CourtListener 10857233•People v. Rodriguez CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/11/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F090104
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. M11311)
v.
JESUS HERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. Sosi Chitakian
Vogt, Judge.
Law Office of Angelica Maria Gutierrez Diaz and Angelica Gutierrez Diaz for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Jesus Hernandez Rodriguez appeals from the order denying his motion
to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7.1 He contends the trial
* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and DeSantos, J.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1.
court erred by finding he had not met his burden of proving his conviction “is legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [his] ability to meaningfully understand … the
actual or potential adverse immigration consequences.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Information and Change of Plea
On March 15, 1993, the Madera County District Attorney’s Office filed a
complaint charging appellant with a single count possession of cocaine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351).
Appellant underwent a preliminary hearing where the investigating officer
testified to the facts underlying the charge. On March 12, 1992, the officer observed
appellant arrive by vehicle in an area known for drug use and sales. Appellant parked
and appeared to take some items out of the front of his pants and deposit something on
the ground near his vehicle and the vehicle parked behind it. He thereafter left the area
on foot. Upon examination of the ground near the vehicles, the officer found bindles of
cocaine that he opined were packaged in amounts for sale. The officer testified it was not
uncommon for people to hide drugs they have on them to avoid police stopping them and
finding the drugs on their person.
Appellant was held to answer to the charge, an information was filed, and he
initially entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial.
On May 25, 1993, appellant decided to change his plea. With the assistance of a
Spanish interpreter, appellant completed a preprinted plea form. The plea form indicated
the plea was “unconditional,”2 and appellant had not been promised anything in exchange
for his plea. Among the items appellant initialed was paragraph 14, which read:
2 An “unconditional” plea, also known as an “open” plea is “ ‘a plea unconditioned
upon receipt of a particular sentence or other exercise of the court’s powers.’ ” (People v.
Conerly (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 240, 245, fn. 1.)
2.
“My attorney has explained the possible penalties and consequences
of the plea(s) of GUILTY to be 2, 3 or 4 years prison, and/or $20,000 fine
with parole term; [r]estitution fine; drug offender registration and, if not a
citizen, my plea may have the consequence of my deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” (Boldface
added.)
Appellant signed the section attesting he had “personally prepared and discussed
with my attorney, or have read, discussed and had explained to me by my attorney, each
of the above items, and I understand same.” Additionally, the interpreter signed the
section attesting he had “interpreted the above declaration and each item thereof to the
Defendant, translating to the best of my ability from the English language to the …
Spanish … language and from the … Spanish … language to the English language.”
Finally, appellant’s attorney signed the section attesting she “personally read, discussed
and explained the contents of the above declaration to the defendant and each item
thereof.”
At the change of plea hearing, appellant was assisted by the interpreter who went
over the plea form with him and was represented by counsel. The court confirmed with
appellant that his initials were on the plea form and confirmed with the interpreter that he
read the entire document to appellant. During the plea colloquy, the following exchange
took place:
“THE COURT: You understand you’re pleading guilty to possession of
cocaine for sale?
“[APPELLANT]: The only reason I’m pleading guilty is so that I will be
released.
“THE COURT: I understand that is a condition of your pleading guilty,
but you understand you’re pleading guilty to possession of cocaine for sale?
“[APPELLANT]: Yes.
“[¶] … [¶]
3.
“THE COURT: Okay. And this plea form is filled out as an
unconditional plea. However, we – I am doing this under the People v.
Fellman[3] where you will be sentenced to three years, the mid term, and
execution of sentence will be stayed on the condition that you be on
probation for a period of five years, you will be released at the time of
sentencing on felony probation and under the usual terms of probation,
which includes a fine and register as a drug offender, and you will be
deported, and if you return to the United States illegally you will
immediately be sentenced to three years in prison. Do you understand
that?
“[APPELLANT]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Okay.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I do want it clear for the record
that this – this plea is against my advice, and I want it clear that I am
reluctantly consenting to him entering the plea.” (Boldface added.)
The court then asked for appellant’s plea, to which appellant responded, “I’m
pleading guilty – I’m not guilty, but I’m pleading guilty on the condition that I’m going
to be released.” The court responded, “[Appellant], if you do not wish to enter an
unconditional plea of guilty under the terms that I’ve suggested, then we will confirm
your trial. So I realize you are maintaining your innocence, but off the record we
discussed evidence, and the evidence is highly suggestive that the acts you are accused of
are true and that’s the reason I made the Fellman [sic] plea. And either you enter an
unconditional plea of guilty, or we set it for trial.” Appellant replied, “Plead guilty.”
Counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea, and the court accepted appellant’s plea
and referred the matter to probation for a recommendation.
3 It is a little unclear what case the court was referring to, as we have been unable to
locate a case with the caption “People v. Fellman,” but we surmise the court may have
been referring to People v. Superior Court (Felmann) (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 270. In
Felmann, the Court of Appeal recognized a distinction between prohibited judicial plea
bargaining and what it viewed as a permissible ‘indicated sentence.’ Considering the
context of the court’s statements, it appears the court here was explaining it had given an
indicated sentence off the record.
4.
Sentencing
In preparing its report, probation interviewed appellant. Appellant reported to
probation that he did not know if he would like to be granted probation as he planned to
go to Mexico to work as soon as it became possible.4 He reported that he was one of five
children, and both of his parents, and all of his siblings lived in Mexico. He had lived in
Madera County for one year and did not reside in the United States legally. He was
currently unemployed, but at the time of his arrest, he had found employment in Santa
Maria. He had worked as a field laborer for approximately six months and had no other
means of support. He further reported he was married in 1988 and had 1 two-year-old
4 “In discussing portions of the probation report, we are cognizant of
section 1203.05, which limits (but does not entirely preclude) public access to the
probation report 60 days after judgment is pronounced or probation is granted. The
Legislature’s intent in cloaking the report with conditional confidentiality was to restrict
access only to personal information about a defendant (such as details concerning his or
her family background, medical and psychological condition, financial status, military
record, and substance abuse history) not nonpersonal information, such as the factual
summary of an offense and the evaluations, analyses, and recommendations of the
probation officer.” [Citation.] ‘[I]n a given case, the report may not contain any personal
information; it may contain only personal information that is readily available in other
public documents; and the probation report contains much nonpersonal information.’
[Citation.] In apparent recognition of this, appellate courts sometimes quote from a
probation report’s factual summary of the offense.” (People v. Williams (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 990, 996, fn. 9.)
Here, to the extent the information we refer to from the probation report is
personal information, we include it only where absolutely necessary to our resolution of
the issue on appeal. The information we cite is directly relevant to appellant’s state of
mind at the time or close thereafter to the time he entered his plea (over 30 years ago),
and something he has put at issue by virtue of his bringing his section 1473.7 motion and
the present appeal. We have been mindful of only including details that are relevant to
the issues on appeal, so as to not unnecessarily violate appellant’s or his family’s privacy.
We note the People’s respondent’s brief cites to similar information from the
probation report, and appellant has not filed a reply brief or otherwise objected to reliance
on the probation report in ascertaining the facts and circumstances surrounding
appellant’s plea nor has he refuted the truth of the statements he made to the probation
officer.
5.
child. Both his wife, with whom he was still in an intact marriage, and child lived in
Mexico.
Probation was recommending denial of probation as, among other reasons,
appellant was planning on returning to Mexico as soon as it became possible, had no
family ties in the community, did not have the ability to comply with a grant of probation
“as he will be deported upon his release from custody as he does not legally reside in the
United States,” and “a felony conviction could exclude the defendant from obtaining U.S.
citizenship and from obtaining certain types of employment.” Rather, probation
recommended a two-year term in state prison, and “release to INS/Border Patrol upon
commitment completion.”
Appellant was sentenced on June 14, 1993. He was assisted by a Spanish
interpreter and represented by counsel. Pursuant to the court’s indicated sentence, it
imposed the middle term of three years, with execution suspended on the condition
appellant be on probation for a period of five years. The terms and conditions of
probation, which the record indicates were accepted by appellant, included that appellant
would receive credit for time served; the court recommended release to immigration
authorities upon completion of commitment; appellant was to report immediately to
probation “upon re-entry into the United States”; and appellant was “not to re-enter the
United States illegally.” Appellant was remanded to custody at the conclusion of the
hearing.
Section 1473.7 Proceedings
On January 3, 2025, appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to
section 1473.7 on the ground that he prejudicially did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of his plea.
Appellant’s motion was accompanied by a declaration signed in Santa Maria,
California, wherein he attested to the following: He entered the United States from
Mexico when he was 14 years old, only spoke Mixteco, and never attended any American
6.
schools. At the time of his guilty plea, he was only 18 years old, and “there were no
discussions of the immigration consequences that were attached to that … plea.”
Appellant asserted he “initialed and signed the guilty plea form because the interpreter
instructed” him to. As for paragraph 14, which he initialed and which stated his plea
“may” have the consequences of deportation, he understood that to mean any adverse
immigration consequences were “only a possibility, and “no one ever told [him]” that
deportation “was a certainty.” He pled because he was “promised” he would be released
from custody, but when he was returned to custody following his plea, he learned for the
first time that immigration authorities had placed a no-bail detainer on him. The day he
entered his plea,5 instead of being released, he was transferred to immigration authorities’
custody. Appellant also was never told the immigration consequences “would be for a
lifetime.” He stated he would not have pled guilty had he known he would not be
released, that the immigration consequences were mandatory and would be imposed
immediately, and that the consequences would last a lifetime. He further declared he was
currently married and had five children born between the years 2001 and 2015, all in the
United States.
Also attached to appellant’s motion were: (1) marriage documents showing
appellant was married in the State of Nevada in 2011; (2) his children’s birth certificates;
(3) documents from his case, including the minute orders from his sentencing and change
of plea hearing and the plea form; (4) a Department of Justice criminal history showing
he was transferred to an immigration facility for the deportation process the day after his
sentencing; (5) character letters from his employer and church pastor, both in Santa
Maria; (6) and U.S. individual tax documents dating back to 2020.
5 Although appellant’s declaration states he was transferred the day after he entered
his plea, supporting documentation shows he was transferred the day after his sentencing.
7.
The People opposed the motion. They contended appellant’s assertion that he did
not understand the adverse immigration consequences of his plea were not supported by
any meaningful corroborating evidence. The People attached the reporter’s transcript
from the change of plea hearing and pointed to the trial court’s advisement to appellant
that he “will be deported” as a result of his plea.
Appellant filed a reply to the People’s opposition. He contended that the
combination of the advisement in his plea form that he “may” be deported, the trial
court’s advisement that he “will” be released from custody, and the court’s advisement
that he “will” be deported created confusion in appellant’s mind and did not qualify as
“accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences” of his plea.
The hearing on appellant’s motion was conducted on May 2, 2025. Counsel
offered no additional evidence or argument. The trial court stated it had read and
considered the motion, opposition, and reply brief. In ruling, the court pointed to the plea
court’s on-the-record advisement to appellant that he would be deported, which appellant
stated he understood at the time, as well as the plea form. The court stated it was “not
swayed by Counsel’s argument that taking the three together, the change of plea initial,
the Court stating that he will be released, as well as the Court stating that he will be
deported, as being ambiguous and not clear. Those items are not mutually exclusive.”
The court explained,
“As the Court looks at the [change of plea] transcript in whole,
[appellant] was clearly advised that he will be deported by the Court –
Court did not use any passive language – and that he would be released on
probation, which he was, and he would not be committed to prison. The
Court went on to further state that if he came back illegally, ‘You will be
immediately sentenced to three years in prison.’ The Court was
unequivocal about the immigration consequences that he will be deported.
Court used plain and clear language, and the Court left no doubt with its
language that he will be deported. The Court further went on to state that
he be released on five years’ probation, under probation terms and
conditions, and if he illegally enters the United States, then he will be
committed to prison.
8.
“I don’t know how much clearer the Court could have been that he
will be deported if he enters the United States illegally, that he will serve
the time, and that he will be released on probation.
“Taken as a whole, the Court finds that the language was clear. The
language was concise and left nothing open to speculation; therefore, the
request for the motion to withdraw the plea is denied.”
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a
conviction or sentence because said conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to
prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of
a conviction or sentence. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) It is the moving party’s burden to
establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id., subd. (f)(1).)
To obtain relief, an eligible moving party “must first show that he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” (People v.
Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) The key to this element is “the
mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the
time the plea was taken.” (People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 866.) That is,
“ ‘the defendant’s own error in … not knowing that his plea would subject him to
mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.’ ” (Id. at
p. 871.) A moving party is not required to prove he received ineffective assistance from
his counsel. (See § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1) [invalidity of conviction “may, but not need,
include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel”]. “[T]he inquiry into a defendant’s
state of mind may often involve the weighing of credibility and circumstantial evidence.”
(Espinoza, at p. 325.)
The moving party must also “show that his misunderstanding constituted
prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) In this context, prejudice
9.
means “a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the
defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529.) A reasonable probability is merely a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; it does not mean more
likely than not. (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324.) The court must
consider the totality of the circumstances; factors to consider include but are not limited
to “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on
avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, … whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible[,]’ … the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he
had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the
likely term if he were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza at pp. 320–321.)
“A defendant must provide ‘ “objective evidence” ’ to corroborate factual
assertions. [Citation.] Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions
with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) A defendant is not required, however, to submit contemporaneous
documentation and “no specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Id. at
p. 325.) Rather, the totality of the circumstances test “necessarily involves [a] case-by-
case examination of the record.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, we conduct independent review in assessing whether a defendant has
demonstrated the requisite misunderstanding and prejudice. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 319; People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 526–528.) When, as here, “the trial
court’s findings ‘derive entirely from written declarations and other documents,’ the trial
court and the reviewing court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference [to the trial
court’s factual determinations] is owed.” (Espinoza, at p. 320.)
10.
II. Analysis
Appellant has asserted that his conviction is classified as an aggravated felony and
a controlled substance offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
(8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.), and, as such, he is subject to mandatory deportation and, by
virtue of his conviction’s classification of an aggravated felony, permanent exclusion
from the United States. (See id., § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i); see also Moncrieffe v.
Holder (2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187.) Another consequence of being convicted of an
aggravated felony is being “ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary
relief allowing some deportable aliens to remain in the country.” (Sessions v. Dimaya
(2018) 584 U.S. 148, 153; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C).) Respondent does not
dispute appellant’s classification of his offense as an aggravated felony and controlled
substance offense. Appellant has not asserted he is currently facing immigration action,
only that “the conviction in this matter is preventing him from gaining legal status in the
United States currently.”6
Appellant contends he established that he did not meaningfully understand his plea
had adverse immigration consequences, namely that (1) he would be deported as a
certainty, (2) he would be transferred immediately to immigration custody for deportation
proceedings upon the entry of judgment, and (3) the consequences would be permanent.
He further contends he demonstrated the requisite prejudice by declaring, “Had I known
a) that the promise of my release after my guilty plea was illusory, b) that the
immigration consequences were not only mandatory and final, but they would be
imposed immediately following my guilty plea, and c) that my deportation, exclusion
6 Neither the court nor the People below or on appeal dispute that the petition was
timely (see § 1473.7, subd. (b)), nor that appellant established his conviction was
“currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for
an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization” (see § 1473.7, subd. (f)(1)).
Because these issues are not in dispute, and appellant’s motion was properly denied on
substantive grounds, we do not reach these issues.
11.
from admission to the United States was a certainty, and would last a lifetime, I would
have rejected the offer and taken my chances at trial.”
After considering all the relevant evidence and circumstances, we conclude
appellant failed to carry his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
A. Appellant Has Not Established He Did Not Meaningfully
Understand He Would be Immediately Deported as a Result of
His Plea
We first address appellant’s assertion that he did not understand he would be
deported or that deportation proceedings would be initiated immediately following his
sentencing. Since appellant’s assertions were brought by way of declaration rather than
live testimony, we are tasked with determining their credibility and weight on appeal.
We find appellant’s claim that he did not understand he would be deported
following his plea wholly uncredible, as it is directly belied by strong evidence on the
record. The court expressly advised him that he would be deported in open court during
his change of plea hearing and would be subject to imprisonment upon return to the
United States, and he indicated he understood. The evidence of said advisement—a court
reporter’s transcript—is highly credible, in contrast to defendant’s “self-serving”
statements. (See People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 664.) On appeal,
appellant does not meaningfully address the court’s advisement.
Appellant was again advised at his sentencing that conditions of his probation
included that the court was recommending “release to Immigration authorities” and that
he was not to reenter the United States illegally. There is no evidence he objected to
these conditions at that time; had there been any question or concern as to what they
meant, we presume he would have raised it then.
We recognize that a strongly worded advisement does not necessarily bar a
defendant from proving that he or she did not meaningfully understand the consequences
of a plea. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175 [plea form
12.
advisement defendant “will” be deported is not a categorical bar to relief]; People v.
Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 906 [even strongly worded advisements do “not
absolve defense counsel of the duty to advise of immigration consequences”];
People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011, fn. 8 [even though defendant “was
advised that his plea ‘will result’ … in adverse immigration consequences,” he presented
sufficient evidence of his lack of understanding to warrant § 1473.7 relief].)
In this case, however, the surrounding circumstances beyond the advisements
appellant was given indicate to us that appellant was fully aware that he would be
deported and was not to reenter the United States without consequence, at least during the
period of his probation. Based on appellant’s statements to probation, as well as to the
court, his motivation to plead guilty appeared to be to achieve his goal of returning to
Mexico as soon as possible. To this end, he went against his attorney’s advice in order to
receive the benefit of the court’s indicated sentence of probation, which saved him the
time of a trial, not to mention, exposure of up to four years’ imprisonment. Although
appellant now states he did not understand he would be transferred to immigration
custody immediately upon his release from custody as to his criminal charge, there was
no reason for appellant to believe, based on the record, that deportation proceedings
would not be immediately initiated.
Finally, appellant has not established to our satisfaction that he was deported
because of his plea. He informed probation he did “not reside in the United States
legally,” which suggests to us he may have been residing in the United States without
documentation, such as a valid visa or legal permanent resident status. Appellant has not
differentiated, either in his motion or on appeal, between immigration consequences
stemming from his criminal conviction and any consequences stemming from his
immigration status nor made any comment on the extent to which he may have been
subject to deportation proceedings regardless of his criminal conviction. Nor has he
13.
demonstrated that his plea precluded him from obtaining relief from removal that
otherwise would have been available to him.
Concluding for the above reasons that appellant did not establish he did not
meaningfully understand he would be immediately deported following his plea, we now
turn to what we find to be the crucial issue: whether appellant meaningfully understood
that pleading to an aggravated felony would result in permanent exclusion from the
United States.
B. To the Extent Appellant Has Established He Did Not
Meaningfully Understand He Would be Subject to Permanent
Consequences by Pleading Guilty, He Has Not Established
Prejudice
While there is some evidence that appellant was advised returning to the United
States would result in adverse consequences, such as the court’s advisement he would be
in violation of his probation if he were to enter the United States and expected to serve
his prison sentence and was not to reenter the United States illegally, we acknowledge
that the record does not conclusively refute appellant’s claim he was never advised that
conviction of an aggravated felony would result in permanent exclusion from the United
States. Further, we cannot presume, even taking into consideration the credibility issues
with appellant’s declaration, that he was advised of all the consequences beyond
immediate deportation. Appellant’s conviction predates Padilla v. Kentucky (2010)
559 U.S. 356, 371, as well as the 2015 enactment of sections 1016.2 and 1016.3, which
require defense counsel to advise criminal defendants of the immigration consequences.7
7 We note appellant’s plea attorney did not participate in the motion proceedings
either by declaration or testimony. Appellant provided no evidence that he sought to
obtain a statement from his trial counsel regarding the circumstances surrounding his plea
nor did he give notice to his trial counsel (see § 1473.7, subd. (h).) Moving parties are
not required to provide a declaration of plea counsel (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 325) but such a declaration could provide support for a moving party’s factual
assertions.
14.
However, even if we were to conclude that appellant did not meaningfully
understand this aspect of the immigration consequences of his plea, we conclude he has
not established the requisite prejudice, i.e., that there was a reasonable possibility he
would not have pled guilty had he known he would have suffered permanent immigration
consequences.
It is uncontested that, at the time of appellant’s plea, he had no significant ties to
the United States, having been in the country for only few years at most, and having no
current employment, means of support, or family in the United States. Conversely, his
entire family, including his then-wife and child, lived in Mexico, and appellant was clear
that he intended to go back to Mexico once he was able to. He has provided no evidence
that, at the time of his plea, he had plans to try return to the United States or seek
naturalization as a citizen or other legal status in the future. As stated above, his
motivation to plead appeared to be to return to Mexico as soon as possible. This
motivation was strong, as appellant pled against his attorney’s advice and without any
promises from the People, only an indicated sentence from the court that would allow
him to reach his goal in the quickest manner. Given appellant’s stated desire to leave the
United States and the determination he showed in making that happen, we cannot
conclude immigration consequences held much weight in appellant’s mind in deciding
whether to plead guilty. In our view, these contemporaneous circumstances hold
considerably more weight than appellant’s bare assertion that he would not have pled
guilty had he known the consequences. (See People v. Villalba (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 659, 673 [“It is not enough for [a] defendant simply to declare that he
would not have accepted any plea that would result in deportation”].)8
8 These facts also support a conclusion that even if we were to find appellant did not
meaningfully understand that he would be deported following his plea, we would
nonetheless conclude that this would not have influenced his decision to plead guilty.
15.
Moreover, on appeal, the overwhelming thrust of appellant’s argument that he
suffered prejudice is that he would not have pled guilty had he known he would be
immediately deported, not that his plea would result in permanent immigration
consequences. He asserts the evidence supports that his motivation to plead guilty was to
be “released,” so if he knew he would have been transferred to immigration custody, he
would have gone to trial. This argument is not persuasive for several reasons, the first
two upon which we have already touched.
First, we conclude appellant has not shown he did not meaningfully understand he
would be deported upon his release on probation; thus, as to this consequence, we do not
reach the issue of prejudice because we find no error. Even if, however, appellant
established he did not understand he would be immediately transferred to immigration
custody, there is no evidence the transfer was not in line with his stated goals to return to
Mexico since the additional detention appellant endured resulted in deportation
proceedings. Second, appellant has not established deportation was a consequence of his
plea rather than his immigration status. Finally, the record undermines his assertions he
pled guilty in exchange for a “promise” to be released and that such a promise was
“illusory.” To the contrary, the record indicates he entered an “unconditional” plea in
response to an indicated sentence by the trial court, not as part of a plea agreement with
the prosecution or pursuant to any “promise.” (See fn. 2, ante.)9
9 As explained in People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 575, an indicated
sentence represents “the same punishment the court would be prepared to impose if the
defendant were convicted at trial,” rather than “an attempt to induce a plea by offering the
defendant a more lenient sentence than what could be obtained through plea negotiations
with the prosecuting authority,” and when properly indicating a sentence, the trial court
makes “no promise that the sentence will be imposed.”
To the extent that appellant is suggesting the court engaged in improper plea
bargaining, such a claim is not properly before us, as appellant does not make such a
claim directly, nor establish such a claim is timely or properly addressed in a
section 1473.7 motion.
16.
We acknowledge that appellant presented evidence of extensive ties he made to
the United States after his conviction and presumed deportation. This is not relevant to
our evaluation of appellant’s mindset at the time he entered his plea. Appellant has
provided sparse information explaining what happened after deportation proceedings
were initiated and under what circumstances he formed the ties he describes in his
motion. From the information he has provided, appellant formed such ties after
participating in deportation proceedings and presumably being deported and knowing the
effects of his deportation on illegal reentry to the country. Appellant has not claimed,
much less persuasively established, that he formed ties to the United States under the
mistaken understanding resulting from the error he claims in his section 1473.7 motion
that he was residing in the country legally or would someday be able to achieve some
form of legal residence.
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude appellant has not met his burden to
establish a reasonable possibility he would not have pled had he known the adverse
immigration consequences of his plea.
C. Conclusion
After an independent review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
to the extent appellant established that he did not understand the immigration
consequences of the plea that led to his conviction and sentence, he failed to establish that
any error resulted in prejudice. (See § 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) Consequently, we affirm the
order denying the motion.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s section 1473.7 motion is affirmed.
17.
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