Marriage of Stommel CA3

CourtListener 10857112Calctapp11 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/11/26 Marriage of Stommel CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

In re the Marriage of CRISTIAN CRISSY and C103664
DONALD STOMMEL.
(Super. Ct. No. 07FL00495)
CRISTIAN CRISSY STOMMEL,
Respondent,

v.

DONALD STOMMEL,
Appellant.

In this family law matter, Donald Stommel challenges three postjudgment orders,
including the order denying his request to modify the stipulated marital dissolution
judgment, which resolved the protracted and contentious divorce proceedings between
himself and his former spouse, Cristian Crissy Stommel.1 Donald argues the family court
erred in denying his motion to modify the provision of the stipulated judgment that
obligated him to continue to maintain a life insurance policy with a benefit paying at least
$150,000 to Cristian as “irrevocable beneficiary.” According to Donald, the family court
applied the wrong legal standard and misinterpreted the stipulated judgment, which, in

1 Because the parties shared the same last name during the proceedings below, we refer
to them by their first name after the first reference to avoid confusion.

1
his view, required the court to remove (or eliminate) his life insurance obligation once his
spousal support obligations were satisfied. In a related argument, Donald claims the
family court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion to modify the stipulated judgment. Finally, Donald argues the family court erred
in awarding Cristian $1,500 in attorney fees as a sanction under Family Code section
271,2 which was based on Donald’s failure to produce the life insurance policy to
Cristian in connection with his motion to modify the stipulated judgment. Finding no
basis for reversal, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Marriage
Donald and Cristian married in 1998 and separated in 2008. During their marriage,
Cristian was a stay-at-home mother while Donald developed and ran a successful
business, D&T Fiberglass, Inc. The couple had two children together, and Donald
adopted Cristian’s daughter from a previous relationship.
Marital Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Judgment
Around three and a half years after separation, in February 2012, Donald and Cristian
executed a marital settlement agreement, which formalized various agreements made at a
settlement conference to resolve their long-running and contentious divorce (or marriage
dissolution) proceedings. The family court entered a stipulated marital dissolution
judgment later that same month, which incorporated the terms of the marital settlement
agreement. Among other things, the stipulated judgment required Donald to pay Cristian
$4,200 in monthly child support until the occurrence of certain events,3 and $6,000 in

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

3 At the time of the stipulated judgment, the parties’ children were seven and 12 years
old. Under the terms of the stipulated judgment, Donald’s obligation to pay child support

2
monthly spousal support for five years, ending when Cristian remarried or January 31,
2017 (whichever occurred first).4 Donald also agreed to pay Cristian $170,000 to
equalize the division of property, and to maintain a life insurance policy with a benefit
paying at least $150,000 to Cristian as “irrevocable beneficiary.”
The terms of the stipulated judgment were recited on the record in open court before
judgment was entered. At no point prior to entry of judgment was there a discussion
about the specific purpose of the life insurance provision, including any representation
that it was meant to “secure” spousal support or that it was subject to termination (or
elimination) once Donald satisfied his spousal support obligation to Cristian. In full, the
life insurance provision, which was drafted by Donald’s counsel, states:
“11. Life Insurance: [¶] [Donald] agrees to continue to maintain a life insurance
policy on his life with a benefit paying at least $150,000.00 to [Cristian] as irrevocable
beneficiary. [¶] [Donald] agrees that [Cristian] may seek periodic confirmation of the
continued effectiveness of this provision and he shall cooperate in providing either a
release to the insurance company to allow her direct access or he will cooperate and
comply with her reasonable requests for confirmation that the policy remains in effect.
[¶] The parties further agree that if [Cristian] wishes to obtain additional life insurance
on [Donald’s] life, she will do so at her own cost, if he is insurable. [Donald] shall
cooperate with [Cristian’s] request. [¶] The court shall have continued jurisdiction over
this provision and it is modifiable.” (Italics added.)

ended upon the occurrence of certain specified events (e.g., “[t]he children attain age 19,
or have attained age 18 and are not full-time high school students residing with
[Cristian]”).
4 For purposes of spousal support, Donald’s monthly income was $31,000 while
Cristian’s imputed monthly income was $2,500. The stipulated judgment expressly
provided that the amount of spousal support and the date this obligation ended (January
31, 2017) were “non-modifiable.”

3
The last paragraph of the marital settlement agreement—Modification by Subsequent
Agreement—states that it could “be modified by subsequent agreement of the parties only
by an instrument in writing signed by both of them, an oral agreement to the extent that
the parties execute it, or an in-court oral agreement made into an order by a court of
competent jurisdiction.” (Italics added.)
Relevant Postjudgment Events
In 2020, more than three years after Donald’s obligation to pay spousal support to
Cristian was satisfied, he remarried. In 2022, Donald’s obligation to pay child support
was satisfied.
At some point in 2023, Donald was diagnosed with cancer. In September 2023,
Cristian sent the following text message to Donald: “Hope you die a slow death you
deserve nothing less.” Cristian also sent a similar message to Donald’s sister via social
media.
In spring and summer 2024, e-mails were exchanged between Cristian’s counsel and
Donald’s counsel about the status of the life insurance policy. As part of this exchange,
counsel disagreed as to whether Cristian was entitled to the benefits of the policy
($150,000) under the terms of the stipulated judgment.
Motion to Modify the Stipulated Judgment
In August 2024, Donald filed a motion to modify the stipulated judgment to remove
(or eliminate) the obligation that he maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of
Cristian. In support of his motion, Donald stated: “At the time that we agreed to [the life
insurance] provision, it was to secure spousal support. I am informed that this is a typical
provision in dissolution actions. I am further under the belief and understanding that my
obligation to name [Cristian] as beneficiary of life insurance ended when spousal support
terminated.” Donald further stated: “[Cristian] is actively wishing for my death and at
the same time apparently asserting that there is a requirement for me to maintain her as a
beneficiary on a life insurance policy. She is clearly looking for a windfall to which she

4
is not entitled. I have no doubt that if I did die before the court specifically makes an
order relating to this issue, she would cause my current wife and other heirs tremendous
headaches trying to gain something to which she has no legal right. Thus, because of
[Cristian’s] prior statements and refusal to acknowledge that the life insurance provision
expired with the spousal support provision, I am compelled to seek an order of the court
specifically stating that there is no obligation on my part to name [Cristian] as a
beneficiary of any life insurance policy.” Donald provided no explanation for why he did
not seek to modify the stipulated judgment earlier, including when his spousal support
obligations were satisfied in January 2017.
Cristian filed a written opposition, arguing that Donald failed to provide any factual or
legal basis for the relief he sought. In support of her position, Cristian stated: “At the
time I signed the [marital settlement agreement] it was my understanding that I was
entitled to a $150,000.00 life insurance policy based on the plain language of the
[agreement]. I have no recollection the life insurance policy was to ensure spousal
support only and there is no language in the [agreement] that reflects that the life
insurance policy was to ensure spousal support.”
In October 2024, the family court scheduled the matter for a one-day bench trial in
January 2025. In so doing, the court made clear that it needed more information to
decide Donald’s motion, including “what type of life insurance policy [was] at issue
(term or whole), the cost, if any of the life insurance policy, when it expire[d] or [was]
paid in full, the cost of any continuing premium, and whether there were assets that
[Cristian] forfeited in light of the life insurance provision.”

5
Bench Trial
In December 2024, the parties each submitted a written statement specifying the
issues to be decided in connection with the bench trial and their respective positions on
those issues. It was not disputed that the primary issue before the family court was
whether Donald’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy of at least $150,000 for
the benefit of Cristian terminated (or was subject to removal/elimination) upon the
satisfaction of his spousal support obligations.
In her pretrial filing, Cristian argued that the marital settlement agreement could not
be modified, since it was a final judgment that had been entered many years earlier
(February 2012). Cristian insisted that Donald had not offered any legal or factual basis
to warrant modification of the stipulated judgment, and that the statute of limitations to
make any such modification had passed. In a separate filing (trial brief and motions in
limine), Cristian requested an evidentiary sanction and/or award of attorney fees as a
sanction against Donald, which was based on his failure to provide her access to or
information about the life insurance policy in violation of the terms of the stipulated
judgment.
Donald, for his part, argued that the life insurance provision could be modified under
the express terms of the stipulated judgment, and that elimination of the provision was
warranted because it was intended to secure spousal support, which had ended almost
eight years earlier (January 2017).
In January 2025, a one-day bench trial was held. Only two witnesses testified:
Donald and Cristian. Upon questioning, Donald explained that he obtained a universal
life insurance policy5 in 2002 and had maintained that policy (which was paid for by his

5 Universal life insurance is a type of permanent life insurance; it is designed to last for
the insured’s entire lifetime. By contrast, a term life insurance plan lasts for a set period
of time (e.g., 10, 20, or 30 years).

6
company) for the benefit of Cristian since the stipulated judgment was entered in
February 2012. Donald acknowledged that he failed to provide Cristian a copy of the life
insurance policy in response to a discovery request, explaining that he did not have a
copy of the policy at his home, and he did not ask his insurance agent for a copy. Donald
also acknowledged that the terms of the stipulated judgment did not explicitly state that
his obligation to maintain life insurance for the benefit of Cristian was contingent upon
his obligation to pay spousal support or that the life insurance provision was subject to
modification or termination upon the satisfaction of his spousal support obligations.
Nevertheless, Donald insisted that the life insurance provision was terminable because
the life insurance policy was meant to be “collateral until the spousal support was over.”
Donald explained that, in his view, the purpose of the life insurance provision was to
“guarantee” spousal support in the event he died before his spousal support obligations
were satisfied, and that he was currently asking the family court to “eliminate” the life
insurance provision because spousal support ended years earlier.6
When Cristian testified, she claimed that the life insurance provision was part of the
“property judgment,” and that the stipulated judgment would not have been fair to her if
she was not designated as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy. In support of her
position, Cristian explained that she agreed to the life insurance provision and to a
$170,000 payment to equalize the division of property in exchange for giving up her
interest in significant community assets (e.g., marital home, cabin, Corvette, boat, RV).
Cristian also testified that everything she stated in her pretrial declaration was true,

6 Under the terms of the stipulated judgment, Donald was required to pay Cristian
$6,000 per month for five years, resulting in a total spousal support obligation of
$360,000. Thus, the $150,000 life insurance policy represented less than half
(approximately 42 percent) of the amount Donald was obligated to pay in spousal
support.

7
including her assertion that all of the assets related to Donald’s business, including
retirement benefits, were awarded to him as his separate property.
At the time of the bench trial, Donald was 68 years old and Cristian was 58 years old.
Family Court’s Ruling
At the conclusion of trial, the family court orally denied Donald’s motion to modify
the stipulated judgment. In so ruling, the court explained that there was nothing in the
text of the stipulated judgment providing that Donald did not have to maintain a life
insurance policy for the benefit of Cristian after his spousal support obligations were
satisfied. In the court’s view, had the parties intended for this result, they would have
included language in the agreement saying as much. The court went on to find that the
“disparaging things” Cristian had said about Donald related to his death were not a proper
basis to modify the stipulated judgment.7
In its written order denying Donald’s motion to modify the stipulated judgment, the
family court stated as follows:
“[Donald’s] principal argument for modification is that the parties agreed as part of
the stipulated agreement that the life insurance obligation should terminate once [Donald]
satisfied his support obligations. [Donald] testified that that was what he had always
understood, but conceded that there is no language in the stipulated agreement that
reflects this alleged agreement or that in any way specifically ties the continuing life
insurance obligation to whether [Donald’s] spousal support obligation is in effect. The
Court finds no support for [Donald’s] interpretation in the stipulated agreement’s terms,

7 The family court also found that sanctions against Donald in the amount of $1,500
were warranted under section 271 because he failed to provide Cristian a copy of the life
insurance policy prior to trial. However, the court (as stated in its subsequent written
order denying the motion to modify the stipulated judgment) decided to give Donald
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter and scheduled a hearing.

8
which ‘contain[] the entire agreement of the parties’ with respect to the life insurance
obligation.
“[Donald] further asks the Court to end his obligation to continue the life insurance
policy because [Cristian] said disparaging or otherwise ‘nasty’ things to [him], including
that she hoped he die a slow death. [Cristian] acknowledges she sent ‘mean’ text
messages to [Donald] and that they do not reflect her ‘finest moment.’ The Court does
not find that [Cristian’s] messages to, or ill will towards, [Donald] justify modifying the
[stipulated] judgment.
“[Donald] has made no argument that the life insurance provision imposes an
unreasonable financial burden on him. He also testified that his company paid for the life
insurance policy.”
Motion for Reconsideration
In April 2025, after a hearing, the family court issued a written order denying
Donald’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to modify the
stipulated judgment. As discussed more fully below, the court found the motion was
procedurally defective because it was not based on any new or different facts that Donald
could not have discovered with reasonable diligence prior to trial.
Sanctions
In April 2025, after a hearing, the family court issued a written order awarding
Cristian $1,500 in attorney fees as a sanction under section 271, which was based on
Donald’s failure to provide Cristian a copy of the life insurance policy in response to a
pretrial discovery request.
Donald filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Modify the Stipulated Judgment
Donald first argues the family court erred in denying his motion to modify the life
insurance provision in the stipulated judgment. According to Donald, his obligation to

9
maintain life insurance for the benefit of Cristian was subject to termination “upon the
cessation” of spousal support in 2017, either because the provision was “implicitly
grounded in and ‘concerned’ support,” or because he had “shown a change of
circumstances” (e.g., new marriage). In Donald’s view, the family court erroneously
concluded that termination of the life insurance provision was not warranted because
there was no explicit language in the stipulated judgment supporting such relief.
A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
California courts generally must divide the community estate of parties to a
dissolution proceeding equally. (§ 2550.) The parties, however, “ ‘can agree on a
lopsided division of community property, but only if it is evidenced (1) by a written
agreement of the parties; or (2) by an oral stipulation of the parties in open court.’ ” (In
re Marriage of Woolsey (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 881, 897; see also Mejia v. Reed (2003)
31 Cal.4th 657, 666 [although a family court is generally obliged to divide the
community estate of the parties equally, no law requires the parties to do so, “and the
court does not scrutinize the [marital settlement agreement] to ensure that it sets out an
equal division”].) “ ‘ “[P]roperty settlement agreements occupy a favored position in the
law of this state. . . .” [Citation.] Courts are reluctant to disturb them “except for
equitable considerations. A property settlement agreement, therefore, that is not tainted
by fraud or compulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship of the parties
is valid and binding on the court.” ’ ” (Woolsey, at pp. 897-898.)

10
“Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are
interpreted under the same rules governing contract interpretation generally.” (In re
Marriage of T.C. & D.C. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 419, 424.) “The primary object of
contract interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the mutual intention of the parties at
the time the contract was formed, determined from the writing alone, if possible.” (In re
Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 688.) “ ‘Thus, “a ‘court’s paramount
consideration . . . is the parties’ objective intent when they entered into [the
contract].’ ” ’ ” (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 437-438.)
“ ‘The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part,
if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.’ [Citation.] This
means that ‘[c]ourts must interpret contractual language in a manner which gives force
and effect to every provision’ [citation], and avoid constructions which would render any
of its provisions or words ‘surplusage.’ [Citation.] Put simply, ‘[a] contract term should
not be construed to render some of its provisions meaningless or irrelevant.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Nassimi, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.)
The words used in a contract generally are to be understood in their ordinary and
popular sense. (Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc.
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1240.) “When the language of the judgment incorporating
the marital settlement agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal, and there is no
ambiguity, the court will enforce the express language.” (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440.) The court will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation
to create an ambiguity where none exists. (Berendes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 571, 577-578.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[I]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must
be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that
the promisee understood it.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] “The mutual intention to which the
courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent,

11
including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective
matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered
into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent
conduct of the parties.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Hibbard (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1007,
1013.) “ ‘The parties’ expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent,
governs.’ ” (In re Marriage of Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 948 (Minkin).)
Extrinsic evidence may be admissible to prove the parties’ intent if a contract term
is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. (In re Marriage
of Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) However, such evidence is “inadmissible to
vary, alter, or add to the terms of an unambiguous agreement.” (Id. at p. 1440.) “ ‘Our
function is to determine what, in terms and substance, is contained in the contract, not to
insert what has been omitted. We do not have the power to create for the parties a
contract that they did not make and cannot insert language that one party now wishes
were there.’ ” (Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah
Insurance Exchange (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 549, 569.)
“ ‘If [a stipulated judgment] is ambiguous, the . . . court may examine the record
for its scope and effect and may look at the circumstances of its making.’ [Citation.]
Indeed, ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible to prove a meaning to which the contract is
reasonably susceptible. [Citations.] If the trial court decides, after receiving the extrinsic
evidence, the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation
urged, the evidence is admitted to aid in interpreting the contract.’ ” “ ‘The threshold
issue of whether to admit the extrinsic evidence—that is, whether the contract is
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged—is a question of law subject to de
novo review.’ ” (Minkin, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.)
“ ‘The ultimate construction placed on the contract might call for different
standards of review. When no extrinsic evidence is introduced, or when the competent
extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court independently construes the

12
contract. [Citations.] When the competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus
requires resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction will be upheld if it is
supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Minkin, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.)
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, we conclude the challenged order is subject to the
independent standard of review. While extrinsic evidence was introduced during the
bench trial, the family court did not admit (or rely upon) that evidence in denying
Donald’s motion to modify the stipulated judgment.
Applying the independent standard of review, we see no error. The marital
settlement agreement was designed to settle and dispose of the parties’ property rights
and to provide support for Cristian and the parties’ two minor children. The life
insurance policy at issue, which was taken out during the marriage, was community
property and subject to division under the agreement between the parties.8 But it was not
awarded to either party under the provisions of the agreement dividing the community
assets. Instead, the parties agreed to a separate life insurance provision, which appears in
the agreement immediately following the spousal support provision. Of relevance here,
the life insurance provision obligated Donald “to continue to maintain a life insurance
policy on his life with a benefit paying at least $150,000 to [Cristian] as irrevocable

8 “Both spouses ordinarily have a community interest in the proceeds of an insurance
policy to the extent it was acquired with community funds.” (In re Marriage of
O’Connell (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 565, 577; see In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1396, 1400 [life insurance policy purchased during marriage with community funds is
community property]; Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy (1984) 35 Cal.3d
599, 605 [“When life insurance premiums are paid with community property funds, the
resulting policy is an asset of the community”].) It is not disputed that the life insurance
policy at issue here was acquired with community funds and that Donald paid the
insurance premiums with community funds prior to separation.

13
beneficiary,” and specifically stated that the family court “shall have continued
jurisdiction over this provision and it is modifiable.”
The question we must decide is whether the obligation imposed on Donald to
maintain life insurance for the benefit of Cristian was terminable upon the satisfaction of
his spousal support obligations. As the family court correctly observed, there is no
explicit language in the life insurance provision supporting such an interpretation. The
plain text does not specifically state or suggest that Donald’s life insurance obligation
was connected to (or contingent upon) his obligation to pay spousal support. And, unlike
the spousal support obligation, there was no agreement that the life insurance obligation
would end on the occurrence of a certain event or on a specified date, such as the date the
spousal support obligation ended (January 31, 2017).
On this record, the trial court properly determined that the express language of the
life insurance provision controls, as it is clear, explicit, and unequivocal. While the
provision expressly states that it is “modifiable,” it does not state that termination of the
provision is required (or mandated) upon Donald’s satisfaction of his spousal support
obligations to Cristian.9 Had the parties intended that result, they could have easily said
so. Instead, the parties agreed that Donald must continue to maintain a life insurance
policy for the benefit of Cristian as an irrevocable beneficiary, without any temporal or
other limitation on this obligation.

9 We recognize that spousal support may encompass “maintenance of life insurance on
the supporting spouse’s life.” (In re Marriage of Stimel (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 991, 995.)
We also recognize that marital settlement agreements can include language requiring a
spouse to secure life insurance for another spouse’s benefit as security for spousal
support. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Siegel (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 944, 947-948.) But,
as we explain, this is not what happened here.

14
The parties’ decision to designate Cristian as an “irrevocable beneficiary” supports
the conclusion that their mutual intention at the time of execution was that any
modification of the life insurance provision would require Cristian’s consent. (See In re
Marriage of O’Connell, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 [an insured can waive any right to
change beneficiaries by making an irrevocable beneficiary designation].) In other words,
the parties agreed that Donald could not unilaterally change the beneficiary of the life
insurance policy or terminate the life insurance provision without Cristian’s approval.
(See ibid. [an irrevocably designated beneficiary obtains a vested contractual right to
recover insurance proceeds].) This conclusion is consistent with the absence of any
express language to the contrary and the text of the stipulated judgment, including the last
paragraph of the marital settlement agreement. That provision—“Modification by
Subsequent Agreement”—provides that the agreement could “be modified by subsequent
agreement of the parties only by an instrument in writing signed by both of them, an oral
agreement to the extent that the parties execute it, or an in-court oral agreement made into
an order by a court of competent jurisdiction.” While the marital settlement agreement
does not explicitly state that this is the only way to modify the agreement, it is clear to us
that the parties contemplated that modification (at least as a general matter) required the
consent of both parties.
Although not cited by either party, we find the circumstances of this case
analogous to those presented in Wright v. Wright (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 56. In that case,
the property settlement agreement required husband to “keep in force” (i.e., maintain)
two life insurance policies in the amount of $10,000, one that designated his two children
as beneficiaries and another which designated his first wife as beneficiary. (Id. at p. 57.)
Under the terms of the agreement, husband was required to “ ‘pay all premiums on said
policies prior to delinquency’ ” and was prohibited from making any change in the
beneficiary under the respective policies. (Ibid.) Before his death, husband “cashed out
one policy and surrendered the other for cancellation.” (Ibid.) After husband died, his

15
first wife and one of his children sued to recover the life insurance proceeds from
husband’s estate, relying on the life insurance provision in the property settlement
agreement. (Ibid.) They argued that the intention of husband and first wife was to
provide an “insurance estate of $10,000” for the first wife and their children upon
husband’s death. (Id. at p. 58.) The executrix of husband’s will (second wife) disagreed,
arguing that husband’s “life insurance obligations were intended merely to secure his
support obligations under the agreement to [first wife] and their children and terminated
when those obligations did.” (Ibid.) In rejecting the trial court’s determination that
husband’s life insurance obligations were only intended to last a reasonable time (i.e., the
periods of time in which the children were minors), the appellate court relied on the text
of the life insurance provision, which, unlike the separate support provisions, contained
no limitation on the duration of his life insurance obligations. (Id. at pp. 58-59.) Based
on the text of the life insurance provision, the appellate court concluded that husband’s
life insurance obligations “lasted until his death.” (Id. at p. 61.)
To the extent Donald urges us to adopt a different interpretation of the life
insurance provision, we decline to do so as it would be contrary to the parties’ objective
mutual intent, as expressed in the plain language of the provision. Indeed, we cannot
(and do not) adopt Donald’s interpretation of the provision, as it would require us to
insert language (or add a term) not agreed upon by the parties, which would substantially
alter the parties’ agreement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [in construing a written
agreement, “the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or
in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has
been inserted”]; Jones v. World Life Research Institute (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 836, 840
[in the context of a stipulated judgment, it is not the province of the court to add to the
provisions thereof; to insert a term not found therein; or to make a new stipulation for the
parties].)

16
We deem forfeited the arguments Donald raises for the first time on appeal,
including his contention that the family court should have eliminated his life insurance
obligation because he showed a “significant change of circumstances” (e.g., child support
payments had ended, he had remarried, he was “largely retired,” he was unable to obtain
life insurance policy for benefit of new wife due to age and health conditions). (DiCola
v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.)
Forfeiture aside, Donald has failed to carry his burden to establish reversible error on this
basis.
II. Motion for Reconsideration
Next, Donald argues the family court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his motion to modify the stipulated judgment.
A. Additional Background
As previously indicated, in April 2025, the family court denied Donald’s motion
for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to modify the stipulated judgment.
The court found the motion was procedurally defective because it was not based on any
new or different facts. In so ruling, the court rejected Donald’s contention that new or
different facts existed because he had only recently learned from his insurance agent that
he could not obtain any life insurance for his current wife given his age (68 years old)
and health conditions. In rejecting this argument, the court explained, in relevant part, as
follows:
“[Donald] claims that, after the Court rejected his position at trial that the parties
had previously agreed that the life insurance policy obligation should terminate once
[Donald] satisfied his spousal support obligations, he learned from his insurance agent
that he cannot purchase a new life insurance policy with benefits of $150,000 for his
current wife. He argues that only by terminating the current life insurance policy for
[Cristian] can he ensure a life insurance policy with benefits of $150,000 for his current
wife. At the same time, he does not argue that, absent a life insurance policy with

17
benefits of at least $150,000, his current wife will not be adequately supported financially
if he were to die. Nor does he otherwise argue that his current wife has any financial
need for a life insurance policy with benefits of at least $150,000. He says that is not
relevant at all.”
“The Court denies [Donald’s] motion for reconsideration. The Court finds that
[Donald] could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the new alleged facts for the
parties’ trial. According to [Donald], only because the Court rejected his position at trial
was he sufficiently motivated to learn more about the life insurance policy at issue and
options for purchasing a new life insurance policy with his current wife as beneficiary. In
other words, he was so confident that the Court would allow him to terminate the life
insurance policy in connection with [Cristian] that he simply had no reason to look into
whether he could obtain a life insurance policy with benefits of $150,000 for his current
wife until the Court unexpectedly decided against him. Once the Court did decide
against him, he happened to discover within fewer than 10 days a new reason to urge the
Court to terminate the life insurance obligation as to [Cristian]. This is not a satisfactory
explanation for [Donald’s] failure to produce the new alleged facts for the 1/23/2025 trial,
which itself took place approximately 5 1/2 months after [Donald] filed his request to
modify the 2/29/2012 judgment.”
B. Relevant Legal Principles
“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and
refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party
affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of
entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make
application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and
modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)
“[A] party seeking reconsideration of a prior ruling upon an alleged different set of
facts must ‘provide both newly discovered evidence and an explanation for the failure to

18
have produced such evidence earlier.’ ” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1168.) The moving party’s burden “is comparable to that of a party seeking a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the
moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the
trial.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.)
Trial courts have no power to grant reconsideration based “on evidence that could and
should have been, but was not, presented to the court in connection with the original
motion.” (In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314; see In re
Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468 [“facts of which the party seeking
reconsideration was aware at the time of the original ruling are not ‘new or different’ ”].)
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th
at p. 212.)
C. Analysis
The family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Donald’s motion for
reconsideration. The facts Donald pointed to were not “new” or “different” within the
meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. The family court reasonably
determined that Donald did not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to
discover the information earlier and present it at trial. Indeed, the alleged new or
different facts—Donald could not obtain a life insurance policy for his current wife given
his age (68 years old) and health conditions—were available prior to trial and could have
been obtained from Donald’s insurance agent, as Donald conceded at trial. In short,
Donald did not make the requisite showing to justify the relief sought. As a result, the
family court properly denied his motion for reconsideration.
III. Sanctions
Finally, Donald argues the family court erred in ordering him to pay Cristian
$1,500 in attorney fees as a sanction under section 271.

19
A. Additional Background
As previously indicated, in April 2025, the family court awarded Cristian $1,500
in attorney fees as a sanction under section 271, which was based on Donald’s failure to
produce the life insurance policy in connection with his motion to modify the stipulated
judgment. In finding that sanctions were warranted, the court explained that Donald had
prevented Cristian from obtaining relevant information by failing to provide her a copy of
the life insurance policy in response to a discovery request, thereby frustrating the policy
of law to promote settlement of litigation and reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
cooperation between the parties and attorneys. The court rejected the various arguments
proffered by Donald for a different result, including (among other things) his claim that
the amount of sanctions imposed was not “tethered” to any specific fees incurred by
Cristian. In so ruling, the court explained that $1,500 was an appropriate sanction given
that the parties participated in a mandatory settlement conference and a two-hour bench
trial in connection with Donald’s motion to modify the stipulated judgment.
B. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
A fundamental aspect of family law practice is to reduce acrimony and adversarial
approaches common to general civil litigation and, instead, to foster cooperation between
the parties and their counsel with a view toward settlement short of full-blown litigation.
(In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1534.)
Section 271 provides a mechanism for family courts to sanction parties who fail to
comply with this aspect of family law practice. Subdivision (a) of section 271 states:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of
attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where
possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties
and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the
nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into

20
consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The
court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable
financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an
award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not
required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.”
“[S]ection 271 . . . imposes a ‘minimum level of professionalism and cooperation,’
to effect the policy favoring settlement of family law litigation—and a reduction of the
attendant costs. [Citations.] Section 271 ‘ “authorizes sanctions to advance the policy of
promoting settlement of litigation and encouraging cooperation of the litigants’ and “does
not require any actual injury.” [Citation.] Litigants who flout that policy by engaging in
conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to imposition of attorney fees and costs
as a section 271 sanction.’ ” (In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p.
1524; see Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152 (Sagonowsky) [the
purpose of section 271 is “ ‘ “ ‘to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation
which will reduce the cost of litigation’ ” ’ ”]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 964, 990, 994 (Falcone & Fyke) [a sanctions award under section 271
need not be limited to the cost to the other side resulting from the bad conduct; it does not
require a correlation between the sanctioned conduct and specific attorney fees]; see id. at
pp. 990-991 [explaining that the sanction “simply authorizes a penalty for obstreperous
conduct”].)
“ ‘The imposition of sanctions under section 271 is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. The trial court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless the
reviewing court, “considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support
and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the
order.” ’ ” (Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152.) “ ‘ “We review any findings
of fact that formed the basis for the award of sanctions under a substantial evidence
standard of review.” ’ ” (Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)

21
C. Analysis
The family court acted well within its discretion in deciding to award Cristian
$1,500 in attorney fees as a sanction against Donald for his failure to produce the life
insurance policy in connection with his motion to modify the stipulated judgment. When
the bench trial was scheduled, the court made clear that it needed more information to
decide the matter, including “ ‘what type of life insurance policy [was] at issue (term or
whole), the cost, if any of the life insurance policy, when it expire[d] or [was] paid in full,
the cost of any continuing premium, and whether there were assets that [Cristian]
forfeited in light of the life insurance provision.’ ” Thereafter, Cristian propounded
discovery to Donald seeking a copy of the life insurance policy. Donald, however, never
produced the policy. At trial, Donald explained that he did not have a copy of the policy
at his home, and he did not ask his insurance agent for a copy.
Donald manifestly failed to establish an abuse of discretion. On this record, we
cannot conclude that no reasonable judge could have made the challenged order. The
family court reasonably concluded that Donald’s act of nondisclosure frustrated the
statutory policy to promote settlement and encourage cooperation among the parties to
reduce the cost of litigation. The record reflects that Donald failed to properly respond to
a valid discovery request seeking production of the life insurance policy. Donald did so
after the family court specifically stated that it needed certain information about the
policy to decide his motion to modify the stipulated judgment. When asked at trial,
Donald conceded that he made no reasonable effort to obtain a copy of the policy. In
refusing to produce the policy, Donald not only misused the discovery process but also
violated the express terms of the stipulated judgment (life insurance provision), which
required that he “cooperate and comply with [Cristian’s] reasonable requests for
confirmation that the policy remains in effect.” In short, Donald has not shown any
abuse of discretion, including the family court’s decision to award Cristian $1,500 in
attorney fees as a sanction against him.

22
We reject Donald’s contention that reversal is required because the family court
did not have the authority to impose sanctions that were not “tethered” to the amount of
attorney fees or costs incurred by Cristian. In making this argument, Donald insists that
the sanctions order was improper because Cristian provided no evidence (e.g., billing
statements, invoices) as to the specific amount of fees she incurred. This argument has
no merit. As we have explained, section 271 “simply authorizes a penalty for
obstreperous conduct.” (Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 990-991.) The
amount of sanctions imposed by the family court need not be limited to the cost to the
other side resulting from the bad conduct. There is no requirement that there be a
correlation between the sanctioned conduct and specific attorney fees. (Id. at pp. 990,
994.) Donald, for his part, has not demonstrated that the family court abused its
discretion in finding that $1,500 in attorney fees was a proper sanction for his failure to
properly respond to discovery.
Equally unavailing is Donald’s contention that an award of sanctions under section
271 was improper because Cristian’s counsel failed to meet and confer regarding “the
alleged discovery abuse.” There is no such requirement in the text of section 271, and
Donald cites no case law holding that sanctions cannot be imposed under section 271 for
misuse of the discovery process unless the party seeking such relief has first met and
conferred regarding the discovery at issue.10 As we have discussed, sanctions are proper
under section 271 when a party engages in conduct that frustrates the policy of promoting
settlement of family law litigation and encouraging cooperation of the litigants.
(Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152.) Under the circumstances presented here,

10 In support of his position, Donald does not cite any authority involving sanctions
under section 271. Instead, he points to several statutory provisions and civil cases
pertaining to discovery sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act. Because Donald fails to
provide any reasoned legal analysis demonstrating that this authority applies to the facts
of this case, no further discussion of it is required.

23
the family court could have reasonably concluded that Donald’s failure to produce the
life insurance policy met that standard.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to modify the stipulated judgment and the related
order denying the motion for reconsideration of that order are affirmed. The order
awarding sanctions under section 271 is also affirmed. Cristian is entitled to recover her
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

/s/
WISEMAN, J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

24

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.