provided
for $200,000 to settle the Stone-Turners’ claims and $200,000 to settle the
Schulers’ claims; that Reed accepted the 998 offers as plaintiffs’ lawyer; and
that Reed accepted both $200,000 settlement checks on plaintiffs’ behalf in
October 2013. It was also undisputed that Reed deposited the settlement
checks into an IOLTA trust account before eventually transferring the funds
22
to his own personal accounts without plaintiffs’ consent and spending them
entirely.
Likewise, the evidence was uncontroverted that PG&E had already
paid Reed $204,000 for his work on plaintiffs’ behalf. And notwithstanding
Reed’s trial testimony that he believed he was entitled to 100 percent of the
settlement funds (which supported his defense of good faith), his counsel
acknowledged during closing argument that at least some “[p]art of [the 998
settlement funds] w[ere] Turner, Schuler, Stone’s.”
In sum, there was undisputed and overwhelming evidence that
settlement funds belonged to plaintiffs and that, despite his fiduciary
responsibilities and initial deposit of the funds into an IOLTA trust account,
Reed transferred the money—unilaterally and without the benefit of an
adjudicated judgment—to his personal accounts and spent it all.
At the same time, there was no record evidence upon which a rational
jury could conclude that plaintiffs did not own the settlement funds paid by
PG&E. To the extent Reed may have claimed a contractual right to his
attorney fees as part of the settlement, the undisputed evidence made it
unmistakably clear that Reed had no such right. Specifically, the evidence
showed that before commencing the PG&E litigation, Reed solicited wildfire
victims, including plaintiffs, with the representation that any settlement
with PG&E would not be reduced by attorney fees, which would be paid
separately by PG&E. Thereafter, Reed provided plaintiffs with a
representation agreement containing a clause stating that plaintiffs “agree
that the reasonable value of [Reed’s] services” was $625 per hour and that
plaintiffs “agree to pay for [certain] costs and expenses in addition to [Reed’s]
hourly fees.” But that document was accompanied by a cover letter expressly
stating it was “part of [the parties’] agreement” that “all fees and costs
23
incurred in th[e] case w[ould] be paid by PG&E under the Inverse
Condemnation claim as the law requires.” Consistent with Reed’s oral
representations to all the wildfire victims, the letter emphasized: “Phrased
another way … there will be no reduction from your recovery from PG&E for
my services. To the extent we are successful, you will be paid for your
damages without reduction for attorney fees and costs, and I will be paid
separately for the fees and costs.”5 (Italics added.)
Because there was no extrinsic conflict in the evidence, the question of
whether the cover letter and representation agreement contractually
obligated plaintiffs’ payment of Reed’s attorney fees is a question of contract
interpretation that is subject to our de novo review. (See Gilkyson v. Disney
Enters., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 900, 915 (Gilkyson).) Thus, we construe
the terms of the parties’ fee agreement under traditional principles of
contract interpretation, mindful that any ambiguities must be resolved “ ‘in
favor of a fair and reasonable interpretation’ ” in favor of the clients and
against the attorney. (M’Guinness v. Johnson (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 602,
617–618 (M’Guinness).)
Here, the plain language of the cover letter, which stated it was part of
the parties’ agreement, twice highlighted Reed’s contractual representation
that plaintiffs’ recovery from PG&E would not be reduced by his attorney fees
and costs and, instead, to the extent plaintiffs were successful in the lawsuit,
Reed would be “paid by PG&E” or “paid separately.” Reed did not advocate
for a contrary interpretation of the cover letter at trial, apart from asserting
5 On appeal, Reed argues the cover letter was not a part of the Schulers’
agreement as Marlene did not recall signing the fee agreement (though she
actually did) and denied receiving the cover letter. But Reed acknowledged
on cross-examination that the cover letter received by the Stone-Turners was
also likely provided to the Schulers, as Reed had a computer program that
auto-generated the same letter to all of the prospective clients.
24
he had made a drafting error in the cover letter and intended to state that all
fees and costs would be “ ‘repaid’ ” and not “ ‘paid’ ” by PG&E under an
inverse condemnation claim.
On appeal, Reed suggests his fee agreement with plaintiffs was
ambiguous as it did not address how settlement funds would be divided if
PG&E decided not to pay “under the Inverse Condemnation claim as the law
require[d],” or what to do in the “unanticipated” event of receiving a lump
sum settlement offer as occurred here. In the face of this perceived
ambiguity, Reed contends the representation agreement’s provision for his
$625 hourly fee controls, and the cover letter’s provision of no reduction from
recovery applies only “where the law required PG&E to separately pay Reed’s
fees.” Reed’s argument lacks merit.
As stated earlier, any ambiguities in a client fee agreement must be
resolved in favor of a “ ‘fair and reasonable’ ” interpretation and in favor of
the client. (See M’Guinness, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 617.) Here, the
nebulous inverse condemnation language Reed cites was followed by two
plainly-worded assurances that plaintiffs’ damages and recovery would not be
reduced by the costs for Reed’s services. Contrary to Reed’s suggestion,
interpreting the agreement as requiring plaintiffs to pay, as a default, his
fees of $625 per hour except where PG&E is legally obligated to pay attorney
fees would be unfair and wholly unreasonable. Similarly, an interpretation
requiring plaintiffs’ payment of Reed’s hourly rate—even when PG&E
separately and actually pays his attorney fees—conflicts with the express
terms of the cover letter and is equally unfair and unreasonable.
Additionally, we note the cover letter emphasized the proposed fee
arrangement was, for plaintiffs, superior to “the usual 33 1/3% to 40%
recovery fee arrangement,” precisely because “there will be no reduction from
25
[plaintiffs’] recovery.” On this last point, it is inconceivable that a reasonable
person would understand the agreement as entitling Reed to any percentage,
let alone 100 percent, of any settlement achieved.
At bottom, the record demonstrates that plaintiffs were successful in
obtaining settlements from PG&E and that Reed did in fact receive $204,000
from PG&E for his work on plaintiffs’ case. Therefore, per the terms of the
representation agreement and cover letter, the $400,000 in settlement funds
belonged to plaintiffs and was not subject to reduction for Reed’s attorney
fees and costs.
Finally, we note Reed advanced several extra-contractual legal theories
at trial that purportedly supported his defense of a good faith belief in his
ownership of the settlement funds. But Reed points to no record evidence
and offers no explanation in this court as to how those legal theories might
defeat a contractual agreement between a lawyer and his clients in a
situation such as this. Nor did he attempt to make such a showing below.
Thus, even accepting that Reed believed such extra-contractual theories
supported a good faith defense to the embezzlement charges (which the jury
evidently rejected), he falls short of establishing that those theories legally
undermined plaintiffs’ contractual right to the settlement funds or otherwise
rationally supported a contrary finding on the ownership element of the
charges. (See Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 19.)
In sum, there is no record evidence upon which a rational jury could
conclude that plaintiffs did not own the settlement funds that were entrusted
to Reed. As such, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
verdict would have been the same even if the trial court had refrained from
26
making the midtrial comments challenged on appeal. (See Neder, supra, 527
U.S. at p. 19; Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417.)6
2. Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct
Reed argues the trial court failed to fulfill its sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on the relevant contract interpretation principles needed to
evaluate the terms of the cover letter and representation agreement. In this
regard, Reed points out the court was clearly conflicted about how the jury
would adjudicate the issue of who was entitled to the settlement funds in the
absence of instructions regarding either contract law or Reed’s ownership
theories. Yet, Reed states, the court left the question of which jury
instructions to provide entirely up to the parties’ counsel who ultimately
declined any additional instructions. We conclude no error has been
demonstrated.
“Trial courts only have a sua sponte duty to instruct on ‘the general
principles of law relevant to and governing the case.’ ” (People v. Rubalcava
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 333–334.) “ ‘That obligation includes instructions on
all of the elements of a charged offense’ [citation], and on recognized ‘defenses
. . . and on the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged
offense.’ ” (Id. at p. 334.) Here, general principles of contract interpretation
are not elements of either the offense of embezzlement or a defense thereto,
and interpretation of a contract is a legal matter that falls within the
province of the court (Gilkyson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 915). In any
event, even assuming the trial court was somehow subject to a sua sponte
6 For all the reasons stated, we likewise reject Reed’s other contention
that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs
owned the settlement funds and that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the special allegation that Reed took property worth more than
$100,000 (§ 186.11, subd. (a)).
27
duty to instruct the jury on principles of contract interpretation, instructional
errors are reviewed under the harmless error standard. (See Neder, supra,
527 U.S at p. 19.) Having concluded in part A.1, ante, that plaintiffs were not
contractually obligated to pay Reed’s attorney fees out of the settlement
funds, we similarly conclude that any failure to instruct the jury on the
relevant principles of contract law was also harmless.
B. Admission of State Bar Fee Arbitration Award
Reed challenges the trial court’s admission of the State Bar fee
arbitration award on various bases. We review this ruling for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 553 (Kerley).)
Reed first points to Business and Professions Code section 6204,
subdivision (e), which provides the award and determinations of State Bar fee
arbitrators “shall not be admissible nor operate as collateral estoppel or res
judicata in any action or proceeding.” Reed also refers to Business and
Professions Code section 6200, subdivision (h), which states that all
discussions and offers of settlement made in a fee arbitration proceeding are
confidential and may not be disclosed in subsequent proceedings.
In response, the People contend the evidence of the fee arbitration
award was properly admitted for impeachment purposes under the doctrine
of “opening the door.” More particularly, the People point out the trial court
had refused to allow any mention of the arbitral result until Reed implied in
his testimony that the State Bar had actually approved his position that he
owned the settlement funds. The People’s argument is well taken.
“Under the doctrine of ‘opening the door,’ one party may render
otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible by introducing the topic
selectively such as to leave a misleading impression.” (Kerley, supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at p. 553.) Thus, “[w]here part of an act, declaration,
28
conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the
same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party.” (Evid. Code, § 356.)
People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997 (Ramirez) is instructive.
There, defense counsel elicited testimony from a witness suggesting that
police officers used “[t]rick questions” and pressured the witness into making
statements that incriminated the defendant. (Ramirez, at pp. 1112, 1114.)
Relying on Evidence Code section 356, the prosecution sought to introduce
the witness’s entire interview with the police so the jury could determine
whether the police acted improperly in obtaining the witness’s statements.
(Ramirez, at p. 1114.) The trial court admitted the recording, finding it to be
relevant and not unduly prejudicial. (Ibid.) It also admonished the jury that
the evidence was not being admitted for the truth of what the officers were
saying but for the limited purpose of explaining the witness’s answers to
their questions and his state of mind. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
defense counsel opened the door” on the issue of the witness’s state of mind
and that the court properly allowed “the prosecutor to rebut [the witness’s]
testimony by introducing the whole interview to reveal the officers’ tone and
manner of questioning.” (Id. at p. 1115; see also People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522, 599, 600 [upholding admission of interview tapes where the
defense created an impression that an inspector had “ ‘spoon-fed’ ” details of
the crime to a prosecution witness during their interviews].)
Here, Reed was the one who raised the topic of determinations the
State Bar had made regarding the issue of ownership over and entitlement to
the settlement funds. As the record reflects, before the trial court admitted
the arbitration award, Reed testified the dispute with plaintiffs over
ownership of the funds “had been resolved” by the State Bar,” “[s]o all of the
29
impediments to [his] moving the money were gone.” (Italics added.) Reed also
testified at this point that this resolution had “answered the question of
entitlement.” At another point, Reed testified he spent all of the settlement
funds only “[a]fter it was determined that there was no legitimate dispute,
after the State Bar made that decision.” (Italics added.) On this record, the
trial court properly granted the prosecutor’s request to admit evidence of the
arbitration award for purposes of rebutting Reed’s insinuation that the State
Bar resolved the ownership dispute in his favor. That is, admission of the
evidence provided another data point from which the jury could determine
whether Reed’s belief that he owned the settlement funds was in good faith.
Reed counters he did not open the door to the award’s admission
because he had not intimated that he won the arbitration or that the State
Bar told him he was free to take the money. He also points to his later
testimony that the State Bar proceeding to which he was referring was the
separate complaint filed by plaintiffs relative to the Settlement Authorization
Dispute. We find this contention unpersuasive.
The trial court admitted the fee arbitration award because the clear
import of Reed’s testimony was that the State Bar had sanctioned his taking
of plaintiffs’ settlement funds. This is evident from Reed’s testimony that the
State Bar’s resolution of the parties’ dispute in January 2016 resulted in the
removal of “all of the impediments to moving the money” from the client trust
account to his personal account because the State Bar had “answered the
question of entitlement.” Likewise, Reed referenced the “consensus” of six
unidentified “different entities” that had purportedly said the “dispute [was]
resolved” and Reed could move “the money as [he] [was] required to do under
the State Bar rules.” It is unclear how this testimony could be understood as
anything other than an assertion that the State Bar ruled in Reed’s favor on
30
the issue of ownership of the funds. And this remained the case even though
Reed later claimed he was actually referring to the separate Settlement
Authorization Dispute that plaintiffs initiated against him before the State
Bar (in which the State Bar decided not to file charges against him).
Reed attacks the arbitration award on various other bases, including
that the award was a “legal nullity” because he requested a de novo trial after
the arbitration proceeding and because it was irrelevant. These contentions
lack merit.
At the outset, whether the arbitration award was binding or of no legal
effect has no bearing on its relevance in this particular criminal proceeding.
“ ‘Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” ’ ” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87.) “ ‘While there is no
universal test of relevancy, the general rule in criminal cases might be stated
as whether or not the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable
inference to establish any fact material for the prosecution or to overcome
any material matter sought to be proved by the defense. [Citation.] Evidence
is relevant when no matter how weak it may be, it tends to prove the issue
before the jury.’ ” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 491.)
Here, the State Bar fee arbitration award carried probative value on
the issue whether Reed maintained a good faith belief in his ownership of the
settlement funds. In the absence of the award’s admission into evidence, the
jury would have been presented with only Reed’s self-serving testimony that
the State Bar had decided he rightfully owned the funds, which would bolster
his good faith defense. The arbitration award was therefore relevant on this
material point.
31
Finally, Reed asserts that even if the arbitration award was relevant,
its admission was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. Reed
points out that the award, on its face, addressed the core issue of ownership
over the disputed funds which was an essential element of the embezzlement
charge. Reed then asserts that the probative value of the award was minimal
because it was poorly reasoned and that its administrative findings may have
been given more weight than they deserved. As such, Reed contends, the
trial court’s admission of the award presented an “enormous risk” that the
jury would view the award as conclusive evidence of Reed’s guilt. We
disagree.
Evidence Code section 352 provides in relevant part that a trial court
may exclude evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” For purposes of
this statute, undue prejudice does not mean merely that evidence is harmful
to a defendant’s case. (Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 532.) Instead, the
term “prejudice” refers to “ ‘ “ ‘evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155,
167.)
This standard for prejudice has not been met. As the record
demonstrates, the questioning around the State Bar fee arbitration award
was straightforward and did not take substantial time to present. Moreover,
the jury was twice instructed that the award was non-binding and was being
admitted solely for the purpose of assessing the merits of Reed’s good faith
defense. On balance, and given the court’s instructions, the award’s
probative value regarding the genuineness of Reed’s good faith belief in his
32
ownership of the settlement funds was not outweighed by any threat that the
evidence would tend to evoke an emotional bias against him.
C. Trial Court Comments and Cumulative Error
Reed contends the trial court engaged in improper judicial comment at
multiple points during the trial. Specifically, he challenges 15 comments or
actions taken by the court which fall into the following general categories:
interjections during or after witness testimony to clarify or repeat certain
responses or to synthesize certain issues; commentary during a ruling on
defense counsel’s objections; a statement regarding the court’s refusal to
certify a defense witness as an expert; and cutting off some of Reed’s
responses to certain questions.
Familiar principles of law govern our review of these contentions. A
trial court has “broad latitude in fair commentary, so long as it does not
effectively control the verdict.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730,
768 (Rodriguez).) A court may not, of course, “express its views on the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence or otherwise ‘usurp the jury’s exclusive
function as the arbiter of questions of fact and the credibility of witnesses.’ ”
(People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735 (Melton).) But it is well settled
that a court “need not confine itself to neutral, bland, and colorless
summaries, but may focus critically on particular evidence, expressing views
about its persuasiveness.” (Rodriguez, at p. 768.) “The propriety and
prejudicial effect of a particular comment are judged both by its content and
by the circumstances in which it was made.” (Melton, at p. 735.) In
evaluating any claims of judicial misconduct in this area, we determine
whether it was reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different
verdict had the court refrained from asking these questions or making these
comments. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350–351, citing People v.
33
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Finally, and importantly here, “[a]s a
general rule, a specific and timely objection to judicial misconduct is required
to preserve the claim for appellate review.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61
Cal.4th 1293, 1320 (Seumanu).)
Interjections During or After Witness Testimony
Reed first challenges the trial court’s interjection during the portion of
plaintiff Turner’s testimony that dealt with her acceptance of PG&E’s 998
offer. Reed asserts Turner “struggled mightily” to avoid conceding that she
authorized Reed to accept the 998 offer but the trial court reframed Turner’s
equivocal responses as possibly stemming from her not understanding if
defense counsel was asking if she accepted the earlier settlement conference
offer that included a separate $75,000 in attorney fees for Reed or the 998
offer that provided her a lump sum of $200,000.
In making this argument, Reed does not identify or meaningfully
discuss what specific statement by the court he challenges. (See Nelson v.
Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [deeming
undeveloped arguments waived].) Nor, apparently, did his counsel object to
anything the trial court said during this line of questioning. (Seumanu,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) For both of these reasons, we deem Reed’s
challenge on this matter forfeited.
Next, Reed takes issue with a comment the trial court made after
PG&E’s counsel testified there generally was no obligation for a defendant
(such as itself) to pay attorney fees unless there was a court ruling requiring
such payment or some agreement between the parties that a defendant would
pay. Specifically, after PG&E’s counsel concluded his testimony on this issue,
the court observed that the “People here may be skipping over some stuff that
might not be quite clear to the jury.” The court then went on to clarify that if
34
a plaintiff won an inverse condemnation lawsuit, he or she would receive a
certain amount for damages and a certain amount for attorney fees. If,
however, the matter settled, “[t]here [w]ere at least two different ways to
handle that.” One way was represented in the earlier mediation proposal
that was not accepted where each family would receive $200,000 and Reed
would receive $75,000. The other way was “represented in the 998 offer”
whereby each family received $200,000 and plaintiffs would then “[have to]
deal with whether or not [they] [we]re going to pay any attorney’s fees.” The
court then proceeded to ask both counsel if it said anything incorrect in this
synthesis of the issue of how attorney fees could be handled in the event of
settlement, and counsel for both parties indicated they had no issue with the
court’s framing of this issue.
Reed contends on appeal that the trial court’s summary of this issue
gave jurors the “false impression” it would have been appropriate for
plaintiffs to not pay Reed anything for his work on their case. Reed, however,
forfeited this challenge. Not only did his counsel fail to lodge an objection
(see Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320), but he affirmatively indicated he
had no issue with the court’s comments. Regardless, even if we were to reach
the merits, Reed fails to identify anything false or misleading in the court’s
clarification on the topic.
Reed argues the trial court inappropriately intervened when Meadows
(the defense witness who testified about attorney billing) was asked about
whether the hours Reed put into the case were reasonable. More
particularly, Reed notes that after Meadows stated his belief that Reed’s
“overall billing was perfectly reasonable,” the court commented: “I’m not sure
I understand that question. I thought you were asking him about the hours,
whether they were reasonable. And he said given the hours, the billing was
35
reasonable. It sounds circular.” Defense counsel then asked Meadows a
second time if he thought Reed billed a reasonable number of hours and
Meadows opined the hours spent were reasonable. Reed asserts the court’s
intervention in this regard made Meadows seem “cagey.”
We see no basis for relief. Reed forfeited this challenge by not objecting
to the trial court’s comment. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.)
Further, Reed’s assertion lacks merit because it is reasonably clear that the
court was merely seeking to clear up possible jury confusion—a judicial
function that is well established. (See People v. Linwood (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 59, 74 (Linwood).)
At the end of his testimony, Meadows indicated that if a 998 offer did
not indicate a separate amount for attorney fees, a client would only be
contractually obligated to pay attorney fees to their lawyer if the
representation agreement required it. The trial court then asked the
following question: “So in other words, it is fair to say they’re not obligated
by the 998, but they may be obligated by their agreement with their
attorney?” Meadows confirmed this was the case. Though Reed does not
challenge the correctness of the court’s comment, he contends the comment
was unnecessary because there was “no need to have the witness say the
same thing twice,” particularly when what was being said was not helpful to
the defense.
This challenge is both forfeited due to Reed’s failure to raise it below
(see Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320) and meritless. A trial court is
not barred from “focus[ing] critically on particular evidence.” (See Rodriguez,
supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 768.) Here, the issue of whether the terms of a
representation agreement govern the division of a settlement that does not
separately address the issue of attorney fees is material because the answer
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to that question provides the jury with guidance as to what to look for in
determining who owns the settlement funds and what distributions should be
made. As such, it was entirely appropriate for the court to highlight the
portion of the witness testimony that spoke to this issue.
Reed next challenges a question posed by the trial court during the
testimony of Jiménez (the State Bar supervising attorney). Specifically, the
court asked Jiménez to confirm that an attorney could only remove funds
from a client trust fund when it had been determined by agreement or a court
ruling how much belonged to the attorney. Since Reed had removed funds
without either, Reed asserts the court’s question suggested he was guilty of
conversion. Additionally, Reed asserts the court erred in having Jiménez
confirm that one of Reed’s banks was not a bank that had been approved by
the State Bar for client trust accounts. Lastly, Reed contends the court
improperly commented that a 2006 State Bar opinion relied on by Reed did
not relate to the facts of this case.
These challenges are all forfeited because no objection was made in the
proceedings below. (See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) And as
recounted earlier in this opinion, the trial court repeatedly clarified to the
jury that violating State Bar rules is not itself a crime.
Comment to Defense Counsel Regarding His Objections
Reed challenges a comment made by the trial court when PG&E’s
counsel was testifying about a heated exchange that occurred between him
and Reed after Reed rejected the offer made at the judicial settlement
conference which included $75,000 in attorney fees on top of the $200,000
settlement for each family. PG&E’s counsel testified that Reed used the “ ‘F’
word” when speaking during this exchange. Defense counsel objected several
times to this portion of the witness’s testimony on the ground of relevance
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and the court overruled this objection a few times before saying: “Mr.
Cardoza, if you keep making the same objection, you are going to keep getting
the same ruling.” Reed claims this judicial comment was “uncalled-for” and
“harmful” because it “diminished” defense counsel “in the eyes of the jurors”
and suggested there was some impropriety in his making these objections.
We acknowledge a trial court should “refrain from making comments
before the jury that might suggest it has allied itself with the prosecution.”
(Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) For example, “[a] trial court
commits misconduct if it ‘persists in making discourteous and disparaging
remarks to a defendant’s counsel . . . and utters frequent comment from
which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not
believed by the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the defense.’ ”
(People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1107.) Here, however, this one
isolated comment to defense counsel regarding the lack of utility in
repeatedly making the same objection does not amount to a persistent
pattern of making discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel.
No impropriety appears.
Comment Regarding Court’s Refusal to Certify a Defense Witness
Reed points out that when his counsel brought in Meadows to testify
regarding the reasonableness of Reed’s billing and asked if the trial court
would “accept him,” the court responded it was “not going to certify or
decertify [Reed’s] expert for him, but [defense counsel] [could] proceed to ask
questions that [he] would ask of an expert.” Reed asserts the court’s
statement made it appear to the jurors that there was some issue as to
Meadows’ competency to testify. Once again, Reed forfeited this challenge by
failing to object below. (See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) In any
event, this passing comment by the court in the context of the examination of
38
a witness whose testimony was relatively short (12 transcript pages) and of
relative insignificance could hardly be deemed to be unfair or prejudicial.
Interruptions During Reed’s Testimony
Reed identifies several instances where the trial court interrupted or
purported to correct his testimony. Reed first highlights that when he
testified the bankruptcy of two other clients not involved in this lawsuit had
resulted in a delay in plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the court expressed its impression
that the stay would only affect those other clients’ lawsuit. Reed also
complains that the court: (1) questioned his testimony that the other clients
settled their lawsuit and then objected to that settlement; (2) interrupted his
attempt to answer the court’s request that he clarify his views on the
$204,000 he received for work on plaintiffs’ case through settlement of the
PG&E Fee Lawsuit; (3) interrupted him when he was recounting the
discussions he had with plaintiffs regarding the strength of their case;
(4) challenged his assertion that Section 1021.9 granted him priority over
client settlement funds; and (5) told him he was “rambling” when he
explained another legal theory supporting his belief that he was entitled to
plaintiffs’ settlement funds. Reed argues that each of these interjections
served to damage his credibility in the eyes of the jury.
Reed forfeited these challenges by failing to object to the trial court’s
comments in the proceedings below. (See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1320.) His challenges also appear meritless as our review of the record
indicates the court’s comments largely served the purpose of providing
clarification to the jury or controlling the proceedings. (See Linwood, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 74 [clearing up jury confusion is a judicial function];
People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237 [trial court has a “statutory
39
duty to control trial proceedings” with a view to the “ ‘expeditious and
effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved’ ”].)
Further, with respect to the skepticism the trial court expressed
regarding Reed’s belief that Section 1021.9 granted him priority of ownership
over plaintiffs’ settlement funds, we observe the court later stated to the jury
that it may have given the jury the impression that it was “somehow
lecturing Mr. Reed on how he was wrong on the law,” but that it was not the
court’s intent to do so. The court further stated that if there was other law
that supported Reed’s theories or Reed reasonably believed other law
supported those theories, “then he does, okay.” We have no reason to doubt
that these comments adequately minimized any conceivable negative effect of
the perceived skepticism.
Cumulative Prejudice
Reed asserts the cumulative impact of the errors that occurred in the
trial court proceeding was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal of the
judgment.
“Cumulative error is present when the combined effect of the trial
court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant.” (People v. Capers
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.) Here, however, apart from our assumption of
instructional error based on the trial court’s mid-trial comments focusing the
jury on the issue of Reed’s good faith defense (which we conclude did not
result in prejudice), there are no errors to aggregate. As such, we reject
Reed’s claim of cumulative error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. Reed (A170827)
41
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