In re Isabella M. CA2/7

CourtListener 10857114Calctapp11 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/11/26 In re Isabella M. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ISABELLA M., a Person B347116
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
________________________________ Super. Ct. No.
22CCJP01148D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHAKIRA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra L. Losnick, Judge. Affirmed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Shakira S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order following
a six-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.21, subdivision (e).1 Shakira argues substantial
evidence did not support the court’s finding that returning her
daughter Isabella M. to Shakira would create a substantial risk
of detriment to Isabella’s safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being. Shakira also argues substantial evidence
did not support the court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services provided reasonable reunification services. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As we described in our opinion in Shakira’s previous appeal
(In re Isabella M. (Feb. 10, 2026, B342827) [nonpub. opn.])
(Isabella M. I), in February 2024 the Department received a
report 13-year-old Isabella did not want to go home because
Shakira physically and verbally abused her when she wore

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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makeup. Shakira said that she did not allow Isabella to wear
makeup, have a cellphone, or use social media and that Isabella
had difficulty following her rules. She denied physically
disciplining Isabella. Shakira said that, after Isabella was
assaulted by a classmate two years earlier, she began skipping
school, getting in fights, and stealing. Shakira stated Isabella
refused to participate in therapy. Shakira said that Isabella
falsely accused Shakira of physically abusing her because she
wanted the Department to remove her and that Isabella enjoyed
the freedom she experienced during a previous stay in foster care.
Isabella’s older half-siblings stated that Shakira never hit them
or Isabella, that Isabella was upset because Shakira did not let
Isabella wear makeup, and that Isabella lied when she did not
get her way. (Isabella M. I, supra, B342827.)
At a detention hearing in March 2024 the juvenile court
removed Isabella and ordered monitored visitation for Shakira.
At a jurisdiction hearing in August 2024 the juvenile court
sustained one count under section 300, subdivision (b). The court
found Shakira had ‘“a limited ability to provide appropriate care
and supervision due to [Isabella’s] behavioral issues and [her]
refusal to return home,”’ which endangered Isabella’s physical
and emotional health and well-being and placed her at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. At a
disposition hearing in October 2024 the court removed Isabella
and ordered Shakira to participate in individual counseling,
parenting classes, and conjoint counseling if recommended by
Isabella’s therapist. The court ordered monitored visitation. We
affirmed the order removing Isabella from Shakira.
(Isabella M. I, supra, B342827.)

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At the six-month review hearing in April 2025 the court
found that returning Isabella to Shakira would create a
substantial risk of detriment to Isabella, that continuing her
current placement was necessary and appropriate, and that the
Department had provided reasonable reunification services. The
court stated that, because Isabella requested conjoint counseling
with Shakira, the court would continue reunification services to
give Isabella “a chance to see if she can mend the fences with her
mom.” The court ordered the Department to arrange conjoint
counseling as soon as possible once Isabella developed a rapport
with her new therapist. Shakira appealed from the court’s
orders.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
At the six-month review hearing the juvenile court “shall
order the return of the child to the physical custody of their
parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to
their parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) The Department
has the burden of proving detriment. (Ibid.; see David B. v.
Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789.) In addition,
“[i]f the child is not returned to their parent or legal guardian,
the court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence
whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent
or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the
initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been

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provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian . . . .”
(§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8); see In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048,
1061.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial
evidence. (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021,
1034; see In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645.) We “draw
all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the
record favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order
even if there is other evidence to the contrary.” (A.L., at p. 645;
see In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 571.) In reviewing the
court’s finding the Department provided reasonable reunification
services, we “‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by
[the clear and convincing] standard of proof.’” (In re A.O., supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996 [“when reviewing a finding that a fact has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before
the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true”].)

B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Finding That Returning Isabella to Shakira Would
Be Detrimental to Isabella
Shakira argues substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s finding that returning Isabella to Shakira would
create a substantial risk of detriment to Isabella’s safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being. She argues that
she completed four sessions of individual counseling and that at

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the April 2025 six-month review hearing counsel for Isabella
stated Isabella wanted to pursue conjoint counseling.
“‘In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider
the extent to which the parent participated in reunification
services,’” as well as “‘the efforts or progress the parent has made
toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-
home placement.’” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966;
see In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.)
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s detriment
finding. First, Shakira had only begun to comply with her case
plan. At the disposition hearing in October 2024 the court
ordered Shakira to participate in individual counseling and
parenting classes, but she did not begin individual counseling
until March 27, 2025, and she had completed only four sessions
by the April 2025 six-month review hearing. Shakira asked for
referrals to parenting classes on March 28, 2025, but had not yet
begun attending classes.
Second, and more importantly, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude Shakira had not yet developed the parenting
techniques necessary to handle Isabella’s defiance and hostility.
As discussed in Isabella M. I, supra, B342827, Isabella had
significant behavioral issues: She skipped school, was suspended
for fighting, was disrespectful and defiant toward Shakira, and
consistently stated she did not want to return home. During
Isabella’s first eight months in foster care, the few interactions
she had with Shakira were brief and confrontational. Isabella
ended their only in-person visit after five minutes, saying she
hated Shakira and wanted to leave. During a telephonic meeting
Isabella told Shakira, “I hate you, just kill yourself.”
(Isabella M. I, supra, B342827.)

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The court-appointed psychologist stated Shakira’s
“authoritarian parenting style,” which “placed a ‘strong emphasis
on outward compliance and rule-following from Isabella,’” “posed
‘several safety risks to Isabella’s well-being and development,’
including ‘emotional and psychological harm’ and a tendency to
‘exhibit increased aggression outside the home.’” The
psychologist “recommended Shakira participate in parent
education programs to learn ‘authoritative parenting techniques
and positive discipline methods’ and ‘shift her focus from
superficial compliance to supporting Isabella’s emotional and
psychological well-being.’” (Isabella M. I, supra, B342827.)
In the six months between disposition and the first review
hearing in April 2025, Shakira began individual counseling,
which was a positive development. Unfortunately, there was no
evidence that Shakira had developed new parenting techniques,
that Isabella had become more emotionally stable, that their
relationship had improved, or that Isabella was open to returning
home.
In January 2025 Isabella’s caregiver “reported that Isabella
was self-isolating, not eating, and sleeping all day.” Isabella also
refused to meet with her mental health providers. The
Department reported that Isabella often walked around the
school campus rather than attending classes and that she refused
to participate in testing necessary to get an IEP.2 In March 2025

2 “An ‘IEP’ is an ‘“individualized education plan,”’ that is,
‘a written statement for the child developed in a participatory
process involving parents and school personnel’ that ‘describes
the child’s needs, academic and functional goals, and . . . the
special education, related services, and program modifications

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Isabella was suspended for “acting verbally aggressive towards
school staff” and “bleaching her hair on the school campus.”
Isabella received “wraparound services” from a facilitator, a child
and family team specialist, and a therapist, but she complained
that she did not like them and that she was too tired to meet with
them, and she stopped participating. Isabella met with a
psychiatrist, but she refused medication. In April 2025 Isabella
had not yet met with a newly assigned therapist.
Though the court ordered semi-weekly monitored
visitation, Isabella generally refused to visit Shakira. The record
describes only two in-person visits between October 2024 and
April 2025, neither of which went well. At the first visit in
December 2024 Isabella became upset because Shakira did not
bring her dog and called Shakira names; the social worker had to
end the visit. At the second visit in April 2025 Shakira “was
shocked to see Isabella’s hair had been bleached and cut,” and
Isabella began to cry. Isabella said she wanted a “new look” to
“fit in at school.” Isabella said that Shakira did “not allow her to
go anywhere or do anything” and that there were “so many
activities that she no longer wants to do because they remind her
of her mother.” Isabella complained Shakira did not “allow her to
hang out with any friends,” even while in foster care, and
Shakira asked “why should she allow her to have such privileges
if she does not do well in school and does not attend her classes.”
Isabella asked Shakira: “‘Why do you even want me back if you
don’t care about me?’” She told Shakira to “stop trying to get her
back and stated ‘I don’t ever want to come back home. If that
happens, I will run away or I would rather die.’” Isabella “began

and accommodations that will be provided’ to the child.” (In re
Juan A. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1204, 1211, fn. 11.)

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to berate her mother and used inappropriate foul language,” and
the social worker ended the visit. Isabella threw a napkin at
Shakira and walked out. Because the relationship between
Shakira and Isabella remained acrimonious, the juvenile court
could reasonably conclude it was not yet safe to return Isabella to
Shakira’s custody.

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Finding the Department Provided Reasonable
Reunification Services
To “support a finding that services were reasonable, ‘the
record should show that the supervising agency identified the
problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed
to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with
the parents during the course of the service plan, and made
reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where
compliance proved difficult.’” (Michael G. v. Superior Court
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 625, fn. 6; see B.D. v. Superior Court
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1151; In re A.G. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.)
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
by clear and convincing evidence the Department provided
reasonable reunification services. Social workers communicated
with Shakira, Isabella, Isabella’s caregiver, her school principal,
and Isabella’s and Shakira’s therapists. The Department
referred Isabella to mental health services and referred Shakira
to parenting classes. Social workers also monitored visits
between Shakira and Isabella.
Shakira argues the Department should have done more to
facilitate conjoint therapy with Isabella. At disposition the

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juvenile court ordered conjoint counseling if Isabella’s therapist
recommended it. (Isabella M. I, supra, B342827.) As of the
six-month review, however, Isabella had not yet established a
relationship with a therapist. In addition, though Isabella at
times said she wanted to participate in conjoint therapy, each
time she changed her mind. Shakira contends “a child should not
have sole control over whether conjoint therapy takes place,” but
the Department tried to facilitate conjoint therapy, as well as
individual therapy, for Isabella.3 When Isabella told the social
worker on April 10, 2025 she wanted to see Shakira and wanted
family therapy, the social worker offered her a visit with Shakira
that day, but Isabella declined. That same day the supervising
social worker contacted Isabella’s therapist and left a voicemail
message stating, “Isabella has stated that she may want conjoint
sessions with her mother.” However, when Isabella and
Shakira’s visit the next day went poorly, Isabella said that she
did not want therapy with her mother and that she only wanted
“therapy for herself to ‘find closure.’”
Shakira does not suggest what more the Department
should have done to persuade Isabella to participate in conjoint
therapy.4 (Cf. In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972

3 For example, when Isabella refused recommended
psychiatric care, the Department obtained an order from the
juvenile court requiring Isabella to participate in psychiatric
services.

4 Shakira states the Department did not consider using a
therapist other than Isabella’s therapist to provide conjoint
counseling, but she does not explain how identifying a different
therapist would have overcome Isabella’s unwillingness to
participate in therapy.

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[child protective agency did not provide reasonable services
where its report “did not even address its efforts to get [the child]
into counseling”].) In addition, given the hostile relationship
between Shakira and Isabella, it was unlikely conjoint therapy
would have been productive until each of them made progress in
individual therapy. The Department did not have to force
Isabella to participate in conjoint therapy before she was ready.
(See In re A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062 [where “‘the
minor is reluctant to visit, and family therapy is needed to
promote visitation, such therapy may be critical to reunification,’”
but the juvenile court must consider “‘the “possibility of adverse
psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between mother
and child”’”]; see also In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1343, 1356 [“‘the child’s input and refusal and the possible
adverse consequences if a visit is forced against the child’s will
are factors to be considered in administering visitation’”].)
Shakira also argues that, when she requested referrals for
parenting classes, the Department “sent an email with
two service providers.” She cites In re Taylor J. (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1446 at page 1452, where the court stated
“reunification services are not ‘reasonable’ if they consist of
nothing more than handing the parent a list of counseling
agencies when the list contained the name of only one domestic
violence victim counseling agency in proximity to [the parent’s]
home.” But Shakira does not contend that the two service
providers the Department suggested were inappropriate or that
the Department’s efforts consisted of nothing more than the
referral. Similarly, Shakira asserts that her assigned social
worker went on leave and that the supervising social worker who
wrote the six-month status review report did not speak to

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Shakira about her “perception of her needs.” Shakira, however,
does not explain how that omission could have prevented her
from reunifying with Isabella. The juvenile court reasonably
concluded by clear and convincing evidence the Department
provided reasonable reunification services.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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